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Section 152 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 mandates that local 
communities receive democratic and accountable governance and they and community 
organisations’ involvement in the matters of local government should be encouraged.  In terms of 
Section 4(2) of the Municipal Systems Act (MSA), 2000, the municipal council is the executive and 
legislative authority of the municipality and must use its resources in the best interests of the local 
community.  The municipal council, as the highest authority in the municipality, has significant 
powers of approval and oversight responsibilities.  As such, the speaker, as the chairperson of the 
municipal council, fulfils a critical oversight role to hold the political executives to account for 
their actions. The mayor (if the municipality has an executive committee) or executive mayor (if 
there is no executive committee) is the political leader who directs the fiscal and financial matters 
of the municipality. Section 56(3)(e) provides that the executive mayor must oversee service 
provision in the municipality and ensure that it is sustainable.  It was highlighted in this study that, 
in terms of Section 59 of the MSA of 2000, it is incumbent on the municipal council to develop a 
system of delegation that maximises the administrative and operational efficiency of the 
municipality. This section also provides for adequate checks and balances and empowers the 
municipal council to delegate certain powers to perform any of the municipality’s duties to any 
other political structure, political office-bearer, councillor, or staff member of the municipality 
and, likewise, to withdraw any delegation or instruction.   In terms of Section 60 of the Municipal 
Financial Management Act (MFMA), 2003, the municipal manager (MM) is the accounting officer 
of the municipality and he/she is accountable for the effective and efficient management of all 
municipal funds received and all payments made by the municipality. The MM, as the accounting 
officer of the municipality, fulfils a key accountability role to promote the sound financial 
management of the municipality.   
 
It is clear that while political office-bearers (mayor or executive mayor, speaker, municipal 
councillors) are responsible for overseeing the financial and administrative performance of the 
municipality, the municipal council holds the accounting officer and relevant municipal officials 
to account for the manner in which they manage the financial and administrative matters or the 
municipality.  Despite numerous legislative prescripts and the establishment of mandated oversight 
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and accountable structures, all the municipalities in the Free State province failed to provide 
accountable local government to their communities.  This was attested by the 2017-2018 Auditor-
General’s audit report that the financial positions of all the municipalities (100%) of the Free State 
province had deteriorated to the extent of total breakdowns in financial controls.  The Auditor- 
General reports for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 warned that the blatant disregard for controls and 
compliance with key legislation have led to deteriorating accountability and leadership failures 
(AGSA, 2018:55; AGSA, 2019:12). The deterioration of all the Free State province municipalities’ 
financial position is proof that citizens failed to hold functionaries to account for poor performance.   
It was argued in this study that the weak control environment in municipalities in the Free State 
province led to a lack of consequences and poor oversight and accountability.  Thus, there is an 
urgent need to ensure that the political oversight structures and MM give effect to the constitutional 
obligations to involve community members and community organisations in the affairs of local 
government. 
 
The aim of the study was to positively contribute to instituted oversight and accountability in 
municipalities in the Free State province by developing a framework for oversight and 
accountability that promotes democratic local governance.  The objective with this proposed 
framework was to provide a holistic and coherent approach by identifying key statutory and 
legislative frameworks, policies, regulations, structures, role players as well as support and 
enforcement structures required to promote political, financial, administrative and social oversight 
and accountability within municipalities of the Free State province.  
 
 Oversight structures must ensure consequences for non-compliance with legislation, policies, 
regulations, serious maladministration in connection with the affairs of municipalities, and other 
transgressions and irregularities. To be effective, enforcement agencies should conduct 
investigations of any reported transgressions and take required disciplinary steps.  The proposed 
framework promotes consequences for non-compliance and non- performance in that mayors, 
accounting officers, chief financial officers (CFOs) and relevant officials in municipalities should 
be accountable for any financial losses incurred by municipalities during their term in office.  As 
indicated in the framework, political office-bearers should give effect to the constitutional mandate 
to promote accountable local government to local communities.     




In addition to the proposed framework for oversight and accountability, this study contained 
specific recommendations to promote effective oversight and accountability. The first was that all 
municipalities in the Free State province should comply with the provisions of the Constitution of 
1996 together and other applicable local government legislative frameworks, policies and supply 
chain management (SCM) regulations, with defaulters held accountable for their actions.  Thus, 
there must be consequences for non-compliance with the afore mentioned.  In addition, municipal 
councillors should adhere to Section 11(a) of the Code of Conduct of Councillors as provided in 
Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000 which stipulates that a councillor may not, unless determined by law 
and mandated by council, interfere in the management or administration of any department of the 
municipal council.  Here also, defaulters should be held to account for their actions.  Moreover, 
municipal councils should adhere to Section 152(1) of the Constitution, 1996 which provides the 
objectives of local government. Furthermore, the oversight roles of the speaker, municipal council, 
mayor or executive mayor and municipal public accounts committee (MPAC) should be 
strengthened in municipalities of the Free State province to hold the executive to account and to 
ensure efficient and effective use of municipal resources. Likewise, the MM, as the accounting 
officer, should personally be held accountable for any loss of allocated funds or assets as a result 
of any deficiency in the administrative or managerial arrangements of the municipality.  
Consequently, failure to execute assigned responsibilities should result in the removal of the MM 
from office.   
 
The Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018, states that if the accounting officer fails to implement 
remedial action, the Auditor-General may issue a certificate of debt in the name of the relevant 
accounting officer.  As a result, it is crucial that internal controls intended to prevent irregularities 
and deviations from the MFMA, 2003, and SCM regulations be strengthened in all municipalities 
of the Free State province. It was therefore recommended that more should be done to empower 
ward committees and strengthen their role to promote participatory governance and accountable 
local governance. Also, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) should 
investigate the possibility to establish an independent local government ombudsperson to address 
the crisis of perennial service delivery protests in municipalities. Although no legislative prescripts 
make provision for a recall procedure, SALGA should investigate the possibility of the 
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implementation of the recall procedure of councillors and mayors as a mechanism to improve 
public accountability in local government.  In this way, delinquent political office-bearers could 
be recalled. Yet another step to ensure sound administrative and financial management within the 
municipality of the Free State province is the filling of key positions, such as senior manager, 
which are increasingly vacant.  Lastly, provincial government should ensure that it supports and 
effectively monitors the performance of all municipalities within the Free State province. 
 
Specific recommendations were made from the empirical study to promote effective oversight and 
accountability in municipalities in the Free State province.  One recommendation was that CoGTA 
should investigate a possible recall procedure.  Concerns included that municipal elections could 
be used to revoke the electoral mandate of an elected official and that voters did not have any direct 
way of holding elected municipal representatives to account during the term for which were 
elected.  This could be addressed by SALGA ensuring that all municipal councillors clearly 
understand their oversight role and the important role of portfolio committees, MPACs, audit 
committees and municipal performance audit committees in promoting oversight and 
accountability in the municipalities. As such, municipal councillors should receive training 
regarding the difference between oversight and political interference in the administration of the 
municipality. Speakers, mayors, executive mayors and municipal councillors should also receive 
training regarding key municipal legislations and SCM regulations to fulfil their oversight role 
effectively and ensuring that the municipal administration implements them.   
 
National and Provincial Treasury should ensure that functionaries unequivocally understand the 
MFMA of 2003.  Mayors should understand their respective oversight roles in municipal financial 
management and administration and MMs ensure that the actions and conduct of administrative 
municipal staff agrees with the Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff Members in Schedule 2 of 
the MSA of 2000.  The 2015-2016 Auditor-General report urged the Free State local government 
political and administrative leadership to take accountability for, and address, control weaknesses 
to improve audit outcomes. It is incumbent on the municipal council and mayor to ensure that the 
MM implements these recommendations as continued inaction weakens oversight and 
accountability of the financial affairs of most municipalities.  Undoubtedly, more should be done 
to educate and inform local communities about the mandate of the local sphere.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Public accountability is increasingly becoming one of the main requirements of good 
governance in all spheres of government.  Ijeoma and Sambumbu (2013:282) maintain that 
effective accountability and oversight improve good corporate governance, the management of 
public finances and service delivery.  According to Normanton (in Thornhill, 2015:79), 
accountability can be traced back to classical Athens where Demosthenes declared that he had 
been subject to “public audit” for his actions and conduct.  Thornhill (2015:79) explains that 
accountability refers to “a statutory obligation to provide independent and impartial observers 
who have the right to report findings at the highest levels of state with any available information 
they may request about financial administration”.  
 
Thus, oversight entails the proactive control mechanisms initiated by the legislature with the 
executive and administrative organs of state to encourage compliance with the statutory and 
legislative frameworks to ensure effective delivery on agreed upon objectives for the 
achievement of government priorities (South African Legislative Sector, 2008:4). This study 
sought to determine how oversight and accountability was applied in order to identify current 
challenges within municipalities in the Free State province. The study further aimed to   develop 
oversight and accountability guidelines for these municipalities to promote good governance 
and effective service delivery. 
 
1.2. ROLE PLAYERS AND COMMITTEES RESPONSIBLE FOR EXERCISING 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT WITHIN 
MUNICIPALITIES 
 
According to Khalo (2013: 583), the role-players and committees below are responsible for 
overseeing municipal officials and their accountability in ensuring that municipalities meet 
their constitutional obligation to provide democratic and accountable government to local 
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1.2.1 Municipal councils 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2011:68) maintain that the municipal council is a municipality’s 
executive and legislative authority that should use the resources of the municipality in the best 
interest of the community.   In terms of section 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (herewith after referred to as the Constitution, 1996), a municipal council must 
conduct its business in an open manner and may close its sittings, or those of its committees, 
only when it is reasonable to do so based on the nature of the business being transacted.  
SALGA (2011:180) declares that municipal councillors have an oversight role that focusses on 
accountability as it requires transparency and consultation.  As such, municipal councillors are 
not only accountable to their party structures but also to the communities they serve. Their role 
is essentially to improve the quality of life for all by overseeing governance and service 
delivery in the local sphere of government (SALGA, 2011:77).  Williams, (2012:6) describes 
this oversight role of councillors as an essential part of any democratic dispensation.  
 
The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) (herewith after referred to  
Municipal Structures Act, 1998) makes provision for the appointment of the speaker as the 
chairperson of the municipal council in Section 36 who is elected amongst the municipal 
councillors of the municipal council.  The speaker fulfils a key oversight role to ensure 
oversight of the political executive authority of a municipality (De Visser in Siddle, 2011:139). 
 
1.2.2 Mayor or executive mayor 
 
According to Khalo (2013:584-585), the mayor or executive mayor of a municipality must in 
accordance of Section 52(a) the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (herewith after 
referred to MFA, 2003) provide general political guidance over the fiscal and financial affairs 
of the municipality and to establish a linkage between the processes required to review the 
Integrated Development Plan and the budget.  Khalo (2013:585) further states that the mayor 
must ensure that within seven months after the end of the financial year an annual audit report 
must be tabled before the municipal council for consideration.  The accounting officer of the 
municipality must then make public the report and invite members of the local community to 
make presentations regarding the municipalities’ annual financial report.     
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1.2.3 Mayoral committees 
 
Thornhill and Cloete (2014:77), state that only certain types of metropolitan, local and district 
councils may have executive mayors.  Therefore, the executive mayor is elected by the council.  
Section 56(2) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 makes provision for the following 
functions of an executive mayor: 
 
• To receive reports from the committees of the council and to forward them with 
recommendations to council except if the executive mayor can dispose of a matter in 
terms of his or her delegated powers; 
• To identify the needs of the municipality; 
• To review and evaluate the needs into priorities; 
• To make recommendations to the municipal council concerning strategies, programmes 
and services, to ensure address the identified priority needs of the community; 
• To bear in mind any national and provincial development plans such as the National 
Developmental Plan of 2030; and 
•  To recommend the most effective way to deliver the identified strategies, programmes 
and services to the benefit of the whole community (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:77-78). 
 
1.2.4 Municipal councillors (proportional representative councillors) and ward 
councillors 
 
Municipal councillors are elected public representatives of their constituents and are mandated 
to make decisions on behalf of their constituencies. There are no specific requirements for a 
person to become a municipal councillor in terms of level of education, experience or skills.   
In terms of the Section 21 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 every citizen who is qualified 
to vote for a particular municipal council has the right to stand as a candidate in an election for 
the council, except a person disqualified in terms of Section 158(1)(9c) of the Constitution of 
1996.  The Local Government: Municipal System Act (Act 32 of 2000) (herewith after referred 
to MSA, 2000) and the MFMA, 2003, emphasise the oversight roles of municipal councillors.    
 
From the above it is clear that municipal councillors are responsible to represent the needs and 
interests of local communities through the making of municipal based policies, but are also 
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involved in the management of municipalities by virtue of their involvement in the allocation 
and management of resources in order to achieve the municipalities policy intentions (Du 
Plessis and Lues, 2011:108).  Furthermore, municipal councillors are also responsible to 
provide effective oversight of municipal executive and council officials and accounting 
officers.  Thus, councillors are not only responsible for political leadership but should have 
certain management skills and competencies to fulfil these functions effectively.   
 
Ward councillors on the other hand are directly elected to represent a specific ward (Joseph, 
2002:20).  In terms of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, only metropolitan municipalities 
and local municipalities may have ward committees.  Section 73(1) and (2) of this Act stipulates 
that a ward committee must consist of the ward councillor representing the ward in the council, 
who must also be the chairperson of the ward committee.    
 
1.3. ROLE PLAYERS RESPONSIBLE TO EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT WITHIN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
1.3.1 Municipal manager 
 
According to Section 60 of the MFMA, 2003, the MM of a municipality is the accounting 
officer of a municipality. Section 62 of the Act further provide that the accounting officer is 
responsible for managing the financial administration of the municipality and must take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that the resources of the municipality are used effectively, efficiently 
and economically and to ensure that the municipality has and maintains effective, and efficient 
and transparent systems. According to Craythorne (2006:193-194), the MM is responsible and 
accountable for the following: 
 
• The development of an economically, effective and efficient and accountable 
administration who are operating in accordance with the municipalities performance 
management system; 
• To implement the municipalities integrated development plan (IDP) as well as 
monitoring the process;  
• Management of the municipalities administration in terms of the MSA, 2000 and other 
legislations; 
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• The management of the provision of services to the local community in a sustainable 
and equitable way; 
• The appointment of staff other than those senior managers accountable to the MM in 
accordance with the Employment Equity Act,1998 (Act 55 of 1998); 
• The management, effective utilisation and training of staff; 
• The maintenance and discipline of staff members; 
• The promotion of sound labour relations. 
 
Based on Section 21(a) of the MSA, 2000, the MM is responsible publicising the oversight 
report adopted by the municipal council regarding the annual report.  
 
1.4 MEASURES AND CONTROL MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPHERE 
 
According to Fourie and Opperman (2011: 501), the MFMA, 2003 provides that the National 
and Provincial Treasury must fulfil their oversight responsibilities over local government 
financial management.  The National Treasury may monitor and assess compliance by 
municipalities with the MFMA, 2003 and any applicable standards, recognised accounting 
practice, uniform expenditure and revenue classification systems.  Whereas, provincial 
Treasuries must fulfil their oversight responsibilities in terms of the MFMA, 2003 to monitor 
compliance with the MFMA, 2003 by municipalities, as well as to monitor the preparation of 
the municipal budgets, submissions of reports and may take any appropriate steps if a 
municipality commits a breach of the MFMA, 2003. 
 
Section 47 of the MSA, 2000 provides that the Member of Executive Council (MEC) for Local 
Government must annually compile and submit to the provincial legislature and the Minister 
of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), and to the national Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) a consolidated report on the performance of all municipalities in a particular 
province.  The Member of Executive Council (MEC) for Local Government must assess all the 
annual financial statements of municipalities within a specific province, the audit reports on 
such statements and any responses by municipalities to such audit reports (Fourie and 
Opperman, 2011:503).  
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According to Kraai, Holtzhausen and Malan (2017:63-64), the municipal council of the 
municipality regulates and delegates functions and powers of oversight to portfolio 
committees, which were outlined below.  
 
1.4.1 Portfolio and Municipal Accounts Committees (MPACs)   
 
Portfolio committees are classified as Section 80 committees and are permanent structures in 
the municipal council. They advise executive committees on policy matters and make 
recommendations to the municipal council. Section 80 committees or portfolio committees 
report to and are therefore accountable to the mayoral committee (Kraai et al., 2017:64).   
According to Kraai et al. (2017:64-65), Section 79 oversight committees such as the municipal 
public accounts committee (MPAC) is one of the key portfolio oversight committee. The 
MPAC committee report to the municipal council. MPACs have the power to request 
departments and members of the executive to account for their actions or inactions.  In terms 
of Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, the MPAC is responsible for overseeing 
the executive functionaries of the municipal council and to promote good governance within 
the municipality.  Khalo (2013:589-560) agrees that the MPAC is used to support and promote 
the municipal councillors oversight function of municipal financial management, to improve 
performance and service delivery, safeguard against corruption, mismanagement of resources 
and abuse of power as well as to improve integrity and confidence in local government. In 
terms of the MFMA, Circular 32, 2006 MPACs must assist the municipal council to hold the 
executive and municipal administration to account, and to ensure effective and efficient 
utilization of municipal resources.  The Auditor-General (AGSA, 2013:95) states that the 
primary functions of the municipal accounts committee include the following: 
 
• Promote good governance, transparency and accountability in the use of the 
municipalities financial resource; 
• To consider and evaluate the contents of the municipalities annual report and to make 
recommendations to the municipal council when adopting on the oversight report and 
annual report; 
• To review information to past recommendations in the municipalities annual report. 
• To examine the municipalities’ financial statements, audit reports and to consider 
improvements based on previous statements and reports. 
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• To evaluate the extent to which the recommendations of the South African Auditor-
General and those of audit committees have been implemented. 
 
Thus, the MPAC as a Section 79 oversight committee is a key oversight committee to assist 
the municipal council to hold the executives and municipal administration to account with the 
aim to promote good governance, effective and efficient use of the municipalities financial and 
administrative resources.  
  
1.4.2 Audit Committee 
 
Another important oversight committee is the Audit committee.  In terms of Section 166 of the 
MFMA, 2003 each municipality must have an audit committee that needs to act as an 
independent advisory body which must  advise the council, the political office-bearers, the 
accounting officer and the management of the municipality on matters relating to internal 
financial control and internal audits, risk management, accounting policies, financial reporting, 
performance management, effective governance, compliance with the MFMA, the annual 
Division of Revenue Act (DoRA) and other legislation. The audit committee should report to 
the municipal council on any issues raised by the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) 
and should carry out any investigation into the financial affairs of the municipality or a 
municipal entity (Fourie and Opperman, 2011:99).     
 
1.5 ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPHERE 
 
Section 16 of the MSA, 2000 requires the municipal council to develop a culture of municipal 
governance that promotes formal representative government with a system of participatory 
government. It requires from municipalities to create conditions for the local community to 
participate in the affairs of the municipality, including in the preparation, implementation and 
review of the municipalities integrated development plan, and the municipality’s performance.  
Section 17 of the MSA, 2000 requires that municipalities have to establish appropriate 
mechanism, processes and procedures to enable the local community to participate in the affairs 
of the municipality.    
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Raga and Taylor (2005:143) aver that the ward committee is a key mechanism with which 
municipalities can communicate with local communities and promote and enhance efficient 
and effective service delivery.  Ward committee’s objectives includes the following; to enhance 
participatory local governance; to assist the ward councillor on matters of the ward; to 
contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of all its residents; to make 
recommendations to the ward councillor or to the other structures of the metropolitan council; 
and to engage residents in matters of local governance. 
 




Van der Waldt, Van Niekerk, Doyle, Knipe and du Toit (2002:264) maintain that traditionally 
the term accountability refers to “being answerable for one’s behaviour or actions” whereas, 
the classical approach which is the dominant approach in the South African public sector 
requires that rules, regulations, orders and instructions be adhered to. Hussein (1999:10-11) 
defines accountability as the obligation to answer for the fulfilment of the assigned and 
accepted duties within the framework of authority and resources provided. Dwivedi and 
Jabbara (in Van der Waldt et al., 2002:267) define public accountability as a process by which 
the public sector fulfils its duties and obligations through which the officials are required to 
account for their actions and omissions. Hussein (1999:10-11) defines accountability as the 
obligation to answer for the fulfilment of the assigned and accepted duties within the 
framework of authority and resources provided.   It can be deduced that accountability occurs 
when political and public officials (functionaries) are answerable and responsible for their 
actions and the fulfilment of their duties within the framework of authority. 
 
1.6.2 Political accountability   
 
Political accountability also known as democratic accountability or democratic responsibility 
involves a responsive relationship between politicians such as municipal councillors and 
officials such as mayors or executive mayors (Hussein, 1999:12). Schedler (in Compte, 
2008:20) avers that political accountability refers to the political accountability of politicians 
to the public for representing them. The author argues that political accountability includes 
representational accountability and financial accountability (Schedler in Compte, 2008:20).  
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Representational accountability concerns municipal councillors as representatives of the party 
to give account to the constituents to whom they are accountable. Financial accountability 
concerns both the municipal councillors as political representatives and officials and it requires 
that all public resources entrusted to the municipality be used for the programmes and projects 
they were intended and that public funds not be diverted for private use. Thornhill (2015:80) 
states that political accountability requires political office-bearers to render account to the 
citizens for the way in which they fulfil their functions and responsibilities assigned to them. 
 
1.6.3 Administrative accountability 
 
According to Botha and Khan in Hussein (1999:42), administrative accountability refers to all 
the control mechanisms created to keep the bureaucracy under surveillance and in check.  
Romzek et al. (in Hussein 1999:410) argues that bureaucratic and professional accountability 
are synthesised into administrative accountability. Whereas, professional accountability entails 
all the internal control of the institution and respect to the discretionary decision-making power 
of the chief financial officer, public officials, accountants while bureaucratic accountability 
focus on power and control of supervisory managers such as heads of departments. Thus, 
administrative accountability refers to all the internal controls mechanisms, the relationships 
among the administrative structures, and appropriate lines of accountability and reporting, 
systems and processes of interaction within a municipality to keep the bureaucracy under 
surveillance and in check. 
 
1.6.4 Financial accountability 
 
Khalo (2013:581) is of the opinion that financial accountability refers to an account how 
municipal funds were used to implement municipal policies as approved by the council.  
Gildenhuys (1997:17) avers that financial accountability involves holding councillors and 
municipal officials responsible for their actions and funds placed under their control.  Sabela 
in Hussein (1999:360) explains that financial accountability in local government requires that 
all public resources entrusted to the municipalities should be judiciously used for the 
programmes and projects they were intended and that all public funds should not be diverted 
for private use. Gildenhuys (1997:26) further avers that councillors as elected political 
representatives are individually and collectively held responsible for the collection, 
safeguarding and the efficient and effective use of public funds.   
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1.6.5 Social accountability 
 
Accountability in general can be defined as giving account to and answerability for one’s 
decisions and actions (Van der Waldt, et al., 2018: 214).  Thornhill (2015:77-78) opines that 
accountability requires that a governing body provide reasons for their actions to the electorate 
and allows for a community to raise an opinion on the body’s governing ability. Compte 
(2008:44) points out that social accountability is an approach that relies on citizen engagement. 
Compte (2008:45) maintains that social accountability refers to citizen participation by 
assessing or generating relevant information and building a credible evidence that will serve to 
hold public officials accountable for their actions.     
 
Raga et al. (2011:154) aver that public accountability can be promoted through citizen 
participation, representativeness, responsibility and transparency. An effective system of 
accountability is critical to ensure that citizens or local communities are assured that resources 
or municipalities are not abused. Therefore, public accountability or social accountability refers 
to citizen or local communities, engagement in the affairs of local government, with the aim to 




According to the South African Legislative Sector (2008:4), oversight entails the proactive 
interaction initiated by a legislature with the executive and administrative organs of state to 
encourage compliance with the constitutional obligations on the Executive and administration 
to ensure effective delivery on agreed objectives for the achievement of government priorities.  
The concept oversight entails the informal and formal, watchful, strategic and structured 
scrutiny exercised by legislatures in respect of the implementation of legislation, the 
application of budgets, and the strict observance of statutes and statutory and legislature 
frameworks (South African Parliament, 2004:3). Kraai et al. (2017: 63) agree that oversight is 
used to define numerous activities executed by legislatures to hold executives to account.  For 
the purpose of this study oversight refers to all the activities of legislature to hold executives 









Kuye, Thornhill and Fourie (2002:2010) see transparency as one of the basic principles of the 
Constitution, 1996 that places the public in a position to contribute to the improvement of 
service delivery by obtaining the correct information to enable them to assess the government’s 
performance.  Transparency and openness are hallmarks of a democratic government and are 
fundamental to the public service transformation process. 
 
1.6.8 Good Governance 
 
Matshabaphala (2014:1009-1010) explains that good governance is democratic, participatory, 
responsive, transparent, equitable and consensus-oriented. Olum (2014:604) concurs and 
argues that good governance is about the inclusion of civil society and the private sector in the 
management of public affairs 
 
1.6.9   Responsibility 
 
Thornhill (2015:78-79) maintains that in the context of the South African public sector 
authority is delegated to public officials to fulfil a specific duty that places a responsibility on 
them that includes aspects such as consent to perform a specific duty or job, obedience to higher 
authority, accountability and liability to be answerable to someone or an authority.  This, public 
officials are responsible for their actions and conduct while performing a specific duty or tasks.       
 
1.7 Previous research/Parallel Studies  
 
Numerous master studies were previously conducted about accountability in South African 
provincial and local governments.  A doctoral study was conducted during 2009 about the 
external control systems in the enhancement of accountability in local government: The case 
of Uganda.  The study investigated the role of two cardinal external control agencies, the Office 
of the Auditor-General and the Inspectorate of government (IG) in the enhancement of 
accountability in Uganda’s local government (LG). The study found that by reforming local 
government requires changes in the approach of individual and organisational culture.   Those 
who inspect, audit and review local governments should be able to recognise the inherent 
system challenges, but also appreciate the challenges and constraints under which the public 
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servants operate. It was argued that improved performance and accountability depend on the 
extent to which people appreciate them as legitimate goals, both within the administration and 
within the external control agency system. 
 
Another doctoral study was conducted about financial control and accountability by local 
authorities in South Africa during 2008. The study found financial control and accountability 
serve as important building blocks for a democratic dispensation relying on effective and 
efficient municipal government and administration.  The study emphasised that there should 
be continuous financial control by guiding and guarding how financial resources are or have 
been spent. This must be reported to the municipal council who in turn must report to the 
inhabitants of the municipality. The study further found that in order to account to the 
inhabitants regarding the functions and activities of municipal officials it is an imperative that 
a municipal council should execute sound control over the activities of its officials.   
Accountability is the responsibility of everyone in a position of authority. It relates to the 
accepted way in which an acquired responsibility is executed. The study further emphasised 
that the effective and efficient enforcement of financial control measures of public 
accountability can ameliorate the occurrence of corruption and financial mismanagement at 
municipalities.  A study was conducted during 2008 till 2011 by the World Bank in partnership 
with the South African National Treasury, Intergovernmental Relations Division about 
Accountability in Public Services in South Africa.  The study examines the accountability 
relationships among citizen-users, policy makers, and service providers. The fundamental 
question posed by the study focussed on whether the organisations in charge of deciding what 
services to deliver and how those services should be delivered are accountable to the citizens 
they are meant to serve. The study also assessed whether the eight Batho Pele principles 
attempts to strengthen accountability between citizens and service provides.    
 
The main finding of the study was that despite the Batho Pele principles and best intentions to 
choose participatory approaches, implementation has sapped power from citizens by 
emphasising delivery through supply-driven sector programs.  This has led to breakdowns in 
citizens’ participation in both the short and long route to accountability and to a government 
unable to respond to citizens, including an inability to provide quantity and quality services as 
demanded by the population. Since 2000, numerous master and doctoral studies were 
conducted in South Africa related to accountability in the South African public sector. 
However, there was no studies conducted pertaining to the development of oversight and 
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accountability guidelines for municipalities in the context of municipalities in the Free State 
province or any other province in South Africa.    
 
1.8 Conceptual framework 
 
According to Badenhorst (2012:21), the conceptual framework provides the key concepts used 
in the research and identifies the relationships between them. It also gives a basic outline of 
data analysis and how to draw conclusions.  This means conceptualising the precise course to 
be followed when pursuing the study. This study sought, firstly, to investigate the specific 
statutory and legislative guidelines, principles and requirements for accountability in 
municipalities; secondly, to determine the current state of accountability in Free State 
municipalities; thirdly, to evaluate the current administrative, financial and social accountable 
structures, internal and external control mechanisms and measures in place in these 
municipalities; and lastly, to determine specific guidelines to strengthen accountability in Free 
State municipalities. The information from the literature and empirical study was used to 
develop oversight and accountability guidelines for municipalities in the Free State province. 
The conceptual framework for this study is illustrated in Figure 1.1 below. 
 














(Source:  Researcher’s own interpretation) 
 
Statutory and regulatory frameworks of oversight and 
accountability in context of local government 
Political and legal oversight and accountability 
Administrative oversight and accountability 
Financial oversight and accountability  
Social oversight and accountability 
Empirical study 
Development of an oversight and accountability framework for 
municipalities of the Free State Province  
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The figure illustrates the various pillars of accountability in local government.  Firstly, the 
statutory and regulatory legislative frameworks guide accountability and oversight within local 
government. Secondly, political officials such as proportional representative councillors, 
mayors or executive mayors must give account to the constituents to whom they are 
accountable. Thirdly, administrative accountability and oversight refers to all the internal 
controls mechanisms, measures, the relationships among structures, the leadership and 
appropriate line of accountability and reporting, systems and processes of interaction within a 
municipality to keep the bureaucracy under surveillance and in check.  Fourthly, financial 
accountability and oversight in local government requires that all public resources entrusted to 
the municipalities should be judiciously used for the programmes and projects they were 
intended and that all public funds should not be diverted for private use.  
 
Financial accountability and oversight refer to all the internal and external control mechanisms, 
measures and systems to promote effective oversight and accountability. Lastly, social 
accountability and oversight refers to public participation mechanisms to hold councillors and 
officials accountable for their actions.   
 
1.9 Theoretical framework, theories and approaches to the study of local government 
affairs  
 
According to Van der Waldt (in Landsberg and Graham 2017:162), a theory refers to a set of 
interrelated concepts, definitions and propositions that present a view of a phenomenon by 
specifying the relationships among variables by explaining, describing and predicting a 
particular phenomenon.  The following theories are some of the descriptive theories to direct 
scientific enquiry into local government, namely; social contract theory; democratic 
participatory theories; efficiency of service theories; state integrationist theories; and 
developmental local government.   
 
• Social contract theory.  The notion of the social contract theory of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s lies in the idea that there is a so called “contract” between political authority 
resides in the municipal council and the citizens.  It entails that political authorities are 
based on consent and voluntary acts of members of society to be subjected to it, in 
exchange for benefits that political authority should bring to society.   It further, means 
that if the political authority does not meet the requirements or obligations of the 
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“contract” it would become illegitimate and citizens have the justification to resist that 
political authority and elect a new political authority to act in their best interest (Van 
der Waldt, in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:162).    
• Democratic-participatory theories.  Theron and Mchunu (2016:17) argues that 
supports of the participatory theories mean that the most important role player in any 
developmental process should be the beneficiaries.  Whereas, Van der Waldt (in 
Landsberg and Graham 2017:162) contend that supporters of the democratic-
participatory theories are of the opinion that local government exist basically to bring 
the people closer to government and to promote democracy and participation at the 
lowest spheres of government.  Thus, from a democratic-participatory viewpoint it is 
critical important to promote responsive, accountable and democratic local governance 
for the communities.   
• Efficiency of service theories.  Supporters of the efficiency of service theories argues 
that the rationale for local government is to provide basic services. The supporters of 
this theory argue that some of the services can only be provided efficiently by local 
government (Van der Waldt in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:162).      
• Developmental local government theory.  The White Paper of Local Government 
(WPLG) (1998:37) mandated the notion of developmental local government.  The 
WPLG (1998:37-38) states that the developmental local government has four 
interrelated characteristics, namely; to maximise social development and economic 
growth; integration and co-ordinating; democratise development and the role of 
leadership and learning.  The notion of developmental local government means that that 
the powers and functions of local government should be exercised in such a manner 
that it maximises the impact on the social and economic development of its 
communities.  The WPLG (1998:39) further requires that municipalities must provide 
a vision and leadership to achieve developmental local government and to involve 
citizens to achieving local development and prosperity.  Effective co-ordination and 
integration can be achieved by involving local communities in the affairs of local 
government such as the Integrated Development Plans (IDP), which can be seen as a 
powerful tool for municipalities to facilitate integrated and co-ordinated delivery within 
their locality (Taaibosch, 2015:38-40). 
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According to Henning et al. (2004:24-25), the theoretical framework assists the researcher to 
position himself/herself in the specific field of study, discipline or subject in which the research 
is conducted. The theoretical framework further supports the researcher in theorising the 
research from which assumptions would be made. These assumptions would then be used for 
the development of guidelines to promote accountability within municipalities within the Free 
State province. This study is grounded in the theory of developmental local government.  Other 
theories that will be used for the purpose of this study include municipal government and 
administration, municipal financial management, public accountability studies, public 
administration and management as it involves the review of past and current oversight and 
accountability practices. 
 
1.10 BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
1.10.1 Background to the problem  
 
Nombembe, reported (in the Free State Times, 23 July 2012:1) that municipalities in the Free 
State performed below the expected standards and that leads to poor service delivery protests 
by various communities.  A report released by the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA 
showed that no municipality in the Free State has received a clean audit report during 2011 and 
2012 financial year (AGSA, 2013:10-11).  The report of the Auditors General for 2013-2013 
(AGSA, 2014:37) states that no municipality in the Free State province received a clean audit 
report during the 2012/2013 financial year.  
 
The report further showed that only four municipalities in the province showed improvements 
in that one municipality moved to an unqualified opinion with findings, while three 
municipalities moved from a disclaimer of opinion to a qualified opinion.  Another concern is 
that the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality audit report was still outstanding with the 
publication of the Auditor-General report for 2012-2013 (AGSA, 2014:28-29).  Three of the 
four district municipalities in the province remained unqualified with findings, while one of 
the district municipalities regressed from an unqualified opinion with findings to a qualified 
opinion.    
 
The Auditor-General further reported further reported that the main root causes of poor audit 
outcomes in local government includes the following: 
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• A slow response of political leadership to embracing their responsibility to guide and 
direct development performance, improving oversight and accountability, 
demonstrating effective leadership, strengthening the municipal public accounts 
committee and reporting mechanism; 
• A lack of consequences for poor performance and transgression of local government 
due to inadequate response to high levels of unauthorised irregular as well as fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure; and 
• Key positions, or key officials lacking appropriate competencies (AGSA, 2014:28-29). 
 
The Auditor-General further states that key role players in municipalities did not provide the 
necessary assurance and did not show any substantial improvements from the previous year, in 
that half of the mayors or executive mayors did not have the impact they should have to 
improve the performance of their municipalities; municipal councils did not provide the 
necessary oversight and monitoring, which includes investigating and acting on poor 
performance and transgressions such as financial misconduct and unauthorised, irregular as 
well as fruitless and wasteful expenditure and the impact of established municipal accounts 
committees is not sufficient to promote transparency, good governance and public 
accountability (AGSA, 2014:29). 
 
1.10.2 The Problem Statement 
 
Based on the above discussion, the problem statement of this study is: Despite many legislative 
prescripts, structures and mechanisms the continued poor audit reports of all municipalities in 
the Free State province is a threat in promoting effective oversight and accountability in 
municipalities.     
 
1.11 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
1.11.1 Research Aim 
 
The main aim of the study was to positively contribute to instituted oversight and accountability 
in municipalities of the Free State province by developing a framework for oversight and 
accountability to promote democratic local governance.      
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1.11.2 Research objectives 
 
Emerging from the above aim the study has the following main and subsidiary objectives: The 
main objective of the study was to develop the proposed oversight and accountability 
framework to promote oversight and accountability within municipalities of the Free State 
province based on literature analysis and an empirical study. The following subsidiary 
objectives were: 
 
• To investigate, through an extensive literature study the statutory and regulatory 
legislative framework, principles and requirements of oversight and accountability in 
the South African public sector with particular reference to local government.  
• To investigate through an extensive literature, study the political, administrative, 
financial and social accountability structures, requirements, principles, internal, and 
external control mechanisms and measures to promote oversight and effective 
accountability within municipalities.      
• To determine the current practices and challenges of oversight and accountability 
(political, administrative, financial and social accountability) in selected municipalities 
of the Free State province. 
• To determine the current challenges pertaining to public participation and social 
accountability in selected municipalities of the Free State province.   
• To make specific recommendations based on research findings with a view to 
improving oversight and accountability in municipalities of the Free State province.      
 
1.12 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The following empirical research questions will attempt to achieve the objectives as stated 
above. The main research question of this study was: What aspects should be taken into account 
based on literature analysis and an empirical study to development the proposed oversight and 
accountability framework to promote oversight and accountability in municipalities in the Free 
State province? 
 
The following subsidiary questions were: 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
19 
 
• What are the principles and requirements of the statutory and regulatory legislative 
framework related to oversight and accountability in the South African public sector 
with particular reference to local government? 
• What structures, principles, requirements, internal and external control mechanisms and 
measures are available based on the extensive literature study to promote oversight and 
effective political, administrative, financial and social accountability within 
municipalities?    
• What are the current challenges of oversight and accountability (political, 
administrative, financial and social accountability) in selected municipalities of the 
Free State province? 
• What are the current challenges pertaining to public participation and social 
accountability in selected municipalities of the Free State province? 
• What specific recommendations based on research findings based on research findings 
could be made with a view to improving oversight and accountability in municipalities 
of the Free State province?   
 
1.13 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
1.13.1 Research philosophy/paradigm 
 
According to Du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis, and Bezuidenhout (2014:23-27), the three most popular 
research paradigms are positivism, post-positivism or interpretivist and pragmatism or mixed 
method paradigms. Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005:6-7) maintain that the positivism 
paradigm (quantitative) implies that research must follow the natural scientific methods when 
collecting and interpret data.  The post-positivism paradigm or interpretivist (qualitative 
research) assumes that there are many ways to acquire knowledge about human behaviour or 
to add meaning to individuals or communities’ experiences besides using scientific methods.  
While pragmatism combines quantitative and qualitative research (Du Plooy-Cilliers et al., 
2014:24-33; Maree, Crewell, Ebershӧhn, Eloff, Ferreira, Ivankova, Jansen, Nieuwenhuis, 
Pietersen and Plano Clark 2017:22-23).  This study was based on a comprehensive descriptive 
study as such a post-positivism (qualitative research) was applied by answering the research 
questions for this study.     
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Bless and Highson-Smith and Sithole (2014:390) state that descriptive research refers to social 
research with the primary aim of describing a particular phenomenon.  Descriptive research 
aims to explain occurrences such as human behaviour in administrative sciences, by indicating 
how the variables relate to one another.  In addition, it aims to clarify how and in what manner 
one variable affects another (Welman, Kruger and Mitchell, 2005:23). The descriptive research 
also assists the researcher to present evidence of interest and significant patterns in existing or 




According to Bless et al.  (2014:391), epistemology refers to the study of different ways in 
which people develop and validate knowledge about themselves and the world.  Mouton 
(2005:138) agrees with this by explaining that epistemology refers to the truth or truthful 
knowledge and how it was acquired.  The term is derived from episteme, which is the Greek 
word for ‘truthful knowledge”.  Mouton, (2005:138) further argues that it is not possible to 
produce scientific results that are infallible and absolutely true for all times and within all 
contexts.  
 
Therefore, researchers have to strive for the most truthful and the most valid results while 
conducting research.  In view of the latter, this study was based on the epistemological 
assumptions about oversight and accountability within municipalities of the Free State 




According to Du Plooy-Celliers, Davis and Bezuidenhout (2014:27-28), ontology is the study 
of being, existence or reality. It includes the assumptions made about certain phenomena.  In 
this study the ontological assumptions refer to the nature of the objective facts regarding 
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1.13.4 Research approach/design  
 
Research design can be seen as a general plan or blueprint on how the researcher goes about 
answering the research questions (Cooper and Schindler, 2003:149).  This study was based on 
a post-positivism or interpretive paradigm that focused on qualitative research.  Mouton 
(2005:161) and Welman et al.  (2005:6-7) contend that qualitative research methods reflect 
certain approaches to knowledge production and include any research that makes use of 
qualitative data.  This was pertinent to this study, which was concerned with data and 
information about oversight and accountability within municipalities in the Free State province.  
Welman et al. (2005:188) are of the opinion that the qualitative approach is fundamentally a 
descriptive form of research. 
 
The following research designs are linked to qualitative research namely; narrative studies; 
phenomenology; grounded theory; ethnography; and case study design (Maree et al. 2017:75-
76; Du Plooy- Cilliers et al. 2014:175-178). According to Zainal (2007:3), there are three types 
of case studies namely exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case studies. This study was 
based on a descriptive case study design to be able to answer the research questions of this 
study.  A case study design recounts a real-life context or situation by describing the specific 
circumstances of a specific occurrence or trend.   A descriptive case study design describes an 
intervention or phenomenon and the real-life context in which it occurred.     
 
A comprehensive descriptive literature study which included relevant statutory and regulatory 
legislative frameworks, journal articles, books, conference papers, internet sources and 
government reports about oversight and accountability of local government was provided in 
Chapter 1 to Chapter 5 of this study.  An empirical study as provided in Chapter 6 of this study 
was conducted by means of a self- administering semi- structured questionnaire and a semi-
structured interview schedule which were used to conduct semi-structured interviews with 




Since the purpose of this study was to develop an oversight and accountability framework for 
municipalities’ in the Free State province the population comprised the Mangaung 
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Metropolitan Municipality, the 4 district municipalities, and the eighteen affiliated local 




Sampling is defined as the process of choosing a small group of respondents from a larger, 
defined target population.  The supposition is that the results discovered about the small group 
will allow the researcher to draw conclusions relating to the larger group (Hair, Bush and 
Ortinau, 2003:3-33).   
 
The researcher made use of non-probability sampling methods namely the purposive or 
judgemental sampling method to select a sample size of nine local municipalities, out of a total 
population of 18 local municipalities of the Free State province.  Other than the nine local 
municipalities, all four district municipalities and the one metropolitan municipality formed 
part of the sampling as indicated below:  
• Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality 
• Xhariep District Municipality 
• Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
• Fezile Dabi District Municipality  
• Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipality 
• Mohokare Local Municipality 
• Kopanong Local Municipality 
• Letsemeng Local municipality 
• Tokologo Local Municipality 
• Tswelopele Local Municipality 
• Nala Local Municipality 
• Moqhaka Local Municipality 
• Ngwathe Local Municipality 
• Metsimaholo Local Municipality 
 
A self-administered semi-structured questionnaire was distributed to elicit information from the 
applicable MMs (MM), Chief Financial Manager (CFO), Mayor or Executive mayor of the 
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above metropolitan municipality, the four district municipalities and nine of the 18 affiliated 
local municipalities in the Free State province.  
 
In addition, the researcher used the convenience sampling method which is also a non- 
probability sampling method to select representatives from the ward committees of two of the 
affiliated local municipalities of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality namely, Tokologo 
Local Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality to conduct the semi-structured 
interviews. Convenience sampling means that elements of the population are selected because 
they are easily and conveniently available (Maree et al. 2017:197).   
 
1.13.7 Research Instruments  
 
According to Saunders et al. (2009:395), the selection of a research instrument depends on the 
purpose of the research. Saunders et al. (2009:395-396) further explains that there are two types 
of questionnaires, namely self-administered questionnaires and interviewer- administered 
questionnaires (Interview schedule). A self-administered questionnaire is a data collection 
strategy in which the respondents read the questions, then choose their preferred answer and 
record it, in the absence of the interviewer. In this study a self-administered semi-structured 
questionnaire was used to collect information the relevant MMs, chief financial officers and 
mayors from the selected municipalities that form part of the sample.  
 
Except for the above a semi-structured interview schedule was used to conduct semi-structured 
interviews with selected ward committee members of the two affiliated local municipalities 
namely, Tokologo Local Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality of the 
Lejweleputswa District Municipality to collect information about community participation 
(social accountability), quality of service delivery and the performance of service delivery of 
these local municipalities.  According to Salkind (2009:144-145), semi-structured interviews 
are more flexible to both the interviewer and the interviewee. This flexibility allows for the 
interviewer to probe for more information to get a better understanding of the information, facts 
and uncertainties, provided by the interviewee. Tsatsire (2008:230) suggests that the following 
be taken into consideration when compiling a questionnaire: 
 
• Confidentiality must be assured; 
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• Preferably a choice of answers should be given on the questionnaire; 
• The layout and appearance of the questionnaire is important, suitable provision and 
adequate space for answers should be made; and  
• The questions must be short, simple and care should be taken that questions/statements 
must not be offensive, and questions or statements should not give cause for emotive 
language; 
 
Both the self-administered semi-structured questionnaire and the semi-structured interview 
schedule consisted of close-ended and open-ended questions/statements.  A five-point Likert 
scale was used with the close-ended questions.  Confidentiality was assured and obtained by 
using a covering letter for both instruments. 
 
1.13.8 Data Collection 
 
Bless et al. (2014:184) maintain that the collection of data can be classified into primary or 
secondary data sources.  Primary sources refer to original report of original work or experiences 
including abstracts, journal articles, scholarly books, while, secondary source refers to 
information which were removed from the original or actual research including papers, 
syntheses of other work in a particular area, textbooks and encyclopaedias.   On the other hand, 
general sources provide an overview about a topic and provides more information where more 
information can be found (Salkind 2018:46).   
 
In this study recent information and literature about oversight and accountability in local sphere 
of government were also collected from both primary and secondary sources. Specific 
information concerning oversight and accountability in the South African public sector and in 
particular local sphere of government was extracted from recent research reports, scholarly 
journals, scholarly textbooks, government reports and documents.  Data were also collected 
from the semi-structured questionnaire and the semi-structured interviews.   Consequently, the 
data obtained from the literature study as well as from the empirical study, contributed to the 
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1.13.9 Data Analysis 
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:148-150), data analysis is a continuous process of 
describing, classifying and interpreting data.  Maree et al. (2017:108-109) agree that data 
analysis is about the systematic analysis of data which is aimed at examining meaningful and 
symbolic content of qualitative data. Henning, van Rensburg and Smit (2004:6-7) maintain that 
the process of data analysis will assist the researcher to answer the research questions, and also 
to achieve the purpose of the research. In the course of organising the data trends, themes and 
or contradictions may emerge.  These patterns will be highlighted for readers to note and for 
the researcher to follow up on (Brassington and Petit, 2013:1-2).   
 
In this study the researcher was be assisted by an experienced statistician to analyse the data of 
the semi-structured questionnaire and the semi-structured interview schedule.  The data 
analysis includes descriptions as well as a summary of the information obtained from the semi-
structured questionnaire and semi-structured interviews.  Simple, graphs, bar charts, tables and 
percentages were used to present data which could be viewed from different perspectives.  In 
doing so, anomalies were identified and pursued.  The Statistical Package for social Sciences 
programme (SPSS) was used to analyse the data. An Excel spreadsheet was used to summarise 
the data created by tables that report how often certain sections of the data appear in the data 
set. Presenting raw data in a table can make even the most comprehensive collection of data 
more readily understandable. The data obtained from the semi-structured interviews was 
categorised into different themes and sub-themes or groups of meaning. The 
questions/statements were grouped into sub-themes to ensure a logical flow of information.  
The data analysis included a description as well as a summary of the information obtained from 
the semi-structured questionnaire and interview schedule.  In this study only descriptive 
statistics were used to analyse the data of the semi-structured questionnaire (qualitative) and in 
particular Section A of the semi-structured interviews.  Bless et al. (2014: 348) confirms that 
descriptive statistics can be used on qualitative data as long as inferential statistical tests were 
not used.  The reason for this is that it is very unlikely that qualitative data meets the 
assumptions demanded by inferential statistics.   
 
In this study the researcher will be assisted by an experienced statistician in qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies. The statistician will assist the researcher to firstly, 
develop the questionnaire and the interview schedule, secondly to provide guidance in 
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collating, interpreting and analysing the results from the data collection instruments. As 
indicated in the sample, the instruments referred to in this study, are the self-administered 
questionnaires and one interview schedule. 
 
1.13.10 Pilot Study 
 
A pilot study will be conducted to assess the research instrument and data feedback.  According 
to Robson (2002:59), a pilot study is a trusted method of establishing “what is happening, to 
seek new insight, to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light, prior to the 
substantive research”.   In this regard, assistance from experts in the field of oversight and 
accountability will be sought to complete the questionnaire and the interview schedule.  The 
expert will be the Director-General of the Free State Provincial Government who is an expert 
of local government, ethics, good governance, oversight and accountability with more than ten 
years’ experience as the Director-General in the Free State Department of Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). Any inconsistencies, ambiguities and 
uncertainties regarding the instruments will be corrected before the actual research is 
conducted.  The purpose of this exercise is to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
questionnaires and the interview schedule.  
 
1.14 THE CASE OF THE FREE STATE DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES  
 
As indicated in Section 1.13.4, a descriptive case study design was followed to achieve the 
objectives of this study, based on a comprehensive descriptive literature study an empirical 
study.  A case study refers to a real-life situation by describing the specific circumstances of a 
specific occurrence or trend.  In the case of this study the Mangaung Metropolitan 
Municipality, the four district municipalities of the Free State province namely, Lejweleputswa 
District Municipality, Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality, Xhariep District 
Municipality and Fezile Dabi District Municipality, the 18 local municipalities who are 
affiliated to each of the four district municipalities form part of the case study.  Figure 1.2 
below illustrates a map of the district municipalities of the Free State province.   
 
 The four district municipalities and the affiliated local municipalities include the following:     
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
27 
 
• Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality:  Affiliated local municipalities are 
Setsoto Local Municipality; Dihlabeng Local Municipality; Phumelela Local 
Municipality; Matsopa Local Municipality; Nketoana Local Municipality; and Maluti-
A-Phofung Local Municipality. 
• Xhariep District Municipality:  Affiliated local municipalities include Letsemeng 
Local Municipality; Kopanong Local Municipality and Mohokare Local Municipality.   
• Fezile Dabi District Municipality:  Affiliated local municipalities are Metsimaholo 
Local Municipality; Moqhaka Local Municipality and Ngwathe Local Municipality.   
• Lejweleputswa District Municipality:  Matjhabeng Local Municipality, Masilonyana 
Local Municipality; Nala Local Municipality, Tokologo Local Municipality and 
Tswelopele Local Municipality.  
 
Figure 1.2 Map of the district and local municipalities of the Free State province  
 
 (Source: Anon, 2019, Available: https: municipalities.co.za, Accessed 31 August 2018). 
 
The Free State province is the third-largest province in the country with the second-smallest 
population density at 2834714 which is only 5.1% of the national population.  It covers an area 
of 129,825 square km and has only one metropolitan municipality, the Mangaung Metropolitan 
Municipality, located in Bloemfontein the capital city of the province and the judicial capital 
of the country.  However, the Free State is the fourth poorest in the country in terms of the 
GDP per capita and the economy is focussed mostly on mining, agriculture and manufacturing 
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(Anon, 2019. Available: https://www.gov.za/aboutgovernment/contact-dictory/fs-
municipalities. Accessed: 31 March 2019; Anon, 2019. Available:  
https//www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-richest-and-porest-province-of-south-africa-html. 
Accessed:  31 March 2019).   
 
The results and findings of the empirical study based on oversight and accountability within 
the municipalities of the Free State province will be discussed in Chapter 6, followed by the 
conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 7 of this study.   
 
1.15   ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
According to Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:102-103), ethical issues in research are universal, 
specific norms, cultures and values which play an important role, must be considered.  Informed 
consent was obtained from the respondents.  The participants participated on a voluntary basis  
 
In this regard, the nature and purpose of the semi-structured interviews and semi-structured 
questionnaire was provided to ensure that the respondents were fully informed of what was 
expected of them and why.  Therefore, the researcher, and the participants were aware and 
observed the following ethical standards: 
• Informed consent: The participants consent to participate in the research was voluntary.   
• Letters of consent:  A letter was sent to the the Member of Executive Council (MEC) 
(Local Government), and the Director General Department of Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA FS) to gain permission to conduct the 
research.  A letter was also sent to the MMs of the selected municipalities and their 
consent for the voluntary completion of questionnaire was sought. It was requested that 
the questionnaire was completed anonymously.  Telephonic permission was granted by 
the MEC for Local Government, Free State province and by the Director General 
Department of CoGTA FS to conduct the research within the selected district 
municipalities of the Free State province.   









There are various external factors that the study may be subjected to, such as the assurance and 
readiness of the participants to take part in the study.  All these factors may have a possible 
influence on this study which is beyond the control of the researcher.   
 
The following were identified as factors that hampered and acted as limitations of the research 
study: 
• General limitations.   Collecting data was very costly as Free State province is vast 
and with poor roads infrastructure. Travelling between municipalities was also time-
consuming. 
• Generalisation of findings.  The findings of the study are restricted to respondents 
based in one particular geographical location, namely the Free State province.  
Therefore, caution should be exercised regarding the generalisation of the findings to 
other provinces or municipalities in the country and beyond.  
• Participants willingness to participate.   There was a sense of fear and mistrust from 
the respondents (municipal officials) as some officials wrongly interpreted academic 
research as some form of investigation. A letter requesting permission to conduct 
academic research was given to officials and the purpose of the study were clearly 
outlined.  Most municipal officials were not co-operative, even though they did not 
openly show it. It took a visit to a municipal council and several telephone calls to get 
a response. 
• Municipal officials’ unavailability and lack of commitment or honesty. Municipal 
officials’ unavailability and their lack of commitment due to fear that they may be 
caught for certain non-compliance issues could also mean that some of the municipal 
officials resolved not to tell the truth.  The latter could have an effect on the 
respondent’s perceptions and the manner in which the municipal officials answer the 
questions in the self-administered structured questionnaire.   
 
1.17 FORMAT OF THE STUDY  
 
The research was structured as follows: 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
30 
 
• Chapter 1:  Introduction and background to the study. The general introduction and 
background of the study was outlined.  This chapter included an overview of 
accountability and oversight, the problem statement, the research question, research 
objectives, methodology, the case study, ethical considerations and limitations of the 
study. 
• Chapter 2: Theoretical overview of the statutory and regulatory legislative 
framework, principles and requirements of oversight and accountability within 
municipalities.  This chapter gave an overview of the statutory and regulatory 
legislative framework, principles and requirements of oversight and accountability 
within municipalities.  It included statutory and regulatory legislative frameworks, 
policies and related regulations, published and unpublished works, scholarly books, 
journal articles, government reports and related documents on the subject matter.  
• Chapter 3: Theoretical overview of legal and political oversight and 
accountability. This chapter provided an overview of the legal and political structures, 
to promote political oversight and effective accountability within municipalities. 
• Chapter 4: Theoretical overview of financial oversight and accountability.  This 
chapter provided an overview of the financial structures that promote political oversight 
and effective accountability within municipalities. 
• Chapter 5:  Theoretical overview of administrative oversight and accountability 
and social accountability.  This chapter provided an overview of the administrative 
and social accountability structures that promote oversight and effective accountability 
within municipalities.    
• Chapter 6: Research design and methodology and findings of results. In this 
chapter the research methodology, the research design, the population, sample data 
collection techniques employed, and the analysis of data were discussed.  The findings 
and results were presented through tables and graphs followed by a statement of the 
findings and the analysis of the data. Major themes and sub-themes were also presented, 
followed by a discussion on the responses and interpretations of the semi-structured 
interview schedule 
• Chapter 7: Conclusion and recommendations.  In this chapter the conclusions were 
drawn and recommendations made. This contained specific recommendations based on 
research findings with a view to improving oversight and accountability in 
municipalities of the Free State province. Recommendations for future research were 
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made and the proposed oversight and accountability framework of municipalities of the 




The aim of the study was to positively contribute to instituted oversight and accountability in 
municipalities of the Free State province by developing a framework for oversight and 
accountability to promote democratic local governance.   The study assessed the statutory and 
regulatory framework and policies concerning, political, financial, administrative and social 
oversight and accountability and how it relates to the promotion of effective oversight and 
accountable local government. Chapter 1 provided background information on the research 
problem, research objectives and questions, the research methodology and research design.  
The next chapter provided the theoretical overview of oversight and accountability in the south 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF OVERSIGHT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR AND 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL BEST PRACTICES AND MODELS OF 
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 




In the South African context, oversight and accountability are constitutionally mandated 
functions of legislatures to scrutinise and oversee executive actions of any organ of state. 
Oversight entails the informal and formal, watchful, strategic and structured scrutiny exercised 
by legislatures, including Parliament, in respect of the implementation of laws, the application 
of the budget, and the strict observance of statutes and the Constitution, 1996. Oversight further 
entails overseeing the effective management of government departments by individual 
members of the relevant executive authority in pursuit of improved service delivery for the 
achievement of a better quality of life for all people (South African Legislative Sector, 2012:8). 
 
In this chapter, the statutory and regulatory legislative frameworks, principles and 
requirements of oversight and accountability within the three spheres was outlined and 
discussed. An emphasis will be on how these statutory legislative frameworks should be 
applied to enhance accountability and oversight within the local government sphere.  Followed 
by an overview of international best practices, models and frameworks of oversight and 
accountability, followed by a discussion of national oversight and accountable models or 
frameworks.  Lastly, the current challenges of oversight and accountability in local government 
were discussed.     
 
2.2 CONCEPTS OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
In Chapter 1 of this study definitions of oversight and accountability were provided.  However, 
in this Chapter the concept of oversight and accountability had been discussed and described 
in more detail.  Mphaisha (2015:88) maintain that the oversight function of the legislature is a 
central tenet of democracy. The legislature as an organ of state must ensures that the executive 
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organ of state is carrying out its mandate by monitoring the implementation of its legislated 
policy and drawing on experiences for future law-making.  Whereas, accountability is designed 
to encourage transparent government. It enhances public confidence in government and 
ensures that the government is responsive to the people it governs. This is achieved through 
the activities of oversight committees which gather and analyse information on the functioning 
of the executive branch. Mphaisha (2015:88) further indicate that the executive branch is 
accountable to the legislature to justify its policies, decisions and actions. Therefore, 
monitoring and evaluating service delivery is the most important part of the activities of 
portfolio and oversight committees.    
 
According to Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:117-118), oversight refers to the proactive 
initiated by the legislature with the executive and administrative organs of state to ensure 
compliance with statutory and regulatory frameworks to ensure delivery on agreed objectives 
and priorities of government.   Oversight is a constitutionally mandated function of legislative 
organs of state to scrutinise and oversee executive action and any organ of state. It follows that 
oversight entails the informal and formal, watchful, strategic and structured scrutiny exercised 
by legislatures in respect of the implementation of legislation, the application of the budget, 
and the strict observance of statutes and relevant statutory and regulatory frameworks (South 
African Legislative Sector, 2012:4-9).   For the purpose of this study the above description of 
oversight was used, namely that oversight as a constitutionally mandated function of legislative 
organs of state to oversee and scrutinise the actions of executive organs and any other organs 
of state.      
 
Munzhedzi (2016) concurs that one of the cornerstones of civilisation is that each public 
functionary (political office-bearer and public officials) are accountable for everything they 
do. Stated differently, functionaries can be called upon to answer for their actions in public. 
The supremacy of the legislatures is one of the guidelines of public administration. This 
requires the legislatures to enforce accountability in the executive institutions and 
functionaries. Mafunisa (2002:192) define accountability as the obligation to answer for the 
fulfilment of assigned duties within the framework of the authority and resources provided. 
Therefore, accountability entails the following; a responsibility conferred, an obligation to 
report back on the discharge of that responsibility, optional monitoring to ensure accountability 
and possible sanctions for non-performance. 
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Gibson and Hoffman (2006:2) aver that over the past two decades, development policies such 
as the National Development Plan, 2030, have changed radically from a narrow focus on 
economic issues to a broader concern and emphasise on political accountability. The new 
approach to development demands that development practitioners, including political and 
public officials have to understand the interface between accountability and development but, 
more importantly, the imperatives of accountability.     
 
In light of the above, Fox (2000:4), emphasises that the concept of accountability and 
democracy is caught in a definitional tension, whether is it a process or an outcome. 
Accountability and democracy do not refer to the same processes and outcomes. Accountability 
forms part of many definitions of political democracy. Such definitions, according to Fox 
(2000:4), implicitly suggest that democratic processes inherently generate accountable 
outcomes.   
 
According to Lindberg (2009:3), the concept of accountability has a long tradition in both 
political science and financial accounting. From political science viewpoint, Lindberg (2009:3) 
points out that John Locke’s theory of the superiority of representational democracy built on 
the notion that accountability can only be achieved when the governed are separated from the 
governors. Lindberg (2009:3) emphasises that when decision-making powers is transferred 
from the public to an organ of state it requires a mechanism that must be in place for holding 
the organ of state to account for the decisions made by public and political officials and if 
needed sanctions should be imposed and the applicable political official should be removed 
from office. 
 
Mavee (2014:209) avers that the concept of democracy has its roots from the combination of 
Greek words “demos” that means “the people” and “kratien” that means “to rule” and “kratos” 
that refers to “power”.  Democracy as a type or form of government that function in accordance 
with the principles of majority rule, sovereignty, political equality and it refers to consultation 
with the people. In terms of Section 1 of the Constitution, 1996, South Africa is a sovereign 
democratic state Swilling (in Mavee 2014:209).  
 
Thornhill (2016:130) warns that democracy alone not succeed unless there are suitable 
mechanisms in place to curb any attempts by political office-bearers to misuse their power. 
Chapter 9 of the Constitution, 1996 provides for specific constitutional mechanism such as 
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Public Protector, the Auditor-General, the South African Human Rights Commission, the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities, the Commission for Gender Equality and the Electoral Commission.   
Mavee (2014:210-212) points out that accountability is one of the most important principles 
of democratic countries, it means that political office-bearers who were elected and appointed 
officials have to be accountable to the people of that country. Good governance is also one of 
the corner stones of democracy. Mavee (2014:212) further points outs that good governance 
refers to aspects such as participatory governance, transparent governance, responsibility and 
accountability. 
 
According to Mafunisa (2002:193), there are five dimensions to the concept of accountability. 
These are dimensions are legal dimensions, that is the rule of law; fiscal dimensions, that is 
the use of public funds; policy and performance dimensions, that is meeting goals, promises 
and expectations. The other dimensions are the democratic dimensions that are amongst other 
things, democratic legitimacy, respecting democratic processes and informing and consulting 
legislatures and the public, and lastly the ethical dimensions, that is behaving in accordance 
with codes of conduct or general moral standards.   Bekker (2009:15) sums it up by pointing 
out that accountability is universally and generally defined as holding responsible elected or 
appointed individuals and organisations charged with public mandate to account for specific 
actions, activities or decisions to the public, from which they derive their authority. 
 
According to Olum (2014:604), accountability is a variable concept denoting a social 
relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct to 
some significant other. Accountability ensures that actions and decisions taken by public 
officials are subject to oversight to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated 
objectives and respond to the community’s needs, thereby contributing to better governance 
and poverty reduction.  Nealer in Van der Waldt (2018:214) aver that accountability means to 
give account and being answerable for one’s decisions and actions.  Gildenhuys (2018:18) 
maintain that the notion of accountability on its own does not imply public accountability.  
Whereas, Mfene (2013:6) states that public accountability is the cornerstone of any democracy. 
In this regard Gildenhuys (2018:18) further argues that that accountability goes hand in hand 
with representative democracy. In this context public accountability implies that those 
responsible should also report not only to immediate higher authority but also to other bodies, 
including the public as the taxpayers for their actions and activities and non-performance.  For 
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the purpose of this study accountability occurs when political and public officials is answerable 
and responsible for their actions and the fulfilment of their duties within the framework of 
authority.   
 
In this study as discussed in Section 1.6 of Chapter 1, a distinction was drawn between political, 
administrative, financial and social accountability. It was mentioned in Section 1.6 of this study 
that political accountability means that political office-bearers must render account to the 
public for the way in which they fulfil their functions and responsibilities assigned to them 
(Thornhill, 2015:80). For the purpose of this study political accountability refers to the 
accountability role of political office-bearers such as municipal councillors, mayors or 
executive mayors to render account to the public for the way in which the municipality fulfil 
their assigned functions as well as to hold public officials to account for the manner in which 
they achieved assigned functions and used public resources entrusted to them. Chapter 3 of this 
study provides a comprehensive discussion about the legislative and political accountability. 
 
Financial accountability in the context of a municipality requires that both political office-
bearers and municipal officials must be held to account for the manner in which public funds 
entrusted to the municipality been used for the programmes and projects they were intended 
and that public funds not be diverted for private use (Compte, 2008:20). Whereas, Gildenhuys 
(2018:26-27) is of the opinion that municipal council(councillors) represented by the elected 
politicians are individually and collectively held responsible for the collection, safeguarding 
and the efficient and effective use of public resources. Gildenhuys (2018:27) further argues 
that the municipal council is responsible for taxing, collection, safe guarding and allocation of 
public resources and the fact that individual members of council are accountable to the 
communities it is clear that there must be financial control over the executive committee of the 
municipality.  Therefore, the executive committee of a municipality must be held to account 
by the municipal council to promote public accountability.  Thus, for the purpose of this study 
financial accountability requires that both the political and municipal officials must be 
accountable on how municipal funds were used to implement municipal policies and to 
achieved assigned duties.  It further means that municipal officials must account to the 
municipal council the way municipal funds were used.  Councillors are individually and 
collective accountable to the community or public for how municipal resources are collected, 
safeguarded and used.   Chapter 4 of this study provided a comprehensive discussion about 
financial oversight and accountability in the context of local government.  
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Administrative accountability as mentioned by Hussein (1999:42) refers to all the control 
mechanisms created to keep the bureaucracy under surveillance and in check.  For the purpose 
of this study administrative accountability as indicated in Section 1.6 of this study refers to all 
the internal control mechanisms, structures, systems and processes within a municipality to 
keep the bureaucracy under surveillance and in check. Chapter 4 of this study provides a 
comprehensive discussion about administrative oversight and accountability in local 
government.     
 
Lastly, social accountability as mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.6 of this study refers to public 
or community participation by assessing or generating relevant information and building a 
credible evidence that will serve to hold both municipal officials and councillors to account for 
their actions.   In Chapter 4 of this study social oversight and accountability was discussed in 
more detail.   
 
2.3 FUNCTIONS OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The function of oversight means to hold the government to account in respect of how the 
taxpayers' money is used. The focus is to detect wasteful and fruitless expenditure, to improve 
the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of government operations.   The function of 
oversight is to discover and avert misuse or uninformed behaviour or illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and public agencies. The focus is the 
protection of the rights and liberties of citizens. The function of oversight is to ensure 
compliance with legislative and regulatory frameworks. This function includes monitoring the 
achievement of goals set by legislation and the government's own programmes and lastly to 
improve the transparency of government operations and to promote public trust in the 
government, which is itself a condition for effective policy delivery (South African Legislative 
Sector, 2012:16). 
 
Reddy, Sing and Moodley (2003:87) argue that accountability is considered as key to every 
political, governmental and administrative system, irrespective of its precise organisational 
structure and its mandate.  Reddy et al. (2003:87) point out that in South Africa, good local 
government is accountable and is answerable to, and recallable by the people. Accountability 
is regarded as one of the constitutional prerequisites for a democratic dispensation as provided 
in the Constitution, 1996. 
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The functions of accountability are to increase the integrity and public trust of public 
governance to safeguard government against aspects such as corruption, nepotism, abuse of 
power and other forms of inappropriate actions. Accountability is an institutional arrangement, 
to promote democratic control and to promote effective performance of all government 
departments with the aim to ensure effective service delivery. Lastly, the function of 
accountability is to promote transparency, responsiveness and answerability, to assure public 
trust and confidence in government and to enable the public to scrutinise and judge the 
performance of the government by ensuring that the government give account in public (South 
African Legislative Sector, 2012:16). 
 
2.4 ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In the South African context, accountability originated in the Constitution, 1996 and is an 
essential requisite for a democratic dispensation. As such public officials have to account to 
political executive office-bearers and political executive office-bearers and political executive 
office-bearers have to account to parliament (Legislature), and provincial legislatures are 
mandated to oversee the activities of the executive and in the context of local government to 
the municipal council (Malapane, 2015:863-864). Accountability implies answerability to 
various levels of control, including the legislature and judiciary. This goes beyond procedural 
compliance to rules and orders as parliamentary oversight and judicial review of actions of the 
executive are indispensable condition of the doctrine of separation of powers.  Parliament 
composed of elected office-bearers who account to the electorate, while the elected office-
bearers in municipalities have to account to the electorate within the municipal area 
(Munzhedzi, 2016:1; Mphaisha, 2015:92).    
 
On the other hand, the president allocates specific responsibilities to ministers. Some of the 
elements of the notion of responsibility are authority and accountability. In a democratic state 
authority is a prerequisite of responsibility as it suggests that ministers are empowered to act 
on behalf of their departments (Mphaisha, 2015:92). Responsibility refers to an assigned duty 
to perform. Responsibility places an obligation on a person assigned with the responsibility to 
fulfil a duty to behave in a such a manner that assumes that the person has the capacity to 
perform the assigned duty while accepting the moral and ethical obligation to give effect to 
the duty (Thornhill, 2015:82-83).  Thus, accountability means that elected office-bearers are 
answerable to the legislature and other bodies for their conduct, while responsibility refers to 
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the assigned duty to perform, while accepting the moral and ethical obligation to give effect 
to the duty.   
 
2.5 STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND POLICY 
GUIDELINES OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The specific statutory and regulatory framework provisions concerning political, financial, 
administrative oversight, accountability and social accountability of local government were 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3 to chapter 5 of this study.    The general statutory and 
regulatory framework and policy guidelines of the three spheres of government were outlined 
below.   The general statutory and regulatory framework and policy guidelines establish a basis 
for accountability and oversight within the three spheres of government. 
 
2.5.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
 
The Constitution, 1996 as the supreme law in South Africa sets out clear directions on ensuring 
accountability and oversight in the three spheres of government. The main legal source of 
accountability and oversight is found in the Constitution, 1996.    
 
According to Cloete (1997:18), Chapter 3, Section 40(1) of the Constitution, 1996 provides 
that government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which 
are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. Section 41(1)(g) outlines that all spheres of 
government and all organs of state within each sphere must exercise their powers and perform 
their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical functional or 
institutional integrity of government in another sphere. 
 
According to Kahn, Madue and Kalema (2016:252), Section 41(1) of the Constitution, 1996 
provides that all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must co-
operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by promoting friendly relations, each 
sphere should assist each other and to consult and inform one another on matters of common 
interest, each sphere of government has to co-ordinate their actions and legislation with one 
another, and each sphere of government has to adhere to agreed procedures and strive to avoid 
legal proceedings against one another. The paragraphs that followe outlined constitutional 
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provisions that refer directly and indirectly to oversight and accountability across the three 
spheres of government in South Africa. 
 
Section 41(2) of the Constitution, 1996 requires that an Act of Parliament must establish or 
provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations and 
must provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to expedite settlement of 
intergovernmental differences. Section 42(3), 1996, specifically sets out that the National 
Assembly is elected to represent and to ensure government by the people. The National 
Assembly is responsible for choosing the President, to provide a national forum for public 
consideration of issues, by passing legislation and scrutinizing and overseeing executive action. 
 
According to Khalo (2013:583), Section 152 of the Constitution, 1996 local government as 
established to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities.  
National Treasury (2005:4), Section 55(2) of the Constitution, 1996 outlines the oversight 
powers of the National Assembly, by requiring that national parliament monitor activities of 
the executive branch to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of 
government are accountable to it; and to maintain oversight of the exercise of national 
executive authority, including the implementation of legislation; and any organ of state. 
 
National Treasury (2005:4) further reiterates that provincial legislatures are provided with 
similar oversight powers as the National Assembly in Section 114(2), but over provincial 
executive organs of state. The National Assembly is also empowered with the power of 
scrutinizing and overseeing executive action by Section 42(3) of the Constitution, 1996.  
Section 56, of the Constitution, 1996 requires that the National Assembly or any of its 
committees may summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, 
or to produce documents; and may require any person to or institution to report to it; or compel, 
in terms of national legislation or the rules and orders, any person or institution to comply with 
a summon or requirement in terms of the above two subsections; and to receive petitions, 
representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions (South African 
Legislative Sector, 2012:9).  
 
The South African Legislative Sector (2012:10) indicates that Section 66(2), of the 
Constitution, 1996 requires that the NCOP may require a cabinet member, a deputy minister 
or an official in the national executive or provincial executive to attend a meeting of the council 
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or a committee of the council. Section 67 provides that no more than ten part-time 
representatives designated by organised local government representing the different categories 
of municipalities may participate in the proceedings of the NCOP when necessary and may not 
vote.  In terms of Section 42(4), of the Constitution, 1996 the NCOP represents the provinces 
to guarantee that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of 
government. It does this by mainly by participating in the national legislative process and by 
providing a national forum for public consideration of issues affecting provinces.  
 
The NCOP as set out in Section 69, of the Constitution, 1996 may also summon any person to 
appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce documents; or to require 
any person or institution to report to it. It may also compel, any person or institution to comply 
with a summon or requirement in terms of the above two subsections; and to receive petitions, 
submissions or representations from any interested persons or institutions. In Section 70(1), 
accountability is further reinforced in that it requires the NCOP to determine and control its 
internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures; and make rules and orders concerning its 
business, to promote representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency 
and public involvement. 
 
Thornhill (2012:277) avers that the supremacy of the legislatures is one of the guidelines of 
public administration. The legislatures are required to enforce accountability on executives and 
its officials with the three spheres of government. Thornhill (2012:277) further states that 
Section 89(1), of the Constitution, 1996, provides for the impeachment and removal of the 
President. It states that the National Assembly, by a resolution adopted with supporting vote of 
at least two thirds of its members, may remove the President from office only on the following 
grounds: a serious violation of the Constitution, 1996; or the law; or serious misconduct; or 
inability to perform the functions of office. Section 89 (2) provides that anyone who has been 
removed from the office of President in terms of Subsection (1) may not receive any benefits 
of that office and may not serve in any public office. 
 
The South African Legislature Sector (2012:11) further stresses that Section 92(2), of the 
Constitution, 1996, requires that members of the cabinet are accountable collectively and 
individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their 
functions in accordance with the code of conduct prescribed for national legislation. While 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
42 
 
Section 93(2), of the Constitution, 1996, requires that deputy ministers are accountable to 
Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions. 
 
The South African Legislative Sector (2012:12) states that Section 100(2), of the Constitution, 
1996, provides that the national executive intervenes in a province by assuming responsibility 
for the relevant obligation which that province cannot or does not fulfill by submitting a written 
notice of the intervention to the NCOP within 14 days after the intervention began; and that the 
intervention must end if the Council disapproves the intervention within 180 days after the 
intervention began or by the end of that period has not approved the intervention; and the 
council must, while the intervention continues, review the intervention regularly and may make 
any appropriate recommendations to the national executive.  
 
According to Fourie and Opperman (2015:557), Section 102(1), of the Constitution, 1996, 
asserts that if the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its members, passes 
a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet (excluding the President), the President must 
reconstitute the cabinet. Section 102(2) states that the National Assembly, by a vote supported 
by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the President, the President 
and the other members of the cabinet and any deputy ministers must resign (South African 
Legislative Sector, 2012:12). 
 
The Constitution, 1996, places significant emphasis on promoting accountability and oversight 
in provincial governments. Firstly, Section 114(2), of the Constitution, 1996, makes provision 
for the mechanisms of a provincial legislature in order to ensure that all provincial executive 
organs of state in the province are accountable to it; and to maintain oversight of regarding the 
exercise of provincial executive authority in a province and oversee that the national legislation 
is implemented. Secondly, Section 125(4), of the Constitution, 1996, requires that any dispute 
concerning the administrative capacity of a province about any of its function must be referred 
to the National Council of Provinces for resolution within 30 days of the date of the referral 
the Council.  Thirdly, Section 127(1), of the Constitution, 1996, points out that the premier of 
a province has the powers and functions entrusted to that office by the Constitution and any 
legislation. Whereas, Section 127(2) of the Constitution, 1996 provides that the premier of a 
province is responsible for assenting to and signing Bills; referring a Bill back to the provincial 
legislature for reconsideration of the Bill’s constitutionality; referring a Bill to the 
Constitutional Court for a decision on the Bill’s constitutionality; (d) summoning the 
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legislature to an extraordinary sitting to conduct special business by appointing commissions 
of inquiry; and calling a referendum in the province in accordance with national legislation.  
Lastly, Section 130(3) of the Constitution, 1996 makes provision for the impeachment and 
removal of the provincial premiers from office by the legislature. Section 132(1) sets out that 
the executive councils of a province must consist of the premier that is also the head of the 
council, and no fewer than five and no more than ten members appointed by the premier from 
among its members of the provincial legislature. Section 132(2) further provides that the 
premier of a province appoints the members of the executive council among the members of 
the provincial legislature and may assigns their powers and functions and may dismiss them.    
 
Another significant provision on ensuring accountability in a province is Section 133(1) that 
requires that members of executive council of a province are accountable and responsible for 
the performance of their functions of the executive assigned to them by the Premier. Section 
133(2) clearly provides that members of the executive council of a province are accountable 
collectively and individually to the legislature for the exercise of their powers and the 
performance of their functions. National Treasury (2005:4) maintains that in order to facilitate 
Parliament’s oversight of the national executive organs of state, Section 92(3)(b) of the 
Constitution of 1996 requires that members of cabinet must provide Parliament with full and 
regular reports concerning matters under their control. The parallel section for the provincial 
sphere of government is Section 133(3)(b) of the Constitution, 1996, which requires that 
members of the executive council of a province must provide the legislature with full and 
regular reports concerning matters under their control. 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2015:557-558) indicate the duty of the provincial government to get 
involved in local governments that are in distress. Section 139(1) of the Constitution, 1996, 
states that when a municipality cannot or does not fulfill an executive obligation in terms of 
the Constitution, 1996 or other applicable legislation, the relevant provincial executive may 
intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfillment of that obligation. It requires 
that the relevant provincial executive must issue directive to the municipal council, describing 
the extent of the failure to fulfill its obligations and stating any steps required to meet its 
obligations (Koma, 2017:27). 
 
Thornhill and Cloete (2014:45-46) further argue that, according to Section 44(2) and Section 
139 of the Constitution, 1996, the aim of the intervention is to maintain essential national 
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standards or meet established minimum standards for the rendering of a service and to prevent 
that municipal council from taking unreasonable action that is prejudicial to the interests of 
another municipality or to the province as a whole; or maintain economic unity; or dissolving 
the municipal council and appointing an administrator until a newly elected municipal council 
has been declared elected, if exceptional circumstances warrant such a step. 
 
Craythorne (2006:36) states that the primary power of intervention, and the corresponding duty 
to do so, rests in the hands of relevant provincial executive. In terms of Section 139(2) of the 
Constitution, 1996 if a provincial executive intervenes in a municipality, it must submit a 
written notice of the intervention to the Cabinet member responsible for local government 
affairs; as well as to the relevant provincial legislature and the NCOP, within 14 days after the 
intervention began. This intervention must end if the cabinet member responsible for local 
government affairs disapproves the intervention within 28 days after the intervention began or 
by the end of that period has not approved the intervention, or the council disapproves the 
intervention within 180 days after the intervention began or by the end of that period has not 
approved the intervention.  
 
According to Fourie and Opperman (2015:557-559), the municipal council must, while the 
intervention continues, review the intervention regularly and may make any appropriate 
recommendations to the provincial executive. Section 139(4), further states that if a 
municipality, as a result of a crisis in its financial affairs, is in serious or persistent material 
breach of its obligations to provide basic services or to meet its financial commitments, or 
admits that it is unable to meet its obligations or financial commitments, the relevant provincial 
executive must enforce a recovery plan with the aim to secure that municipality's ability to 
provide basic services or to fulfill its financial commitments, in accordance with national 
legislation. It also binds the municipality in the exercise of its legislative and executive 
authority, with the aim to solve the crisis in its financial affairs, as well as to dissolve the 
municipal council. This is on condition if the municipality cannot or does not approve 
legislative measures, including a budget or any revenue-raising measures, necessary to give 
effect to the recovery plan. 
 
Nkuna and Sebola (2014:3) emphasise that local government management takes place within 
a policy framework that is regulated by law in South Africa. Section 139(4) of the Constitution, 
1996 provides that the relevant provincial executive has to appoint an administrator until a 
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newly elected municipal council has been declared elected. The relevant provincial executive 
also has to approve a temporary budget or revenue-raising measures or any other measures 
giving effect to the recovery plan to provide for the continued functioning of the municipality. 
If the municipal council is not dissolved the relevant provincial executive assume responsibility 
for the implementation of the recovery plan to the extent that the municipality cannot or does 
not otherwise implement their recovery plan.  The Constitution, 1996, Section 139(6) stresses 
that if a provincial executive intervenes in a municipality in terms of Subsection (4) or (5), it 
must submit a written notice of the intervention to the cabinet member responsible for local 
government affairs, as well as to the relevant provincial legislature and the NCOP, within seven 
days after the intervention began (Legislative Sector, 2012:15).   This, legislation must be in 
line with the provisions of the Constitution, 1996.   
 
According to Van der Waldt (2011:49), Section 151 of the Constitution, 1996 confers a 
municipal council with legislative and executive powers. Fourie and Opperman (2011:33) 
maintain that Section 151(4) of the Constitution, 1996, provides that the national and provincial 
governments may not impede or compromise local governments’ right to perform its functions 
effectively.  Gildenhuys (2018:14) and Van der Walt (in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:58), 
maintain that the Constitution, 1996, provides in Section 152(1) the objects of local government 
is to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; to ensure the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; to promote social and economic 
development and a safe and healthy environment; and local government must also encourage 
the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local 
government.  Except for the above constitutional objects of local government, the Constitution, 
1996 makes provision in Section 195 for the basic values and principles necessary to govern 
public administration which applies to administration in all three spheres of government. 
Gildenhuys (2018:14) points out that Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996, makes provision 
for the following basic democratic values and principles to govern public administration 
namely: 
 
• To promote and maintain a high standard of professional ethics; 
• To promote the efficient, economic and effective use of resource;  
• To ensure that public administration is development-oriented; 
• To ensure that services are provided in an equitable, fair and impartial manner; 
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• To respond to people’s needs and to encourage the public to participate in policy 
making; 
• To ensure that public administration is accountable; and  
• To foster transparency by providing the public with accurate, timeously and assessable 
information. 
 
Thus, in terms of municipal service delivery one could argue that Section 195 of the 
Constitution, 1996, stipulates that public administration of all municipalities should adhere to 
the number of basic principles and values, including that services should be provided 
impartially and equitably and that resources should be utilised in an efficient, economical and 
effective manner. In this regard, municipal councillors of all municipalities must be responsive 
to the needs of the citizens and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy making 
processes of the municipality.  Furthermore, municipal officials must be held to account for 
their actions including the economically, efficient effective use of municipal resources.   
 
In light of the above, there is no doubt that all three spheres of government of which local 
government cannot be excluded must govern public administration in accordance with the 
constitutional basic values and principles as well as to provide democratic and accountable 
government and to involve the local communities and community organisations in the matters 
of local government.   
 
According to Section 153 of the Constitution, 1996, a municipality must structure and manage 
its administration, budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the 
community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community (Van der 
Waldt, 2011:50). Section 154(1) of the Constitution, 1996, provides that the national 
government and provincial governments, by legislative and other measures, must support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers 
and to perform their functions (South African Legislative Sector, 2012:15). 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2011:33) state that Section 154(4) of the Constitution, 1996 compels 
national and provincial government to assign to local government by means of agreement and 
subject to conditions the administration of a matter relates to local government and provided 
in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5. Van der Waldt (2011:51), postulates that the oversight role of 
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provinces is further outlined in Section 155(6) which requires the provincial government to 
monitor and give support to local governments in the province, as well as to promote the 
development of local government capacity in such a way that it will enable all municipalities 
to perform their functions and manage their own affairs in an effective manner. Section 217 of 
the Constitution, 1996 provides that when an organ of state in the three spheres of government, 
contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.   Thus, the Constitution, 1996 clearly 
makes provision for oversight and accountability structures and mechanisms within all three 
spheres of government, to promote democratic and accountable governance.  In particular, in 
terms of Section 152 of the Constitution, 1996 local government is mandated to provide 
democratic and accountable government for local communities   
 
2.5.2 Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1of 1999) 
 
The aim of the Public Financial Management Act (PFMA), 1999 (herewith after referred to 
PFMA, 199) is to modernise the system of financial management in the public sector and the 
key objectives are to enable accountable public management and to eliminate waste and 
corruption. It further aims to ensure all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of those 
governments are managed efficiently and effectively, as well as to provide for the 
responsibilities of persons entrusted with financial management in those governments (Fourie, 
2015:275).   The PFMA, 1999, gives effect to Section 216 of the Constitution, 1996, and is 
applicable to national and provincial spheres and public entities under their ownership and 
control. In addition, the PFMA, 1999, gives effect to financial management reforms that place 
greater implementation responsibility on managers in the public service, and makes them more 
accountable for their performance (Fourie, 2018: 275).  
 
Section 65 of the PFMA, 1999, requires that Ministers or MECs table the annual reports for the 
departments and public entities for which they are responsible by 30 September. It is proposed 
that 30 September be designated the day of delivery.  The latter will enable portfolio and Public 
Accounts Committees to start their oversight processes sooner (National Treasury, 2005:6). 
The PFMA, 1999, provides measurable improvements in financial management in both 
national and provincial spheres of government, which include, requiring national and 
provincial departments to submit monthly expenditure reports on actual expenditure incurred, 
and on projected expenditure for the remainder of the financial year. The aim is to improve risk 
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management and to establish internal-audit functions and audit committees in all national and 
provincial departments and standardising accounting standards set in accordance with best 
accounting practices and tabling. Finally, to submit financial statements to the Auditor-General 
(South Africa Yearbook, 2009:228).    
 
In strengthening oversight and accountability in the public sector, the PFMA, 1999, Section 
36(1), provides that every department and every constitutional institution must have an 
accounting officer. Accounting officers must monitor progress on the department’s operational 
plan which includes the budget. Fourie (2018:288) states that Section 38 of PFMA, 1999 
provides that the accounting officer of national or provincial department, must ensure that 
department, promotes effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk 
management and internal control. The accounting officer must manage a system of internal 
audit under the control and direction of an audit committee, regulating as provided in the 
PFMA, 1999, Sections 76 and 77. The accounting officer must also manage an appropriate 
procurement and provisioning system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective and manage a system that is responsible for all major capital projects. 
 
The PFMA, 1999, makes specifically provision in Section 38 for the promotion of 
accountability and oversight in national and provincial departments. The accounting officer 
must collect all money due to the department or constitutional institution and to prevent 
unauthorised, irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure and losses resulting from 
criminal conduct and has to manage available working capital in an efficient and economical 
manner. He/she is responsible for the management assets as well as to safeguard and maintain 
all the assets. The PFMA, 1999, further requires that the accounting officer has to manage all 
liabilities of the department in an effective manner. 
 
Provision is made in Section 38(1)(g), that the accounting officer of national or provincial 
department has to report immediately in writing on discovery of any unauthorized, irregular or 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure, particulars of the expenditure to the relevant treasury and in 
the case of irregular expenditure involving procurement of goods and services to the relevant 
tender board. 
 
Another significant provision to further strengthen accountability is contained in Section 
38(1)(h), of the PFMA, 1999. It outlines that the accounting officer of national and provincial 
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department, must take effective and appropriate disciplinary steps against any public official 
in the service of the department who contravenes and fails to comply with a provision of the 
Act or a public official who commits an act which undermines the financial management and 
internal control system of the department. The provision of the PFMA, 1999, further requires 
that the accounting officer has to ensure that there is no an unauthorized, irregular or fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure in any national or provincial departments.   Accountability and 
oversight is further reinforced in that Section 38(j), of the PFMA, 1999, emphasises that the 
accounting officer of department, before transferring any funds, other than funds in terms of 
annual Division of Revenue Act or to a constitutional institution, to an entity within or outside 
government, must obtain written assurance from an entity that that entity implements effective, 
efficient and transparent financial management and internal control systems. Section 38(1)(l), 
of the PFMA, 1999 points out that the accounting officer of department, a trading entity or 
constitutional institution, must take into account all financial considerations including issues 
of propriety, regularity and value for money when policy proposals affecting the accounting 
officer’s responsibility are considered, and when necessary, bring those considerations to the 
attention of the responsible executive authority. 
 
Firstly, Section 40(1)(a), of the PFMA, 1999, provides that an accounting officer must keep 
full and proper records of the financial affairs of the department. Secondly, the accounting 
officer of the department must prepare financial statements for each financial year in 
accordance with generally recognised accounting practice. Thirdly, the PFMA, 1999, states 
that an accounting officer of a national or provincial department, or trading entity must submit 
those financial statements after the end of the financial year to the Auditor-General for auditing 
and the relevant treasury. The relevant treasury has to prepare consolidated financial statements 
in terms of Section 8 and 19 of the Act. 
 
Fourthly, the PFMA, 1999, provides in Section 40(1)(d), that an accounting officer must submit 
within five months of the end of a financial year to relevant treasury and also to the executive 
authority of the responsible department or trading entity an annual report on the activities of 
that department including the financial statements of that financial year after those statements 
have been audited, and the specific the Auditor-General’s reports.   Lastly, Section 40(2), the 
PFMA, 1999, further provides that the Auditor-General must audit the financial statements and 
must submit an audit report on those statements to the accounting officer within two months of 
receipt of statements. 
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2.5.3 The Public Audit Act, 2004 (Act 25 of 2004) and Public Audit Amendment, 2018 (Act 
5 of 2018) 
 
Section 2 of the Public Audit Act, 2004 makes provision of the following objectives: 
• To give effect to the constitutional requirements of auditing of institutions and 
accounting entities in the public sector; 
• To makes provision for an oversight mechanism by assisting, protecting and promoting 
the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of the Auditor-General; and  
• To provide advice to the National Assembly (Fourie and Opperman, 2015:13).  
 
The Public Audit Act, 2004, further prescribes the formal control functions of the Auditor-
General.   In terms of Section 3 of the Public Audit Act, the Auditor-General is the supreme 
independent audit institution of the Republic of South Africa subject only to the Constitution, 
1996laws and which is accountable to the National Assembly.  Section 20 of the Public Audit 
Act, 2004 requires that the Auditor-General’s report “must reflect such opinions and statements 
as may be required by any legislation applicable to the auditee which is the subject of the audit.” 
Section 20 of the Public Audit Act further sets out the minimum requirements that should be 
covered in the Auditor-General’s report. 
 
The Public Audit Amendment (Act 5 of 2018) empowers Auditor-General not to just 
recommend remedial action for public financial mismanagement and abuse but to enforce 
them. The Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 Section 3(b) state that the Auditor-General may, 
as prescribed, refer any suspected material irregularity identified during an audit performed 
under this Act to a relevant public body for investigation, and the relevant public body must 
keep the Auditor-General informed of the progress and the final outcome of the investigation. 
Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018, Section 3(1B) further indicates that the Auditor-General 
has the power to (a) take any appropriate remedial action; and (b) issue a certificate of debt, as 
prescribed, where an accounting officer or accounting authority has failed to comply with 
remedial action. 
 
According to Makwetu (2019:5), once a material irregularity has been identified or suspected 
under the Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 the Auditor-General may take the following 
extended actions: 
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• Refer a suspected material irregularity to a public body such as the Public Protector, 
Special Investigating Unit or South African Police Service. The agencies would deal 
with the matter within their own legal mandate and take appropriate action when 
necessary. 
• Make recommendations in the audit report on how material irregularity should be 
addressed, within a stipulated period. If these recommendations have not been 
implemented by the stipulated time, the Auditor-General must take binding remedial 
action; and, if the material irregularity involves a financial loss, issue a directive to the 
accounting officer to quantify and recover the loss from the responsible person. 
• Lastly, if the accounting officer fails to implement the remedial action, the Auditor-
General may issue a certificate of debt in the name of the relevant accounting officer 
(Makwetu, 2019:5). 
 
2.5.4 The White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery, 1997 (Batho 
Pele) 
 
The White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery, 1997 provides eight Batho 
Pele principles, namely consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, redress, 
value for money, openness and transparency.  According to Chetty (2015:44-45), 
municipalities must at all times uphold the eight Batho Pele principles as follows: 
 
• Consultation.   Consultation requires that municipalities should consult and involve the 
communities in the affairs of the municipality such as the quality of services provided, 
the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), budgetary process, open council meetings, 
audit outcomes and relevant matters.      
• Service standards.   Chetty (2015:45) contends that municipal councillors should be 
honest when communicating to communities about the quality of services to be offered 
by the municipality, such honesty will ensure that the public is aware of the service 
standards and level of services to be expected.   
• Access.  The whole community including the indigent or poor communities should have 
access to the services provided. In this regard the municipality should ensure that the 
disabled or people with special needs have physical access to municipal facilities.     
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• Courtesy.  The municipality should ensure that the public are treated with courtesy, 
dignity and consideration including the manner of answering the telephone and 
assisting the public at municipal facilities.   
• Information.  Councillors and municipal officials should ensure that the public have 
access to accurate information about the services and information about other relevant 
municipal matters. 
• Openness and transparency.  Council meetings should be open to the public in particular 
when discussion the budget, audit outcomes and other relevant municipal matters which 
requires openness and transparency.  
• Redress.  Thornhill and Cloete (2014:111) confirm that councillors should 
communicate with communities in a timely manner about any challenges or delays in 
service delivery. 
• Value for money.  Chetty (2015:45) further points out that municipalities should give 
effect to the constitutional requirement to ensure that municipal services are provided 
in an economically, efficient and effective manner.    
 
In light of the above, the Batho Pele principles set out the standards that needs to be observed 
by local government in the view of promoting accountable municipal services. The 
communities must hold the councillors and other political office-bearers to account for the 
quality of services provided.   
 
2.5.5 The White Paper on Local Government, 1998 (WPLG) 
 
The drafting of the WPLG (1998:6) necessitated by the lack of oversight systems and the need 
to have legislative structures and systems in place to hold local government officials to account. 
Craythorne (2006:12) points out that although the WPLG, 1998 process preceded the local 
government legislations.  The WPLG (1998:6) spells out the framework in terms of which the 
local government system will be radically transformed. The WPLG (1998:6) further established 
the basis for a system of local government which is centrally concerned with working with 
local citizens and communities to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve the 
quality of their lives.    
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Van der Waldt (2011:52) articulates that the developmental local government as stated in the 
WPLG, 1998 requires municipalities to become strategic, visionary and ultimately influential 
in the way they operate. In this way, they can impact on the lives of their communities. Siddle 
and Koelble (2012:74) point out that the WPLG, 1998 proposed three inter-related tools to 
assist municipalities to become more developmental, namely, integrated planning and 
budgeting, performance management and working together with local citizens and partners.  
 
Section A of the WPLG, 1998 provides a complete overview of the history of local government 
under apartheid, which points to the origins of many of the problems currently faced by local 
government in South Africa. It highlights the history of community mobilisation and locates 
the current transition process in its broader historical context.   While, Section B, of the WPLG 
(1998:23) discusses four characteristics of developmental local government.  The four 
characteristics of developmental local government requires that  municipal powers and 
functions must be exercise in such a manner that it maximises the impact on social development 
and economic growth; playing an integrating and co-ordinating role to ensure alignment 
between public and private investment within the municipal area; democratising development; 
and building social capital through providing community leadership and vision, and seeking to 
empower marginalized and excluded groups within the community. 
 
Section C, of the WPLG (1998:37-49) provides a preliminary outline of the roles and 
responsibilities of national and provincial government with respect to local government. 
Section D, of the WPLG (1998:50-57), deals with municipal institutional systems. Two types 
of metropolitan government were proposed: Metropolitan government with metropolitan 
substructures, and metropolitan government with ward committees. The WPLG (1998:57-65), 
proposes three forms of category (B) municipality, that is urban municipalities, rural 
municipalities, and amalgamated urban-rural municipalities.  
 
Section E, of the WPLG (1998:66-72) is concerned with municipal political systems and begins 
by highlighting the importance of dynamic local political leadership. It discusses the 
advantages of allowing for the delegation of executive powers by a municipal. Section F, of 
the WPLG (1998:73-83) introduces the issue of municipal administrative systems. It notes that 
the local-level transition process has largely been concerned with the amalgamation of 
previously separated municipalities, and that significant changes to administrative systems 
have not yet taken place. Section G, of the WPLG (1998:84-96) deals with municipal finance. 
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The WPLG, 1998 put’s forward a set of principles to guide the development of a new 
framework for municipal finance, and then elaborates the key aspects of that framework. These 
include local revenue instruments and policies, where it is noted that while existing sources of 
municipal revenue should remain, some regulation of the property taxation system and the 
regional and establishment levies is required. Municipalities are encouraged to develop clear 
tariff policies and credit control mechanisms, to ensure that poor households have access to 
basic services and that services are provided on a sustainable basis.  Finally, Section H, of the 
WPLG, (1998:97) puts forward an approach to municipal transformation. Municipalities are 
encouraged to think critically about how they operate and relate to local communities, and to 
develop their own strategies for meeting local needs and promoting the social and economic 
development of communities in their areas of jurisdiction.   
 
In light of the above, the WPLG, 1998 clearly provides that llocal government as the sphere of 
government closest to the local communities must provide services and infrastructure which 
are so essential to local communities wellbeing, and further provided that local government is 
tasked with the responsibility to ensure that the growth and development of communities takes 
place in a manner that enhances accountability.   
 
2.5.6 Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act 27 of 1998) 
 
According to Nkuna and Sebola (2014:4), the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 
(Act 27 of 1998) (hereafter refer to as the Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998) was enacted by 
Parliament to provide for criteria and procedures for the determination of municipal boundaries 
by an independent authority, and to provide for matters connected thereto. The authority here 
is the Municipal Demarcation Board that is established to, from time to time; determine 
categories and size of municipalities. Such category and size of a municipality will therefore 
have a bearing on the extent to which it manages its finances in the foundries that cover the 
municipal area to a large extent a determinant of spatial planning for such a municipality. 
 
Section 24 of the Demarcation Act, 1998 provide that when the Demarcation Board determines 
a municipal boundary, its objective must be to establish an area that would enable the 
municipality to fulfil its constitutional obligations including namely to; promote a democratic 
and accountable government for the local communities; to deliver services to the communities 
in an equitable and sustainable manner; to promote social and economic development; to 
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promote a safe and healthy environment and to encourage the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in matters of local government; to promote good governance; to 
enable integrated development; and to ensure that municipalities have a tax base as inclusive 
as possible (Taaibosch, 2015:43).     
 
The Demarcation Act, 1998 has led to changes in the size of local government in South Africa. 
During 1995 the number of municipality was reduced from 843 to 293.  In terms of the Act the 
number was further reduced to 284 and later in 2011 to 283 (Thornhill and Cloete, 2015:32). 
The number of municipalities was further reduced in 2016 to 257 municipalities in the country.   
 
2.5.7 The Local Government: Transition Second Amendment Act, 1996 (Act 97 of 1996)  
 
In terms of Section 10 of the Local Government: Transition Second Amendment Act, 1997 
(herewith after referred to as the Transition Second Amendment Act, 1996) each municipality 
should conduct its affairs in an effective, economical, efficient way by addressing the needs of 
the society.  The Act further provides that municipalities have to conduct its financial affairs 
in an accountable and transparent manner by preparing its budget in accordance with the IDP.  
The Transition Second Amendment Act, 1997 further requires that municipalities must structure 
and manage its administration, budgeting and planning processes to deliver services and to 
promote social and economic development to all communities. The Act further provides that 
municipalities must support the implementation of national and provincial development 
programmes.  It is also required from municipalities to manage their financial resources in such 
a way that it strives to meet and sustain developmental objectives, monitor and assess 
performance against its IDP, and to report and receive comments annually from its community.     
 
2.5.8 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998) 
 
The Municipal Structures Act, 1998, guided the rationalisation of municipal administrations. 
The legislation provides provincial MECs with the powers to determine the type of 
municipality that will exist within each demarcated boundary.  
 
Thornhill (2008:499) states that Municipal Structures Act of 1998, provides for the 
establishment of municipalities in accordance with the requirements relating to categories and 
types of municipality. In terms of Chapter 1, of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, there are 
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three types of municipalities. First, Category A municipalities (Metropolitan municipalities): 
they have exclusive legislative and executive authority throughout their area of jurisdiction. 
Secondly, Category B municipalities (local municipalities): they share executive and 
legislative authority with Category C municipalities (district municipalities).  
 
Thornhill (2008:499) further illustrates that the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, makes 
provision for the type of executive available to each category. Although the Municipal council 
possesses both the legislative and the executive authority, executive actions can be performed 
on behalf of council by a collective executive system; a mayoral executive system; a plenary 
executive system; sub council participatory system; and a ward participatory system. Cloete 
and Thornhill (2005:78) point out that Section 2(a), of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, 
provides that an area must have a single Category A municipality if that area can reasonably 
be regarded as an urban area featuring areas of high population density; an intense movement 
of people goods and services; extensive development; and multiple business districts and 
industrial areas. Van der Waldt et al. (2018:8) explain that a Category A municipality refers to 
metropolitan municipalities with exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in 
their areas.     
 
Section 2(b)(c)(d), of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, provides that an area must have a 
single Category A municipality if that area can reasonably be regarded as a conurbation 
featuring a center of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy; that it must have 
a single area for which integrated development planning is desirable; and that it must have 
strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent units.Section 3, of 
the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, entails that an area that does not comply with the criteria 
set out in Section 2 must have municipalities of both Category C and Category B (Van der Walt 
in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:62). 
 
In terms of Section 9 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 a category B municipality can be 
a municipality with a collective executive system; or a municipality with a collective executive 
system combined with a ward participatory system; or a municipality with a mayoral executive 
system; or a municipality with a mayoral executive system combined with a ward participatory 
system; or a municipality with a plenary executive system; or a municipality with a plenary 
executive system combined with a ward participatory system. Section 10, of the Municipal 
Structures Act, 1998, provides that a category C municipality refers to a municipality with a 
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collective executive system; or a municipality with a mayoral executive system; or a 
municipality with a plenary executive system (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:57; Van der Waldt, 
2018:8). 
 
Section 22(1) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, provides that the municipal council of a 
metropolitan or local municipality consists of councillors elected in accordance with Schedule 
l by voters registered on that municipality’s segment of the national common voters roll, to 
proportionally represent the parties that contested the election in that municipality; and by 
voters registered on that municipality’s segment of the national common voters roll in the 
respective wards in that municipality, to directly represent the wards (Van der Walt in Van der 
Waldt et al.,  2018:63-64). 
 
Schedule 1(2) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 further provides that the Demarcation 
Board after consultation with the Electoral Commission, for purposes of an election must 
delimit all metropolitan municipalities and all local municipalities that must have wards, into 
wards. Craythorne (2006:65) points out that the delimitation of wards by the Demarcation 
Board cannot be done until the Demarcation Board knows the total number of councillors will 
be. The reason is that the number of ward councillors in a metropolitan or local council must 
be equal to 50 per cent of the number of councillors determined for the municipality. If the 
number of councillors determined; in terms of Section 20 of the Municipal Structures Act,  
1998; is an uneven number, the fraction must be rounded off upwards. 
 
Van der Waldt et al. (2018:64-65) maintain that the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, provides 
for the delegation of powers and functions by municipal councils to committees. Section 32(1) 
of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, submits that a municipal council must develop a system 
of delegation that will maximise administrative and operational efficiency and provide for 
adequate checks and balances and in accordance with that system may delegate appropriate 
powers, excluding the power to approve its integrated development plan. These powers and 
functions may be delegated to its executive committee, if it has an executive committee; 
executive mayor, if it has an executive mayor; metropolitan sub-councils, if it has such sub-
councils; ward committees if it has ward committees; other committees or elected office-
bearers; and MM or any of its other officials. 
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Section 32(2) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, maintains that a delegation or instruction 
as is normal practice must be in accordance with the Constitution of 1996 and this Act and 
must be in writing; is subject to any limitations, conditions and directions the municipal council 
may impose; may include the power to sub-delegate a delegated power; does not divest the 
council of the responsibility concerning the exercise of the power or the performance of the 
duty; and must be reviewed when a new council is elected or if it is a district council, elected 
and appointed. Section 43(1) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, further provides that if the 
council of a municipality establishes an executive committee, it must elect a number of 
councillors necessary for effective and efficient government, provided that no more than 20 
per cent of the councillors or 10 councillors, whichever is the least are elected. An executive 
committee may not have less than three members.  Section 44(1) of the Municipal Structures 
Act, 1998 further provides that an executive committee is the principal committee of the council 
of a municipality of a type that is entitled to establish an executive committee and the 
committee of a municipal council which receives reports from the other committees of the 
council and which must forward these reports together with its recommendations to the council 
when it cannot dispose of the matter in terms of its delegated powers. 
 
Thornhill and Cloete (2014:73) state that the mayor must not be confused with the executive 
mayor. The mayor is the chairperson of the executive committee. In terms of Section 49(1) 
presides at meetings of the executive committee and performs the duties including any 
ceremonial functions, and exercises the powers delegated to the mayor by the municipal 
councillor the executive committee and the deputy mayor exercises the powers and performs 
the duties of the mayor if the mayor is absent or not available or if the office of the mayor is 
vacant. The mayor may delegate duties to the deputy mayor. 
 
Van der Waldt et al. (2018:66) explain that in terms of Section 55(1) of the Municipal 
Structures Act, 1998, if a municipal council chooses to have an executive mayor, it must elect 
an executive deputy mayor and if the MEC for local government in the province so approves, 
also an executive deputy mayor from among its member sat a meeting held within 14 days of 
the councils election; or if it is a district council, within 14 days after the last of the local 
councils have appointed its representatives to the district council. The executive mayor is 
entitled to receive reports from committees of the municipal council and to forward these 
reports together with a recommendation to the council when the matter cannot be disposed of 
by the executive mayor in terms of the executive mayors delegated powers. 
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Section 56(2) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that the executive mayor must 
identify the needs of the municipality and review and evaluate those needs in order of priority. 
The executive mayor must recommend to the municipal council strategies, programmes and 
services to address priority needs through the integrated development plan, and the estimates 
of revenue and expenditure considering any applicable national and provincial development 
plans. Lastly, the executive mayor must recommend or determine the best way including 
partnership and other approaches to deliver those strategies, programmes and services to the 
maximum benefit of the community (Van der Walt in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:66). 
  
The Municipal Structures Act, 1998 Section 60(1) avers that if a municipal council has more 
than nine members, its executive mayor must appoint a mayoral committee from among the 
councillors to assist the executive mayor; may delegate specific responsibilities to each 
member of the committee; may delegate any of the executive mayor’s powers to the respective 
members; and may dismiss a member of the mayoral committee. According to Kraai et al 
(2017:63-64), in Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 makes provision for the most 
important oversight structure in the municipality namely, Section 79 committees that consist 
of the speaker who is the chairperson of the committee and its members.  Section 79 oversight 
committees have the power to request directorates or departments and members of the mayoral 
committee to account on the outputs and performance of their functions, whereas Section 80 
portfolio committees serve at the sole discretion of the executive mayor.  Sibanda (2017:313) 
agrees that Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 makes provision for the 
establishment of municipal public accounts committees (MPACs) to perform an oversight 
function on behalf of the municipal council.   
 
In light of the above, it is clear that the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 predominantly makes 
provision for the establishment of the different categories of municipalities, the division of 
powers and functions among the categories of municipalities and in particular to regulate the 
internal structures of political office-bearers and senior municipal officials.  According to 
Sibanda, (2017316), the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 in particular makes provision for the 
delegation of functions to committees including the establishment of Section 79 oversight 
committees such as the MPACs.   The role and responsibilities of the mayor or executive 
mayor, the MM and the chief financial officer, as well as Section 79 oversight committees and 
Section 80 portfolio committees, were discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this 
study.    
© Central University of Technology, Free State
60 
 
2.5.9 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (MSA), 2000 (Act 32 of 2000), and 
Amendment Act, 2011 (Act 7 of 2011) 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2011:6) state that the MSA, 2000 sets down the core principles, 
mechanisms and processes that are necessary to enable municipalities to move progressively 
towards the social and economic development of local communities and ensure universal 
access to essential services that are affordable to all. According to Mathane (2013:60-61), the 
Municipal Systems Amendment Act (Act 7 of 2011) (herewith after referred  to as the Systems 
Amendment Act, 2011) strives to professionalize local government by ensuring that senior 
municipal officials have the appropriate qualifications and that there is no conflict of interest 
between political office-bearers and local government administration by barring political 
office-bearers from holding senior positions in municipalities.  In this regard Section 56A (1) 
of the Systems Amendment Act, 2011 provides that a MM or a manager who is directly 
accountable to a MM may not hold any political office in a political part, whether it is in an 
acting, temporary or permanent capacity.  In addition, Section 57A (3) of the Systems 
Amendment Act, 2011 provides that any staff member who was dismissed for any misconduct 
may only be re-employed in any municipality after the prescribed period. Furthermore, 
Mathane (2013:61) avers that the Systems Amendment Act, 2011 provided that any staff 
member dismissed for any type of financial misconduct may not be re-employed in any 
municipality for a period of ten years.     
 
According to Fourie and Opperman (2011:6), Section 3 of the MSA, 2000, provides that 
municipalities must exercise their executive and legislative authority within the constitutional 
system of co-operative government. The MSA of 2000 further requires that the national and 
provincial spheres of government must, in terms of Section 41 of the Constitution, 1996 
exercise their executive and legislative authority in a manner that does not compromise or 
impede on the municipalities’ ability or right to exercise its executive and legislative authority. 
 
Cloete and Thornhill (2005:141) and Fourie and Opperman (2015:6-7) point out that the MSA, 
2000 provides for the rights and duties for municipal councils. Section 4(2) of the MSA, 2000 
relates that the municipal council of the municipality has the duty to exercise the municipality’s 
executive and legislative authority and use their resources of the municipality in the best 
interests of the local community.  As well as to provide municipal service without favour or 
prejudice, and to promote a democratic and accountable local government. The MSA, 2000 in 
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Section 4(2) further encourage municipalities to involve local communities in the affairs of the 
municipality and to ensure that municipal services are provided to the local community in a 
financially and environmentally sustainable manner. 
 
Van der Waldt et al. (2011:59) state that MSA, 2000, could be regarded as the foundation on 
which the implementation of the local government system is built. Section 5(1)(a) of the MSA, 
2000 provides that members of the local community have the right to contribute to the decision-
making processes of the municipality and submit written or oral recommendations, 
representations and complaints to the municipal councillor to another political structure or a 
political office-bearer or the administration of the municipality. While, Section 5(1)(c) of the 
MSA, 2000 indicates that members of the local community have the right to be informed of 
decisions of the municipal council, or another political structure or any political office-bearer 
of the municipality, affecting their rights, property and reasonable expectations. 
 
In addition to the above Section 6(2) of MSA, 2000 emphasises that the administration of a 
municipality must be responsive to the needs of the local community; facilitate a culture of 
public service and accountability amongst officials and councillors and must take measures to 
prevent corruption. It further outlines the establishment of clear relationships and facilitation 
of co-operation and communication between it and the local community. Lastly, it proposes 
giving members of the local community full and accurate information about the level and 
standard of municipal services they are entitled to receive and informing the local community 
how the municipality is managed. 
 
Section 16(1)(a) of the MSA, 2000 outlines that a municipality must develop a culture of 
municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of 
participatory governance, and must for this purpose encourage, and create conditions for, the 
local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality.  In this regard Van der Waldt 
et al. (2018:69), states that performance management is critical to the management of a 
municipality, to ensure that plans are being implemented. Therefore, performance management 
system must be established in line with the priorities, objectives, indicators and targets 
contained in the IDP.  
 
According to Fourie and Opperman (2015:72), a MM must in terms of Section 21a of the MSA, 
2000 must within seven days of the adoption of the oversight report make the oversight report 
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available to the public. In terms of Section 38 of the MSA, 2000, a municipality must administer 
its affairs in an economical, effective, efficient and accountable manner.  While, Section 39 of 
the MSA, 2000, performance management system must measure the performance of the 
municipality.  In terms of Section 11 of the Local Government: Laws Amendment Act, (Act 19 
of 2008) political office-bearer in the context of local government refers to the speaker, 
executive mayor, deputy executive mayor, mayor, deputy mayor or a member of the executive 
committee as provided in the Municipal Structures Act of 1998.  In this regard Kraai et al. 
(2017:64) maintain that Section 53 of the MSA, 2000 defines the specific governance roles and 
areas of accountability of each political structure and political office-bearers. Section 53(5) of 
the MSA, 2000 emphasises that when defining the respective roles and areas of responsibility 
of each political structure and political office-bearer and of the MM, the municipality must 
determine the relationships among those political structures and political office-bearers and the 
MM, and the manner in which they must interact. Appropriate lines of accountability and 
reporting for those political structures and political office-bearers and the MM should be 
outlined.  In this regard Okafor, Matiwane, and Onuigbo (2015:55) argue that the executive 
mayor accounts to the speaker who is obliged to report to the municipal council which is a 
body that holds the executive mayor to account for the execution of council decisions.   
 
Siddle and Koelble (2012:101) state that the MM forms part the administration rather than the 
municipal council. They also point out that the office is a vital one, and together with that of 
the mayor, provides the link between the municipal council and the administration. In addition, 
Section 55(1)(a) of the MSA, 2000 provides that as head of administration the MM of a 
municipality is, subject to the policy directions of the municipal council, responsible and 
accountable to the formation and development of an economical effective, efficient and 
accountable administration. Siddle and Koelble (2012:101) emphasise that the MM; as outlined 
in Section 56 of the MSA, 2000 is appointed by the municipal council, as are the managers 
directly accountable to him or her. A person appointed as a manager in terms of the above 
sentence must have the relevant skills and expertise to perform the duties associated with the 
post in question.  
 
Nealer (in van der Waldt et al. (2011:178) states that a Code of Conduct for councillors was 
established in terms of Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000 and covers aspects such as general conduct 
expected of a councillor, attendance at council meetings, disclosure of interests and the use of 
council property.  Cloete and Thornhill (2005:87) show that the preamble of a Code of Conduct 
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illustrates the role and responsibilities of a councillor. The Code of Conduct states that 
councillors are elected to represent local communities on municipal councils, to ensure that 
municipalities have structured mechanisms of accountability to local communities, and to meet 
the priority needs of communities by providing services equitably, effectively and sustainably 
within the means of the municipality. Councillors must be accountable to local communities 
and report back at least quarterly to constituencies on council matters, including the 
performance of the municipality in terms of established indicators (Taaibosch and Van 
Niekerk, 2017:12-13).  In this regard Raga and Taylor (2005:104-141) maintain that the 
governing function of the councillors cannot be delegated as councillors are separately or 
jointly accountable to the different communities they represent.      
 
Nealer, in Van der Waldt et al.  (2011:178) illustrates that the Code of Conduct for municipal 
employees applies to every appointed staff member and covers aspects such as general conduct 
in the loyal execution of a council’s executive policy. Schedule 1 of the MSA OF 2000, Section 
2, it is points out that a councillor must perform the functions of office in good faith, honestly 
and a transparent manner and at all times act in the best interest of the municipality and in such 
a way that the credibility and integrity of the municipality are not compromised.Schedule 2 of 
the MSA, 2000, Section 2 states that a staff, a member of a municipality must at all times 
perform the functions of office in good faith, diligently, honestly and in a transparent manner; 
act in the best interest of the municipality and in such a way that the credibility and integrity 
of the municipality are not compromised; and act impartially and treat all people, including 
other staff members equally without favour or prejudice.    
 
Considering the discussion above, there is no doubt that the MSA, 2000 can be seen as a very 
important Act that accentuates the importance of a democratic and accountable local 
government.  It was further stresses in the discussion that MSA, 2000 requires that the 
administration of a municipality must be responsive to the needs of the local community and 
that local government must facilitate a culture of public service and accountability amongst 
officials and councillors and further must take measures to prevent corruption.  The MSA, 2000 
further highlighted that that a municipality must develop a culture of municipal governance 
that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance, 
and must for this purpose encourage, and create conditions for, the local community to 
participate in the affairs of the municipality.  In addition, in terms of Section 38 of the MSA, 
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2000, a municipality must administer its affairs in an economical, effective, efficient and 
accountable manner.     
 
2.5.10 Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management 
Regulations of 2001 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2015:115-116) point out that the Local Government: Municipal 
Planning and Performance Management Regulations of 2001 (Hereinafter refer to as MPPMR, 
2001) promulgated under the MSA, 2000 provides that the municipal council of a municipality 
must on an annual basis appoints and budgeted for a performance audit committee.  The 
MPPMR, 2001 further provides that the performance audit committee must consist of at least 
three members, of which the majority of the members may not be involved in the municipality 
in the capacity as a municipal official or as a councillor.  The MPPMR, 2001 provides that the 
performance audit committee must include at least one person who has expertise in 
performance management.  The municipal council must designate a member who is not a 
councillor or an official of the municipality to serves as the chairperson of the performance 
audit committee.  Furthermore, the performance audit committee must meet at least twice a 
year, however, special meetings may be called by any member of the committee (Fourie and 
Opperman, 2015:115-116).    
 
In terms of Regulations 14(4) of the MPPMR, 2001 the performance audit committee must 
review the quarterly reports submitted to it.  The performance audit committee must review the 
municipalities performance system with a focus on economy efficiency, efficacy and impact 
and the committee must make recommendations to the municipal council in this regard.  The 
performance audit committee must have access to any municipal records containing 
information required from the committee to perform its functions.  This committee also may 
communicate directly with the municipal council, internal and external auditors and MM and 
may request any person to attend any of its meetings to provide information as requested by 
the committee.  The performance audit committee further may investigate any matter as deem 
necessary to perform the functions and to exercise its powers.    
 
A municipal council may in terms of Regulation 14(2(h) may instead of appointing its own 
performance audit committee make use of the relevant district municipalities performance audit 
committee.  Fourie and Opperman (2015:116) further point out the performance audit 
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committee which is combined into one committee as required in Section 166 of the MFMA,  
2003 to ensure and promote effective management, oversight and reporting.   Thus, the 
performance audit committee as provided in the MPPMR, 2001 fulfils an important oversight 
function to promote effective management, oversight and reporting.     
 
2.5.11 Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers 
and Managers Directly Accountable to the Municipal Manager of 2006 
 
The MSA OF 2000 provides for the employment of MMs and managers accountable to the 
MM to be on contractual basis. The Local Government Municipal Performance Regulations 
for MMs and Managers Directly Accountable to the MM of 2006 regulate for such appointment 
to assist municipalities in giving effect to the provisions of the MSA, 2000 (Nkuna and Sebola, 
2014:6). 
 
2.5.12 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management (MFMA), 2003 (Act 56 of 2003) 
 
Siddle and Koelble (2012:109) write that the MFMA, 2003 was enacted in response to the fiscal 
crisis that had gripped local government almost continuously under the new dispensation. It 
imposes tighter central control over the administration of municipal finances. Every aspect of 
financial management; from the operation of bank accounts and preparation of budgets, 
incurring of debt, general financial management and supply chain management; is closely 
regulated by MFMA, 2003.  In this regard Van der Waldt et al. (2018:70) state that the vision 
of the MFMA, 2003 is to modernise budget and financial management practices in 
municipalities with the aim to maximise the capacity of municipalities to deliver services to all 
their residents, customers and users. It also gives effect to the principle of transparency.   
 
According to Craythorne (2006:249), Section 2 of the MFMA, 2003, state that the object of the 
Act is also to secure sound and sustainable management of the fiscal and financial affairs of 
municipalities and municipal entities by establishing norms, standards and other requirements. 
This is done to ensure transparency, accountability and appropriate lines of responsibility in 
the fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities; to manage their 
revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities and the handling of their financial dealings; to do 
budgetary and financial planning processes and the co-ordination of those processes with the 
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processes of organs of state in other spheres of government and to handle financial problems 
in municipalities.  
 
According to Kraai et al.  (2017:63), Section 23 of the MFMA, 2003 requires municipalities to 
prepare and adopt annual reports to encourage accountability to the communities for services 
rendered during the year by the municipality.  The MFMA, 2003, clearly outlines the oversight 
and accountable duties and responsibilities of the political officials, councillors and municipal 
officials. The particular oversight and accountable responsibilities in terms of the MFMA, 2003 
of the political officials, councillors and municipal officials were discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
study.   
 
Thornhill and Cloete (2014:113) state that the MM is the accounting officer of the municipality 
in terms of Section 60 the MFMA OF 2003. This implies that the accounting officer is 
personally responsible for the effectiveness of the municipal administration. If financial losses 
occur due to a weakness in the administration, the loss could be recovered from the MM as the 
accounting officer of the municipality.  
 
According to Thornhill and Cloete (2014:113), Section 52 of the MFMA, 2003, makes 
provision for the role of a mayor or executive mayor in municipal financial matters by 
providing general political guidance over the fiscal and financial affairs of the municipality; 
monitoring and overseeing the exercise of the responsibilities assigned to the accounting officer 
and the chief financial officer, but may not interfere in the exercise of these responsibilities.  In 
this regard Okafor (2015:55) avers that the roles and responsibilities of the municipal council 
should always be carried out with a clear distinction between oversight and interference in the 
administration as defined in Section 52 and Section 103 of the MFMA, 2003, as well as the 
Code of Conduct for Councillors, which is defined in Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000.  In addition, 
the MFMA, Circular 32 of 15 March 2005 provides guidance concerning the oversight process 
that the municipal council must follow when considering the annual report and producing the 
oversight report of the municipality. 
 
Section 21(1), of the MFMA, 2003, provides that the mayor of a municipality must co-ordinate 
the processes for preparing the annual budget and for reviewing the municipality's integrated 
development plan and budget-related policies to ensure that the tabled budget and any revision 
of the integrated development plan and budget-related policies are mutually consistent and 
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credible. The MFMA, 2003, in Section 22(a), indicates that immediately after an annual budget 
is tabled in a municipal council the accounting officer of the municipality must make public 
the annual budget and invite the local community to submit representations in connection with 
the budget.  Craythorne (2006:270) points out that if the municipality faces financial problems, 
the mayor/executive mayor must promptly respond and initiate remedial or corrective 
measures. The MFMA, 2003, Section 27(1), also points out that the mayor of a municipality 
must, upon becoming aware of any impending non-compliance by the municipality of any 
provisions of this Act or any other legislation pertaining to the tabling or approval of an annual 
budget or compulsory consultation processes, inform the MEC for finance in the province, in 
writing, of such impending non-compliance. 
 
Section 5 of the MFMA, 2003, outlines that the accounting officer of a municipality must 
submit to the National Treasury the relevant Provincial Treasury and the Auditor-General, in 
writing, the name of the bank where the primary bank account of the municipality is held, and 
the type and number of the account. If a municipality wants to change its primary bank account, 
it may do so only after the accounting officer has informed the National Treasury and the 
Auditor-General, in writing, at least 30 days before effecting the change. The MFMA, 2003, 
Section 10(1), points out that the accounting officer of a municipality must administer the entire 
municipality's bank accounts; is accountable to the municipal council for the municipality's 
bank accounts and must enforce compliance with the Act. The MFMA, 2003, Section 11(1), 
stresses that only the accounting officer or the chief financial officer (CFO) of a municipality 
or any other senior financial official of the municipality acting on the written authority of the 
accounting officer may withdraw money or authorize the withdrawal of money from any of the 
municipality's bank accounts, and may do so only to defray expenditure appropriated in terms 
of an approved budget.  
 
Van der Waldt et al. (2018:71) states that the MFMA, 2003, differentiates between the role of 
executive councillors and officials. The executive mayor or executive committee is responsible 
for policy and outcomes, while the MM and senior managers are responsible for 
implementation and outputs. The executive mayor or executive committee must oversee the 
performance of the officials in relation to the budget and service delivery implementation plan 
and monitor performance through monthly progress reports. Thus, the MFMA, 2003, clearly 
outlines duties and responsibilities of municipal officials and councillors. Furthermore, the 
MFMA, 2003, makes provision for the oversight role of a mayor or executive mayor in 
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municipal financial matters.  It was also emphasised that the MFMA, 2003 provides that the 
municipal management as the accounting officer of the municipality is not only accountable to 
the municipal council for financial matters but that the MM is personally responsible for the 
effectiveness of the municipal administration. It means that if financial losses occur due to a 
weakness in the municipal administration, the loss could be recovered from the MM as the 
accounting officer of the municipality.  
 
In terms of Section 81 of the MFMA, 2003, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is the head and 
in charge of the Budget and Treasury Office (BTO) of the municipality. The CFO is responsible 
for advising the municipal manager concerning the assigned powers and duties; assisting the 
municipal manager concerning the administration of the municipality’s bank accounts; 
assisting the municipal manager with the preparation and implementation of the municipality’s 
budget; and providing advice to senior managers and other senior officials in the exercise of 
powers and duties assigned to them in terms of the Act or delegated to them by the municipal 
manager.  
 
According to Sibanda (2017:313), Section 165 of the MFMA, 2003 compels municipalities to 
establish internal audit units to exercise effective financial control.  In terms of Section 166 of 
the MFMA, 2003, each municipality and municipal entity is required to establish an audit 
committee as a committee of the municipal council. MPACs, established in terms of Section 
79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, must perform an oversight function, which includes 
financial oversight, on behalf on the municipal council. The roles and responsibilities of the 
mayor or executive mayor, MM, CFO, and audit committees, were discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this study.    
 
2.5.13 Local Government: Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act, 2007 (Act 12 of 
2007) 
 
According to Siddle and Koelble (2012:84), the Local Government: Municipal Fiscal Powers 
and Functions Act (herewith after referred to the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act, 
2007) is intended to give effect to the provisions of Section 229 of the Constitution, 1996 which 
permits the imposition by municipalities of surcharges on fees and, if authorised by national 
legislation.  The Act also provides for the authorisation of taxes, levies and duties that 
municipalities may impose under Section 229(l)(b) of the Constitution, 1996 (Nkuna and 
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Sebola, 2014:6).   Siddle and Koelble (2012:163) note that to date, no additional tax has been 
authorised under this Act. 
 
2.5.14 Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004 (Act 6 of 2004) 
 
The Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act, (Act 6 of 2004) (herewith after referred 
to as the Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004 was enacted to regulate the power of 
municipalities to impose rates on property for revenue generation. Certain properties that are 
for national interest are excluded. In implementing the provisions of the Act, municipalities are 
required to be transparent and apply a fair system of exemptions as well as reductions and 
rebates through their rating policies. The Act further makes provision for objections and 
appeals process whereby property owners may make submissions (Nuka and Sebola, 2014:6; 
Fourie and Opperman, 2015:12). 
 
Khalo (2011:193) outlines that the Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004, provides for 
municipalities to levy a rate on all properties in their areas. It sets out specific categories of 
property and allows for different rates to be levied on different properties. The minister of 
finance may issue guidelines to assist municipalities in the exercise of their power to levy.  
Siddle and Koelble (2012:83) indicate that income derived from property rates is a critical 
source of revenue for municipalities to achieve their constitutional objectives. The Act insists 
that it is essential that municipalities exercise their power to impose rates within a statutory 
framework that enhances certainty, simplicity and uniformity. 
 
2.5.15 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 (Act 97 of 1997) 
 
Nkuna and Sebola (2014:5) indicate that the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 
seeks to promote co-operation between the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government on fiscal, budgetary and financial matters through prescribing a process for 
determining equitable sharing and allocation of revenue raised nationally. The 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 makes provision for the establishment of the 
Local Government Budget Forum to consult on any fiscal, budgetary and financial matters 
which affects local government.  The Act also makes provision for the Local Government 
Budget Forum to consult on any proposed legislation or policy which has a financial 
implication for local government or any matter concerning the monitoring of finances of local 
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government (Khalo in van der Waldt et al. 2018:227; Thornhill and Cloete, 2017:86; Fourie 
and Opperman, 2015:16-17).   
 
Local government has a share in the revenue raised nationally and it is through this legislation 
that co-operation among the spheres of government is regulated in respect of sharing such 
revenue.  In this regard, Section 8 of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997, 
provides for the process of sharing nationally raised revenue among the national, provincial 
and local spheres of government. In terms of Section 214(1)(a) of the Constitution, 1996 makes 
provision for the division of the provincial share among the provinces.  While, Section 
214(1)(b) makes provision for any allocation of national raised revenue to the provincial 
governments.  While, Section 214(1)(c) of the Constitution, 1996 makes provision for the 
allocation of nationally raised revenue to local government. 
   
2.5.16   Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act , 2005 (Act 13 of 2005) 
 
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 (herewith after referred to as IRFA, 
2005) give effect to the constitutional obligation of co-operative governance. Taaibosch 
(2015:47) explains that the primary objective of co-operative government is to promote 
effective and efficient co-operation between the three spheres of government.  Taaibosch 
(2015:47) further avers that co-operative governance requires that the three spheres of 
government co-ordinate and consult with each other concerning strategic planning processes, 
promote and facilitate co-operative decision making and ensure that policies and activities 
across all spheres encourage service delivery and meet the needs of citizens in an effective 
manner. 
 
Section 4 of the IRFA, 2005 provides within the principle of co-operative government a 
framework for the three spheres of government, and all organs of state within those 
governments, to facilitate co-ordination in the implementation of policy and legislation. 
Section 6(1) of the IRFA, 2005 indicates that the President’s Co-ordinating Council was 
established consisting of the President and the Deputy President; the Minister in the Presidency; 
the Minister; the Cabinet member responsible for finance; the Cabinet member responsible for 
the public service; the Premiers of the nine provinces; and a municipal councillor designated 
by the national organisation representing organised local government. The President is the 
chairperson of the Council.   
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Section 7 of the IRFA, 2005 outlines that the President’s Co-ordinating Council is a 
consultative forum for the President to raise matters of national interest with provincial 
governments and organised local government. It is also a forum to hear their views on those 
matters and to consult provincial governments and organised local government on the 
implementation of national policy and legislation in provinces and municipalities.  
 
According to Thornhill and Cloete (2014:49), Section 16 of the IRFA, 2005 provides that a 
Premier’s Intergovernmental Forum was initiated to promote and facilitate intergovernmental 
relations between the province and local governments in the province.  Section 17, of the IRFA, 
2005, outlines that a Premier’s Intergovernmental Forum consists of the Premier of the 
province; the member of the Executive Council of the province who is responsible for local 
government in the province; any other members of the executive council designated by the 
premier; the mayors of district and metropolitan municipalities in the province; the 
administrator of any of those municipalities if the municipality is subject to an intervention in 
terms of Section 139 of the Constitution; and a municipal councillor designated by organised 
local government in the province. The Premier is the chairperson of the forum. 
 
Section 18 of the IRFA, 2005, provides that the Premier’s Intergovernmental Forum is a 
consultative forum for the Premier of a province and local governments in the province to 
discuss and consult on matters of mutual interest, including the implementation in the province 
of national policy and legislation affecting local government interests; matters arising in the 
President’s Co-ordinating Council and other national intergovernmental forums affecting local 
government interests in the province. 
 
The IRFA, 2005, Section 24 informs that there is a District Intergovernmental Forum to 
promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations between the district municipality and the 
local municipalities in the district. Section 25(1) of the IRFA, 2005, outlines that a district 
intergovernmental forum consists of the mayor of the district municipality; the mayors of the 
local municipalities in the district or, if a local municipality does not have a mayor, a councillor 
designated by the municipality; and the administrator of any of those municipalities if the 
municipality is subject to an intervention in terms of Section 139 of the Constitution, 1996.  
The IRFA, 2005, Section 26 (1) states that the role of a district intergovernmental forum is to 
serve as a consultative forum for the district municipality and the local municipalities in the 
district to discuss and consult each other on matters of mutual interest. Matters of shared 
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interest include draft national and provincial policy and legislation relating to matters affecting 
local government interests in the district (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:50). 
 
2.5.17 National Treasury MFMA, 2003 Circular 32, 2006 and guidelines for establishment 
of Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) of 2012 
 
National Treasury, MFMA, 2003 Circular 32, 2006 and the Guidelines for Establishment of 
MPACs, prepared by the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(CoGTA) and South African Local Government Association (SALGA) provides guidelines 
concerning the establishment, composition, roles, functions and duties of Municipal Public 
Accounts Committees (MPACs).  According to Khalo (2013:589), in the past municipalities 
did not fall within the remit of the Public Accounts Committees and at some point parliament 
used to refer audit reports of municipalities to a separate committee such as the Portfolio 
Committee on Provincial and Local Government Affairs (currently known as Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs). This meant that SCOPA did not, in the past, exercise 
financial oversight on municipalities in South Africa and further implication was that the void 
created by an absence of an oversight mechanism in this sphere of government accounted for 
the concomitant and sporadic mismanagement of funds, corruption and other unethical 
practices, hence the need to establish MPACs to ensure accountability. Khalo (2013:589) 
further indicates that the key functions of accountability and oversight in municipal financial 
management is to improve performance and service delivery, safeguard against corruption, 
mismanagement of resources and abuse of power, as well as improve integrity and confidence 
in local government. The committee system as provided in Section 79 of the Municipal 
Structures Act, 2003 is used to support and enhance council oversight function and MPACs 
performs the council’s oversight role over municipal finances.  For the purpose of this study 
the functions of the MPAC was discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this study.   
 
2.5.18   National Treasury, MFMA, 2003 Municipal Supply Chain Management (MSC) 
Regulations (27636 of 2005) and National Treasury, Guide for Accounting Officers of 
Municipalities and Municipal Entities, 2005 
  
National Treasury published the Municipal Supply Chain Management (SCM) Regulations 
(27636 of 2005) in terms of the MFMA, 2003. The Municipal SCM Regulations, 2005 outlines 
the responsibilities, powers of certain officials of the municipality at the discretion of the 
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municipal manager.   In terms of the Chapter 1 of the National Treasury, Guide for Accounting 
Officers of Municipalities and Municipal Entities, 2005) every municipality and municipal 
entity must adopt and implement a Supply Chain Management (SCM) policy, which gives 
effect to Section 217 of the Constitution, 1996. This means that the MM needs to ensure that 
the SCM policy in place is implemented in a manner that is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost effective and bidders should be treated fairly, without bias, favouritism.  
Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for SCM Practitioners as contained in the National Treasury, 
Guide for Accounting Officers of Municipalities and Municipal Entities, 2005 requires SCM 
officials to act in the public interest and not perform their duties to gain any unlawful form of 
compensation, payment or gratuities from any person, or supplier for themselves, their family 
or their friends.  The Code of Conduct for SCM Practitioners further requires that municipal 
officials responsible for SCM should ensure that they perform their duties effectively, 
effectively and with integrity, in accordance with the relevant legislation and regulations and 
ensure that public resources are administered responsibly.   Section 3 of the Code of Conduct 
requires from SCM practitioners to be accountable for their decisions and actions to the public, 
as well as to use public property scrupulously.   Only accounting officers or their delegates 
have the authority to commit the government to any transaction for the procurement of good 
and services. All transactions conducted by a practitioner should be recorded and accounted 
for in an appropriate accounting system (National Treasury, Guide for Accounting Officers of 
Municipalities and Municipal Entities 2005; Fourie 2018:732).  
 
.2.5.19 Division of Revenue Act (DoRA)  
 
The annual Division of Revenue Act, (DoRA) provides for the equitable division of revenue 
raised nationally among the national, provincial and local spheres of government for their 
annual budgets and the responsibilities of all three spheres pursuant to such a division, and to 
provide for matters connected with it (Nkuna and Sebola, 2014:6; Yearbook, 2009:218). The 
annual DoRA is enacted each year to determine the equitable share to be allocated to all 
government spheres and government entities including local government. The amount 
allocated in terms of DoRA is an indication of the applicable current financial year, but it is 
also an indicative of the allocations for the next two financial years as provided in the Medium-
Term Expenditure Framework (Nkuna and Sebola, 2014:6; Yearbook, 2009:218; Chetty, 
2015:25). 
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2.5.20 Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9: A Responsive, Accountable, Effective and 
Efficient Local Government System 
 
According to the AGSA General Report on Local Government Audit Outcomes of 2016/2017 
(2017:12), the Medium-Term Strategic Framework derived from the National Development 
Plan (NDP) provides the overall outcome for local government which is known as outcome 9 
to be a responsive, accountable, effective and efficient developmental local government 
system. Therefore, outcome 9 is the target that municipalities are striving to achieve, with 
support of national and provincial government and oversight.   
 
The Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9 (DPLG 2010:5) outlines that government has agreed 
on 12 outcomes as a key focus of local government. Each outcome has a limited number of 
measurable outputs with targets. Each of the 12 outcomes has a delivery agreement which in 
most cases involve all spheres of government and a range of partners outside government. 
Combined, these agreements reflect government’s delivery and implementation plans for its 
foremost priorities up to 2014. 
 
The Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9 (DPLG, 2010:5), is a negotiated charter which reflects 
the commitment of the key partners involved in the direct delivery process to working together 
to undertake activities effectively and on time to produce the mutually agreed‐upon outputs 
which in turn will contribute to achieving outcome 9. The delivery agreement provides detail 
to the outputs, targets, indicators and key activities to achieve outcome 9, identifies required 
inputs and clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the various delivery partners.  
 
The Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9 (DPLG, 2010:6) further notes that challenges at 
municipalities range from issues of poor governance and accountability, weak financial 
management, high vacancies in critical senior management posts and in a number of instances, 
an inability to deliver even a core set of critical municipal services efficiently and effectively. 
Crucially as many as 5.7 million households did not have universal access to water, sanitation; 
refuse removal and electricity in 2007. All these challenges combined have shattered the 
confidence of the majority of citizens in the local government system.    
 
The Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9 (DPLG, 2010:6) envisages addressing seven critical 
issues in order to achieve the overarching goal or vision of a responsive, accountable, effective 
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and efficient local government system. The agreement proposes to develop a more rigorous, 
data driven and detailed segmentation of municipalities that better reflect the varied and 
capacities and contexts within municipalities to lay the basis for a differentiated approach to 
municipal financing, planning and support.  As well as to ensure improved access to essential 
services; to initiate ward‐based programmes to sustain livelihoods; and to contribute to the 
achievement of sustainable human settlements. It also intends to strengthen participatory 
governance and administrative and financial capability of municipalities. 
 
The Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9 (DPLG, 2010:7) identified a core of National 
Departments that have a direct impact on municipalities. The core departments together with 
CoGTA are National Treasury, Water Affairs, Human Settlements, Energy, Rural 
Development and Land Reform, The Presidency and Environment. These departments will 
have to establish a closer working relationship to jointly tackle the co-ordination of 
infrastructure funding to unlock delivery of services and the co-ordination of human settlement 
planning and service delivery planning. The Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9 (DPLG, 
2010:80) indicates that a key role of the provinces in the implementation of outcome 9 is to 
undertake critical support, monitoring, and reporting roles based on their provincial‐specific 
municipal implementation support plan related to the outputs and targets. The agreement 
includes the alignment with the national government approach and national delivery agreement 
and similarly undertake the applicable actions at a provincial level.    
 
According to the Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9 (DPLG, 2010:80), provinces should 
allocate more and appropriate resources towards the local government function, encourage 
better spending and outcomes in municipalities and promote alignment and resource 
commitments of provincial departments in IDPs. Provinces are urged to improve support and 
oversight of municipalities; as well as monitoring and reporting on the implementation of 
targets and activities.   Lastly, the Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9 (DPLG, 2010:8) 
identifies municipalities as the key delivery partners in the field of implementation.  
 
In light of the above, the Auditor-General, Report on Local Government Audit Outcomes of 
2016/2017 (2017:12-13) raises a concern that accountability (as provided in outcome 9) 
continues to fail in local government. The reason for this is that only a total of 33 (13%) 
municipalities managed to produce quality financial statements and performance reports and 
to comply with legislation (clean audit report), while the audit outcomes of 45 municipalities 
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regressed (of which 17 municipalities were from a clean audit status) and only 16 
municipalities improved.  One could argue that if local government and in particular municipal 
councils of municipalities are not committed to the achievement the targets of outcome 9, 
oversight and accountability will remain a challenge.      
 
2.5.21 National Development Plan (NDP), 2030 
 
The NDP, released in August 2012, characterise the belief of South Africa being a 
developmental state. It significantly extends the planning beyond the five-year medium-term 
span of the existing departmental five-year strategic plans and aims to strengthen policy 
coherence. The NDP aims to mobilise all South Africans to eliminate poverty and reduce 
inequality by 2030 (Mphaisha, 2014:77). 
 
Mphaisha (2014:77) indicates that the NDP provides for 13 focus areas underpinned by 119 
specific actions. The focus areas, among others, are economy and employment, safer 
communities, combating corruption and building a capable and developmental state. The NDP 
is based on governmental intervention in the production of goods and services. The government 
seeks to achieve a fundamentally transformed economy by 2030 through government 
intervention policy strategies. The NDP calls for the tightening of the accountability chain. An 
important step towards this is to ensure that all activities necessary to implement a programme 
are clearly spelt out including the timeframe and responsibility for implementation, as well as 
oversight and monitoring mechanisms that will help identify blockages (The NDP Executive 
Summary, 2012:1).  
 
The NDP Executive Summary (2012:1) further stresses that to achieve the aspiration of a 
capable and developmental state, the country needs to enhance parliament’s oversight role, 
stabilize the political-administrative interface, professionalise the public service, upgrade skills 
and improve co-ordination. It also needs a more pragmatic and proactive approach to managing 
the intergovernmental system to ensure a better fit between responsibility and capacity. 
Equally, the state needs to be prepared to experiment, to learn from experience and to adopt 
diverse approaches to reach common objectives (The NDP 2030: Executive Summary, 2012:1). 
 
The NDP re-emphasises that accountability is essential to democracy. It points out that there 
are several weaknesses in the accountability chain, with a general culture of blame-shifting. 
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The accountability chain has to be strengthened from top to bottom. To begin with, 
parliamentary accountability is weak, with Parliament failing to fulfil its most basic oversight 
role. The rising number of service delivery protests indicates that the state also needs to make 
it easier for citizens to raise concerns.  Accountability in state-owned enterprises has been 
blurred through a complex, unclear appointment process and, at times, undue political 
interference.  The NDP in conclusion recommends clarifying lines of accountability by 
developing public-interest mandates that set out how each state-owned enterprise serves the 
public interest, ensuring appointment processes are meritocratic and transparent, and 
improving co-ordination between the policy and shareholder departments (The NDP 2030: 
Executive Summary, 2012:1-2). 
 
In light of the above discussion, concerning the statutory and legislative framework and policy 
guidelines to promote oversight and accountability, it was argued in Chapter 1, Section 1.10.2 
that despite many legislative prescripts, structures and mechanisms the continued poor audit 
reports of all municipalities in the Free State province is a threat in promoting effective 
oversight and accountability in municipalities.    
 
2.6 THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION 
(SALGA)  
 
Cloete (1997:169) indicates that on 21 November 1996, between 2000 and 3000 people, mostly 
members of municipal councils, attended a conference in Durban where it was agreed to 
establish the South African Local Government Association (SALGA).  SALGA (2012:24) 
points out that SALGA was recognised by the Minister of Constitutional Development (now 
CoGTA) as the national organisation representing local government from January 1997. The 
organisation was established as a voluntary body representing all municipalities and 9 
provincial Local Government associations. SALGA’s official status stems from its recognition 
by the Minister. SALGA’s role in terms of legislation is to represent the interests of its 
constituent members. SALGA does not have statutory executive authority over its members. 
SALGA’s power over its members stems from its constitution. 
 
The Organised Local Government Act, 1997 (Act 52, 1997), (herewith after referred to as the 
Organised Local Government Act, 1997), recognises SALGA as representative of organised 
local government. According to Cloete and Thornhill (2005:218), the principal function of 
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SALGA is consultation with the national and the provincial governments. The Act allows 
organised local government to designate up to ten part-time representatives to the NCOP in the 
national Parliament, and to further nominate two persons to the FFC, which advises the Finance 
Ministry on budget issues.  
 
Venter (2011:86) specifies that SALGA with its nine local government associations, represents 
organised local government in South Africa. SALGA participates in intergovernmental 
structures and can influence national and provincial legislature and to measure the impact of 
such legislation on local government. Thornhill and Cloete (2014:169) assert that SALGA 
constitution provides that the objectives of the SALGA are, among others, to represent, 
promote and protects the interest of local government, to transform local government to enable 
it to fulfill its developmental role and to enhance the role and status of municipalities. 
 
SALGA is a Schedule 3A Public Entity, recognized in terms of the PFMA, 1999 and as such 
reports to the Minister of CoGTA. SALGA is funded through a combination of sources 
including a national government grant, membership levies from municipalities, and project 
specific funds from the international donor community (SALGA, 2012:24). From as far back 
as 1999, SALGA has demonstrated a political preference for a unitary structure for organised 
local government, that is, one structure that is governed through a constitution as one unit. 
SALGA has been thinking and deliberating that for organised local government to be 
representative, it needs to speak with one voice. For this to happen, there should not be an 
institutional/organisational distinction between SALGA and the 9 provincial organisations. 
Hence, the view within SALGA has been that organised local government should be contained 
in one body, i.e. SALGA, and that the 9 provincial organisations should merge into SALGA 
(SALGA, 2012:24). 
 
The role of SALGA is to make a contribution to the development of municipalities throughout 
the country, through the provision of specialized services to supplement and strengthen the 
capacity of municipalities; research and information dissemination; facilitating shared learning 
between municipalities; human resource development and councillor training (SALGA, 2012: 
24). The training of municipal councillors will not be the responsibility of the Local 
Government Sector Education and Training Authority (LGSETA). It is envisaged that SALGA 
will play a major role in councillor training, and that an intensive councillor training 
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programme will be required to coincide with the election of new municipal councillors 
(SALGA, 2012:24). 
 
2.7 INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES, MODELS OR FRAMEWORKS OF 
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
To complete this research study, it is imperative to add a subsection on international best 
practices on oversight and accountability at local government sphere. For this purpose, best 
practices, models or frameworks of oversight and accountability of local government in 
countries such as Britain, Botswana, Namibia, Kenya, Malawi, China and Brazil and are briefly 
discussed. Britain has cultural and economic links with South Africa. As former colonies of 
Britain; South Africa and Kenya are members of the Commonwealth. The membership of this 
body is reserved for former colonies of the Great Britain.  
 
Botswana and Namibia are neighbours of South Africa and have (thus far) proven to be stable 
democracies with no known recent local government service delivery protests. China and 
Brazil are members of the BRICSA (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). BRICS is 
an emerging international economic block, which includes South Africa as a member. China is 
also aggressively expanding its economic and political influence over many countries in Africa. 
It will therefore be of interest for this research project to note how they these countries deal 
with concepts of oversight and accountability at their respective local governments.  
 
This international best practices of oversight and accountability was taken into consideration 
with the development of the proposed oversight and accountable framework for municipalities 
of the Free State province. 
 
2.7.1 Britain: A shared services model for local government to enhance oversight and 
accountability 
 
According to Guerin, McCrae and Shepheard (2018:3), there are weaknesses in the United 
Kingdom (UK) system of accountability both nationally and local which contributes to failures 
and it undermines the trustworthiness of public institutions.   Guerin et al.  (2018:7-8) argue 
that accountability is indicative of good governance and that relationships are at the heart of 
accountability.  These relationships include: 




• Oversight entails that that one side must overseeing the other by means of direct 
reporting lines of performance.   
• Regulation requires that one side regulating the other by means of setting and 
enforcement of regulations and rules. 
• Inspection entails that one side inspecting the other by assessing their performance.  
• Scrutiny entails that one side scrutinising the other by means of reports on what has 
happened. 
Although there are many systems in place committees fulfil a key role in holding government 
to account. Guerin et al.  (20187-8) further aver that there are four key aspects of robust 
accountability in the UK, which is applicable to national and local government, namely: 
 
• Clarity of accountability requires that there must be structures and to whom individual 
or institutions are accountable;  
• Appropriateness of control requires that people must be held accountable in a fair 
manner; 
• Sufficiency of information entails that there must be suitable and relevant information 
available to judge whether accountability and responsibilities have been performed. 
• Clarity of consequences means that there must be consistency concerning sanctions and 
penalties that flow from the process to hold people to account for failure to perform. 
 
Except for the above four key aspects to promote robust accountability nationally and locally 
the United Kingdom (UK) introduced a shared service model or system in local government to 
promote accountability.  In this regard Johnson and Williams (2017:2) explain that a shared 
services model involves the consolidation and standardization of common tasks and services 
across different organisations or parts of an organisation into a single services center (Bergeron, 
2003 in Johnson and Williams, 2017:3).  In addition, Johnson and Williams (2017: 2) further 
explains that people often see shared services as being synonymous with outsourcing, which is 
not correct.  Outsourcing is only one way in which local authorities may choose to share 
services, but there are many forms of collaboration between local councils which do not involve 
outsourcing to the private sector.  
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Sandford (2015:3) points out that an increasing number of local authorities in the UK are 
making use of schemes to shared service.  Some of these have taken the form of shared services 
or shared staff between a number of local authorities, not always those bordering one another. 
The best known of these shared services include the Tri-Borough arrangements between 
Hammersmith and Fulham, Westminster, and Kensington and Chelsea local authorities.  
 
Sandford (2015:4) further asserts that the legislative authority for local authorities to share 
services is the Local Government Act, 1972.   In particular, Section 112 of Local Government 
Act, provides that local authorities may appoint officers to enable them to discharge their own 
functions and any functions they carry out for another local authority. In terms of the Local 
Government Act, 1972, Section 113, a local authority may enter into an agreement with another 
local authority to place its officers at the disposal of the other local authority, subject to 
consultation with the officer concerned about any changes in terms and conditions. Section 1 
of the Local Authorities (Goods and Services Act) 1970 enables a local authority to enter into 
an agreement to provide another local authority with goods and services, including 
administrative, professional or technical services.   Gospel and Sako, 2010; Strikwerda, 2014, 
in Dixon and Elston (2017:3) aver that shared services are adopted in many local authorities 
around the world, including in the United States of America (USA), UK, Ireland, and in 
regional governments in Canada, Belgium, and Australia.      
 
Sandford (2015:5) argues that there are clear financial benefits from sharing services amongst 
local authorities that leads to staff reductions and by cutting out unnecessarily duplications. 
Sharing services are more acceptable than outsourcing of services to most local councils. One 
of the reasons for this is that the local council can retain more control over the shared service 
than an outsourced service. If an outsourced service failed the local council has to find a 
different way of providing that particular service such as by either taking the service back or 
by finding another service provider.  Through the level of control and influence a municipal 
council has over a shared service it can be argued that a shared service provides a level of 
flexibility which an outsourced service does not provide. 
 
In light of the above, Johnson and Williams (2017:2) maintain that the primary reason that 
local councils have chosen to share services was to reduce costs, to avoid duplications, to 
optimize greater service consistency and to reduce the local council’s dependence on other 
service providers. Sharing services among local councils have clear benefits such as financial 
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benefits. Other benefits include the following, to consolidating structures, integrating IT 
services, reducing buildings and costs, and improving and reducing staff procurement. 
However, achieving these requires effective planning and implementation, as well as political 
and managerial leadership. Johnson and Williams (2017:2) are further of the view that 
successful sharing of services requires a clear understanding of existing practice within 
potential partner local authorities.  Shared services rely on evidence-based analysis of the 
specific outcomes and improvements that sharing services can deliver.  It also requires a 
thorough assessment of the costs and potential cost savings.  Thus, there are many benefits for 
local councils to shared services with other local councils, however it requires effective 
planning and implementation, as well as political and managerial leadership.  By sharing 
services local council can retain more control over the shared services than an outsourced 
service.        
 
2.7.2 Local government in Botswana: central government oversight and accountability 
 
Botswana has a commendable track record regarding the growth and functioning of local 
government in the African context (Sharma, 2010:3). It has a conducive and enabling 
democratic political environment in which local government can develop. There is peace, 
stability and the rule of law across the country. There is also freedom of expression, criticism 
and opposition. Public participation in public policy making, development planning and 
implementation has grown steadily (Sharma, 2010:3).  
 
Sebudubudu (2010:16) argues that unlike most countries in Africa, Botswana has enjoyed 
relative political stability unsurpassed by any on the African continent, which is a rare 
achievement. It is this stability that attracted relative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and at 
the same time ensured the country placed its scarce resources in productive sectors such as 
health, education, water provision and building of infrastructure.  
 
Sharma (2010:1) indicates that Botswana is known as a country in Africa which has operated 
within the political framework of democracy since independence and has promoted local 
government as an instrument of decentralization and public participation for local level 
governance and service delivery. Local government in Botswana stands on four pillars: 
Councils (City Councils, Town Councils and District Councils); District Administration, 
headed by District Commissioners; Land Boards, created after independence for allocation of 
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tribal land; and tribal administration, headed by Chiefs as traditional leaders (Sharma, 2010: 
1).  
 
Kaunda (2009:134) indicates that local authorities in Botswana are not independent of central 
government, the Ministry of Local Government exercises considerable control through 
financial administration and human resource management provisions. The ministry is the focal 
point for planning and co-ordinating local authorities. It retains the power of final approval 
over most activities of local authorities. The proportion of public servants employed by local 
authorities is quite significant.  
 
Lekorwe (1998:71) points out that in its strictly political sense; decentralization refers to the 
transfer of powers and responsibilities to elected local governments, to exercise a significant 
measure of local autonomy. The main emphasis that flows from this definition is 
responsiveness and accountability. In this sense Botswana decentralized governments are 
closer to the people as consumers of services. They are therefore better able to make choices 
that reflect the needs and priorities of the people. It is also easier and more convenient to hold 
locally elected representatives and officials accountable than those at the centre. 
 
Kaunda (2009:134) points out, is that the Ministry of Local Government staffing bill is 14 per 
cent of total public expenditure. The recruitment, hiring, deployment, disciplining, promotion 
and regulation of the conditions of service of senior staff in the local government councils is 
centralised at the Ministry of Local Government (MLG). The government justifies centralised 
recruitment on the basis that it ensures that the councils get equal access to scarce manpower 
and that it minimises the possibility of corruption. However, the local authorities have 
responsibility for employing very low-level staff such as cleaners, gardeners, etc. 
 
Kaunda (2009:134) stresses that the national government controls, directs, supervises and 
provides guidance on matters at the national level. It maintains a function of national interest 
that local government cannot undertake. Government distributes revenue based on the needs 
of every local authority as presented in the local authorities’ budget estimates. The national 
government closely monitors local authority expenditures. The disbursement of funds for 
district level projects is done by the centre, just as the monitoring and evaluation of 
development projects is. Kaunda (2009:134) further points out that local authorities are 
accountable to the Ministry of Local Government, to which they are required to submit reports 
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on their projects. The Ministry of Local Government is in turn accountable to the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning for local authority expenditures and progress of 
implementation.  
 
Du Toit, (in Lekorwe 1998:74) points out that all local authorities in Botswana exist by virtue 
of ordinary Acts of Parliament and, at least in theory, any of them could be abolished at any 
time by Parliament. Local authorities are not included in the Constitution and, consequently, 
they have no inherent competence derived from the Constitution. That makes Botswana a 
unitary state with Parliament having sovereign power with full competence in all areas of 
jurisdiction. Legislative authority is vested in Parliament, which consists of the National 
Assembly, the House of Chiefs, and the President.  
 
Kaunda (2009:134) adds by indicating that all financial power rests with the central 
government, except to the extent that the central government may delegate any financial control 
to the organs of local government. Therefore, the central government retains the right to keep 
a very close watch and control over any financial authority granted to the various branches of 
local government. Central government may intervene if it so wishes, may withdraw any 
delegated authority and may delay any recommended changes in financial administration.  
 
Sebudubudu (2010:17) indicates that there is no doubt that democratic governance steered 
Botswana’s development agenda during the most critical stages of the country’s development 
process. It created institutions such as the Auditor-General that ensured good usage of 
government resources by producing highly critical reports that were used by the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) of parliament. This ensured relative transparency and 
accountability in government and in the process was able to contain the kind of corruption that 
ravaged most African countries and thus discouraged investment and in turn development in 
such countries. The mechanisms of national government monitoring of local government 
include the enforcement of the Finance and Audit Act (discussed in Chapter 4) and other 
technical controls. For example, the department of Local Government Technical Services was 
established in 2006 to improve project implementation and accountability by local authorities 
(Kaunda, 2009: 134). The Local Authorities Public Accounts Committee (LAPAC) was 
established in 1999 to improve accountability. The functions and powers of LAPAC are to 
examine the accounts of every district council, city council, town council, township authority 
and land board, and to report on such accounts, financial statements and audits to the minister. 
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LAPAC is responsible for enforcing performance in the implementation of projects and 
programmes, submission of monthly financial and management statements, and final accounts 
(Kaunda, 2009:134).  
 
Kaunda (2009:134) notes that elections have been held in a free and fair manner and serve to 
legitimise the councillors. Local authorities do not formulate policies or set standards for 
performance. These are functions of central government. There is a relatively high level of 
centralisation of public policy making and public sector management, and local authorities are 
merely implementers of central government policies, the centrally determined development 
plans and annual budgets.  
 
Sebudubudu (2010:17) avers that Botswana has largely avoided such kind of corruption to the 
extent that it is classified as the least corrupt country in Africa by Transparency International. 
Transparency International produces a yearly Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in which 
countries are ranked on the basis of either being more or least corrupt on a scale that ranges 
from 1 to 10. The closer the country is to 1 the more corrupt it is and the closer it is to 10 it is 
regarded as least corrupt. In fact, in terms of the Transparency International CPI, Botswana is 
well ahead of developed countries such as Italy.  
 
Sebudubudu (2010:18) indicates that aas a way of demonstrating its commitment to 
transparency and accountability, the Botswana state has created other oversight institutions 
notwithstanding their limitations. Such institutions included the Directorate on Corruption and 
Economic Crime (DCEC), and the Ombudsman. The DCEC’s principal mandate is to 
investigate, prevent and teach the public on the dangers of corruption. Since its creation in 
1994, the DCEC has so far fallen short of realizing its mandate owing to limited resources and 
lack of independence. It also lacks the power to prosecute.    
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the Local Authorities Public Accounts Committee 
(LAPAC) was established with the aim to improve accountability.  LAPAC are responsible to 
examine the accounts of every district council, city council, town council, township authority 
and land board, and to report on such accounts, financial statements and audits to the minister. 
Botswana state has created other oversight institutions notwithstanding their limitations. The 
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), and the Ombudsman was also 
established to promote oversight and accountability of local government in Botswana.    




2.7.3 Namibia: A hybrid of autonomous and centrally dependent local municipality 
oversight and accountability arrangement 
 
Tötemeyer (1997:118) states that although local authorities in Namibia are independent bodies, 
certain actions such as budgeting and decisions on regulations and assessment rates can only 
be taken after consultation with the Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing. 
Tötemeyer (1997:118) points out that local authorities range from those which are independent 
and autonomous, to those which are fully dependent on central government support. The 
Namibian Constitution does not refer to any degree of autonomy for local authorities, nor to 
any powers to be allocated to and exercised by such bodies. 
 
According to Tötemeyer (1997:118), the promulgation of the Namibia: Local Authorities Act, 
1992 (Notice 23 of 1992) provides the parameters in terms of which towns and villages could 
formally be constituted across the country. The Local Authorities Act, 1992 provides for the 
establishment of local authority councils, and determines their powers, duties and functions. 
Tötemeyer (1997:118) indicates the main responsibilities of central government towards local 
authorities are to assist them to perform their duties and functions efficiently by providing the 
necessary resources and training; formulate, direct and co-ordinate overall national policies; 
control town planning, and survey land leading to the proclamation of towns; devise and 
develop a national town-development strategy, and provide for the establishment of local 
authority councils and control the administration of such councils. 
 
Gerhart (1997:124) maintains that Article 102 of the Namibian Constitution states that, for the 
purpose of Regional and Local Government, Namibia will be divided into regional and local 
units, which will be governed by elected councils. Local authorities range from those which 
are independent and autonomous, to those which are fully dependent on central government 
support. The Namibian Constitution does not refer to any degree of autonomy for local 
authorities, or to any powers to be allocated to and exercised by such bodies. According to the 
Local Authorities Act, Section 32(1), a local authority council may enter into an agreement 
with the government of Namibia, with one or more other local authority councils or with any 
regional council providing for the exercise or performance, on such terms and conditions as 
may be agreed upon.  
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Gerhart (1997:134) points out that soon after its inauguration, the Government decided that the 
Namibian unitary state would ultimately devolve responsibility, authority and resources and/or 
resource bases in accordance with the criteria relating to functions to be decentralised, and the 
timing and pace of such decentralisation. The pace and content of devolution will have to take 
into account political and technical feasibility, system and individual capacity, as well as the 
national macroeconomic and fiscal environment, and public sector and economic reform 
policies and activities in the country.  
 
Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing (2000:3) outline certain functions 
under the Namibian Constitution. The following functions are vested in Regional Councils in 
terms of Article 108 of the Namibian Constitution. In exercising its oversight functions, Article 
108 of the Namibian Constitution states that a regional council has the power to receive and 
peruse minutes of local councils within its jurisdiction, together with the relevant agenda and 
any related documents and reports. This enables a regional council to appraise the decisions of 
local authority councils within its area and to take appropriate corrective measures when 
needed. This enables regional councils to offer any useful and reasonable advice to the local 
authority council pertaining to project identification and function.  
 
Gerhart (1997:134) explains that for decentralisation to be implemented effectively, the 
government will affect organisational and institutional change at national, regional and local 
level, while identifying the functions and individual, organisational, institutional and system-
wide capacities available or requiring to be developed. There will also be legislative and other 
rationalisation, to bring the law in line with the decentralisation policy. Gerhart (1997:134) 
further indicates that the Cabinet Memorandum of 9 June 1998 specifies that all delegated 
functions and services should be administered as a trust by the Regional Councils and local 
authorities, who would be fully accountable for such trust. The above memorandum also draws 
attention to the fact that the overall and ultimate responsibility for the delegated functions and 
services remains with the respective sector’s line ministry. 
 
Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing (2000:3), states that central 
government Ministries have additional responsibilities in relation to decentralised functions 
such as provision of technical advice and assistance, mentoring, support, supervision during 
implementation, inspection to ensure compliance with established standards and guidelines. It 
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also includes capacity building, monitoring and evaluation to get feedback on the suitability of 
the policy whether its objectives are being realised or whether it requires modification.   
 
In light of the above, one could interpret that points out that local authorities in Namibia range 
from those which are independent and autonomous, to those which are fully dependent on 
central government support.   It was further mentioned that regional councils are responsible 
for the oversight functions in terms of Article 108 of the Namibian, Constitution whereas local 
authorities are accountable to regional councils for their functions.   
 
2.7.4 Kenya: Strong central government financial oversight in local government  
 
Mboga (2009:1) points out that in the Kenyan case the establishment of local authorities is 
covered by the Local Government Act cap 265 of the Laws of Kenya. For cities and local 
governments to play their role as institutions for service delivery and centres of public 
administration for citizens, they must be governed by widely accepted Principles of Good 
Governance (PGG). The principles or elements of good governance include democracy, justice, 
peace, equality, transparency and accountability.  
 
Ochieng (2017:164) points out a key issue is that Articles 138–142 of Kenya’s Public Finance 
Management Act, 2012, stipulate regulations and restrictions that greatly limit the scope of 
counties (local authorities) to borrow or attract grants. National government retains the power 
to determine the way in which county governments engage with development partners, 
especially regarding loans that require approval by Treasury. Tanzi, Devas et al. 2008 (in 
Ochieng, 2017:164) indicates that the national government argues that without effective 
controls in several areas; namely; public finance management, the scope of engagement with 
international development partners and the tax regime selected, county governments could 
cause macroeconomic turmoil that must be avoided.  
 
Mboga (2009:2) explains that transparency in government, one of the principles of good 
governance, encourages accountability. Transparency and accountability in turn eliminate 
corrupt practices, provide ready access to information, ensure fair and impartial application of 
the law and maintains high standards of personal and professional integrity among the elected 
and appointed officials. Mboga (2009:2) concludes by indicating that participation is 
considered to promote the principle of civic engagement and citizenship. Application of this 
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principle empowers and engages the citizens, particularly women and the poor, to take part in 
the municipal elections, citizens’ forums, citizens’ advisory councils and all other forms of 
participatory democracy.  
 
2.7.5 Malawi:  local government accountability tool 
 
According to Kafakoma, Roka and Chimutu (2005:3), the local government accountability tool 
was developed from a study conducted by Kafakoma in 2004 in co-operation with the Malawi 
forest Government learning Group in partnership with Duncan Macqueen from the 
International Institute for Environment and Development. The local government accountability 
tool is a strategic process to increase local communities, awareness and their expectations from 
local government and to ensure accountability.  The local government accountability tool   was 
initially developed for forest dependent communities, but the tool can be used for other local 
government services. The local government accountability tool is based on five sets of 
expectations of communities concerning local governance services, and a set of demand-driven 
steps to address these expectations. Kafakoma et al. (2005:3-4) state that the local government 
accountability tool is based on five main sets of expectations and required steps that needs to 
be taken to ensure accountability: 
 
• Expectation 1:  To promote and involve communities in the affairs of local 
government. To ensure that local leaders involve the communities by setting up 
community meetings; to involve communities in participatory resource assessment 
activities and to establish structures to involved communities and to promote 
awareness.    
• Expectation 2:  To take full responsibility and to provide effective leadership to local 
communities.   Clarify roles and set performance standards, allow communities to have 
access to local government reports and involve communities to express their concerns.   
• Expectation 3:  To provide clear strategies for the usage of resources by the local 
government.  Transparency should be promoted by ensuring that communities provide 
inputs regarding local government strategies, plans, and processes.   
• Expectation 4: To ensure sufficient financial resources and technical support.    Publish 
financial reports and ensure that communities have access.  Ensure that technical 
support is provided to communities.     
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• Expectation 5:  To provide a high quality of services to communities. Establish a 
process to assess the impact of service delivery against stated objectives, and resources 
used.   
 
Kafakoma et al. (2005:3) further argue that the local government accountability tool is 
designed and used to involve the communities and to ensure that local government be 
accountable for the quality of services provides to the communities. 
 
2.7.6 Central government incentive targets: Model for oversight and accountability in 
China 
 
Burns and Zhiren (2010:2) shows that since the early 1990s, local governments have 
experimented with various performance management systems that by 1995 became formalised 
as the Objective Responsibility System (ORS). In this system, governments at higher 
administrative levels set targets for lower-level administrators and hold them to account for 
completing them. The system is now widely practised, and targets have become increasingly 
specific, quantifiable, and linked to personnel outcomes.  
 
Xuedong (2010:205-206) argues that with funding support from the central government and 
other public sources no longer available, local governments were entirely on their own to fulfill 
various social management and service obligations. For local governments trying to cope with 
these dual pressures, the only choice was to push economic growth at any price, using any 
means available to increase income. Xuedong (2010:205-206) points out that the 1990's saw 
the decline of state-owned enterprises with many losing money and some being effectively 
bankrupt. Not only were these enterprises no longer the primary source of funds for local 
governments, but in many cases, they created both financial and social burdens for 
governments which had to deal finding jobs for workers formerly employed by state owned 
enterprises. For local governments in need of new sources of funding, it obviously made sense 
to seek outside investors. Investment promotion of this sort was also encouraged by the central 
government. 
 
Burns and Zhiren (2010:2) points out that monitoring of performance, is often left to local 
authorities that have a vested interest in reporting outstanding achievement. This explains the 
discrepancy between GDP growth reported by the central government and local governments 
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over the past decade. The system focuses very much on the performance of territorial units 
which undercuts cross-boundary co-operation to solve problems such as environmental 
degradation. The system also focuses overwhelmingly on measuring inputs and some outputs, 
but not on policy outcomes. 
 
Xuedong (2010:207) explains that with clearly defined incentive targets in place, achieving top 
performance results became a very high priority of local governments and leaderships. Officials 
put a great deal of time and energy into devising ways to get the most achievements in the least 
amount of time. Competition among local governments became intense. An incentive system 
based on achieving performance results was positive in the sense that it made room for 
governments and individuals to show initiative and make use of their creative talents. 
 
Burns and Zhiren (2010:2) aver that although the ORS provides no formal mechanism for 
citizen participation, local governments have begun surveying public satisfaction with 
government performance as part of the process. Still, citizen participation in performance 
management is limited even when surveys are carried out. We conclude then that ordinary 
citizens have little voice in the process, let alone a share in decision making about the system. 
 
Xuedong (2010:206) Local governments adopted various measures to attract capital, making 
for intense competition between local governments in different regions. Initially, local 
governments focused on infrastructure improvements to upgrade the business environment and 
attract investment. Over time, as more and more localities had first class infrastructure to offer, 
the competition moved into other areas. Local governments competed to offer the most favora-
ble tax and investment policies, the least red tape and the best service. 
 
In conclusion, Xuedong (2010:208) states that given limited financial resources, governments 
had to make choices, inevitably giving priority to economic development at the expense of 
other kinds social development and public services. An incentive system based on meeting 
growth targets and self-interest on the part of both governments and officials made the focus 
on economic development all the stronger. In the event as economic growth did occur, 
governments increased their incomes which left them better able to fulfill their various 
obligations and, at the same time, put government officials in a position better to protect their 
own interests. 
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2.7.7 Brazil: Established oversight institutions to hold local government officials 
accountable 
 
According to Aranha (2017:3), contemporary democracies reaffirm, as a core principle, the 
idea that rulers should be held accountable by the people and should be held responsible for 
their actions and omissions in the exercise of power. Consistent with Mainwaring (2003) (in 
Aranha, 2017:3) one of the most controversial points in the definition of accountability 
concerns the sanction theme. For some authors, accountability calls for mechanisms of direct 
and credible sanctions in order to be effective.  
 
Aranha (2017:3) indicates that accountability can be divided between direct and indirect power 
of sanction, for certain accountability institutions have only the ability to transfer their findings 
to other actors that may establish punishments. What this means is that institutions with indirect 
sanction power must rely heavily on a close relationship with those that can pronounce 
judgments so that the cycle of accountability may come to a close. 
 
O’Donnell (2001) (in Aranha, 2017:4) indicates that the accountability institutions mentioned 
above are part of what is called horizontal accountability. While vertical accountability is 
associated with electoral or societal control, horizontal accountability requires state agencies 
with legal authority to take action (from routine checks to criminal sanctions) in relation to 
actions or omissions by other state agencies.  
 
Aranha (2017:7) points out that there are three types of legal punishment that can be imposed 
on someone engaged in corruption in Brazil, that is administrative, civil and criminal; 
determined by separate judicial or administrative actions that run independently from one 
another. Aranha (2017:7) points out that the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office is the most 
unusual accountability institution in Brazil. It is a prosecutorial body, formally independent of 
the other three branches of government, with a guaranteed budget and career incentives set 
with almost no outside interference.  
 
2.8 NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS/MODELS TO PROMOTE OVERSIGHT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR 
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Three particular models/frameworks concerning oversight and accountability were identified 
in the context of the South African public sector that were taken into consideration with the 
development of an oversight and accountable framework for municipalities of the Free State, 
province. The oversight model of the South African Legislative Sector, a proposed 
comprehensive framework of accountability for government departments and SALGA, 
consequence and accountability framework for local government were discussed below.    
 
2.8.1 The South African Legislative Sector Oversight Model 
 
The South African Legislative Sector develop an oversight model that was published in 2012.  
The aim of the oversight model was to set standards, vision and principles and best oversight 
practices in the legislative sector as well as to guide the legislative sector concerning the overall 
oversight function aligned with the PMFA, 1999.   It was also expected from the legislatures 
to adopt elements of the model that they are individually able to implement depending on each 
legislature particular circumstances and availability of resources (Legislative Sector, 2012:6).   
According to Malapane (2015:863), the oversight model of the South African Legislature 
implies that oversight refers to the proactive relations initiated by a legislature with the 
executive and administrative organs of state to ensure compliance with legislative provisions 
and obligations.        
 
The oversight model is operationalised on three pillars. The first pillar focuses on the budget 
cycle model, the second pillar focuses on operationalization of Budget Information Matrices 
(BIMs) and the third pillar of the oversight model focused on the analytical approach and 
analytical exercises or analysis (South African Legislative Sector, 2012:20).   According to the 
South African Legislative Sector (2012:20), the first pillar of the oversight model which 
focuses on the budget cycle includes the various committee structures and the role of public 
participation to strengthen the legislative sector oversight of budgetary processes. The 
committee structures include the finance committees who fulfilled a critical oversight role in 
the budgetary processes, and other portfolio committees. Public participation concerning the 
budgetary process requires sufficient involvement of the general public in committee meeting, 
to ensure that the performance plans are available to the public for their effective input and to 
invite stakeholder of a committee and affected communities to attend meetings where 
departments present their performance plans (South African Legislative Sector, 2012:20-23).   
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According to the Legislative Sector (2012:54), the second pillar of the oversight model 
concerning the operationalisation of the budget information system that needs to be created for 
each committee structure including that of the Standing Public Accounts Committees SCOPA, 
that can be utilised when engaging in programme evaluation and the analysis of the budget. 
The aim is to strengthen oversight by ensuring that the budget information is accessible to the 
public to allow the civil society organisations and the general public to develop an awareness 
as well as to allow the public to provide inputs (Legislative Sector, 2012:20-23). 
 
The last pillar of the oversight model which focuses on the analytical approach and exercises 
which consisted of various analytical applications which offers various degrees of insight (such 
as fixed and variable cost studies, cost- benefit analysis, costing outputs, needs budget vs 
available budget analysis et.) into a departmental budgetary process (Legislative Sector, 
2012:58-64).        
 
In light of the above, there is no doubt that the South African Legislative Sector oversight 
model can be seen as a useful instrument to guide the legislatures concerning the oversight of 
departments budgetary process aligned with the PFMA, 1999. The oversight model further 
assists the legislatures to ensure that compliance requirements and expectations for the 
executives are clearly understood. The oversight model is only bases on national and provincial 
legislatures, however the NCOP, SALGA and the Provincial legislatures fulfil an oversight 
role in the provision of government services in the province and local sphere of government.  
Therefore, lesson can be learnt from this oversight model concerning the oversight of the 
budgetary process of local government.    
 
2.8.2 The comprehensive framework of accountability for government departments 
 
 Ijeoma and Sambumbu (2013:283) reported on a comprehensive framework to promote 
accountability across government departments which was developed based on a study.  Ijeoma 
and Sambumbu (2013:283) further point out that the various government departments in the 
South African public sector of which local government cannot be excluded may adopt the 
following three steps of the suggested comprehensive framework to promote accountability, 
namely: 
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• Step 1:  Essentials in public accountability.  Ijeoma and Sambumbu (2013:296) aver 
that there are three core essentials to ensure public accountability.  The first core 
essential is information, it means that the public must have access to relevant 
information and it also requires that the public must be education and made aware of 
compliances measures to ensure if there is a breach that the public can take the 
appropriate initiatives to report on the abuse or misconduct of public officials to 
relevant authorities and forums.  The second core essential is justification means that 
the accused may be provided the opportunity to explain and justify their actions. While 
the last core essential entails consequences. Consequences implies that the department 
must take the necessary disciplinary steps or appropriate remedies to hold the officials 
to account, including imprisonment, reimbursing of funds or dismissals from 
employment (Ijeoma and Sambumbu, 2012:296).     
• Step 2:  Measures to improve public.   In this regard Ijeoma and Sambumbu 
(2013:296) emphasise that departments must apply a combination of measures to 
ensure public accountability.   
• Step 3: Monitoring and evaluate the effects of public accountability.  Ijeoma and 
Sambumbu (2013:296) maintain that the department must evaluate to determine 
whether public accountability has been effective including assessing the impact on 
service delivery processes, the improving of budgetary processes and public financial 
management and the promotion of good governance. 
 
The above oversight model and the above framework should be considered with the 
development of the proposed framework for oversight and accountability of municipalities in 
the Free State province.  
  
2.8.3   Consequence and Accountability Framework for Local Government 
 
The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) develop a draft consequence and 
accountability framework in 2015 based on continued poor audit outcomes of municipalities 
as provided by the Auditor-General in the annual audit outcomes reports.  The purpose of the 
draft consequences and accountability framework is to propose certain measures to strengthen 
governance and accountability in municipalities. The emphasis should be on consequences for 
non-performance. According to SALGA (2015:19), the draft consequences and accountability 
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framework was developed in particular to assist municipalities who obtains a disclaimer or 
adverse audit opinion from the Auditor-General.         
 
SALGA (2015:19) argue that if a municipality received a disclaimer or adverse audit opinion 
from the Auditor-General it implies that the municipal council of the particular municipality 
failed to ensure that the administrative branch has not complies with statutory and legislative 
prescripts concerning municipal financial management and concerning the implementation of 
its IDP.  SALGA (2015:20) argues that consequences for non-compliance should start with the 
municipal council.  In the case of a municipality who received an adverse disclaimer audit 
opinion it could means that the municipal council and municipal officials has fail to submit 
required documentation or deliberately submitted incorrect information or they tried to hide 
something.  The consequences for a municipality which obtained an adverse or a disclaimed 
audit opinion should be that these municipalities may not be entitled to receive any additional 
funding from the National Treasury, until these municipalities improve their performance 
though audit outcomes.   
 
SALGA (2015:24) provides that the consequence and accountability framework set out the 
responsibilities of the political and administrative leadership of the municipality related to 
governance, financial management, service delivery and inter-governmental relations.  It 
implies that the failure in each of these responsible areas must be highlighted and proposals 
must be made on how the regulatory has to be adopted to give effect to the consequence and 
accountability framework.  SALGA (2015:27) further indicated that the aim of the draft 
consequence and accountability framework for local government should not be to focus only 
on failure in performance, but the focus should be on what the consequences for non-
performance should be, in order to improve accountability in all municipalities. The draft 
consequences and accountability framework was presented to SALGA and the National 
Members Assembly on 24 to 26 March 2015 to discuss the possible full development and 
implementation. A resolution was taken to further develop the consequences and accountability 
framework for implementation in municipalities who received poor audit outcomes.   
 
According to SALGA (2019:7), the objectives for developing the consequences and 
accountability framework for local municipalities include the following: 
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• It will serve as a guideline on which consequences for which type of transgressions and 
non-performance must be apply; and 
• The intention is to promote a culture of accountability and to promote professional and 
ethical public administration with the aim to promote good governance and effective 
service delivery to local communities. 
 
SALGA (2015:8) further explain that the envisage structure of the consequences and 
accountability framework should be based on the following four aspects:  
 
• Key Municipal and other relevant legislation.  What consequences should be taken 
for non-compliance of the key municipal and relevant acts, policies such as the MSA, 
2003, Municipal Structures Act, 1998, MFMA, 2003, the Public Audit Amendment Act, 
2018, and relevant National Treasury regulations? 
• Consequences for non-compliance.  What role players should be responsible to 
invoke such consequences against the transgressors based on non-compliance with 
relevant acts, policies and regulations? 
• Implementation of consequences and enforcement.  What constitutional institutions 
should investigate the offenders? 
• Case studies.  What are the practical examples or case studies that can be used as 
examples where consequences where taken against transgressors? 
  
Although, no further SALGA documents or CoGTA documents were issued concerning the 
further development or implementation of the envisage consequence and accountability 
framework lesson can be learned from the initiative with the development of the oversight and 
accountability framework for municipalities in the Free State province.  One could argue that 
the envisage consequence and accountability framework did not achieve the required impact, 
due to the continued deterioration of all municipalities of the Free State province. 
 
2.9   FACTORS INHIBITING OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
The following factors which was outlined in the subsections below obstructing effective 
oversight and accountability in the three spheres of government. 
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2.9.1 Failure by legislatures to fulfil their oversight role to hold executives to account 
 
Oversight means that legislatures including parliament, provincial legislatures and the 
municipal council must fill their constitutional mandate to maintain oversight of the exercise 
of national, provincial and local executives including the implementation of legislation and any 
other organ of state. If parliament, as the national legislature, and parliamentary committees 
such as the Standing Committees of Public Account Committees (SCOPA), fail to hold national 
executives (Cabinet) to account they have abandoned their constitutional oversight function as 
provided in Section 55(2) and Section 92 of the Constitution, 1996. Section 92(2) clearly 
provides that members of Cabinet are accountable individually and collectively to Parliament 
for the manner in which they exercise their powers and perform their mandate.    Thornhill 
(2015:98) warns that the debates in Parliament over the last 20 years indicates that the ruling 
alliance without exception defended the actions of executives (Cabinet) instead of holding them 
to account for their actions or inactions.   An example is SCOPA decision to approve the Joint 
Investigation Team on the Government’s Arms Deal.  Obiyo (2007:60) argues that SCOPA 
decision on the Arms Deal means that SCOPA succumbed to pressure from the ruling alliance 
to defend wrong doings of the executives (Cabinet) instead of holding executives in this case 
the former President of the country to account.  Obiyo (2007:63) argues that in the case of the 
Arms Deal Report, SCOPA failed to ensure that a limit or threshold point of adequacy were 
satisfied, which must precede legitimate committee decisions through voting, therefore. the 
investigation fell substantially short of the threshold of minimal adequacy. However, although 
the minimum standard requirements of minimum adequacy were not met, the arms deal report 
was approved by a majority vote in the committee.  The majority endorsement of the Arms 
Deal Report by SCOPA was illegitimate.  If the Parliamentary oversight committees such as 
SCOPA does not perform its oversight role effectively it means that it failed its constitutional 
obligation and the democratic sovereignty of the South African people.   
 
Thornhill (2015:98) points out that the Parliamentary committee to investigate the cost of the 
Nkandla homestead project of the former President, the committee failed again and give in to 
the ruling alliance and the matter was never discussed by Parliament. The particular committee 
consisted of 12 members, of who 5 members represented the opposition parties.  As such when 
the issue was raised of the procedures and the timeline of the investigation concerning the 
Nkandla project, one of the members representing the ruling party simple stated that as a 
member of the ruling party he acts in accordance with his mandate. Due to the composition of 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
99 
 
the committee the matter was never discussed Parliament.  One could argue that the ruling 
party misused its majority representation in the committee to hold the former President to 
account.  Another example is that since the former Public Protectors State Capture Report was 
made know in November 2016, Parliament fails till date to discuss the matter in Parliament to 
hold the former President to account for his engagement in the state capture scandal.      
 
2.9.2 State capture and corruption 
 
Martin and Solomon (2017:2) defines state capture as the actions of individuals or groups from 
both public and private institutions by influencing the formation of laws, regulations and 
policies to their own personal benefit and gain.  Swilling, Bhorat, Buthelezi, Chipkin, Duma, 
Mondi, Peter, Qobo, and Friedenstein (2017:5) is of the opinion that state capture is a 
systematic and well planned and systematic organised by a group of people with well-
established relations, that involves repeating activities and transactions at a large and increasing 
scale.  On the other hand, Thornhill (2015:96) views a corrupt activity as any activity or action 
by a person in a position of authority with the intention to gain any personnel benefits from 
such an action which are in conflict with existing laws, policies, regulations or any other 
prescripts or code of conduct.   Whereas, Pauw, Van der Linde, Van der Linde, Fourie and 
Visser (2015:301) state that that corruption thrives when there is a failure to enforce laws, rules 
regulations or to apply any sanctions to a given situation.  Thus, laws and policies are flawed 
and in particular when there are no consequences for corrupt conduct and any acts of unethical 
conduct and acts of dishonesty.         
 
The former Public Protectors Report on State Capture was published on 02 November 2016.  
The matter was investigated after three complaints were received.  The first complaint came 
from Father Mayevb on of the Dominican order of Catholic Priests who compliant about the 
Gupta family involvement in corruption and allegations that the family offered cabinet 
positions to Mcebisi Jonas to be appointed as the Minister of Finance.  Another complaint from 
Father Mayevb was about allegations by Vytjie Mentor who claimed that the Gupta family 
asked her to drop the SAA route to India and to give it to the Gupta family.  A second complaint 
came from the leader of the opposition party, Mmusi Maimane, which complaint that the 
former President Jacob Zuma broke the Executive Ethics Code of Conduct based on media 
reports of the conduct of the former President and the involvement of the Gupta family 
members in the appointments of Ministers. A third complaint was received from an anonymous 
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member of public about governments influence when commercial banks refused to render 
banking services to Gupta owned companies (Van Niekerk, 2018:4; Potgieter and Govender, 
2016:2-3; Karim 2016:1-11).   
 
In light of the above, the former Public Protectors State Capture Report underlines the potential 
conflict of interest and violations of the Executive Ethics Code of Conduct and the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 by the former President in that he shared 
information with the Gupta family about the appointment of ministers.  The former Public 
Protectors State Capture Report reported that there were possible violations concerning the 
appointment of chief executive officers or directors to the boards of some state owed 
enterprises (SOEs).  The report further found that the board of Eskom failed to prevent fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure when the board approved the contract with Tegeta, a Gupta-owned 
family company.  The former Pubic Protector recommended that the former President must 
constitute a commission of inquiry to investigate the alleged corrupt allegations and that the 
Chief of Justice must appoint the head of the Commission who has to investigate the allegations 
as well as that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Office for serious Economic 
Offences must be notified in case a crime has been committed (Van Niekerk, 2018: 4-5).    
 
Since the announcement of the former Public Protectors State Capture Report no commission 
was appointed to investigate the allegations.  No individual till date has been convicted for a 
crime associated with state capture and alleged corrupt activities (Erasmus, 2019:3).  However, 
Woolman (2018:161) avers that the former Public Protectors State Capture Report give effect 
for a full-scale independent investigation into these different forms of corruption in that the 
former President himself created the recommended judge-led commission in January 2018.  In 
terms of Section 88 of the Constitution, 1996 which provided that the President may only run 
two terms, which meant that the former President could not run again a third term of office.  
The members of the ruling party the African National Council (ANC), chose Cyril Ramaphosa 
as its new party President and subsequently, President of the nation in December 2017. In 
January 2018, Mr. Ramaphosa appointed the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into state Capture 
to investigate the allegations. The Deputy Chief Justice, Raymond Zondo was appointed as the 
head of the Zondo Commission, assisted by five commissioners to hold hearings about the 
allegations which is open to the public and broadcasting live. After the May 2019 national 
elections Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa was inaugurated as the new President of the country.  In the 
State of the Nation Address (SONA) the President Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa announced the 
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establishment of the Office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions as an independent 
corruption directorate who will deal with serious corruption and associated offences in terms 
of Section 7 of the National Prosecution Act, (Act 32 of 1998) (Erasmus, 2019:2).     
 
Martin and Solomon (2017:2) point out that the shocking allegations of state capture not only 
undermine the efficiency of the state, especially where there is a direct relationship between 
state capture and corruption but it also undermines the rule of law. Furthermore, state capture 
also undermines the efficiency of the state and the constitutional mandated government bodies 
instated to maintain oversight and accountability. Martin and Solomon (2017:2) further 
maintain that state capture can only survives when the state capacity is weakening.  This takes 
place by appointing less than capable or corrupt people in positions of authority, especially in 
key positions.  State capture happens when governance structures, systems, laws and policies 
were   disobeyed.  Furthermore, there are no consequences for any wrong doings as a result of 
a lack and weakening of oversight, transparent and accountability structures and mechanisms.  
There is no doubt that the various corrupt activities and the shocking allegations of state capture 
damaged the integrity of the constitutional mandated, oversight organs of state and 
constitutional bodies to hold executives to account for their actions or inactions.  What is more 
shocking till date there were no consequences for any one till date.  
 
2.9.3 Ignorance of citizens 
 
Another factor that inhibiting oversight and accountability is the ignorance of citizens to hold 
the elected political representatives to account for their actions.   The ruling party won the May 
2019 elections which is an indication that although there are clear allegations of state capture 
by members of the ruling party the public continue to vote for the ruling party.  The apathy of 
citizens as in the case of the alleged state capture report creates the danger of government to 
being allowed to disobey laws, policies, regulations and to continue with unethical conduct and 
acts of dishonesty without being called to account for their actions or inactions (Thornhill, 
2015:95-96).       
 
2.9.4    Other reasons for oversight and accountability failures 
 
The Auditor-General (AGSA, 2018:9) reported that the following factors are major 
contributors to accountability failures in particular in local government; key positions and not 
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filled; a lack of adequate skills and a lack of oversight by municipal councils, councillors, 
including the mayor; political interferences by councillors in the administration of local 
government weakened oversight; the development of a culture of no consequences as a result 
of inadequate oversight and performance systems and process; and disobeying and continued 
non-compliances with key municipal legislations creates an environment that makes it easy to 
commit fraud and corruption.   In this regard Van der Waldt (2015:52) is of the view that the 
lack of effective oversight leads to instability and dysfunctionality of municipalities which 
creates an environment open to fraud and corruption.    
 
From the above discussions about the factors that inhibits oversight and accountability it may 
be argued that the shocking allegations of corrupt activities linked to the allegations of state 
capture by top government executives undermines the rule of law, and the functionality of the 
constitutional bodies to maintain oversight and accountability.   A concern is the development 
of a culture of no consequences. The lack of effective oversight and accountability creating 
loopholes for corruption, fraud and acts of dishonesty.   
 
2.10 CURRENT CHALLENGES CONCERNING OVERSIGHT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
Since 1996 local government has taken significant steps towards realising the goal of 
democratic and accountable and developmental local government. However, the majority of 
municipalities are still facing a number of challenges including the promotion of accountable 
government for local communities. The former Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG) State of Local Government Report (2009:71-75) showed that the 
majority of the municipalities were in distress. It was reported that the majority of the 
municipalities faced challenges such as huge service delivery backlog challenges, poor audit 
outcomes, credible budget, poor financial management, poor communication and 
accountability relations with communities, political interferences into the administration of 
municipalities corruption and fraud and insufficient capacity due to a shortage of scares skills 
(Mathane, 2013:26).   Venter in Van der Waldt et al. (2018:105) confirm that in particular the 
State of Local Government Report (2009:71-75) mentioned that poor financial management, a 
lack of control and accountability systems in the majority of the municipalities give rise to an 
increase in fraud, corruption and the misuse of municipal assets and funds.     
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In light of the above, Madumo (2015:162-163) also adds that local government faced the 
following challenges.  Firstly, the inability of municipalities to sustain themselves financially 
remains a major concern.  In this regard Madumo (2015:163) point out that most municipalities 
failed to institute effective mechanisms to increase their revenue collections.  Secondly, 
municipalities lack the capacity to deliver constant and regular services to their communities.  
The latter situation is worsened by political interferences and influencing with the appointment 
of service providers and other supply chain management related processes. Thirdly, failure of 
municipalities to comply with regulatory legislative frameworks and regulations remains a 
major concern. Madumo (2016: 163-164) suggested the following to improve the 
abovementioned challenges to ensure effective and efficient delivery of services and to reach 
optimum level of service delivery, namely: 
 
• There should be a clear distinction between politicians and administrators and their role 
and functions to ensure that both parties adhere to the provisions of the Municipal 
Structures Act, 1998; 
• Effective mechanisms must be implemented to monitor and prevent wasteful and 
fruitless expenditure in municipalities.  Municipalities must comply with SCM policies 
and regulations and prevent political influences concern in the appointment of service 
providers. 
• More emphasis should be placed on the usage of technology and knowledge to promote 
economic growth and development.  
•  There must be a single framework to be used as a performance indicator for all 
municipal officials across all municipalities in the country. Madumo (20151640 explain 
that municipal officials often fail to comply with relevant municipal legislative acts, 
policies and regulations as a result of a lack of capacity without any punitive action 
taken against them. 
 
The above suggestions should be implemented to overcome the many challenges facing by 
municipalities across the country.     
  
As a result of the poor performance of municipalities the former department of Provincial and 
Local government (DPLG) developed the Local Government Turnaround Strategy.  National 
government approved the comprehensive Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS) 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
104 
 
at the end of 2009, with the aim to address the above challenges as reported in the State of 
Local Government Report (2009:71-75). It was required from all municipalities to incorporate 
their own tailor-made Municipal Turnaround Strategy (MTAS) into their IDP as well as into 
their budgeting, monitoring and evaluation and reporting processes (Van Niekerk, 2012:55). 
The LGTAS was later replaced with the Department of Co-operative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) Back-to-Basic campaign in 2013 to respond to challenges 
identified by similar prior initiatives in local government.  It was argued that the LGTAS and 
the Back-to-Basic campaign did not achieve the required results to improve the performance 
of municipalities. According to Venter (in van der Waldt et al., 2018:105), the Back-to-Basic 
campaign focuses on five aspects namely: 
 
• Delivering of basic services.  CoGTA established an Inter-Ministerial Basic 
Service Delivery Task team to assist municipalities with fast-tracking service 
around the country.  
• Putting people first.  Measures have to be taken to ensure that all municipalities 
comply with the requirements of the MSA, 2000 to promote community 
participation.  Aspects such as the optimal functioning of ward committees, open 
municipal council meetings, and regular community satisfaction surveys must be 
introduced to promote community participation (Venter in Van der Waldt et al., 
20118:105).   
• Good governance.   Good governance is a constitutional requirement and 
therefore municipalities must be constantly monitored and evaluated on their 
ability to promote good governance of which accountability cannot be excluded. 
• Sound financial management.  National Treasury has legislated specific 
financial and reporting standards to improve financial management.  The aim of 
this is to reduce the number of disclaimer and qualified audit outcomes, to ensure 
that municipalities utilise their budgets effectively, improve the collection of 
revenue and supply chain management processes and to reduce municipal debt.    
• Building capabilities.  The aim of this is to build capacity by ensuring that 
competent and committed people are appointed in administrative positions.  
Furthermore, the campaign aims to ensure that the municipal administrative 
systems and processes are strengthened (Venter in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:105).   
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Except for the above, as mentioned in Section 2.8.3 of this chapter, SALGA developed the 
consequence and accountability framework to strengthen governance and accountability in 
municipalities. The emphasis of SALGA’s consequence and accountability framework is to 
ensure consequences for non-performance. It was argued that SALGA’s envisage consequence 
and accountability framework did not achieve the required impact, due to the continued 
deterioration of all municipalities of the Free State province. 
 
According to the former DPLG, the State of Local Government Report (2009) provides that 
most of the municipalities are in distress due to the following: 
 
• Political deployment and political interferences by political parties; 
• Blurred boundaries between political representatives (councillors) and municipal and 
municipal administration; 
• Poor management and leadership; 
• Ineffective oversight functions and poor accountability or lack of accountability; 
• Insufficient control systems; and  
• Lack of skills base for councillors.  
 
Except for the above challenges that were raised in 2009 the Auditor-General reported in the 
2016-2017 audit outcomes that most of the municipalities in the country are still in distress. 
Many, of which the municipalities of the Free State province cannot be excluded, are still facing 
various challenges including the promotion of accountable government for local communities 
(AGSA, 2018:22). In this regard the Auditor-General (AGSA, 2018:22) further indicated that 
one of the root causes of accountability failures at local government includes political 
infighting and interference at council level in the administration weakened oversight.  Except 
for the above short coming of political interference of municipal councillors in the 
administration of local government other root causes as reported by the Auditor-General 
(AGSA, 2018:22) that needs to be addressed by municipal councils of all municipalities as 
mentioned in Section 2.9.4 in this chapter include the following: 
 
• Vacancies and instability in key positions; 
• Inadequate skills led to a lack of oversight by council and insufficient implementation 
of financial and performance management systems by the municipal administration;  
© Central University of Technology, Free State
106 
 
• Leadership inaction or inconsistent action, created a culture of no consequences, as a 
result of inadequate performance systems and processes; 
• The blatant disregard for control measures including proper record keeping and the 
blatant non-compliance with key legislation makes it easy to commit fraud; 
• Leadership ignore repeated recommendations and warnings of risks; 
• Usage of consultants at a greater cost; and  
• Lack of proper support from provincial and national role players.   
 
According to the Auditor-General (AGSA, 2018:2), municipal councils failed in a total of 61% 
of municipalities to conduct investigations into all cases of unauthorised irregular and fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure in the 2016/2017 financial year.  Another concern is that inadequate 
skills of municipal councillors contributes to a lack of oversight by municipal councils 
including the mayor, which resulted into insufficient implementation and maintenance of 
financial and performance management systems by municipal administrations.   As a result of 
the failure of accountability mechanisms the oversight and accountable role of municipal 
councils in local government in the Free State needs to be increased.  The Auditor-General 
(AGSA, 2018:57) further reported that the Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 was introduced 
with the aim to recover losses and to enforce accountability against municipal officials 
responsible for financial losses.  The latter would strengthen accountability and enforce 
adequate consequences where accountability failures occurred.       
 
The above underlines the need for effective oversight and accountability in municipalities to 
hold executives to account as well as to ensure that the citizens hold the elected political 




In this chapter the concepts of oversight and accountability were clarified.  It was mentioned 
that oversight can be seen as a constitutionally mandated function of legislatures to scrutinise 
and oversee executive actions and mandated functions. Whereas, accountability occurs when 
political and public officials is answerable and responsible for their actions and the fulfilment 
of their duties within the framework of authority. Therefore, accountability requires to be 
answerable to various levels of control, including the legislature and judiciary. This goes 
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beyond procedural compliance to rules and orders as parliamentary oversight and judicial 
review of actions of the executive are indispensable condition of the doctrine of separation of 
powers. Parliament composed of elected office-bearers who account to the electorate, while 
the elected political office-bearers in municipalities have to account to the electorate within the 
municipal area.     
 
The Constitution, 1996 sets out clear directions on ensuring oversight and accountability in the 
three spheres of government. I was accentuated that Section 152(1) of the Constitution, 1996 
clearly requires from local government to provide a democratic and accountable government 
for local communities.     
 
The Chapter further underlines that in terms of Section 4(2) of the MSA, 2000 the municipal 
council of the municipality has the duty to exercise the municipality’s executive and legislative 
authority and use their resources of the municipality in the best interests of the local community 
as to ensure democratic and accountable local government.  Section 55(1)(a) of the MSA, 2000 
provides that as head of administration the MM of a municipality is, subject to the policy 
directions of the municipal council, responsible and accountable to the formation and 
development of an economical effective, efficient and accountable administration.  In addition, 
the MFMA, 2003, clearly outlines oversight and accountable duties and responsibilities of 
municipal officials and councillors.    
 
From the discussion about international oversight and accountable practices, models and 
frameworks it was mentioned that the UK introduced four key aspects to promote 
accountability nationally and locally namely; clarity of accountability structures lines; 
appropriateness of control measures to ensure that people must be held accountable in a fair 
manner; sufficiency of information are required to judge whether accountability and 
responsibilities have been performed; and clarity of consequences requires that there is 
consistency regarding sanctions and penalties to hold people to account for failure to perform.  
Except for the above four key aspects to upheld accountability the UK introduced a shared 
service model or system in local government to promote accountability.  In this manner local 
councils can share services without outsourcing it to private businesses.   By sharing services 
local councils can retain more control over the shared services than an outsourced service.      
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It was underlined that in Botswana’s local authorities are accountable to the Ministry of Local 
Government, to which they are required to submit reports on their projects and performance. It 
was argued that it is easier and more convenient to hold locally elected representatives and 
officials accountable than those at the centre or national government.  As in the case of the UK 
committees Botswana fulfil a key oversight and accountable role. The Local Authorities Public 
Accounts Committee (LAPAC) is responsible for enforcing performance in the implementation 
of local projects and programmes.  Oversight institutions in Botswana include the Directorate 
on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), and the Ombudsman Regional Councils that was 
established in terms the Constitution of the country.  
 
Regarding the discussion about oversight and accountability at local government in Namibian 
it was mentioned that local authorities range from those which are independent and 
autonomous, to those which are fully dependent on central government support. It was further 
underlined that the Namibian Constitution does not refer to any degree of autonomy for local 
authorities, nor to any powers to be allocated to and exercised by such bodies.  It was further 
mentioned that regional councils are responsible for the oversight functions in terms of Article 
108 of the Namibian Constitution local authorities are accountable to regional councils for their 
functions.   
 
In the context local government in Kenya it was emphasised that local governments as the 
centres of public administration for citizens, must be governed by widely accepted principles 
of good governance (PGG) with the aim to promote accountability. On the discussion about 
Malawi it was mentioned that Malawi introduced the local government accountability tool to 
ensure accountability. The accountability tool requires that local leaders must involve the 
communities by setting up community meetings and to involve communities in participatory 
resource assessment activities and to establish structures to involved communities and to 
promote awareness.    
 
Front the discussion about China it was mentioned that China introduced the Objective 
Responsibility System (ORS) in which governments at higher administrative levels set targets 
for lower-level administrators to hold them to account.  While, in Brazil it was discussed that 
accountability can be divided between direct and indirect power of sanction, for certain 
accountability institutions have only the ability to transfer their findings to other actors that 
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may establish punishments.  It was mentioned that in Brazil that the Federal Public Prosecutor's 
Office fulfil a key role in the promotion of accountability in Brazil.   
 
In the context of South Africa, lessons can be learned from the three models/frameworks to 
promote oversight and accountability in local government.   The comprehensive framework for 
government departments focuses on three steps namely; the essentials in public accountability; 
measures to improve public accountability; and monitoring and evaluating the effects of public 
accountability.  Local government can learn from the above three steps to ensure that the public 
must have access to relevant municipal information as well as that local communities must be 
made aware of the measures to ensure compliance to hold councillors and public officials to 
account for failure in service delivery.  Another lesson from the comprehensive framework of 
accountability is that the political structure of the municipality must ensure that there are 
consequences for non- compliance by taking the required steps to hold officials to account to 
for their actions.   Measures to improve accountability means that municipalities must apply a 
combination of measures to ensure public accountability.  Lastly, monitoring and evaluate the 
effects of public accountability is to determine what is the impact of accountability on service 
delivery.   
 
SALGA develop a draft consequence and accountability framework in 2015 based on 
continued poor audit outcomes as provided by the Auditor-General of municipalities to 
promote accountability and to enforce consequences for failure to perform.  It was emphasised 
that the purpose of the draft consequences and accountability framework is to propose certain 
measures to strengthen governance and accountability in municipalities.  The emphasis should 
be on consequences for non-performance such as in the case of municipalities who obtained an 
adverse or a disclaimed audit opinion. Consequences in this regard could be that these 
municipalities may not be entitled to receive any additional funding from the National 
Treasury, until these municipalities improve their performance though audit outcomes.  It was 
argued that SALGA’s envisage consequence and accountability framework did not achieve the 
required impact, due to the continued deterioration of all municipalities of the Free State 
province. 
 
The discussion about the factors that inhibits oversight and accountability it was argued that a 
lack of oversight and accountability leads to the development of a culture of no consequences 
that creates a loophole for corruption, fraud and acts of dishonesty.  Regarding the current 
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oversight and accountability challenges of local government it was mentioned that majority of 
municipalities are still facing several challenges including the promotion of accountable 
government for local communities.  Failure of municipalities to comply with regulatory 
legislative frameworks and regulations remains a major concern.  The following chapter  
provided a theoretical overview of legislative and political oversight and accountability in the 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE AND POLITICAL 





The previous literature chapter provided the theoretical overview of oversight and 
accountability in the South African public sector with specific reference to local government. 
In the previous chapter the statutory and regulatory legislative frameworks, principles and 
requirements of oversight and accountability within the three spheres were discussed.  
Followed by an overview of international best practices, models and frameworks of oversight 
and accountability, followed by a discussion of national oversight and accountable models or 
frameworks and the current challenges of oversight and accountability in local government 
were discussed.     
 
This literature chapter examined the legislative or legal oversight and accountability with a 
discussion about the separation of powers, followed by a discussion about legislative 
mechanisms to promote oversight and accountability.  The constitutional bodies to strengthen 
oversight and accountability were discussed.   In the discussion about political oversight and 
accountability the various mechanisms to promote political accountability were outlined, 
followed by a discussion about a discussion about the municipal council, municipal councillors, 
mayor or executive mayors, the speaker and other municipal committees.  The current 
challenges pertaining to political oversight were discussed followed by a discussion about the 
Code of Conduct for municipal councillors’ emphasis on the promotion of oversight and 
accountability.   
 
3.2. LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
  
According to Malapane (2015:865), legislative oversight refers to the constitutional obligation 
of the legislatures to oversee the functions of the executives and to hold them to account and 
to ensure compliance and delivery on agreed upon objectives for the achievement of 
government priorities. According to Sikhakane and Reggy (2011:88), legal or legislative 
accountability refers to the constitutional and legislative provisions which set out clear 
performance mandates and assigned duties that must be adhered to by all three spheres of 
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government.  It implies that those assigned the duty to deliver services are held accountable if 
they fail to perform their constitutional and legislative mandates. Whereas, Hussein (1999:12) 
states that legal accountability refers to the relationships between an organ of state and other 
bodies established by the legislature to exercise legal control or sanctions. Kakumba and Fourie 
(2007:654) agrees with the above definition where accountability relationships refer to a large 
extent to relations with external oversight bodies such as legislative and constitutional 
structures or bodies such as the Auditor-General the Public Protector, the Public Service 
Commission to ensure that the three spheres of government comply with established standards 
and performance mandates. Whereas, Fox (2000:4) is of the opinion that legislative 
accountability limits the use and sanctions the abuse of political power. Therefore, in terms of 
the above definitions one could argue that legislative or legal oversight legislative oversight 
refers to the constitutional obligation of the legislatures to oversee the functions of the 
executives and to hold them to account.  
 
Except for the above the National Treasury (2011:29) states that each sphere of government 
has a specific constitutionally defined mandate, powers and responsibilities. Therefore, each 
sphere of government is direct accountable to its legislature (Parliament or provincial 
legislature) or in the context of local government, the municipal council. In addition, Section 
100 of the Constitution, 1996 empowers national government to intervene in the affairs of a 
provincial government if it fails to fulfil its executive functions. Whereas, Section 139, of the 
Constitution, 1996 allows a provincial government to intervene in local government affairs if 
a particular municipality fails to carry out an executive obligation.   
 
The constitutional bodies to strengthen oversight and accountability are discussed in Section 
3.4 of this chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Separation of powers  
 
A starting point for the purpose of this study is to outline the important role of separation of 
powers to ensure accountability and oversight within the three spheres of government.  
Separation of powers as provided in the Constitution, 1996 also known as trias politicas forms 
the basis to safeguard the young democracy which was established in 1994 in South Africa 
(Malapane, 2015:863). The intention of the classical separation of powers between the 
legislature, the executive and judiciary founded by John Locke and Charles de Montesquieu 
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was to promote accountability and to ensure checks and balances (oversight) in government 
(Myeni and Buccus in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:61-63). Whereas, Van der Waldt 
(2015:49) point out that the intention of Montesquieu’s separation of powers was to guard 
against the abuse of state powers and to protect human rights.  The latter gives effect to the 
concept of oversight, which include political, legal, strategic, administrative, financial and 
ethical elements.  Heywood (in Van der Waldt, 2015:50) avers that the function of oversight is 
aimed at and to prevent abuse of power, arbitrary actions, illegal and unconstitutional conduct 
by government. 
 
However, the current Constitution, 1996 does not conform the classic notion of separation of 
powers.  The separation between the legislative authority and the executive authority vested in 
the President and Cabinet and the judicial authority is not clearly separated as uphold in the 
classical concept of separation of powers. The reason for this is that the President is elected by 
the National Assembly, which can dismiss the President if there is a misconduct or if there is a 
notion of confidence in the President. In addition, the executive has both judicial and legislative 
powers and is not systematically separated from the legislature. The President has legal powers 
to promulgate regulations with the force of law that means that the president has legislative 
competence. Furthermore, the President has powers regarding the judiciary through the 
competence to appoint judges and to pardon and reprieve offenders. The President, the Deputy 
President, and members of the Cabinet requires the confidence of National Assembly to remain 
in office and they are accountable to the legislature (Parliament) for their actions and the 
performance of their office (Myeni and Buccus in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:61-63). 
 
In light of the above, Section 92(2) of the Constitution, 1996 requires that member of Cabinet 
is accountable either individually or collectively to Parliament concerning the manner in which 
they exercise their powers and the performance of their responsibilities or functions. While, 
Section 55(2) of the Constitution, 1996 requires the legislature in exercising its legislative 
power to maintain oversight of the national executive authority, including the implementation 
of legislation. In terms of Section 114 of the Constitution, 1996 the provincial legislature must 
provide mechanisms to ensure that all provincial executive organs of state are accountable and 
to maintain oversight of the provincial executive authority including the implementation of 
legislation. In terms of local government as discussed on the previous chapter, Section 152(1) 
of the Constitution, 1996 clearly requires from local government to provide a democratic and 
accountable government for local communities.     
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Although the Constitution, 1996 clearly provides that legislatures are mandated to oversee the 
activities of the executive, which entails that the executives are accountable to the legislature 
and that the legislature must makes provision for separation of powers between legislative, 
executive and the judiciary in South Africa, the countries democracy remains fragile.  The 
reason for this is that the separation of powers has been perceived as ambiguous in nature 
between the legislative and executive branch in the adopted political system.  In that the 
executives appears before the legislature or committees of Parliament, but the executives seem 
to be reluctant to provide clear answers about the manner in which their exercise their powers 
and the performance of their functions.  The challenge is that the executives tend to provide 
blurred responses to such an extent that some of the matters are left to the judiciary to provide 
answers.  The political will to exercise the constitutional mandated oversight function of 
legislatures to hold the executives to account remains a challenge (Malapane, 2016:863; 
Thornhill, 2015:98-100; Van der Waldt, 2015:48-50).   
 
The latter and allegation of corruption and state capture as discussed in Chapter 2 of this study 
leads to the emerging culture of avoidance of the constitutional mandated functions of oversight 
by the legislatures. Another concern that hampers legal accountability is the continued 
avoidance of accountability by executives to appears before oversight committees such as 
SCOPA to provide clear answers for their actions or inaction. The latest tendency is to leave 
the matters to the judiciary to provide answers to such questions of legitimacy.  The latter 
occurs, despite that the Constitution, 1996 demarcates the powers of each of the three branches 
of government and clearly mandated that the legislature must oversee the activities of the 
executives to hold them to account for their actions or in actions (Malapane, 2015:863).    
       
In the context of local government Section 151(2) of the Constitution, 1996 provides that the 
executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in the municipal council.  
According to CoGTA (2013:5), the Constitution, 1996 does not provide for a separation of 
powers in local government.  The executive and the legislature are therefore not separate 
branches as is the case in the national and provincial spheres of government. The municipal 
council makes by-laws and needs to ensure that they are executed. The electorate knows that 
the municipal council is responsible for policy making and governance. This puts the 
responsibility on the electorate to hold the municipal council accountable to implement their 
legislative mandate (Malapane, 2015:863; Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits, 2016:119).    
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SALGA (2015:20-21) agrees with the above statement that there is no separation of powers in 
the context of local government as in the case of national and provincial government between 
the legislature and the executive branches. However, SALGA (2015:20-21) argues that with 
the introduction of the speaker in municipalities who serves as the chairperson of the municipal 
council and the subsequent establishment of the municipal public accounts committees 
(MPACs) who acts as an internal oversight committee of municipalities set the tone for the 
roll out of a model of separation of functions between the legislative and executive.  SALGA 
(2015:20) further argues that except for the above the Section 80 of the Municipal Structures 
Act, 1998 committees support the political executives therefore Section 80 committees reports 
to the executive mayor or the executive committee. On the other hand, according to Section 
79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, committees are mechanisms to oversee political 
executives and are accountable to the municipal council.  The function of the Section 79 
committees is the responsibility of the speaker. A concern is that political deployment and 
interferences undermines the functionality of MPACs to fulfil its oversight role effectively. 
Therefore, failure to ensure that the Section 80 and Section 79 function effectively requires 
strong political accountability to ensure that councillors who do not fulfil their responsibility 
must be removed (SALGA, 2015:20-21; Sibanda, 2017:316).  It was mentioned in Chapter 2 
of this study that the roles and responsibilities of the municipal council should always be 
carried out with a clear distinction between oversight and political interference in 
administration as defined in the Section 52 and Section 103 of the MFMA, 2003, as well as in 
the Code of Conduct for Councillors, which is defined in Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000.       
 
Having considered the above one could argue that idea of separation of powers between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches is to guard against the abuse of powers and to 
protect human rights of the public.  It was further argued that the separation of powers in South 
Africa and in particular in local sphere of government are unambiguous.  One could further 
argue that the absence of a political will to ensure that legislatures fulfil their constitutional 
mandated oversight role to hold the executives to account coupled with the reluctance or 
avoidance of executives to provide clear answers for their actions undermines the idea of 
separation of powers and it undermines the prescripts of the Constitution, 1996.  Another 
concern is that political interferences in local sphere of government undermines the 
functionality of MPACs to fulfil their oversight role effectively. It may be concluded that a 
strong political will and political accountability is required to oversee that the municipal 
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council fulfil their constitutional mandated oversight function and to hold the administration 
to account for their actions and inactions.   
 
3.3 LEGISLATIVE MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE OVERSIGHT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
In terms of Section 55(2) of the Constitution, 1996 the National Assembly (NA) has to put 
mechanisms in place to ensure that all executive organs of state of the national sphere of 
government are fulfilling and maintaining their oversight and accountable role.  Section 55 of 
the Constitution, 1996 provides that the legislature must establish mechanisms to uphold 
oversight of the national executive authority.  Furthermore, the Constitution, 1996, further 
provides in Section 92(2) that the members of Cabinet are accountable to Parliament 
(Legislative branch of national government) regarding the way they exercise their powers and 
the way they perform their functions. While Section 93(2) of the Constitution, 1996, further 
provides that the Deputy Ministers are also accountable to Parliament for how they exercise 
their powers and fulfil their functions (Thornhill, 2015:81-82; Legislative Sector, 2012:9-11).  
 
The provincial legislatures are mandated in terms of Section 114(2)(a) of the Constitution,  
1996, to establish mechanisms to ensure that provincial executive organs of state of the 
province are accountable to the provincial legislature. While, Section 133(2) of the 
Constitution, 1996, provides that the executive councils of all nine provinces are also 
accountable to the provincial legislatures for the manner that they exercise their functions. At 
local sphere the municipal council is required in terms of Section 151(2) of the Constitution,  
1996, is required to provide reasons for their actions (Legislative Sector, 2012:12-15).  
 
Except for the above constitutional requirements, the Constitution, 1996, also sets out the 
prescripts and crucial roles of responsibilities assigned to political and public office-bearers as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.1) of this study. Section 84(2) of the Constitution, 1996 
provides the responsibility roles and functions of the President, while Section 92(1) 
emphasises the responsibility role of the Deputy President and Ministers. Section 127(1) 
clearly assigns specific responsibilities to the premiers of the nine provinces, while Section 
151(2) states that the responsibility to fulfil the municipal functions is vested in the municipal 
councils. Lastly, Section 96(1) of the Constitution, 1996, provides that members of the Cabinet 
and Deputy Ministers’ conduct must be in accordance with the Code of Conduct for these 
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political office-bearers (Legislative Sector, 2012:11; Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits 2016:119; 
Thornhill, 201581). 
 
Section 195(1) of the Constitution, 1996 provides the basic values and principles of the public 
administration. These principles include, that all political and public officials must set a high 
standard of professional ethics and that must be promoted and maintained. It also maintains 
that services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias and that 
functionaries and administration institution must be accountable.  The above constitutional 
principles have implications for all functionaries, political and public officials. One could 
argue that public functionaries’ day to day actions and interactions should be guided by these 
principles (Holtzhausen in Draai et al. 2017:94-95; Thornhill, 2015:82). 
 
According to Adeyemi, Akindele, Aluko and Agesin (2012:84), the Constitution, 1996 
empowers a legislature to hold functionaries and organs of state to account. In the case of an 
allegation of misconduct or corruption an internal or independent inquiry has to take place. In 
terms of Section 89 of the Constitution, 1996, the national and provincial legislature has the 
power to impeach the individual, remove them or suspend them from office for a period of 
time. Adeyemi et al. (2012:84) are further of the view that the accused person might also decide 
to resign before trial.   
 
The following section discussed the constitutional bodies established to strengthen 
accountability and oversight in the three spheres of government.   
 
3.4 CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES TO STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
In terms of Section 181(1) of the Constitution, 1996 the following constitutional institutions 
must strengthen constitutional democracy namely; the Auditor- General, Public Protector; The 
Human Rights Commission; the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights 
of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; the Commission for Gender Equality, and 
the Electoral Commission (Mphaisha, 2015:102).  Section 181(2), of the Constitution, 1996 
provides that the Chapter 9 institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution,  
1996 and that these institutions must be impartial and exercise their powers and perform their 
functions without fear, favour or prejudice (Craythorne, 2006:293).  Section 181(3) of the 
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Constitution, 1996 provides that other organs of state, must provide assistance and protection 
to the Chapter 9 institutions to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity and 
effectiveness. While, Section 181(4), of the Constitution, 1996 further provides that no person 
or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the Chapter 9 institutions. Lastly, Section 
181(5) of the Constitution, 1996 provides that these institutions are accountable to the National 
Assembly and must report on their activities and the performance of their functions to the 
Assembly at least on an annual basis.  
 
Section 194(1) of the Constitution, 1996 provides that the Public Protector, the Auditor-
General or a member of a Commission established in terms of Chapter 9 may be removed from 
office only on the ground of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence, or a finding to that effect 
by a committee of the National Assembly, and the adoption by the National Assembly of a 
resolution calling for that person’s removal from office.  Section 194(2) of the Constitution,  
1996 further outlines that resolution of the National Assembly concerning the removal from 
office of the Auditor-General or Public Protector must be adopted with a supporting vote of at 
least two thirds of the members of the Assembly, or a member of a Commission must be 
adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly.  For the purpose 
of this study that focused in particular on oversight and accountability the Auditor-General, 
Public Protector, Public Service Commission and the National Prosecuting Authority were 
discussed below.    
 
3.4.1 The Auditor-General 
 
According to Munzhedzi (2016:7) and Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:121), the Auditor-
General is a constitutional body established in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution, 1996 as 
an oversight body with the function to oversee the management of public finance on behalf of 
Parliament.  The functions of the Auditor-General includes inter alia to ascertain, investigate 
and audit and report on all the accounts, financial statements and financial management of all 
national and provincial departments and administrations and all municipalities and municipal 
entities (Fourie and Opperman, 2015:14; Munzhedzi, 2016:7; South Africa Yearbook, 
2009:228).   
 
The Auditor-General as the supreme audit institution of South Africa is responsible to 
strengthen and promote the country’s democracy by ensuring and enabling oversight and 
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accountability and good governance in the public sector.  The Auditor-General provides world-
class audits and reports on the accounts, financial statements and financial managements of all 
municipalities, national and provincial state departments. The South Africa Yearbook 
(2009:228) further asserts that auditing of public sector departments and organs of state 
involves investigating and evaluating government and related institution’s financial-
management practices, performance and compliance with legal requirements. According to 
Gildenhuys (1993:92), the responsibilities of the Auditor-General differ completely from those 
of private auditors. Private auditors are responsible for auditing the financial transactions and 
accounts of the public and private organisations. Private auditing organisations such as KPMG 
are also used by public sector departments to audit their books. 
 
The Auditor-General must further audit and report on the consolidated financial statements of 
national, all provincial governments as required by Section 8 to 19 of the PFMA, 1999 and of 
all municipalities and municipal entities as required by Section 12(2) of the MFMA, 2003. In 
addition, the Auditor-General may audit and report on the accounts and financial statements 
and financial management of any public entity and any other institution which is funded by 
national or provincial revenue or is authorized in terms of any legislation to receive funds for 
a public purpose (Fourie and Opperman, 2015:14).  In terms of Section 189(3), of the 
Constitution, 1996 the Auditor-General must submit audit reports to any legislature that has a 
direct interest in the audit and to any other authority prescribed by national legislation. All 
reports must be made public.  
 
The Constitution, 1996 provides in Section 188(1), 2(a), (3) and (4) the functions of the 
Auditor-General.  Section 189 of the Constitution, 1996 requires from Parliament to appoint 
an Auditor-general for a five to seven years fixed and non- renewable term (Thornhill, 
2015:85).  In this regard Gildenhuys (2018:29-30) point out that the general functions of the 
Auditor-General concerning local government include the following: 
 
• To ensure that the accounts and financial statements of municipalities are compiled in 
accordance with the prescribed requirements and that proper and generally acceptable 
accounting practices and procedures have been followed; 
• In the case where a municipality spent public funds illegally the Auditor-General may 
request a court of law to pronounce the expenditure irregular and may instruct the 
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responsible councillor or municipal official by way of a court order to repay the sum of 
money which was spent illegally; 
• In the case where the Auditor-General finds that public funds due to a municipality 
have not been properly collected, and brought to account, or that a financial loss has 
occurred as a result of mismanagement of funds or maladministration the Auditor-
General may recover the loss directly form the responsible municipal official.      
 
In the context of local government Section 4(3) of the Public Audit Act, (Act 12 of 1995) 
provides that the Auditor-General has to convey a report on the accounts of a municipality to 
the chairperson of the municipal council and to the accounting officer of the municipality (Van 
Niekerk and Dalton-Brits, 2016:121).  In addition, Fourie and Opperman (2015:14-15) and 
Gildenhuys (2018:30) state that the Auditor-General must prepare a report concerning the audit 
of a municipality or municipal entity and such report much reflect an opinion or conclusion on 
the following: 
 
• Whether the financial statements fairly present the financial position of the municipality 
or municipal entity at a specific date, and whether it comply with the applicable 
financial framework and legislation relating to financial matters, financial management 
and related matters; 
• Whether all expenditure has been properly authorized by the Municipal council;   
• Whether all income has been collected in accordance with prescriptions; 
• Whether proper accounting practices have been followed, and whether the internal 
control mechanisms will prevent any losses; 
• That no fraud or corruption can take place which cannot be detected by the audit 
process; 
• To ensure that any fraud or corruption discovered is reported to the appropriate 
authorities, such as the Auditor-General and the local public protector; 
• Whether the municipality concern takes relevant factors into account when making 
decisions; and  
• The Auditor-General may report on whether the municipality resources were produced 
economically and utilized efficiently and effectively.   
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In light of the above, the Auditor-General report is submitted to the chief executive officer of 
the municipality concerned. Gildenhuys (2018:31) further points out that on receipt of the 
Auditor-General report the chief executive officer must submit the report to the chairperson of 
the municipal councillor to the chairperson of the executive committee.  The chief executive 
officer explanations of any discrepancies as indicated in the Auditor-General report must be 
placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the municipal council.  In this regard Van Niekerk 
and Dalton-Brits (2016:121) explain that in terms of Section 4(3)(c) and (d) of the Public Audit 
Act, 1995 the municipal council must not discuss the Auditor-General’s report behind closed 
doors. Gildenhuys (2018:31) further explains that the executive committee must advise the 
municipal council on any required corrective measures to be taken or advise it to accept and 
condone the chief executive officer explanations.  The municipal council must report back to 
the Auditor-General concerning the required steps it has taken to correct and to rectify any 
discrepancies.   
      
In terms of Section 3(b) of the Public Audit Amendment Act (Act 5 of 2018) the Auditor-
General has the power to take any appropriate remedial action and to issue a certificate of debt 
where an accounting officer or accounting authority has failed to comply with a remedial 
action.  In addition, Section 5(A) of the Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 provides that where 
a material irregularity resulted in a financial loss to the state, and the accounting officer or the 
accounting authority has failed to implement the recommendations of the Auditor-General’s 
audit report, the remedial action taken by the Auditor-General must include a directive to the 
accounting officer or the accounting authority to determine the amount of the loss, and to 
recover such a loss from the responsible person such as a municipal councillor or a municipal 
official.    
 
Thus, the Auditor-General fulfil a critical important role to report on the accounts, financial 
statements, and financial management of all three spheres of government, including all 
municipalities and all municipal entities, as well as to assess whether municipalities comply 
with the relevant requirements of the MFMA, 2003. The amendments of the Public Audit 
Amendment Act, 2018 should have a positive impact on implementing consequences in that it 
deals with the recovery where losses have been suffered and enforcing accountability against 
municipal officials and councillors responsible for such losses.    
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3.4.2 The Public Protector 
 
The Public Protector as one of the accountability mechanisms has the power as provided in 
Section 182(1) of the Constitution, 1996 to investigate any conduct in state affairs or 
concerning public administration of any of the three spheres of government, which includes 
the local sphere of government, which is either alleged or suspected to be improper or it may 
result in any indecency or prejudice. Section 182(1) further requires that the Public Protector 
must report on that conduct and must take the required remedial action.   Furthermore, the 
Public Protector must be accessible to all persons and to all communities and the reports must 
be open to the public unless exceptional circumstances as determined in terms of national 
legislation, require that a report be kept confidential.   In terms of Section 181(2) of the 
Constitution, 1996 the Public Protector has the additional powers and functions prescribed by 
national legislation. Section 181(2), of the Constitution, 1996 further provides that the Public 
Protector may not investigate court decisions.  In terms of Section 183, the Constitution of 
1996 the Public Protector is appointed for a non-renewable period of seven years.  Thus, the 
Public Protector fulfill a key role to strengthening constitutional democracy, by maintaining 
transparency and public accountability (Munzhedzi, 2016:6; Thornhill, 2016:130-131; 
Thornhill, 2015:84-85).    
 
According to Pienaar (2000:6), Section 6 of the Public Protector Act, (Act 23 of 1994), 
provides that the Public Protector has the powers to investigate any matter reported to him/her. 
The public may lodge a complaint to the Public Protector by means of written or oral 
declaration made under oath. A member of the office of the Public Protector shall render 
necessary assistance, free of charge.  Section 6 of the Public Protector Act, 1994, further states 
that the Public Protector shall on his/her own initiative or on receipt of a complaint, investigate 
any maladministration in connection with the affairs of any state institution.  Public Protector 
must also report on the conduct in state affairs, or in any sphere of government or its 
administration and take the required appropriate remedial action (Van der Walt in Thornhill, 
van Dijk and Ile, 2014:307; Van der Waldt, 2016:154; Hussein, 1999:25).   
 
According to Pauw, Van der Linde, Fourie and Visser (2015:308), the Public Protector is a 
constitutional institution responsible to investigate allegations of government fraud and unfair 
practices on behalf of members of the public. Van der Walt (in Thornhill, van Dijk and Ile, 
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2014:307) claim that in a democratic development state public institution such as the Public 
Protector assist government to provide services of an acceptable standard to all citizens. The 
Public Protector not only receives but has to investigate complaints from political parties, civil 
society and all sectors in South Africa such as complaints about basic service delivery, health 
care services, water and basic electricity supplies, corruption and ethical behavior of the 
executive to name but a few.    
 
According to Thornhill (2016:148), the public protector as one of the chapter 9 constitutional 
institutions is the guardian of accountability and ethical conduct.   However, some of the 
remedial actions concerning the Nkandla project about the former President’s homestead 
prescribed by the former Public Protector was questioned by the former President, the Cabinet 
and National Assembly.  In fact, the National Assembly tried to protect the former president’s 
failure to comply with the former Public Protectors remedial actions and to give effect to the 
findings.  The Constitutional Court provided a clear response by declaring that the remedial 
action as prescribed by the Public Protector means exactly what it implies.  Thus, the 
Constitutional Court justify the role of the public protector that implies that the President, the 
National Assembly and the Cabinet are obliged to give effect to the provisions of the Public 
Protector.  A concern is the current Public Protector Busiswe Mkhwebane who occupied the 
office since late 2016 loyalty to the Constitution were questioned.  The current Public 
Protector’s was criticized about the findings of her report affecting ABSA and the South 
African Reserve Bank.    
 
Furthermore, the current Public Protector was also criticized in the Pretoria high court over her 
judgement to set aside the report about the former premier of the Free State province Ace 
Magashule and former agriculture Member of Executive Council (MEC) Mosebenzi Swane 
involvement in the Gupta-linked Vrede dairy farm corruption investigations.  In her application 
to appeal the Vrede dairy judgement by the high court, the Public Protector argues that it was 
wrong to use the provisional report of the former Public protector as a standard to measure the 
legality of her (Busiswe Mkhwebane) report because it had no legal status in that it was only a 
“working document or work in progress akin to a draft judgement”.  However, the high court, 
argues that the differences between the reports of the former Public Protector and the report of 
the current Public Protector affected the legality of the latest report. The former public protector 
report had sought to give effect to an earlier investigation by the National Treasury and its 
recommendations, while the current Public Protectors report had come to a different view. The 
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high court mentioned that the basis for the current Public Protector to come to such a conclusion 
to was unclear and that it points to ineptitude or gross negligence.  Furthermore, the judge 
claims that no explanation was given by the current Public Protector for the changes to the 
report (Marrian 2019:30).  
 
From the above it can be deduced that the there is no doubt that the Public Protector is a key 
constitutional body to upheld accountability, to maintain transparency and the constitutional 
democracy of the country.  The constitutional mandate is provided to the office of the Public 
Protector in terms of Section 181(2) of the Constitution, 1996 while Section 7 of the Public 
Protector Act, 1994 provided that the Public Protector has significant powers and influences 
over the three spheres of government of which local government cannot be excluded.  One 
could argue that the office of the Public Protector may investigate any activities of 
municipalities and make the findings of such reports must be make known to the public.    
 
3.4.3 Public Service Commission (PSC) 
 
Although local government falls outside the mandate of the PSC it is a key oversight 
constitutional institution.   Munzhedzi (2016:9) states that the Public Service Commission 
(PSC) is mandated by Chapter 10 of the Constitution, 1996 to fulfill an oversight and 
monitoring role of the entire public service which include the national and provincial 
government.  It is also required from the PSC to promote the following values and principles 
of public administration as provided in Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996, namely to 
promote and maintain high standards of professional ethics; to provide services in an 
impartially, fair, equitable and without bias; and to ensure accountability.    
 
Munzhedzi (2016:7), further points out that the PSC introduced the system of financial 
disclosures by senior managers or senior management services (SMS) to address conflict of 
interest issues when government senior managers want to do business with the government.  A 
concern is that the compliance rate concerning the declarations of conflict of interest have not 
been effective to enhancing accountability.  In this regard, Mabuza (2017:1) mentioned that 
during the 2016/2017 financial year contracts of R165 million were awarded to suppliers of 
which government employees including political office-bearers had an interest.  Mabuza 
(2017:2) further mentioned that at a total of 31 of the audited government departments, 
employees had failed to declare their own interest in awards of R54 million as part of 
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procurement process or through annual declarations, while employees failed to declare their 
family members’ interest in awards of R274 million.  Another concern was also raised by 
Mkhabela (2018:1) that the PSC is the only Chapter 10 institution dedicated to overseeing the 
performance of the public service, however the PSC has said and done nothing about alleged 
allegations about state capture.   
 
Mkhabela (2018:1) explain that when media report revealed that the former President Mr Jacob 
Zuma introduced his son, to a senior official of the Department of Mineral Resources, with 
clear instruction to give his son deals in a manner not in accordance with Section 195 of the 
Constitution, 1996, the PSC fails to investigate the alleged unethical behaviour.  One could 
argue that the above has serious implications in that the PSC is mandated by the Constitution,  
1996 to promote and maintain high standards of professional ethics and to ensure accountability 
in the South African public service. Although local government falls outside the mandate of 
the PSC it is a key oversight constitutional institution to promote oversight at national and 
provincial spheres of government. 
 
3.4.4. National Prosecuting Authority 
 
In terms of Section 179 of the Constitution, 1996 and the National Prosecuting Authority Act 
(Act 32 of 1998) the National Prosecution Authority (NPA) has the power to institute criminal 
proceedings on behalf of the government to ensure that perpetrators of crime are charged and 
held responsible for their conduct and criminal actions (Munzhedzi, 2016:7).   The NPA consist 
of various units to achieve its mandate such as the Witness Protection Unit, Priority Crimes 
Litigation Unit, the National Prosecutions Service, Asset Forfeiture Unit, to name a few.   Moeti 
(2014:124) warns that although the NPA independence must be preserved the NPA is often 
linked to cases of impartiality and controversies.  As such the independence and the credibility 
of the NPA is often questioned.  Examples of these allegations of impartiality and biasness 
includes the disbandment of the Scorpions in 2009 based on political interferences which, was 
replaced by the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI).Munzhedzi (2016:13) 
mentions that several senior political and senior public officials have contravened the 
provisions of the PFMA, 1999 and in particular the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act, (Act 5 of 2000) but they are not yet brought to account for their actions that 
raises questions of the independence and impartiality of the NPA.  
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The failure to investigate the former Premier of the Free State and the MEC for Agriculture in 
the Gupta involvement in the Estina dairy farm and the dropping of charges against the people 
accused with the murder of the ANC Youth League leader Sindiso Magaqa in 2017 raised 
questions about the independence of the NPA (Skiti (2019:3). Skiti (2019:3) further reported 
that the NPA has been riddled with factional infighting and has been criticized for its avoidance 
to prosecute those involved in state capture. Maughan (2018:7) warns that allegations were 
made in the media that the NPA and the former President being captured.  These allegations 
were because the former President of South Africa replaced the former National Director of 
the NPA Mxolisi Nxasana form this key position in 2017 and appointed Shaun Abrahams as 
the National Director of the National Prosecuting Authority.   
 
The Constitutional Court declared on 03 August 2018 that the appointment of Shaun Abrahams 
as the National Director of the NPA as unconstitutional and invalid.  Allegations were also 
made before the Zondo Commission that top officials of the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA) were capture and that these top officials responsible to withheld oversight and 
accountability received monthly payments from the alleged corrupt and company Bosasa. In 
February the President, Mr Ramaphosa appointed Shamila Batohi in February 2019 as the new 
head of the NPA, and also announced the establishment of an Investigation Directorate into 
state capture to investigate the recommendations of the report of the Zondo Commission of 
Inquiry into State Capture.  In light of the above, one could argue that although the NPA as an 
independent, constitutional body fulfill a critical important role to ensure that perpetrators of 
crime are brought to account for their actions, its impartiality and independence is questioned 
to such an extent that the NPA was criticized as being captured. 
 
3.4.5 Other anti-corruption institutions or agencies  
 
Except for the above constitutional institutions to promote oversight and accountability in the 
three spheres of government, the following anti-corruption institutions or agencies were 
established to deal with offences relating to corruption. 
 
• The Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU).   The unit was established in 1999 in the office of 
the National Prosecutions Authority to investigate and seize assets of criminals as an 
effort to fight against crime, and particularly organised crime (Pauw et al., 2015:308). 
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• The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (Hawks).  The Hawks targets 
organised crime, economic, crime, corruption, and other serious crime referred to it by 
the President or the South African Police Service.  
• Special Investigation Unit (SIU).  The President of South Africa established a Special 
Investigation Unit Tribunal in February 2019 to fast- track the finalization of matters 
that the SIU refers for civil litigation. In terms of the Special Investigation Unit and 
Special Tribunals Act (Act 74 of 1996) provision is made in respect of the affairs of 
municipalities.  The SUI is mandated to investigate activities of corruption and fraud, 
serious maladministration in connection with the affairs of municipalities.  The SIU is 
mandated to recover funds and or assets lost by state institutions through irregular and 
corrupt means.  This will ensure that those who are responsible for the loss of monies 
and or assets by state institutions including municipalities are held accountable. The 
litigation process includes both public and private sector and public entities (Gerber, 
News 26 September 2019). The political oversight and accountability were discussed 
in the discussions below.    
 
3.5 POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 
 
Adeyemi et al. (2012:84) are of the view that political accountability refers to the accountable 
role of the political office-bearers to the citizens and to legislative bodies such as a Parliament, 
provincial legislatures and municipal councils. Political accountability can be promoted 
through both organs of state, committees and non-government institutions (Fox, 2000:4).   
Adeyemi et al. (2012:84) maintain that the political office-bearers of any rank should be 
accountable to their constituencies for how they spent the taxpayer’s money. This takes place 
during elections through which the citizens should decide, whether to hold or throw out the 
political office-bearers by refusing to vote for such a person based on their actions or in actions 
and performance while in office. In this regard Fox (2000:4) argues that political accountability 
limits the use and sanctions the abuse of political power. Political accountability can be 
promoted through both organs of state, committees, non-government institutions and local 
communities to hold politicians to account.  
 
Sikhakane and Reddy (2011:89) are of the view that political accountability relationships 
allow the municipality to respond to the demands of key stakeholders such as interest and 
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pressure groups, politicians and the local community.  It also refers to the relationship between 
politicians and their constituencies which emphasised responsiveness to the needs of the local 
community.  A concern is that in many municipalities the relationship has become restrained 
in that politicians (mayor) and municipal officials are often in conflict resulting in conflicting 
and even factions within the municipal councils. The latter situation is not conducive for 
political accountability to citizens and it has a negative impact on service delivery.    In this 
regard, Fox (2000:4) maintain that that public exposure is necessary but not sufficient to limit 
or sanction the abuse of power.  
 
Political office-bearers refer to the speaker, executive mayor, deputy executive mayor, mayor, 
deputy mayor or a member of the executive committee as provided in Section 11 of the Local 
Government Laws Amendment Act, (Act 19 of 2008).  According to the Auditor-General 
(AGSA 2018:12), the political leadership (municipal councillors) and municipal officials 
(administrators) must achieve the objectives of a particular municipality while taking the 
interest of their communities into account at all times by been consistently adhering to the 
requirements of legislation and government policies.  The Auditor-General (AGSA 2018:12) 
further states that accountability in local government is critical and it means that political 
office-bearers of which municipal councillors cannot be excluded are answerable to the 
electorate for their actions, decisions and policies. The mechanisms to promote political 
oversight and accountability were outlined below. 
 
3.5.1 Mechanisms to promote political oversight and accountability 
 
In the sections below the various mechanisms to promote political oversight and 
accountability were discussed. 
 
 
3.5.1.1 Elections to promote political and representational accountability 
 
Political accountability requires that political office-bearer of any rank should be accountable 
to their constituencies, by whom they have been elected.  It is through regular elections 
(national or municipal) that the citizens decide whether to retain or throw out a particular 
political representative by refusing to vote for such a person based on their performance during 
their term of office. It may be argued that elections can be used to revoke the electoral mandate 
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of a representative or elected political office-bearer.  However, voters do not have any direct 
means to hold a political office-bearer to account during the term for which they have been 
elected.  Political.  However, Babaginda (in Adeyemi et al., 2012:84) contend that, it is an 
imperative for the electorate to hold public and political office-bearers to account for their 
conduct and performance. The importance of municipal elections to hold elected political 
office-bearers and municipal officials to account was discussed below.  
 
3.5.1.2 Municipal Elections 
 
Sporran (2015:5) indicates that various statutory provisions are enacted to promote 
accountability and transparency in the public sector, including local government. It is important 
that the public and the municipal council be able to see and understand the relationship between 
elected political officials and the community within a specific municipality area. Sporran, 
(2015:5) points out that these relationships create conflicts of interest that need to be managed 
but, however, in order to maintain public confidence in the system of government, these 
relationships must be transparent. Anything that obscures that transparency should be removed.  
 
Du Plessis (2013:55) mentions that the Constitution of 1996, Section 157(1) provides that a 
municipal council consists of members elected by national legislation. The national legislation 
must prescribe a system of the proportional representation based on a municipality’s portion of 
the national common voters’ roll.  This, proportional representation provides for the election 
of members from lists of party candidates drawn up in a party’s order of preference; or 
proportional representation combined with a system of ward representation. 
 
Yilmaz et al. (2008:9) point out that communities’ delegate authority to elected representatives 
to carry out daily functions of a municipality. Lawson in Yilmaz et al. (2008:9) further cites 
that political parties are situated at the heart of this representation. Political parties articulate 
and aggregate interests, provide channels for the recruitment of leadership, adjudicate disputes 
between conflicting interests, and engage in government decision-making. Political parties 
provide the linkage between the ruler and the ruled, the policy-maker and the citizen.   Adeyemi 
et al. (2012:84) concurs that both the national and municipal elections can be used to revoke 
the electoral mandate of an elected official. However, voters do not have any direct way of 
holding elected municipal representatives to account during the term for which they have been 
elected. In this regard Community Law Centre (2008:1) cautions that this deficit in local 
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accountability begs the question whether a recall procedure would be an appropriate vehicle to 
enhance local accountability. Neither the Constitution of 1996 nor any of the local government 
legislation provides for a recall procedure. 
 
In light of the above, the Community Law Centre (2008:11) notes that a combination of 
proportional and constituency-based elections constitutes the electoral system for local 
government in South Africa. Unlike the fully proportional system of election at the provincial 
and national level, the injection of a constituency-based election into the local government 
election system introduces an element of direct accountability. The ward councillors are 
directly linked to a constituency, which means they have a direct link with the community they 
represent. Where applicable, they also sit as a chairperson of ward committees and such see 
their function as intermediaries between the community and the municipality underlined. This 
direct link is conspicuously absent in the case of proportional representative councillors 
(Community Law Centre, 2008:11).  
 
The Community Law Centre (2008:11) further corroborates the above that the proportional 
representative councillors are not made directly accountable to constituencies although there 
has been a suggestion that proportional representative councillors be assigned to wards. This 
obviously limits the accountability of elected representatives. The lack of direct accountability 
is more glaring at the level of district municipality. Sixty percent of the district councillors are 
indirectly elected by the constituent local councils, while the rest are directly elected through 
proportional party representation list. That means all district councillors are not directly linked 
to a constituency.  
 
Van der Waldt (2015:50) postulates that the municipal council is elected directly by the 
electorate it represents and has constitutional mandate to oversee the administration and the 
executive of the municipality. In performing this constitutional mandate, the administration 
and the executive undertake vast powers that need proper oversight and accountability to avoid 
abuse and poor performance. Van der Waldt (2015:50) further indicates that since South Africa 
is a constitutional democracy, it is a requirement that the administration and the executives of 
the governmental institutions are monitored and held accountable by a distinct organ of state. 
 
The Community Law Centre (2008:11) submits that the fact that ward councillors are directly 
linked to a constituency does not mean that this institution of accountability in fact produces 
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genuine accountability. A key reason for instances of weak accountability of ward councillors 
has to do with the manner in which important stakeholders in the accountability system are 
taking part in it. The role of political parties is an important factor in that senior party structures 
appear to play overly decisive roles in the selection of ward candidates. 
 
Yilmaz et al. (2008:11) notes that the link between national and local party politics affects local 
governance. In some instances, local mayors who belonged to the ruling party at the national 
level were ousted from office because of the unpopularity of the party at the national level. 
Yilmaz et al. (2008: 11) further notes that critical features affecting the party system and 
structures are the existence of partisan or non-partisan systems, the role of national parties in 
nominating local candidates, rules governing the financing of parties, rules governing the 
participation of disadvantaged groups such as women or certain minorities, and the availability 
of parties based on ethnicity or religion. Municipal political officials and administration tend 
to be more accountable to their national and provincial political parties than to the local 
electorate. This loyalty to the national and provincial political parties also compromises 
effective oversight and accountability at local government sphere. 
 
According to CoGTA (2009:11), the relationships at the local level are also tainted by 
contestations amongst the elites of local areas. The democratisation of the local sphere so well-
envisioned in the WPLG, 1998, is now fraught with community frustration over poor 
institutionalisation of systems, poor service delivery and poor political governance.  A culture 
of patronage and nepotism is now so widespread in many municipalities that the formal 
municipal accountability system is ineffective and inaccessible to many citizens.  
 
De Visser (2008:4) advises that government should more vigorously enforce, and political 
parties should more readily respect, a strong separation of party and state at local government 
level. Political parties should not use municipalities as platforms for regional or national 
politics and should cease from interfering in the decisions of municipal administrations. The 
evidence of political interference, particularly around the appointment of municipal staff, is 
damning and the consequences dire. De Visser (2008:4) further refers to a court case in the 
Eastern Cape, the council of Amathole District Municipality and the regional structures of the 
ANC were slammed for colluding in a perverse deployment strategy. The strategy resulted in 
a less qualified individual being appointed as MM, despite the availability of an outstanding 
candidate (De Visser, 2008:4).  
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According to Craythorne (2006:69), the national legislation on the local government electoral 
system is referred to in the Constitution of 1996, as the Municipal Structures Act, 1998.  The 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998, Schedule 1, states that a municipality consists of representative 
councillors (PR councillors) elected by the voters to proportionally represent the parties 
contesting the election and voters in wards, to directly represent the wards. Du Plessis 
(2013:55) indicates that in referring to the composition and election of municipal councils, the 
Constitution, 1996, Section 157(1) states that a municipal council consists of members elected 
by national legislation. The national legislation must prescribe a system of the proportional 
representation based on a municipality’s segment of the national common voters’ roll. This 
proportional representation provides for the election of members from lists of party candidates 
drawn up in a party’s order of preference; or proportional representation combined with a 
system of ward representation.  The Community Law Centre (2008:17) argues that if the 
electoral system is candidate-based as opposed to party-based, compatibility is less of a 
problem. The electoral system at the local government in South Africa is not fully candidate-
based and thus issues of compatibility are evident. The proportional representative aspect of 
the municipal electoral system is not easily agreeable to a recall procedure. The use of a recall 
method needs the direct linking of an elected official to a constituency (Community Law 
Centre, 2008:17).  
 
Social institutions such as the media and civil society have also been ineffective in increasing 
municipal accountability and oversight that led to a situation where there is lack of citizen 
confidence and trust in the government. This lack of citizen confidence and trust in the 
government has been publicly evidenced in the spate of community protests over the years, 
which may be seen as a symptom of the alienation of citizens from local government (DPLG, 
2009:11).  A report by Pricewaterhouse and Coopers (2010:6) showed that the alienation of 
citizens from local government bring forth certain governance challenges, the most important 
being the perceived lack of independence by councillors. Councillors should be held liable and 
accountable for their decisions, as are directors in the private sector, to ensure that decisions 
are made with the financial benefit of the municipality in mind. Du Plessis (2013:56) contends 
that leaving the choice of candidates to local people during municipal elections could not make 
voters trust their councillors less and may prompt them to place more faith in them. Because 
of the crucial role that the party is made to play in the choice of candidates, these candidates, 
who are too often unknown to their localities, labour to appease not their constituency but the 
political party that fielded them. Du Plessis (2013:56) points out that the carrot and stick for 
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re-election thus lies not with the constituency or even the local branch but with the upper 
branches of the party. This introduces an important accountability deficit in the system of local 
government.  Yilmaz et al. (2008:11) indicates that politicisation of local government decision-
making may encourage policy-making based more on prejudice and the exchange of benefits 
among the governing party members. Stone (in Yilmaz et al., 2008:11) maintains that extreme 
politicisation of local government decision-making might result in the rotation of posts 
whereby each party has a chance to benefit for a short period of time.  Thus, direct link in the 
case of proportional representative councillors to hold them to account by the electorate is 
absent in local sphere, that obviously limits the direct accountability of elected representatives.     
 
3.5.1.3 Internal political mechanisms to promote accountability 
 
Napier (2007:386) argues that between elections the electorate has to rely on alternative ways 
or internal mechanisms to hold political office-bearers and municipal officials to account for 
the performance of the municipality. These alternative or internal mechanisms include the 
following: 
 
• Questions either verbal or written may be directed to the mayor or executive mayor of 
the municipality which may be placed on the agenda of the municipal council for 
discussion. Napier (2007:386) explains that the questions may be answered in writing 
or a member may ask for clarification which, refers to an opportunity to exact more 
information regarding the particular matter.  In this way failures to perform or any 
other weaknesses in the performance of the executive of the municipality may be come 
to the surface and the municipal executives may be called to account for failure or 
weaknesses to perform. 
•   Another internal mechanism refers to the facility to petition an executive to address a 
weakness, in this way the municipality is compelled to account for a certain decision, 
or action or failure to perform. 
•  Another internal mechanism is a motion that may be put to the municipal council 
requesting further action or requiring further information which may be debated.  In 
this way the executive has to account for a decision, action or any weakness 
concerning a certain municipal matter.  Napier (2007:386) warns that a motion can 
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either be accepted or rejected in a legislature and it may be put to vote that is subject 
to political party lines in rejecting or accepting the particular motion.   
• Another internal mechanism refers to debates on agenda items which allows members 
of the municipal council to raise points of concerns or to elicit more information on a 
municipal matter. However, the placing of an item on the municipal council’s agenda 
is determined by the political executive of the council which does impose rigidity on 
the agenda, and which may limit the opportunity for representatives to debate or raise 
and issue. 
• Another internal mechanism are deputations from a group of representatives which may 
be received by the mayoral committee or the municipal council in response to a 
request.  Deputations is an important accountability mechanism to hold executives to 
account by the public.  
 
Except for the above internal political mechanism to hold the executives of a municipality to 
account other communication channels may be used to elicit information such as meetings with 
municipal officials and formal correspondence. Another internal mechanism includes the 
mayoral imbizos (gatherings of people) to address the members of the local community and to 
discuss municipal matters with the community.       
 
3.6 MUNICIPAL COUNCILS AND COUNCILLORS 
 
According to Sibanda (2017:313-314) the oversight role of elected public officials cannot be 
overemphasised.  In terms of Chapter 1 of the MSA, 2000 the political structure of a 
municipality, means the municipal council of the municipality or any committee or other 
collective structure of a municipality, elected designated or appointed in terms of the specific 
provision of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998.  On the other hand, political office-bearer in 
terms of the Laws Amendment Act, 2008 means the speaker, executive mayor, deputy executive 
mayor, mayor, deputy mayor, or a member of the executive committee as referred to in the 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998.   Thus, the political structure of the municipality resides in the 
municipal council, while political office-bearers refers to the speaker, executive mayor, deputy 
executive mayor, mayor, deputy mayor, or a member of the executive committee.  Specific 
provisions were made in applicable statutory and regulatory legislative framework, concerning 
the oversight and accountable role and functions of the municipal council (political structure 
of the municipality) and the political office-bearers.  In this regard, Section 53 of the MSA, 
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2000 defines the specific governance roles and areas of oversight and accountability of each 
political structure and political office-bearers.  Section 48 of the MSA OF 2000, provide for 
the election of the mayor, deputy mayor whereas, Section 36 allows for the election of the 
speaker which serves as the chairperson of the municipal council.   
 
In terms of Section 151(2) the executive and legislative authority of the municipality is vested 
in its municipal council. The municipal council is responsible to provide a democratic and 
accountable government to local communities as required in Section 4(2) of the MSA, 2000.  
Section 19 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that municipal councils retain 
responsibility for approving policy and exercising oversight of its mayor, and the 
administration is accountable to the council via the mayor. Section 4(1)(b) of the MSA, 2000 
provides that the municipal council exercise the municipalities executive and legislative 
authority, without improper interference. Except for the oversight and accountable role of the 
municipal council Section 2 of Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000, provides that a councillor must 
perform the functions of office in good faith, honestly and a transparent manner and at all times 
act in the best interest of the municipality and in such a way that the credibility and integrity 
of the municipality are not compromised.  Section 59(3) provides that the municipal council in 
accordance with procedures in its rules and order, may or at the request in writing or at least 
one quarter of the councillors, must review any decision taken by such a political structure, 
political office-bearer, councillor or staff member in consequence of a delegation or instruction, 
and either confirm, vary or revoke the decision subject to any rights that may have accrued to 
a person.   
 
Ismael, Bayat and Meyer (1997:66) state that the Constitution, 1996, provides in Chapter 7 for 
the establishment of local authorities throughout the country. In a municipality the legislative 
and executive spheres of authority are vested in the municipal councils. In terms of the MSA, 
2000, Section 4, Municipal councils have the right, on their own initiative, to manage their 
affairs of their constituents, subject to national and provincial legislation. In this connection, 
their ability or right exercise their powers shall neither be impeded nor compromised by 
national or provincial governments.   Section 59(3) of MSA, 2000 provides that the municipal 
council in accordance with procedures in its rules and order, may or at the request in writing 
or at least one quarter of the councillors, must review any decision taken by such a political 
structure, political office-bearer, councillor or staff member in consequence of a delegation or 
instruction, and either confirm, vary or revoke the decision subject to any rights that may have 
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accrued to a person.   Section 129(1) of the MFMA, 2003 provides that the municipal council 
must consider the annual report of the municipality or that of any municipal entity under the 
control of the municipality.   The MFMA, 2003 Circular 32 of 2006 focusses on the oversight 
process that municipal councils must follow when considering the annual report and how to 
deal with the municipalities oversight report by encouraging continuous improvement and 
promoting accountability to stakeholders 
 
In terms of Section 18 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, makes provision for the 
composition of the municipal council.  Section 32 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 
provides for the establishment of the executive committees. In terms of Section 59 of the MSA, 
2000 the municipal council must develop a system of delegation that will maximise the 
administrative and operational efficiency of the municipality. The system of delegation would 
provide for adequate checks and balances.  The system of delegation further allows the 
municipal council to delegate appropriate powers, excluding the power mentioned in Section 
160 (2) of the Constitution, 1996 and the power to set tariffs, to decide to enter into a service 
delivery agreement in terms of Section 76(b) and to approve or amend the municipalities 
integrated development plan (IDP) to any of the municipalities other political structures, 
political office-bearer, councillor, or staff member to perform any of the municipalities duties 
and withdraw any delegation or instruction.   
 
Section 59(3) of MSA, 2000 provides that the municipal council in accordance with procedures 
in its rules and order, may or at the request in writing or at least one quarter of the councillors, 
must review any decision taken by such a political structure, political office-bearer, councillor 
or staff member in consequence of a delegation or instruction, and either confirm, vary or 
revoke the decision subject to any rights that may have accrued to a person.    
 
Yilmaz et al. (2008:13) are of the opinion that municipal councils are another core mechanism 
to promote representational accountability in municipalities. Effective oversight of municipal 
councils relies on the assumption that local elected representatives (PR councillors) have to 
respond to the needs and preferences of their constituencies. Yilmaz et al. (2008:13) further 
point out that the municipal council is tasked with the responsibility to formulate municipal 
policies and by-laws and serves as the representative body for collective decision-making. 
Municipal councils work with the local government’s executive branch to deliberate on these 
policies and implementation to promote accountability and oversight. It is the duty of municipal 
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councillors to perform governing functions which involve decisions about the implementation 
of statutory and provincial legislation, by-laws and other applicative directives as well as 
continuous monitoring of the activities of officials.   
 
Du Plessis (2013:57) points out that when considering the role of elected representatives, the 
argument for representatives to have detailed knowledge of the organisational functioning of 
public institutions including relevant municipal legislative frameworks and policies 
municipalities in this case, is indeed questionable.  Taaibosch (2015:90) points out that a 
councillor who is unable to perform legislative and governing activities will be less able to 
master administrative executive activities. Thus, councillors who lack the necessary knowledge 
and insight concerning relevant municipal legislation and policies may will not be able to fulfil 
their oversight and accountable functions effectively, nor will they be able to make sound 
decisions.    
 
In terms of the Section 21 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 no specific mention is made 
to the educational or academic qualifications for a municipal councillor.  Section 21 provides 
that every citizen who is qualified to vote for a specific municipal council has the right to stand 
as a candidate in an election for that council.  Thus, one could argue there are no specific 
educational or academic requirements for a member to serve as a councillor on a municipal 
council.    
 
Thornhill in Du Plessis (2013:57) argues that one of the major inhibiting phenomena in the 
public sector is the increased interference of politicians in the normal administrative activities 
of the state, of which council meetings cannot be excluded.   Siddle and Koelble (2012:100) 
argue that in a collective executive system, the political parties represented in the municipal 
council also served on the executive committee. Proportionality is being used as the guiding 
principle in this regard in that one executive council member is elected to serve as mayor.  The 
mayor presides over meetings of the executive committee and the mayor performs other 
functions as may be assigned by the municipal councillor the executive committee (Siddle and 
Koelble, 2011:135). 
 
According to Taaibosch (2015:87), the functions of a municipal councillor (PR) are not 
provided with in legislation however, Section 53 of the MSA, 2000 states that municipalities 
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have to determine the specific roles of each of its political structure (municipal council), 
political office-bearers and how municipal councillors and the MM should interact.  Section 53 
of MSA, 2000 further provides that the municipality must determine the required lines of 
reporting and accountability for its political office-bearers and the MM.    
 
Taaibosch (2015:87-88) further explains that the Constitution, 1996 formulates the following 
responsibilities of municipal councillors and objectives of local government: 
 
• In terms of Section 152(1)(a), councillors must ensure democratic and accountable 
government for local communities.  
• In terms of Section 153(1)(a), municipalities must structure and manage their 
administration, planning and budgetary processes to give preference to the needs of the 
community that can promote their social and economic development;  
• In terms of Section 151(3), a municipality has must govern the affairs of its community 
in accordance with national and provincial legislation as provided in the Constitution, 
1996; 
• In terms of Section 156(1)(4), national and provincial government must assign the 
administration of matters listed in Schedule 4, part A or Schedule 5, part A.  
 
According to the South African Local Government Association (SALGA, 2011:182), 
municipal councillors must fulfil the following functions:  
 
• Make decisions on behalf of the constituents they serve;  
• Represent the needs and interests of their constituents; 
• Fulfil leadership roles in municipal councils; 
• Act as custodians or guardians of public finance; 
• Provide effective oversight of municipal executives, council officials and accounting 
officers; and  
• Be responsive to the communities they serve. 
 
Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000, Section 2, it is points out that a councillor must perform the 
functions of office in good faith, honestly and a transparent manner and at all times act in the 
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best interest of the municipality and in such a way that the credibility and integrity of the 
municipality are not compromised. 
 
Municipal councillors are accountable to their constituents and to their party structures. 
Municipal councillors are key to improve the quality of life for all by overseeing governance 
and service delivery in the local sphere of government.  Furthermore, the oversight role of 
councillors is an essential part of any democratic dispensation (Van der Waldt, 2011:74; 
Williams, 2012:6; SALGA, 2011:180).  National Treasury MFMA, 2003 Circular 32 of 15 
March 2006 furbishes municipal councillors with practical guidance regarding municipal 
financial management and oversight role within the municipal council.   
 
The Municipal Structures Act, 1998, states that each municipal council must have a chairperson 
who will be called the speaker. At its first sitting after its election; or when necessary to fill a 
vacancy; a municipal council must elect its speaker from among the councillors. The MM or if 
the MM is not available, a person designated by the MEC for local government in the province, 
presides over the election of a speaker.  Section 37 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 
provides that the speaker of a municipal council performs the duties and exercises the powers 
delegated to the speaker in terms of Section 59 of the MSA, 2000.   Although it is argued by 
SALGA (2011:17) that the speaker must be able to perform his or her functions independently 
form the executive arm of the council and that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the 
executive and legislative arm of the municipal, it was emphasised in Chapter 3 of this study 
that Section 151(2) of the Constitution, 1996, Section 4(1)(b) of the MSA, 2000 or the Laws 
Amendment Act, 2008 does not make provision for the separation of powers between the 
legislative and executive branch in municipalities.  Therefore, there is no clear separation of 
powers between the legislative and executive authority in the municipal council who is tasks 
with both the legislative and executive authority. However, the speaker of the municipality 
fulfils a critical oversight role to hold the political executives to account for their actions.   
 
Van der Waldt (2011:69) stresses that a municipality must conduct its business transparently 
but may, on reasonable grounds and considering the nature of the business, close its meeting 
to the public and the media. The MM must give notice to the public of the time and date of an 
ordinary meeting or special council meetings. Van der Waldt (2011:74) indicates that a 
municipal council may establish one or more committees necessary for the effective and 
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efficient performance of its functions or the exercise of any of its powers. Members of a 
municipal council may be appointed as members of the committees and the municipal council 
must appoint chairpersons for the committees.  The MPAC is appointed in accordance with 
Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, which must report directly to the municipal 
council and the chairperson of the MPAC consult directly with the speaker of the municipality 
on the inclusion of reports from the MPAC. The MPAC is responsible to exercise oversight of 
the executive functionaries (political and municipal officials) of the municipal council and to 
ensure good governance and performance of the municipality. Section 166 of the MFMA, 2003 
provides that each municipality and municipal entity is required to establish an Audit 
Committee as a committee of the municipal council. 
 
SALGA, (2011:42) outlines that the municipal council is responsible for all the decisions of a 
municipality subject to Section 59 of the MSA, 2000 which, deals with the system of 
delegations in a municipality.  Whereas, Tsatsire (2000:119) is of the opinion that the municipal 
councils fulfil a key role in promoting local democracy, by representing the interest of the local 
community within the municipal council.   
 
In light of the above, it was mentioned in the previous chapter of this study in Section 2.10 that 
the Auditor-General mentioned that one of the root causes of accountability failures in local 
government is political infighting and the interference of councillors in the administration of a 
municipality that weakens oversight (AGSA, 2017:22).   
 
Du Plessis (2013:58) maintains that an important question with regard to the role of elected 
representatives, can be asked whether they can be entirely excluded from managing 
municipalities and whether the role of elected representatives and appointed officials can really 
be seen as being mutually exclusive.  Du Plessis (2013:58) is of the view the reality is that the 
demands from the local community is of such a nature, as demonstrated in continued public 
protests regarding service delivery and other demands, that it becomes impossible to expect 
from elected representatives, who are under constant pressure for their constituencies to 
perform, not to become involved in administrative matters of a municipality. Subsequently, 
municipal councillors tend to involve themselves in the daily administrative functions of the 
municipalities. In terms of legislation there are limits to the binding decision making authority 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
141 
 
of municipal councillors. Therefore, municipal councillors must have the political will to abide 
by the rules (Du Plessis, 2013:58).  
 
Except for the above other root causes as reported by the Auditor-General (2017:22) that needs 
to be addressed by municipal councils of all municipalities include the following: 
 
• Vacancies and instability in key positions; 
• Inadequate skills led to a lack of oversight by council and insufficient implementation 
of financial and performance management systems by the municipal administration;  
• Leadership inaction or inconsistent action, created a culture of no consequences, as a 
result of inadequate performance systems and processes; 
• The blatant disregard for control measures including proper record keeping and the 
blatant non-compliance with key legislation makes it easy to commit fraud; 
• Leadership ignore repeated recommendations and warnings of risks; 
• Usage of consultants at a greater cost; and  
• Lack of proper support from provincial and national role players.   
 
According to Auditor-General (2017:2), municipal councils failed in a total of 61% of 
municipalities to conduct investigations into all instances of unauthorised irregular and fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure in the 2016/2017 financial year.  Another concern raised by the 
Auditor-General (2017:3) is that inadequate skills of municipal councillors led to a lack of 
oversight by municipal councils including the mayor which resulted into insufficient 
implementation and maintenance of financial and performance management systems by 
municipal administrations.  The Auditor-General (2017:57) further reported due to failure of 
accountability mechanisms the oversight and accountable role of municipal councils in local 
government in the Free State needs to be increased. The Auditor-General (2017:57) further 
reported that the amendments to the Public Audit Act to recovery losses and enforcing 
accountability against municipal officials responsible for financial losses would strengthen 
accountability and enforce adequate consequences where accountability failures occurred.  
Another concern as indicated in Chapter 2 of this study is that Manguang Metropolitan 
Municipality was the first metropolitan municipality in the country, to be placed under 
provincial administration, during January 2020. This is an indication of the continued 
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deterioration of the failure of oversight and accountability structures of municipalities in the 
Free State province.  
 
In terms of the above discussion municipal councils are instrumental in maintaining 
representative accountability within the municipality.  However, it was clearly confirmed by 
the Auditor-General that municipal councils of the majority of municipalities lack the ability 
to fulfil their accountable and oversight role in an effective manner.  Only time will tell whether 
South Africa has the political will to enforce the Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 to promote 
accountability and to enforce consequences for where accountability failures occurred.        
    
3.6.1 Metropolitan Sub-councils  
 
Metropolitan municipalities or Category A councils exist in the eight biggest cities in South 
Africa. They have more than 500 000 voters and the metropolitan municipality co-ordinates 
the delivery of services to the whole area. Van der Waldt (2011:68) states that metropolitan 
councils have exclusive legislative and executive authority in their areas. They may make by-
laws on all matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution, 1996. These 
municipalities are broken into wards. Half the councillors are elected through a proportional 
representation ballot, where voters vote for a party. These municipalities are broken into wards. 
Half the councillors are elected through a proportional representation ballot, where the 
electorate vote for a particular party (Alexander and Kane-Berman, 2014:3: Van der Waldt, 
2011:68).  
 
Cloete and Thornhill (2005:92) maintain that the council of a metropolitan municipality may 
delegate assigned duties and powers to a metropolitan sub-council.  The chairperson of the 
metropolitan sub-council is elected amongst its members.  The metropolitan sub-council may 
make recommendations and advise the metro council on the duties and powers to be delegated 
to it. A metropolitan sub-council may, with the supporting vote of a majority of its members, 
determine its own procedures, subject to directives of the metropolitan council.   
 
3.7 MAYOR OR EXECUTIVE MAYOR 
 
SALGA (2015:21) states that the executive political leadership is provided by the executive 
mayor and the mayoral committee or the executive committee headed by the mayor, together 
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with Section 80 committees assisting the executive mayor and executive committee to fulfil 
the executive functions of the municipality. SALGA (2011:7) states that Section 7 makes 
provision for the different types of municipalities namely a collective executive system, a 
mayoral executive system and a plenary executive system that may be established within each 
category of municipality. Section 7(a) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that a 
collective executive system allows for the exercise of executive authority though an executive 
committee in which the executive leadership of the municipality is collectively vested. Section 
7(b) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998   SALGA (2011:7) points out that the municipal 
council in municipalities with a collective executive system appoints an executive committee 
which is accountable to the municipal council.  Section 44 of the Municipal Structures Act,  
1998 provides that the executive committee is a committee of the municipal council which 
receives reports from the other committees of the council and which must forward these reports 
together with its recommendations to the municipal council when it cannot dispose of the 
matter in terms of its delegated powers.  The executive committee must report to the municipal 
council on all decisions taken by the committee.  In terms of Section 44(d) the executive 
committee must ensure that regard is given to public views and report on the effect of 
consultation on the decisions of the municipal council.  Therefore, the executive committees 
must ensure that the committee is available and accessible for consultation with the public.  
 
Section 44 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that the executive committee is a 
committee of the municipal council which receives reports from the other committees of the 
council and which must forward these reports together with its recommendations to the 
municipal council when it cannot dispose of the matter in terms of its delegated powers.  The 
executive committee must report to the municipal council on all decisions taken by the 
committee.  Section 49 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that the mayor presides 
at meetings of the executive committee and must perform the duties and exercises the powers 
delegated to the mayor by the municipal councillor the executive committee.   In terms of 
Section 44(d) the executive committee must ensure that regard is given to public views and 
report on the effect of consultation on the decisions of the municipal council.  Therefore, the 
executive committees must ensure that the committee is available and accessible for 
consultation with the public (Van der Waldt et al., 2018:82; Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:71-
73).     
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A concern is that meetings of the mayoral committee, which must assist the executive mayor 
in municipalities with a mayoral executive system, is not regarded as a committee of municipal 
council.  It means that decision-making is centralised in the hands of the executive mayor and 
the mayor committee and more than often the decisions take place behind closed doors.  The 
councillors that are not members of the mayor committee claim that they cannot participate, or 
influence decision taken because they are not involved in the decision-making process of the 
mayoral committee.  The latter means that there is a lack of transparency in the way that the 
mayor committee functions that makes it difficult for councillors to fulfil their oversight role 
effectively. A concern is that the mayoral committee can meet behind closed doors when 
matters related to by-laws, the municipal budget and the IDP denies the municipal council and 
councillors to have access to information makes it difficult to make the former accountable.  It 
is argued that both the executive committee in a collective executive system, and the mayoral 
committee in municipalities with a mayoral executive system, should be available and 
assessable for consultations to enhance the councillors oversight role (Siddle and Koelble, 
2012:100; Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:78-79).         
 
The Auditor-General (2018:87) maintains that mayors have a monitoring and oversight role 
within a municipality and municipal entities.   In terms of the MSA, 2000 mayors have to review 
the integrated development plan (IDP), the budget and has to ensure that a municipality address 
the issues raised in the Auditor-General audit reports on local government. In terms of the 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the mayor of a municipality presides at meetings of the 
executive committee and performs the duties, including any ceremonial functions, and 
exercises the powers delegated to the mayor by the municipal councillor the executive 
committee.   
 
 Thornhill and Cloete (2014:57) maintain that the following Category A executive system are 
available to metropolitan municipalities.  Firstly, a metropolitan municipality with a collective 
executive system.  Secondly, a metropolitan municipality with a collective executive system 
combined with a sub-council participatory system.  Thirdly, a metropolitan municipality with 
a collective executive system with ward participatory system. Fourthly, a metropolitan 
municipality with a collective executive system combined with both a sub-council and a ward 
participatory system. Fifthly, a metropolitan municipality with a mayoral executive system, or 
a metropolitan municipality with a mayoral executive system combined with a sub-council 
participatory system. Seventhly, a mayoral executive system combined with a ward 
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participatory system. Lastly, a metropolitan municipality with a mayoral executive system 
combined with both a sub-council and a ward participatory system.   
 
Except for the speaker the executive mayor as the political head in municipalities with a 
mayoral executive system, fulfil also a key oversight and accountability role over the 
executives of the municipality.  The statutory functions of the executive mayor are provided in 
Section 56 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998.  In terms of Section 56(1) of this Act an 
executive mayor is entitled to receive reports from committees of the municipal council and to 
forward these reports together with recommendations to the municipal council when the matter 
cannot be disposed of by the executive mayor in terms of the executive mayor’s delegated 
powers.  The municipal council may in terms of Section 80 of the Municipal Structures Act, 
1998 may establish portfolio committees, to assist the executive committee or executive mayor 
of the municipality. Section 80 portfolio committees serve at the sole discretion of the executive 
mayor. Section 59 (3)(b) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, provides that the municipal 
council may require its executive committee or executive mayor to review any decision taken 
by such a political structure, political office-bearer, councillor or staff member in consequences 
of a delegation or instruction.  As part of the political structure oversight function, the 
municipal council has to approve the budget of the municipality, provide oversight of the 
tabling of the annual budget, responsible for the approval of the SDBIP and the signing of 
annual performance agreements and the municipal council has to adopt the annually review 
SCM policy of the municipality. In terms of Sub- Section 3 and 4 of the MSA, 2000 the 
municipal council has to ensure the implementation of national, provincial and local legislation 
and policies by supplying the required resources and authority to the municipal authority.   The 
municipal council must give account to the local community by providing and establish suitable 
control and reporting systems and procedures for monitoring and evaluating.   
 
The executive mayor must ensure that that the objectives of local government as provided in 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution, 1996 are achieved (Van der Waldt et al., 2018:82).    In terms of 
the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the mayor of a municipality presides at meetings of the 
executive committee and performs the duties, including any ceremonial functions, and 
exercises the powers delegated to the mayor by the municipal councillor the executive 
committee. Siddle and Koelble (2012:100) state that in the executive mayoral system, members 
of the mayoral committee are appointed by the executive mayor and report directly to and are 
accountable to the mayor, who may dismiss them. It is clear that the choice of executive system 
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influences power relationships within a municipality. A mayor in a collective executive system 
may, be subject to the dictates of the executive committee. The powers and functions imposed 
on the executive committee are much the same as those imposed on the executive mayor. In 
the case of the executive mayor, enormous powers are concentrated in a single office.   One 
executive council member is elected to serve as mayor and he or she presides over meetings of 
the executive committee and performs such other functions as may be assigned by the council 
or executive committee.  
 
The executive committee members report not to the mayor but to the municipal council. In the 
executive mayoral system, by contrast, members of a mayoral committee are appointed by the 
executive mayor and report directly to and are accountable to the mayor, who may dismiss 
them (Van der Waldt et al., 2018:82; Siddle and Koelble, 2012:100). Thornhill and Cloete 
(2014:77), state that only certain types of metropolitan, local and district councils may have 
executive mayors.  Therefore, the executive mayor is elected by the council.   The executive 
major must ensure that that the objectives of local government as provided in Chapter 7 of the 
Constitution, 1996 are achieved (Van der Walt in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:82).   
 
In terms of Section 56(2) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 an executive mayor is 
responsible for the fulfilment of the following functions: 
• To receive reports from the committees of the council and to forward them with 
recommendations to council except if the executive mayor can dispose of a matter in 
terms of his or her delegated powers; 
• To identify the needs of the municipality; 
• To review and evaluate the needs into priorities; 
• To make recommendations to the municipal council concerning strategies, programmes 
and services, to ensure address the identified priority needs of the community; 
• To take into account any national and provincial development plans such as the 
National Developmental Plan of 2030; and 
•  To recommend the most effective way to deliver the identified strategies, programmes 
and services to the benefit of the whole community (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:77-78). 
 
Except for the above powers and functions the executive mayor must provide the general 
political guidance about financial and fiscal matters relating to the submission of the municipal 
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annual budget.  The ceremonial functions of an executive mayor include the following:  to 
provide political direction concerning the economic and social development, co-operative 
governance, community participation of the municipality.  Furthermore, the executive mayor 
should welcome all visitors and dignitaries.  The executive mayor should open campaigns, 
projects and programmes and should collaborate with business industry to promote investments 
within the municipal area (Van der Walt in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:81-82).  
 
The primary function of the mayoral committee is to assist the executive mayor.  Craythorne, 
(2006:117) also mentioned that the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 does not describe the 
mayoral committee as a committee of the council. Furthermore, the Municipal Structures Act, 
1998 also does not require minority party representation in the mayoral committee.   As such 
the mayoral committee is accountable to the mayor and not to the municipal council. 
 
3.8 THE SPEAKER 
 
The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 makes provision for the appointment of the speaker as 
the chairperson of the municipal council in Section 36 who is elected amongst the municipal 
councillor of the municipal council. Craythorne, (2006:108) and Thornhill and Cloete 
(20114:79) point out the following functions of the speaker as provided in Section 37 of the 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998: 
 
• The speaker must preside the meeting of the municipal council; 
• The speaker has to perform the duties and has to exercise the powers as provided in the 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998; 
•  The speaker has to ensure that the municipal council meets at least on a quarterly basis; 
• The speaker is responsible to ensure and to maintain order during municipal council 
meetings; 
• The speaker has to ensure that members of the municipal council and committees of the 
municipal council adhered to the requirements of the Code of Conduct of Councillors;  
• The speaker has to ensure that the municipal councils are conducted in accordance with 
the rules and regulations of the municipal council; and 
• The speaker has to co-ordinate the activities of the ward committees. 
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According to van der Waldt et al. (2018:79), the speaker can be seen as a new political office-
bearer introduced in terms of Section 36 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998. Siddle 
(2011:140) states that the greater executive burden placed on the mayor under the current 
arrangement gave rise to the perception that the task of chairing the municipal council should 
be assigned to a more neutral figure, and hence provision was made for the office of the 
speaker. Khalo and Vyas-Doorgapersad (in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:80) state that a 
municipal council is assigned with both the legislative and executive authority in order to 
prevent the monopolisation of powers.  Therefore, a division of legislative and executive 
authority takes place between the speaker and the executive mayor in municipalities with an 
executive mayor system. In this regard Kraai et al. (2017:64) aver that the legislative and 
oversight structure refers to the speaker of the municipal council and the chairperson of the 
Section 79 portfolio committees and the members of this portfolio committee.   
 
As mentioned in Section 3.2 of this chapter SALGA (2015:20) argues that the introduction of 
the speaker in municipalities who acts as the chairperson of the municipal council together with 
the establishment of the MPACs as the internal oversight committees in municipalities, set the 
stage for the implementation of a model of separation of functions in municipalities.   However, 
the Constitution, 1996 does not make provision for a separation of powers between the 
legislative and executive branch in municipalities, in terms of Section 151(2) the executive and 
legislative authority is vested in the municipal council.  Thus, there is no clear separation of 
powers between the legislative and executive authority in the municipality but the municipal 
council and the speaker as the chairperson fulfil a key oversight role, to ensure oversight of the 
political executive authority (SALGA, 2015:20).  
 
In terms of Section 9(e) and (f) and Section 10(c) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 a 
councillor is not allowed to hold office as the speaker and mayor or executive mayor at the 
same time, but in municipalities with a plenary executive system combine with a ward 
participatory system the speaker must be called the mayor (Thornhill and Cloete, 2017:79). 
The speaker’s primary functions relate to preside over meetings, disciplinary issues, and 
specifically assigned duties (Siddle, 2011:140). Siddle (2011:139) warns that the councillor 
support function may give rise to the abuse of power by any ambitious speaker. Unlike national 
and provincial legislatures, municipal councils have both a legislative and an executive 
function. The fact that the holder of a supposedly impartial office presides over a body with 
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executive functions may lead to tensions with structures and office-bearers responsible for 
executive functions and duties.  The above underlines the importance that the speaker is not a 
member of the executive, the office of the speaker fulfil a leading oversight role over the 
executive function of a municipality (Siddle, 2011:139).  
 
De Visser (in Siddle, 2011:139) warns that it is general practice to delegate to the office of the 
speaker certain responsibilities regarding community participation and the responsibility of 
supervising the ward committee system. These roles are highly political in nature, therefore a 
concern that speakers may not limit themselves to organisational duties but become rather 
active participants often to the embarrassment of the municipal executive (De Visser in Siddle, 
2011:139).  Thornhill and Cloete (2014:79) agrees with this statement by pointing out due to 
party political nature of the municipal council the role of the speaker has been filled with 
difficulty.   From the above discussion one could argue that Section 37 of the Municipal 
Structures Act, 1998 clearly emphasised the functions of the speaker in the municipal council.  
Although it is argued by some scholars as pointed out in the above discussion that the 
introduction of the speaker who acts as the chairperson of the municipal council can be seen as 
the beginning of the separation of functions in municipalities, the Constitution, 1996 does not 
makes provision for a separation of powers between the legislative and executive branch in 
municipalities.  Therefore, there is no clear separation of powers between the legislative and 
executive authority in the municipal council who is tasks with both the legislative and executive 
authority.  However, it was further argued in Section 3.6 above, that the speaker fulfils, a key 
oversight role, to ensure oversight of the political executive authority of a municipality. 
 
3.9 OTHER MUNCIPAL OVERSIGHT STRUCTURES/COMMITTEES 
 
Except for the municipal council other committees of the municipal council fulfills a key 
oversight role such as the portfolio committees which are outlined in the discussion below.  
 
3.9.1 Council portfolio committees 
 
Van der Walt (in Van der Waldt et al. 2018:84) point out that a municipal council may establish 
one or more committees as required to perform its functions or to exercise its powers in an 
effective manner. The municipal council may not delegate or dispose of the power to make 
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laws to any other committee, office-bearer or municipal official. However, the municipal 
council may seek advice or may seek the support in the drafting or assessment of certain 
municipal policies through portfolio committees which must be part of the legislative structure 
of the municipality. The municipal council must determine the functions and procedures of a 
portfolio committee and may delegate powers and duties to such a committee in terms of 
Section 32 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998. Besides the powers allocated to portfolio 
committees in terms of Section 32 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, powers are delegated 
to elected representatives and senior officials heading the functional or cluster areas. A 
municipal council may establish a portfolio committee for a specific function or cluster of 
functions such as health, planning, finance, environment and social services, public safety and 
transport, governance and administration or local economic development. Portfolio committees 
report to the mayoral committee and to the municipal council (Van der Walt in Van der Waldt 
et al., 2018:83-84; Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:74; Napier, 2007:387).    
 
Van der Walt (in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:84) further maintains that all new or draft 
municipal policies must be addressed by the relevant portfolio committee. The relevant 
portfolio committee must assess, consider and make recommendations, thereafter the policy is 
ready for scrutiny by the community through public participation and finally the policy the 
draft policy may be submitted for final approval by the municipal council. According to Napier 
(2007:387), portfolio committees are established in accordance with Section 80 of the 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998.  Representatives of Section 80 committees are determined in 
proportion to the strength of their party representation in the municipal council.  Each of the 
Section 80 committees comprises fourteen members of political parties represented in the 
municipal council and appointed proportionally.  Napier (2007:387) further maintain that 
opposition parties have presentation in the portfolio committees, their role in decision-making 
is limited by their minority status.       
 
Portfolio committees are classified as Section 80 committees and are permanent structures in 
the municipal council. Portfolio committees advise the executive committees on policy matters 
and make recommendations to the municipal council. Section 80 or portfolio committees report 
and are therefore accountable to the mayoral committee (Kraai, et al., 2017:64)  
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3.9.2 Ward Committees 
 
For the purpose of this study the functions of ward committees to strengthen social 
accountability is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this study. However, ward committees 
can also be seen as a political oversight mechanism.   Ward councillors are directly elected by 
a particular constituency as such the ward councillor is the link between the constituency and 
the municipal council. Ward councillors has the responsibility to meet on a regular basis with 
the relevant stakeholders in the constituency.  The communities must be kept informed about 
the affairs of the municipal councils such as the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the 
municipalities budget (SALGA, 2015:20).  SALGA (2015:20) further explains that the 
municipality must provide technical support to ward councillors in the form of assistance by a 
public representative councillor and a technical official designated to provide administrative 
support. A performance scorecard must be developed that clearly set out the requirements of 
ward councillors and the acceptable level of performance, by indicating the consequences for 
non- compliance or non-performance of ward councillors including the recall procedure in the 
case of non-performance. Ward committees serve as a forum through which local communities 
can participate and representation, transparency and accountability are facilitated (Hussein, 
1999:33).  In terms of Section 72(3) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, the objective of a 
ward committee is to enhance participatory democracy in local government and must be 
established in each ward in the municipality. A ward committee consists of the councillor 
representing that ward in the council, who must also be the chairperson of the committee and 
not more than 10 other persons.  
 
The ward council must make rules regulating the procedure to elect members of the sub-
committee, taking into account the need for women to be equitably represented in a ward 
committee; and for diversity of interests in the ward to be represented. Section 73(4) of the 
MSA, 2000, provides that a ward council may make administrative arrangements to enable 
ward committees to perform their functions and exercise their powers (Siddle and Koelble, 
2012:134). 
 
One of the key functions of a ward committee is to promote participatory democracy in local 
government. Therefore, ward committees can be seen as an independent, advisory and impartial 
structure in that the ward councillor must make recommendations to the municipal council, the 
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executive mayor or metropolitan sub-council. Ward committees is not part of the municipal 
council and although they do not have any executive authority, they can express their 
dissatisfaction with the performance of a councillor to the municipal council (Shikhakane and 
Reddy, 2011:95).  Thornhill and Cloete (2013:75) maintain that a ward committee may make 
recommendations on any matter affecting its ward to the ward councillor, or through the ward 
councillor, to the metro or local council, the executive committee, the executive mayor or the 
relevant sub-council. Thornhill and Cloete (2013:75) further point out that members of a ward 
committee are elected for a term determined by the metro or local council. If a vacancy occurs 
among members of a ward committee, the vacancy must be filled in accordance with procedure 
determined by the council concerned. The activities of the ward committee are usually co-
ordinated through the office of the speaker of the council. A council may dissolve a ward 
committee if the committee fails to fulfil its duties. Thus, ward committees are a direct link 
between the ward councillor and the communities within a demarcated ward.  In Chapter 5 of 
this study the critical role of ward committees to promote social accountability was discussed.    
 
3.9.3 Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) 
 
According to Munzhedzi (2016:5-6), and Sibanda (2017:316), one of the key mechanisms to 
promote oversight and accountability is the standing committees on public accounts (SCOPA) 
and in the context of local government the municipal public accounts committee (MPAC). 
Munzhedzi (2016:5-6) further, aver that both SCOPA and MPAC focuses on public 
expenditure by the executives.  These committees are responsible for scrutinising the Auditor- 
General audit outcomes report regarding financial measures which may lead to dismissal or 
possible criminal proceedings taken against a public official and in local government against a 
municipal official.  A concern is that the Auditor-General, Kimi Makwetu warns in his report 
on the 2017-2018 financial year that municipalities in the Free State province have displayed 
a total breakdown in internal controls.  It is clear that neither of the municipalities or the 
MPACs nor the Free State Provincial government exhibited any response to improve oversight 
and accountability within local government in the Free State province (Ndaba, 2018:1).  It may 
be argued from the latter that the culture of no consequences of the failure of political oversight 
and accountability remains a serious concern in municipalities of the Free State province. 
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Section 79 committees report to the municipal council. According to Kraai et al. (2017:64), the 
legislative and oversight structure refers to the speaker of the municipal council and the 
chairperson of the Section 79 portfolio committees and the members of this portfolio 
committee.  Therefore, one could argue that the Section 79 committees are a key oversight and 
accountable mechanisms in the municipality.  
 
  Therefore, one could argue that the Section 79 committees are a key oversight and accountable 
mechanisms in the municipality. The functions and oversight and accountable role of MPAC 
were detailed in Chapter 4 of this study.    
 
3.10 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS 
 
Nealer (2011:178) submits that a code of conduct was established in line with Schedule 5 of 
the Municipal Structures Act, 1998. SALGA (2006:55) provides that councillors are 
accountable to the people who elected them, and the code of conduct sets the framework that 
governs their behaviour. The code of conduct spells out specific ways in which a municipal 
councillor must conduct him or herself at meetings and in disclosing of interests, personal gain, 
rewards, gifts and favours, unauthorised disclosure of information and intervention in 
administration and council property.   Pauw et al. (2015:312) warn that a code of conduct does 
not make municipal officials virtuous, but it should promote moral behaviour.  Breaches of the 
code of conduct are regarded in a serious light, hence the Code of Conduct for Municipal 
councillors also spells out procedures for a breach of the code.  
 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2003 defines a public officer 
(political or public office-bearer) as any person receiving remuneration from public funds. A 
municipal councillor is therefore subject to the laws that govern all other public officers as the 
Act defines the municipality as a public body (SALGA, 2006:55). 
 
Furthermore, a municipal councillor can be charged with a criminal offence if he or she 
deliberately influences or attempts to influence any of the municipal officials to refrain from 
the financial reporting requirements or interferes in the financial management responsibilities 
or functions assigned in terms of the MFMA,  2003 (SALGA, 2006: 56). SALGA (2006:55) 
points out that a municipal councillor can also be found guilty if he or she deliberately or in a 
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grossly negligent way gives incorrect, untrue or misleading information to the accounting 
officer that would affect financial decisions of a municipality.   
 
A concern is that the Auditor-General reports for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 state the following 
factors are major contributors to accountability failures in particular in local government; key 
positions and not filled; a lack of adequate skills and a lack of oversight by municipal councils 
including the mayor; political interferences by councillors in the administration of local 
government weakened oversight; the development of a culture of no consequences as a result 
of inadequate oversight and performance systems and process; and disobeying and continued 
non-compliances with key municipal legislations creates an environment that makes it easy to 
commit fraud and corruption (AGSA, 2019:9).  One could argue that it is clear that there are 
no consequences if municipal councillors conduct is not in line with the Code of Conduct for 
Municipal councillors.   
 
3.11 CURRENT CHALLENGES OF LEGAL AND POLICITAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The numerous allegations of state capture raise a serious concern for the functionality of 
political oversight and accountable mechanisms in South Africa. The involvement of political 
executives including the former President, ministers, premiers, members of executive councils 
(MECs), municipal councillors and mayors in unlawful activities raises questions about the 
status of political responsibility and the functionality of oversight mechanisms such as 
legislatures (Parliament), provincial legislatures and municipal councils to hold political and 
public office-bearers and to account for their actions or inactions.   
 
The functionality of constitutional mechanisms to promote legislative oversight and 
accountability are another concern. The effectiveness of the Public Protector, Auditor-General, 
PSC and NPA as constitutional mandated bodies have been in question to enforce remedial 
actions   In the discussion above it was mentioned that the remedial actions of the Public 
Protector about the Nkandla project concerning the former President’s homestead being 
questioned by former President, the Cabinet and National Assembly to such an extent that the 
National Assembly tried to protect the former president’s failure to comply with the Public 
Protectors remedial actions and to give effect to the findings.  The Constitutional Court justified 
the role of the Public Protector that means that the President, the National Assembly and the 
Cabinet are obliged to give effect to the provisions of the Public Protector.  Another concern is 
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that before the implementation of the Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 the recommendations 
of the Auditor-General was not enforced. Even though the NPA fulfills a significant role in the 
criminal justice system the alleged allegations that the NPA been captured raised questions 
about its impartiality and independence (Thornhill, 2016 148; Munzhedzi, 2016:10-14).    
 
Although SALGA (2015:20) argues that the introduction of the speaker in municipalities who 
also acts as the chairperson of the municipal council and the establishment of the MPACs as 
the internal oversight committees of municipalities to improve separation of powers between 
executives and legislature, democracy, transparency, oversight and accountability within 
municipalities one could argue that its fails in its obliged political oversight and accountable 
role.  The reason for this is cited in the Auditor-General report for the 2016-2017 financial year 
as political infighting and the interference of municipal councils and other politicians with the 
administration of municipalities weakening its oversight function (AGSA, 2019:12).  However, 
one could further argue that one of the main reasons why political oversight and accountability 
fails in local government is the lack of the leadership of municipalities and provincial 
governments to hold municipalities to account for their continued blatant non-compliance with 
the constitutional obligation as provided in Chapter 7 of the Constitution, 1996, including non-
compliance with key municipal legislation.  The Auditor-General further reported that the 
failure of accountability and oversight creates a culture of no consequences. The latest findings 
of the Auditor-General, Kim Makwetu, concerning the local government 2017-2018 financial 
year audit outcomes confirms, that there is a continued deterioration of blatant non-compliance 
with key municipal legislation, which is evident that mayors, municipal mangers, and 
municipal councils are not serious about their oversight and accountable role which ultimately 
leads to the creation of a culture of non-compliance (AGSA, 2019:35). The Auditor-General in 
particular warns that the municipalities of the Free State province showed a total breakdown 
of internal controls as the political leadership of municipalities and the provincial government 
fails to improve their oversight and accountability role (AGSA, 2019:10).  Therefore, in terms 
of the above discussion it is clear that oversight and accountability in particular the Free State 











This chapter provided insight into the legislative or legal oversight and accountability, 
separation of powers, legislative mechanisms to promote oversight and accountability.  
Furthermore, the constitutional bodies to strengthen oversight and accountability were 
outlined.  Political oversight and accountability as well as the various mechanisms to promote 
political accountability were discussed.  The political oversight and accountable role of 
municipal council, metropolitan-sub-council, municipal councillors, mayor or executive 
mayors, the speaker and other municipal committees including ward committees were 
discussed. The discussion about the Code of Conduct for Municipal Councillors emphasised 
the promotion of oversight and accountability within municipalities.   
 
In the context of local government Section 152(1) of the Constitution, 1996 clearly requires 
from local government to provide a democratic and accountable government for local 
communities. Section 151 provides that legislative and executive authority is vested in the 
municipal council.  It was further argued in this chapter that the speaker who is also the 
chairperson of the municipal council fulfils a key oversight role, to ensure oversight of the 
political executive authority of a municipality.  It was further emphasised that mayors have a 
key monitoring and oversight role within a municipality and municipal entities. The 
accountable role of municipal councillors to their constituents they serve and to their party 
structures were emphasised.  It was mentioned that municipal councillors are key to improve 
the quality of life for all by overseeing governance and service delivery in the local sphere of 
government.  The oversight role of councillors can be seen an essential part of any democratic 
dispensation.   It was further argued in this chapter that the fact that ward councillors are 
directly linked to a constituency has not directly translated into local accountability. This deficit 
in local accountability begs the question whether a recall procedure would be an appropriate 
vehicle to enhance local accountability. The lack of direct accountability is more glaring at the 
level of district municipality in that sixty percent of the district councillors are indirectly elected 
by the constituent local councils, while the rest are directly elected through proportional party 
representation list.  This means all district councillors are not directly linked to a constituency.     
     
Although the Constitution, 1996 clearly provides that local government must provide 
accountable local government to local communities the following concerns were raised in this 
chapter. It was argued that although, municipal councils, speaker, mayor and MPAC, are key 
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oversight structures in municipalities, the poor performance of municipalities in the Free State 
province raised a concern about the functionality of these key oversight and accountable 
structures. It was mentioned that in many municipalities the relationship between that 
politicians (mayor or executive mayors) and municipal officials are often in conflict resulting, 
in conflicting and even factions within the municipal councils. It was argued that the latter 
situation is not conducive for political accountability to citizens and it has a negative impact 
on service delivery. From the latest findings of 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 of the Auditor-
General on audit outcomes of municipalities in the Free State province, one could argue that 
neither the municipalities nor the Free State provincial government made any effort to improve 
oversight and accountability within local government of the province.  The functionality of the 
MPACs to fulfil a critical oversight role was also questioned, due to the fact the majority party 
have a the main say in the committee which could contributes that the MPACs do not fulfil 
their oversight role effectively. It was also mentioned that that political deployment and 
interferences undermines the functionality of MPACs to fulfil its oversight role effectively.  It 
was further argued that the failure of effective oversight and accountability led to a culture of 
no-consequences.  
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CHAPTER 4:  THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 





Financial oversight and accountability are critical in the context of local government to ensure 
that municipal councils, political office-bearers, municipal office-bearers and municipal 
councils are holding to account for the decisions and the how the municipality manage limited 
financial resources. No municipality can deliver effective services and fulfil its constitutional 
mandated development role without sufficient financial resources. Municipal financial 
management deals with the municipality’s revenue and expenditure decisions. The decisions 
include the revenue sources such as taxes used by municipalities to collect their revenue and 
decisions about ways of financing infrastructure developments and maintenance. It further 
refers to intergovernmental transfers received from national government such as conditional 
and unconditional grants. Procurement and SCM, asset management, reporting and oversight 
form part of financial management. The effective functionality of the various oversight 
structures and mechanisms to hold political office-bearers and municipal executives to account 
for the way that the municipality managed its financial affairs is critical to ensure sustainable 
service delivery.  
 
In this section, an in-depth discussion of various mechanisms and strategies to promote 
accountable, ethical and responsible municipal financial management were explained. The 
oversight and accountability role of senior municipal officials such as the MM, the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) and departmental heads and managers accountable to MM were 
scrutinized. The oversight and accountability role of each of the above positions were discussed 
in detail. 
 
4.2 STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
In Chapter 2 of this study the financial statutory and regulatory framework requirements of 
local government were discussed in detail.  In this section a brief overview of the legislative 
framework for municipal financial management was briefly outlined.  According to Hanabe, 
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Taylor and Maclean (2017:394-395) and Kanyane (2011:935) avers that the MFMA, 2003 was 
designed to create financially viable municipalities, and to give effect to the requirements of 
efficient, effective financial management practices, including capacity building in areas such 
as budgeting, financial reporting and credit controls.  Sibanda (2017:317) state that the MFMA, 
2003 emphasises the efficient and economic use of resources to achieve the desired outcomes 
that serve the needs of society.   
 
Chapter 2 of the MFMA, 2003 makes provision for the supervision role of the National Treasury 
and Provincial treasuries.  The supervision roles of the national treasuries and the provincial 
treasuries were outlined in more detail in section 4.4 of this study.  Chapter 7 of the MFMA, 
2003 makes provision for the oversight responsibilities of mayors.  The financial oversight 
responsibilities of mayors were discussed in more detail in Section 4.3 and Section 4.8.2 of this 
chapter. Chapter 8 of the MFMA, 2003 makes provision for the financial accountability 
responsibilities of the municipal manager as the accounting officer of the municipality, while 
Chapter 9 of the MFMA, 2003 set out the role of the CFO concerning the municipal budget and 
treasury offices of the municipality. These responsibilities were discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.8.3 and Section 4.8.4 of this chapter. 
 
Kanyane (2011:938) further points out that the MFMA, 2003 and the MSA, 2000 requires that 
the accounting officer of the municipality must ensure that the municipality develop all 
necessary policies such as a debt collection policy; a credit control policy; a tariff policy, an 
indigent management policy; and an information system policy. These policies must be 
implemented and continuously monitored and evaluated.   In terms of Sections 165 and 166 of 
the MFMA, 2003 the municipality must establish internal audit units and audit committees.  In 
terms of Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 the municipality must establish an 
MPAC to perform an oversight function on behalf of the municipal council.  In addition to the 
above Section 165 of the MFMA, 2003 compel municipalities to establish internal audit units 
and audit committees to exercise effective financial control. According to Sibanda (2017:319), 
the internal audit unit prepares a risk-based audit plan and an internal audit programme for each 
financial year.  The internal audit unit must further advise the accounting officer of the 
municipality and report to the audit committee on the implementation of the internal audit plan 
and matters relating to internal audit, internal controls, accounting procedures and practices, 
risk and risk management, performance management, loss control and compliance with the 
MFMA, 2003, and other applicable legislation.   




The Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004 regulates the power of the municipality to impose 
rates on property.  In addition, the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act (Act 12 of 2007) 
gives municipalities the right to impose rates on property and surcharge on fees for services 
provided by the municipality, or on behalf of the municipality. The Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations Act, 1997 makes provision for the establishment of the budget forum, to consult on 
any fiscal, budgetary or financial matter affecting local government.      
 
Ambe (2016:22-23) maintains that the following Acts, regulations and guidelines guide SCM 
in municipalities namely; the MFMA, 2003; MSA, 2000; the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act, (Act 5 of 2000); and the Supply Chain Management: A Guide for Accounting 
Officer of Municipalities and Municipal Entities, 2005.  All the SCM processes must be 
developed in accordance with the above and in conjunction with Section 217 of the 
Constitution of 1996 and other applicable treasury regulations. The Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act, 2005 provides for the application of the points system when evaluating 
and adjudicating bids.  The SCM Guide for Accounting Officer of Municipalities and 
Municipal Entities, 2005 makes provision for a step by step guide for the implementation of 
the SCM policies.     
 
4.3 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Financial accountability, as explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.6.4 of this study, refers to the 
municipal councillors as the political representative’s and municipal official’s responsibility to 
be held accountable, individually and collectively for the collection, safeguarding and the 
efficient and effective use of public. Mazibuko and Fourie (2013:131) maintain that 
accountability can be seen as the cornerstone of financial reporting, which is based on the 
assumption that local communities have a right to know how a municipality utilised public 
funds. 
 
Except for the above, Gildenhuys (2018:203-204) is of the opinion that financial accountability 
between the three spheres of government comes to the fore when public funds are transferred 
from national sphere to the other spheres of government including local government such as 
subsidies or grants. Funds transferred from national sphere of government in the form of 
subsidies for the payment of agency services or grants requires that national sphere as the donor 
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body must hold the recipient local government to account for the spending of these public 
funds. Gildenhuys (2018:2014) further argues that the national government as the donor body 
is also the taxing authority which is directly responsible to the taxpayers for the ways in which 
public funds are spent. However, local government as the beneficiary do have the discretion to 
spend the money to their own discretion if no conditions are laid down.  If no condition is laid 
down on how and under what conditions public funds may be spent it can lead to distrust 
between national and local spheres of government.    
 
Laubscher (2011:63) points out that extensive corruption and financial mismanagement can be 
seen as the result of a lack of accountability and oversight often with detrimental consequences 
for effective and efficient service delivery. Currently, several challenges exist that hamper 
effective and efficient financial management at municipalities. These challenges include, 
among others, a lack of expertise, an inability to collect arrear debt, extensive corruption, 
exorbitant salaries and bonuses, and a lack of accountability. The National Treasury (2004:5) 
emphasises that the MFMA, 2003, aims to modernise budget and financial management 
practices in municipalities to maximise the capacity of the municipalities to deliver as well as 
to promote effective services to communities. The MFMA, 2003, also gives effect to the 
principle of transparency as required by Sections 215 and 216 of the Constitution, 1996.  For 
these reasons, the MFMA, 2003, stipulates certain procedures and assigns specific 
responsibilities to the municipal council, the mayor, councillors and municipal officials, in 
particular the MM and the CFO.   
 
In terms of Section 2 of the MFMA, 2003 all municipalities are responsible to promote effective 
financial management of its financial resources. In terms of Section 52 of the MFMA, 2003 the 
mayor of the municipality must provide general political guidance over the fiscal and financial 
affairs of the municipality. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, the MFMA Circular 32 of 
2006 provides guidance on the oversight process that the municipal council must follow when 
considering the annual report and producing the oversight report of the municipality. Section 
62 of the MFMA, 2003 provide the general financial management functions of the accounting 
officer, who is responsible and accountable for managing the financial administration of the 
municipality.  The National Treasury (2004:5) points out that the responsibilities of financial 
accountability and oversight, are only possible if there is a culture of transparency and regular 
reporting within the municipal council (Van der Waldt et al., 2014:213-214; Thornhill and 
Cloete, 2014:109-114).    
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In this regard, Savage in Van Donk, Swilling, Pieterse and Parnell (2008:285) explains that 
local government financial management has long been regarded as a set of specialised rules 
and regulations, which must be carefully monitored by municipal councils with the intention 
to obscure financial performance from public scrutiny. Savage (in Van Donk et al. 2008:285) 
further aver that effective management of municipal revenues, expenditure and debt is become 
increasingly critical for a municipality to deliver services and to give effect to its development 
mandates. Therefore, one could argue that effective financial management, accountable and 
transparent local government may hold the key to render effective services to local 
communities and to give effect to local governments developmental mandate.      
 
However, the National Treasury (2004:5) warns that confusing or duplicating responsibilities 
tend to weaken accountability and oversight mechanisms, hence the need for clearly established 
oversight and accountability responsibilities. In terms of Section 44 and Section 56 of the 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998, the executive mayor or committee is responsible for providing 
the municipality with political leadership, proposing policy and overseeing its implementation. 
Section 19 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 states that municipal councils retain 
responsibility for approving policy and exercising oversight of its mayor, and the 
administration is accountable to the council via the mayor. Municipal officials are responsible 
for implementation and for providing the executive mayor or committee with professional 
advice (National Treasury, 2004:5).  The oversight role of National Treasury and Provincial 
Treasuries was outlined in the section below. 
 
4.4 THE OVERSIGHT ROLE OF NATIONAL TREASURY AND PROVINCIAL 
TREASURIES 
 
Chapter 5 of the MFMA, 2003 makes provision for supervision over local government finance 
management.   In particular Section 5(1) of the MFMA, 2003 provides that National Treasury 
may monitor the budgets of municipalities to establish whether they are consistent with national 
government’s fiscal and economic policy. Fourie and Opperman (2007:393) state that Section 
5(2) of the MFMA, 2003 provides that the National Treasury must monitor whether 
municipalities and municipal entities promote good budgetary and fiscal management, 
compliance with applicable standards of generally recognized accounting practices and 
uniform expenditure and revenue classification systems.  Section 5(2) of the MFMA, 2003 
further provides that the National Treasury must investigate any system of financial 
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management and internal control in any municipality or municipal entity and recommend 
improvements.   
 
Provincial treasuries were established in terms of Section 17 of PFMA, 1999.  The Member of 
Executive Council for Finance is the head of the particular Provincial Treasury is responsible 
for policy decisions related to financial matters.  In terms of Section 18 and 19 of the PFMA, 
1999 the Provincial Treasury is responsible for   preparation of the provincial budget and to 
control its execution.   Provincial Treasuries have to ensure the effective and transparent 
management of revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities by provincial departments in 
accordance with national policies.  Ajam and Fourie (2014:52) further provides that provincial 
treasuries are required to implement national legislations including the PFMA, 1999, the 
MFMA, 2003 and the DoRA as well as National Treasury regulations.   In terms of Section 5(3) 
a Provincial Treasury must assist the National Treasury in enforcing compliance with the 
measures established in terms of Section 216(1) of the Constitution of 1996 (Thornhill, Cloete, 
2014:101; Ajam and Fourie (2014:51-52).   
 
In light of the above, Fourie and Opperman (2007:393) indicate that the Provincial Treasury 
must monitor compliance with MFMA, 2003, by municipalities in the province.  The Provincial 
Treasury must also monitor the preparation by municipalities in the province of their budgets, 
monitor monthly outcome of those budgets and monitor the submission of reports by 
municipalities. The Provincial Treasury may assist municipalities in the province in the 
preparation of their budgets and may also take appropriate steps if a municipality commits a 
breach of the MFMA, 2003. National Treasury (2004:23) stresses that in order to strengthen 
the oversight role of councillors and prevent conflicts of interest, councillors will not be 
allowed to serve on any bid or tender committee. Note that this prohibition on boards of entities 
also applies to other elected representatives in Parliament and provincial legislatures.  
 
4.4.1 National Treasury Financial Circulars and Regulations to ensure accountability 
and oversight 
 
The National Treasury from time to time issues circulars and regulations that guide and assist 
in ensuring oversight and accountability in managing municipality public finances. This is done 
in terms of the National Treasury being the custodian of the state’s fiscus and having the 
mandate to regulate public finance management as it relates to the country’s economy (Nkuna 
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and Sebola, 2014:6).  The aim of the National Treasury, MFMA, Circular 32 of 2006 is, to 
provide municipal councillors with practical guidance regarding municipal financial 
management and their oversight role oversight within the municipal council.  The MFMA, 
Circular 32 of 2006 focuses on the oversight process that municipal councils must follow when 
considering the annual report.  It also explains how the municipal council must deal with the 
municipalities oversight report by encouraging continuous improvement and promoting 
accountability to stakeholders (The National Treasury (2006:1). 
 
According to the National Treasury MFMA, Circular 80 of 2015, the National Treasury is 
constitutionally mandated to set norms and standards to ensure both transparency and internal 
control of the financial affairs of all three spheres of government. In addition, the National 
Treasury must execute against its constitutional monitoring and oversight role over 
municipalities as it relates to adherence and compliance to the legislative framework governing 
local government (National Treasury, 2015:4).  The MFMA, Circular 85 of 2015, avers that the 
MFMA, 2003, Section 62 sets out the general financial management responsibilities of the 
municipal manager as the accounting officer of the municipality. The accounting officer is 
required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the resources of the municipality are 
effectively, efficiently and economically utilised (National Treasury, 2015:8).  The accounting 
officer must also ensure that unauthorized, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure are 
prevented. In addition, The MFMA, Circular 85 of 2015 state that the MFMA, 2003, Section 
62 also obliges the accounting officer to ensure that disciplinary or when appropriate, criminal 
proceedings are instituted against any official of the municipality who has allegedly committed 
an act of financial misconduct. The same responsibilities have also been placed upon other 
municipal officials (National Treasury, 2015:8). 
 
In addition, the National Treasury MFMA, Circular 85 of 2016 provides that the National 
Treasury, together with the provincial treasuries, must undertake during 2017/18 financial year 
a compliance check for all municipalities (National Treasury, 2016:9). It further points out that 
where municipalities have not provided complete budget information, the municipal budgets 
will be returned to the mayors and MMs of the affected municipalities for the necessary 
corrections. In terms of Section 31 of Schedule A of the National Treasury Municipal Budget 
and Reporting Regulations, MMs are reminded that the annual budget must be accompanied 
by a quality certificate and council resolution in accordance with the format specified in item 
(National Treasury, 2016:9). 
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The National Treasury, Municipal SCM Regulations, 2001 are put in place to give effect to the 
implementation of the provision of SCM as provided for in the MFMA, 2003. The regulations 
are meant to co-ordinate the implementation of the MFMA, 2003 as specified in relevant 
sections as well as ensuring uniformity in application (Nkuna and Sebola, 2014:7).  Fourie and 
Opperman (2015:112) provides that although the municipal council is responsible for the 
oversight function concerning SCM, there is not much oversight which municipal council can 
do except to express their dissatisfaction with the implementation of SCM policies. In terms of 
the National Treasury, SCM Regulation 6, the MM as the accounting officer of the municipality 
must report to the municipal council once in a financial year. Fourie and Opperman (2015:113) 
point out that one could question whether the municipal councillor, the mayor, has any powers 
regarding SCM except for criticising the MM. However, the mayor has to submit quarterly 
reports of which SCM cannot be excluded to the municipal council as part of their oversight 
role.  In this regard the Auditor-General reported in the 2016-2017 audit outcomes that mayors 
and councillors should critically assess information, such as SCM and procurement deviations, 
before making any decisions (AGSA, 2018:57).      
 
Selebano (2018:2) cautions that municipalities, deviated from National Treasury 2011 and 
SCM frameworks to obtain tender contract. Selebano (2018:2) further warns that although 
National Treasury, 2011 and amended National Treasury, 2017 allow deviations from these 
regulations in extreme exceptional circumstances, public institutions, including municipalities, 
misused this clause to justify fruitless and wasteful expenditure including corruption with the 
allocation of tenders. A concern is that since most municipal SCM policies do not specify 
procurement spent targets, municipalities award contracts to established suppliers who often 
take advantage of the weak procurement management practices to hike their prices.  This 
confirms that deviations from National Treasury regulations and SCM procedures and poor 
acquisition management practices can leads to irregularities in the municipalities bidding 
processes.  
 
In light of the above, it is clear that the National Treasury provides clear guidelines in the form 
of circulars and relevant regulations to promote oversight of financial matters including SCM 
within municipalities.  However, in Chapter 2, of this study it was mentioned that most 
municipalities in South Africa do not comply with relevant municipal financial management 
acts of which National Treasury Circulars and SCM regulations cannot be excluded.    
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4.5 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Kahn et al. (2016:135) argue that the system of intergovernmental transfers from national and 
provincial spheres to municipalities aimed to strengthen municipalities capacity to promote 
effective service delivery. The intergovernmental transfers of funds to municipalities are 
divided into direct and indirect transfers. Indirect transfers include transfer of assets, transfers 
for agency payments who perform a function on behalf of a municipality. Direct transfers to 
municipalities are in the form of cash transfers such as conditional or unconditional transfers.  
Unconditional transfers refer to the municipalities constitutional entitlement to receive their 
share of the vertical division of revenue in the form equitable share. The equitable share is used 
to fund a range of municipal activities but in particular to fund the national free service levels 
to provide free basic services to poor households. On the other hand, conditional transfers either 
in the form of cash or assets or support services provided to municipalities makes up the 
remainder of the resources transferred by national government to municipalities to support 
municipal infrastructure investments and to strengthen municipal capacity.  Since 2003 there 
was a significant rapid growth in transfers of grants from national government to local 
government.  This, municipalities dependence on grants showed as a source of revenue has 
risen considerably while, most municipalities collection of their own revenue radically 
decreases. Even metropolitan municipalities which are supposed to be less dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers of grants showed a rapid increase in their dependence on grants 
(Kahn et al., 2016:136-138).    
 
Thus, one could argue that most municipalities of which metropolitan municipalities are largely 
dependent on the national transfers due to the lack or inability of municipalities to collect their 
own revenue. The continually growth of dependency on grants from national government of 
municipalities obscure the accountability of municipalities to raise and collect their own 
financial revenue as required in terms of MFMA, 2003. One could further argue that the 
municipalities’ continued non-compliance with key municipal legislation, such as the MFMA, 
2003, hampers accountability which then leads to a culture of no consequences. The 
functionality of oversight structures and mechanism to oversee municipalities can also be 
questioned.     
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4.6 INTERVENTIONS OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OVER MUNICIPALITIES 
 
 
Section 139 of the Constitution, 1996 provides that when a municipality cannot or does not 
fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution, 1996, or legislation, the relevant 
provincial executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that 
obligation. This includes issuing a directive to the municipal council, describing the extent of 
failure to fulfil its obligation and stating steps required to meet its obligation or assuming 
responsibility for the relevant obligation in that municipality. 
 
National Treasury (2005:4) points out that whilst the primary responsibility of the Provincial 
Treasuries is to manage the financial affairs of the province, the MFMA, 2003 provides for 
greater involvement of both National and Provincial Treasuries in the regulation and 
management of the financial affairs of municipalities and to take appropriate measures 
including monitoring, support and intervention if necessary.  A concern is that the relevant 
provincial governments fail to intervene and taking the required steps when municipalities do 
not fulfil their financial obligations. Ndaba (in The Star, 27 June 2019:1) confirms that the 
municipalities in the Free State province placed under administration showed no improvement 
in the Auditor-Generals audit outcomes of local government of the 2017-2018 financial year. 
The functionality of the political oversight function of the Free State Provincial government 
and those of the particular municipalities under administration could be questioned. Therefore, 
it was argued that the latter situation hampers effective oversight and accountability.   
 
The continued poor performance of municipalities in the Free State province remains a 
concern. National interventions such as Local Government Turn-around Strategy (LGTAS) 
later replaced by the Back-to-Basic campaign which involves proposed actions to support to 
municipalities to improve their performance did not achieve the desired impact.  According to 
Gericke (In “Die Volksblad” 30 Janaury 2020), the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality 
became the first metropolitan to be placed under provincial administration.  Therefore, one 
could argue that provincial leadership (Premier, MEC for local government, and Heads of 
provincial departments - CoGTA in particular) needs to do more to support municipalities in 
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4.7 MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL REPORTS AND RETURNS 
 
Mazibuko and Fourie (2013:131) and Fourie and Opperman (2007:212) are of the opinion that 
accountability is a cornerstone of financial reporting of local government.  Financial reporting 
and auditing are the most important internal control measures to promote accountability and 
transparency. Accountability is based on the belief that communities as taxpayers and 
stakeholders have a right to know and a right to receive openly declared facts about the way 
that public funds are spending.  One of the objectives underpinning the MFMA, 2003, is the 
development of sound financial governance within every municipality. Governance is built 
around the responsibilities of accountability and oversight requiring a culture of transparency 
and regular reporting.  
 
According to Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:151), in terms of Section 129(1) of the MFMA, 2003 
the municipal council must consider the annual report of the municipality or that of any 
municipal entity under the control of the municipality.  In terms of Section 130(1) of the 
MFMA, 2003 requires that the municipal council meeting at which the municipal council 
discusses the annual report must be open to the public and any organs of state. Section 127(5) 
of the MFMA, 2003 requires that immediately after the annual report is tabled in the municipal 
council, the MM as the accounting officer of the municipality must make the annual report 
available to every member of the community.  In addition, the municipal council must provide 
a reasonable time to allow the community or any organ of state to submit any written 
submissions on the annual report. The municipal council must make provision for any 
community members or organs of state to address the municipal council on any matters on the 
annual report. Fourie and Opperman (2015:214) indicate that the purpose of the annual report 
is to provide a record of activities of the municipality during the financial year and to provide 
a report on the performance against the budget of the municipality. This, the purpose of the 
municipalities annual report is to promote accountability to the local community for the 
decisions made by the municipality in any given year. 
 
In terms of Section 71 of the MFMA, 2003 the MM which is the accounting officer of the 
municipality must submit not later than 10 working days after the end of each month a 
statement in the prescribed format on the state of the municipalities budget, indicating the 
actual revenue per revenue source; actual borrowings; actual capital expenditure  per vote; the 
amount of any allocations received; actual expenditure on those allocations; for that month and 
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for the financial year up to the end of that month to the mayor of the municipality and the 
relevant provincial treasury. 
 
Section 73 of the MFMA, 2003, compels the MM to inform the provincial treasury, in writing 
of any failure by the municipal council to adopt or implement a budget-related policy or a 
supply chain management policy or non-compliance by any of the political structures or office-
bearers of the municipality of any such policy. In terms of Section 74 of the MFMA, 2003 the 
MM of a municipality must submit to the National Treasury and the relevant Provincial 
Treasury, the department for local government in the province or the Auditor-General such 
information as may be required.  National Treasury (2004:22) states that all municipalities and 
municipal entities are expected to comply with this provision to submit their financial 
statements to the Auditor-General by 30 September, unless specifically exempted by the 
National Treasury. Non-compliance with this provision will transgress Section 5 of the 
Division of Revenue Act (DoRA) of 2004 and may result in the withholding of the equitable 
share grant. Municipalities are also expected to table an annual report, which will include 
audited financial statements for the previous year.  
 
The annual report of the municipality serves as an instrument to promote accountability of the 
municipal executive to the municipal council. The mayor has to present the annual report to 
the municipal council.  The municipal council must accept or reject the annual report. After the 
municipal council accepts the annual report the municipal council must issuing an oversight 
report (Community Law Centre, 2008:4). The following must be included in the annual report 
of the municipality namely; the annual performance report; the Auditor-General’s audit report; 
the results of the performance measurements and, details of the corrective action taken or 
planned by the relevant municipality in response to the report if required; the financial 
statements as submitted to the Auditor-General. Also included in the annual report is an 
assessment by the MM of any arrears of municipal taxes and service charges and whether the 
revenue-raising objectives set in the budget have been met; and the recommendations of the 
audit committee.  Furthermore, effective financial reporting should not only involve the 
presentation of financial facts, integration and interpretation thereof is critical. This will enable 
local communities and relevant stakeholders to comprehend the significant aspects of a 
municipality’s financial operations (Fourie and Opperman, 2007:213; Community Law Centre, 
2008:25).   
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The process of adoption of the annual report by the municipal is an indication of the importance 
of the annual report as an accountability instrument.  In this manner the municipal council and 
the local community can hold the political and municipal office-bearers to account for their 
decisions and actions.  Therefore, council meetings that discusses any aspects or decisions of 
the annual report must be open to the public and any organ of state.  A reasonable time must 
also be allowed for the discussion of any written submissions received from the local 
community or organs of the state on the municipalities’ annual report to allow members of the 
local community or any organs of state to address the municipal council Community Law 
Centre, 2008:26).   
 
Another key oversight instrument over the municipal administration is the mayor’s mid-year 
budget and performance assessment report. The MM must assess the performance of the 
municipality during the first half of the financial year by considering the monthly budget 
statements and the municipality’s service delivery performance, and its targets and 
performance indicators set in the implementation plan (Community Law Centre (2008:70).  
The MM must inform the municipal council on the state of the budget and of any impending 
short falls, overspending and overdrafts (Thornhill and Cloete, 2013:114).    Thus, the annual 
report and the mid-year budget and performance assessment report can be seen as key oversight 
instruments to hold political office-bearers and municipal office-bearers to account for their 
decisions and actions.  However, a concern is raised by the Auditor-Generals report on the 
audit outcomes of municipalities in the 2016-2017 financial year that financial reporting has 
rapidly weakened in most municipalities. Credible financial statements and reporting including 
performance reports are crucial to enable accountability and transparency (Makwetu in Media 
Release, 23 May 2018).  In addition, the Auditor-General warned that the that the lack of 
commitment by municipalities towards responding to recommendations made by the Auditor-
General further contributes to a lack of consequences for transgressions and irregularities 
(AGSA, 2019:9).  In this regard, Gericke (in “Die Volksblad, 10 Julie 2019) reports that 
financial reporting in the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality of the Free State province has 
decreased dramatically, subsequently the prevention of fruitless and wasteful expenditure and 
the overall financial management of finances in the metro has rapidly declined.  One could 
argue that that latter situation hampers effective oversight and accountability.    
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4.8 ROLE PLAYERS AND INTERNAL MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL 
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
Krishnan (2008:27) indicates that since 1994 the reforms of the legal framework governing 
municipalities has evolved with the aim to promote good governance and public accountability 
to local communities. Some of the key the instruments to promote transparency and public 
accountability include the IDP of the municipality.  The IDP is the five-year strategic plan of 
the municipality.  It captures the strategic priorities of the municipality and highlights its 
service delivery priorities.  The IDP must be reviewed annually to ensure effective 
implementation and budgets, which are an annual expression of the resource allocations for 
implementation of strategic priorities (Krishnan, 2008:27).  
 
The Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) of the municipality serves as 
a specific measurable implementation plans to give effect to the IDP and ensure the operational 
alignment between the municipalities budget and the IDP; as well as the performance 
agreements.  The senior managers in the municipality must entered annually their performance 
agreements to ensure cohesion and alignment of individual plans to the strategic priorities as 
provided the IDP and budget (Krishnan, 2008:27). The financial governance framework which 
indicates the oversight and accountable responsibilities is summarised in Table 4.1 below:   
 
Table 4.1: Financial governance framework applicable to local government 
 Responsible for: Oversight of: Accountable to:  
Municipal 
council 
Approving policy and budget  Mayor  The community 
Mayor Policy, budgets, outcomes, 







Outputs and implementation Administration 
and finances of 
the municipality 
Mayor or Executive 
mayor/Municipal 
council/Public 




(Source: Adopted from the Oversight Report, 15 March 2006) 
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Table 3.1 above illustrates the various role players of oversight and accountability within the 
municipality.  In terms of Section 83(1) and Section 107 of the MFMA, 2003 requires that the 
MM as the accounting officer, senior managers, the CFO and other financial officers must meet 
certain competency levels.  In addition, Section 119 of MFMA, 2003 requires that the 
accounting officer and any other municipal officials responsible for supply chain management 
(SCM) of a municipality must meet prescribed competency levels (Thornhill and Cloete, 
2014:115).   The financial oversight and or accountable role of each of these role players were 
outlined below.    
 
4.8.1 The financial oversight and accountable role of the municipal council    
 
According to the Auditor-General (AGSA, 2019:35), the political leadership (mayor, executive 
mayor and municipal councillors) must oversee the functioning of the municipality and takes 
key decisions to promote accountable local government to local municipalities. In terms of 
Section 4(2) Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the municipal council, within the municipalities 
financial and administrative capacity has the duty to exercise the municipalities’ executive and 
legislative authority and use the resources of the municipality in the best interests of the local 
community, and to provide without favour or prejudice, a democratic and accountable 
government.  In terms of Section 37 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that the 
speaker of a municipal council performs the duties and exercises the powers delegated to the 
speaker in terms of Section 59 of the MSA,  2000.  The speaker is also the chairperson of the 
municipal council. According to SALGA (2005:16), the speaker fulfils a key role to ensure 
oversight, accountability, integrity and discipline of council meetings. The speaker of the 
municipality fulfils a critical oversight role to hold the political executives to account for their 
actions.    
 
Section 16 of the MFMA, 2003 provides that the municipal council of the municipality must 
for each financial year approve an annual budget for the municipality before the start of that 
financial year.  When the annual budget has been tabled, Section 23 of the MFMA, 2003 
requires that the municipal council must consider any views of the local community, the 
National Treasury,  
 
In light of the above, Mazibuko and Fourie (2013:133-134) argue that the municipal council 
together with the mayor and MM fulfil an important role to promote accountable financial 
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management of the municipality.  The municipal council is responsible for bylaws relating to 
municipal rates and taxes, collecting, safeguarding and allocating of public funds. The latter 
implies that the municipal council must have financial control over the executive committee of 
the municipality. The executive committee of the municipality is therefore subject to the 
municipal council to ensure public accountability. On the other hand, individual members of 
the municipal council (councillors) are accountable to the taxpayers/voters. The municipal 
council may delegate some of the financial functions including the collection, safeguarding and 
municipal expenditure to the CFO but the municipal council remains accountable for the 
municipality’s finances.  The municipal council is responsible for the financial policy in 
accordance with prescripts of the MFMA, 2003.  The municipal council has to give instructions, 
lay down procedures to be followed concerning all financial functions and transactions.  Thus, 
the municipal council is responsible for financial control over all financial matter of the 
municipality.  In order to fulfil its financial responsibility concerning the manner in which the 
executive departments collect, safeguard and spend the municipal funds entrusted to them the 
municipal council rely on audits and the reports made by the auditors and other functionaries 
who are accountable only to the municipal council.   
 
The municipal council holds the mayor responsible for promised outcomes and the MM for 
specific outputs. The mayor is expected to oversee the functions of the MM to ensure delivery 
on the agreed outputs, and the council must exercise oversight of the executive mayor or 
committee to ensure they fulfil this responsibility of oversight (National Treasury, 2004:6).  In 
addition to the above, the municipal council must consider the annual audit report and adopt 
an oversight report containing the municipal council’s comments on the annual audit report 
(Gildenhuys, 2018:28-29; Khalo, 2013:585; National Treasury, 2004:6). 
 
In light of the above, the Auditor-General, Kimi Makwetu, reported on the 2016-2017 audit 
outcomes of municipalities some of the key reasons for accountability failures in most of the 
municipalities in the country is a lack of inadequate skills led to a lack of oversight by 
municipal councils including mayors and the subsequent non-compliance of key financial 
management legislation. Political infighting at municipal council level and the continued 
interference of municipal councils in the administration hampers oversight and contributes to 
the development of a culture of no consequences (Makwetu, Media Release 23 May 2019:9). 
In this regard Gericke (in “Die Volksblad” 10 Julie 2019:4) confirms that political conflict as 
a result of political factions in the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality in the Free State 
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province weakened the municipal councils oversight function.   One could argue that political 
interference and political infighting weakens oversight and accountability and could further 
contributes to the development of the culture of no consequences. 
 
4.8.2 Financial and oversight and accountable role of mayor or executive mayor   
 
The executive mayor or executive committee are expected to provide the municipality with 
political leadership, by proposing policies, budgets and performance targets for the 
municipality and its officials (National Treasury, 2004:5; Mazibuko and Fourie, (2013;133-
134).  Thornhill and Cloete (2013:112) state that the mayor has a particular responsibility 
concerning budgetary control and oversight function concerning implementation of the budget. 
The mayor may also give instructions to the accounting officer to ensure that the budget is 
implemented in accordance with the service delivery and budget implementation plan. 
Thornhill and Cloete (2013:112) further outline that the mayor or executive mayor has 
oversight role in municipal financial matters by providing general political guidance over fiscal 
and financial affairs of the municipality; taking reasonable steps to ensure that a municipality 
performs its constitutional obligations within the limits of the municipality’s approved budget, 
and reporting to the provincial executive if the budget has not been approved as required or if 
financial problems necessitates provincial intervention. The mayor must also perform oversight 
concerning municipal entities. Thus, the mayor of a municipality fulfils a critical political 
oversight role in financial matters of the municipality.  
 
According to Khalo, (2013:584), the mayor or any other councillor is prohibited by the MFMA, 
2003 to interfere in the financial management responsibilities assigned to the accounting officer 
or CFO.  The mayor is responsible to monitor assigned responsibilities and to report on 
financial matters.  The mayor must table at the end of each financial year an annual report 
before the municipal council for consideration.  Submission of annual reports by the mayor to 
the municipal council is one essential tool of peer-accountability. The purpose of the annual 
report is to record the activities in the year under review and measure the municipality’s 
performance against its budget. It also promotes the municipality’s accountability for decisions 
made throughout the year to the local community (Community Law Centre, 2008: 25).   Thus, 
the annual report submitted to the municipal council serves as a key oversight instrument to 
hold the municipality to account for their decisions and actions.  
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In terms of Section 52 of the MFMA, 2003 the mayor must provide political guidance 
concerning fiscal and financial matter of the municipality. The mayor must monitor and 
oversees the responsibilities assigned to the accounting officer and CFO of the municipality 
and that the municipality performs within the municipal budget.  The mayor has to submit a 
report to the municipal council within 30 days of each quarter regarding the implementation of 
the municipal budget and the financial state of the municipality. The mayor of the municipality 
has to report to the provincial executive if provincial interventions exist.  The mayor must 
establish a budget steering committee that must consist of the CFO, senior manager responsible 
for the three largest budget votes, the budgeting manager, planning manager and technical 
experts on infrastructure.    (Khalo, 2013:584; Fourie and Opperman, 2015:82; Thornhill and 
Cloete, 2014: 231).   
 
Section 56 and Section 60 of the MFMA, 2003, also differentiates between the role of executive 
councillors and their officials by making the executive mayor or committee responsible for 
policy and outcomes and the MM and other senior managers for implementation and outputs. 
The executive mayor or committee is expected to oversee the performance of its officials, using 
the SDBIP and monitoring performance through monthly progress reports. Non-executive 
councillors are expected to hold both the executive mayor or committee and the officials 
accountable for performance, on the basis of monthly, quarterly and annual reports (National 
Treasury, 2004:5). Thus, the executive mayor or executive committee of the municipality fulfil 
a key oversight role by oversee the performance of the municipal officials by using the SDBIP 
to monitor their performance through monthly progress reports and by submitting the annual 
report to the municipal council.   In terms of Section 131(1) of the MFMA,  2003 the mayor of 
the municipality must ensure that the MM address all aspects raised by the Auditor-General in 
an audit report.  In light of the above, the Auditor-General warns in the report for 2016-2017 
that inadequate skills led to a lack of oversight by municipal councils and mayors, that resulted 
in insufficient implementation and maintenance of financial and performance management 
systems by the administration (AGSA, 2018:3).    
 
4.8.3 Accountable role of the Municipal Manager (MM)  
 
In terms of Section 60 of the MFMA of 2003 the MM is the accounting officer of the 
municipality.   In this regard, Mazibuko and Fourie (2016:134) argue that the MM as the 
accounting officer of the municipality fulfils a key accountability role to promote sound 
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financial management of the municipality. The MM is responsible and accountable for the 
municipalities revenue (income), expenditure, asset management, discharging of all liabilities, 
and to ensure compliance with legislation regulating local government. Mazibuko and Fourie 
(2016:134) further maintain that in terms of the MFMA, 2003 the municipal council of the 
municipality must oversee that the municipal finances of the municipality are managed in such 
a way that the objects of local government are achieved. The latter implies that the MFMA, 
2003 gives the mandate to the municipal council to approve the municipal budget, which must 
be aligned with the municipalities IDP to promote effective service delivery and to give effect 
to the constitutional requirements and objects of local government.     
 
Gildenhuys (2018:61) also adds that the MM as the executive officer of the municipality is in 
terms of Section 60 of the MFMA, 2003 the accounting officer of the municipality.  As the 
accounting officer of the municipality the MM is accountable for the effective, efficient of all 
municipal funds received, safeguard and for all payments made by the municipality.  The MM 
is given some general and specific responsibilities related to developing and maintaining 
effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk management, internal control, 
budget and expenditure control, control of assets and liabilities and reporting. The MM 
delegates the financial function to the CFO.  The MM may not delegate any financial or other 
responsibilities to a political structure.  However, MM must ensure that the standardised 
accounting system is implemented, that an effective accounting service and effective 
processing of financial data and transactions are instituted.  The accounting officer has to 
ensure that proper financial and progress reports are compiled and submitted to the executive 
committee. Sibanda (2017:320) is of the opinion that the MM is responsible for auditees, 
internal controls administrative leadership, planning, risk management and monitoring.   The 
MM may develop a system of delegation to maximise the administrative and operational 
efficiency and to provide sufficient accountable mechanism.  However, a MM may not delegate 
financial or any other administrative responsibilities to a political structure. 
 
In order for a municipality to fulfil their constitutional mandate, it is necessary for them to have 
the means to provide sustainable services, to promote a safe and healthy environment to local 
communities. Craythorne (2006:118) further states the municipal manger must have the 
required relevant skills and expertise to perform the duties associated with the post.   The MM 
is the leader of the municipal administration, supported by senior managers and other municipal 
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officials. According to Craythorne (2006:193), the MM responsible and accountable for the 
formation and development of an economical, effective, efficient and accountable 
administration and the management of the municipality’s administration in accordance with 
the MSA, 2000 and other legislation applicable to municipality. 
  
The MFMA, 2003, requires more regular and accurate financial reporting to the municipal 
council in order to facilitate an environment in which potential or real financial challenges are 
reported in a timely and appropriate manner that will allow the municipal council to remedy 
the situation.  Therefore, the MM must submit monthly budget progress reports to the mayor 
and Provincial Treasury and a mid-year budget report and performance assessment to the 
mayor, the National Treasury and to the Provincial Treasury by 31 January each year.  In 
addition, the MM must also report to municipal council on prescribed withdrawals from bank 
accounts each quarter and on unforeseen or unavoidable expenditure or expenditure that is 
deemed to be unauthorised or irregular or fruitless and wasteful (Fourie and Opperman, 
2015:199; Gildenhuys, 2018:61). 
 
Kumar, Moodley and Reddy (2003:13) maintain that the MM (accounting officer) of the 
municipality must keep full and proper records of the financial affairs of the municipality in 
accordance with relevant prescribed norms and standards. Fourie and Opperman, (2015:109) 
assert that the MM must within one month of receiving Auditor-General’s audit reports, table 
in the municipal council copy of the financial statements and the audit report.  According to 
Thornhill (2014:118) the MM has to submit to the National Treasury and the Provincial 
Treasury copies of the municipality’s annual report, the financial statements and the audit 
report.  
 
According to Siddle and Koelble (2012:101-102), and Fourie and Opperman (2015:72), the 
MM of a municipality must monitor whether the CFO of a municipal entity who function under 
the control of the municipality act in accordance with the prescripts of the MFMA, 2003. The 
MM must report any non-compliance with the MFMA, 2003, to the Municipal council and the 
Provincial Treasury.  In terms of Section 131(1) of the MFMA, 2003 the MM has to address all 
aspects raised by the Auditor-General in an audit report. Furthermore, the MM as the 
accounting officer of a municipality must in accordance with Section 127(3) of the MFMA, 
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2003 submit within seven days after municipal council has adopted the oversight report, the 
municipality’s annual report, including the report of each of the municipal entity. 
 
Section 82 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 requires from the municipal council to appoint 
the MM with the required skills and relevant experience. The necessary framework for 
delegation of authority should be put in place and although the Municipal council delegates 
authority to the accounting officer and management, councillors should not be allowed to 
abdicate their duties and responsibilities to the community (Pricewaterhouse and Coopers, 
2010:6). Fourie and Opperman (2015:10) contend that the MM is responsible for 
implementation of policies and must fulfil his/her oversight role over the administration of the 
municipality. The MM is accountable to the Mayor, the Municipal council and the public.  
 
Siddle and Koelble (2012:101) point out that although the MM forms part of the administration 
rather than the municipal council, the office is a vital one. Together with that of the mayor, the 
office of the MM provides the link between the municipal council and the administration. The 
MM is appointed by the municipal council, as are managers directly accountable to him/her. 
This arrangement was made to provide for a senior management structure in the municipality 
that understands and operates in agreement with its political principals in the executive of the 
municipality (De Visser in Siddle and Koelble (2012:101). Van der Waldt (2011:74) submits 
that as head of administration the MM of a municipality is responsible and accountable for the 
formation and development of an economical, effective, efficient, cost-effective and 
accountable administration. The MM is responsible and accountable to the executive mayor 
for the management of the administration as well as the performance of the functions and 
responsibilities assigned to him/her by the municipal council and the Executive mayor.  
 
Van der Waldt (2011:74) stresses that the MM of a municipality is responsible for the 
appointment of staff subject to the Employment Equity Act, (Act 55 of 1998) and the 
maintenance of discipline of staff. In addition, the MM is tasked with the advising of the 
political structures and political office-bearers of the municipality, managing communications 
between municipal’s administration and its political office-bearers and carrying out the 
decisions of the political structures and political office-bearers of the municipality. 
 
In light of the above, Ndaba (in The Star, 27 June 2019:1) avers that there is a rapid 
deterioration of accountability as showed in the Auditor-Generals audit outcomes of 
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municipalities of the 2017-2018 financial year.   This is a clear indication that MMs as the 
accounting officers, mayors, CFOs and relevant officials in most municipalities including 
metropolitan municipalities should be accountable for any financial losses incurred by 
municipalities during their term in office.  In particular, in the Free State province most 
municipalities showed a total collapse in internal controls in that the political leadership of the 
provincial government and those in all municipalities in the province exhibited no responses 
to improve political oversight and accountability for financial and performance management  
 
The latter is confirmed by the Auditor-General reports for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 that there 
is a continued lack of accountability and leadership failures were the main causes of 
governance failures (AGSA, 2018:55; AGSA 2019:12). Thus, the slow response by political 
and administrative leadership to address the weak control environment leads to a lack of 
consequences and poor oversight and accountability.    
 
4.8.4 Accountable role of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
 
In terms of Section 56 of the MSA, 2000 the CFO is appointed by the municipal council and is 
directly accountable to the MM. Thornhill and Cloete (2018:115) state that the CFO may sub-
delegate in accordance with the MFMA, 2003 any of the delegated functions to an official in 
the budget and treasury office, or to any other municipal official or with prescribed safeguards 
to any other person contracted by the municipality.  In term of Section 77(1) and (2) of the 
MFMA, 2003 the CFO must assist the MM concerning the management and co-ordinating of 
the financial administration of the municipality.  
 
In terms of Section 81 of the MFMA, 2003, the CFO is the head and in charge of the Budget 
and Treasury Office (BTO) of the municipality. The CFO is responsible for the following: 
  
• advising the municipal manager concerning the assigned powers and duties;  
• assisting the municipal manager concerning the administration of the municipality’s 
bank accounts;  
• assisting the municipal manager with the preparation and implementation of the 
municipality’s budget; and  
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• providing advice to senior managers and other senior officials in the exercise of powers 
and duties assigned, in terms of the MFMA, 2003, or delegated to them by the municipal 
manager.  
 
The CFO is accountable to the MM for his delegated functions and is responsible for the 
financial management the budgetary process, accounting, analysis, financial reporting, cash 
management, debt management and other review functions as delegated by the MM.  The CFO 
or municipal treasurer is responsible to provide advise concerning all financial matter, to co-
ordinate all financial activities; responsible for the implementation of the financial system, the 
accounting system and the financial control function within the municipality. As part of the 
administrative functions the CFO is in charge of the budget and treasury office in the 
municipality. The CFO has to perform budgeting, accounting analysis, financial reporting, cash 
management, debt management, review and any other delegated functions by the MM 
(Sibanda, 2017:2017:321; Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:115; Gildenhuys, 2018:62).   
 
Fourie and Opperman (2015: 78) maintain that the CFO of the municipality is responsible for 
the following: 
 
• To ensure that the financial management system of the municipality and internal control 
are properly established and implemented; 
• To ensure effective, efficient, transparent and economic utilisation of all financial and 
other resources within the municipality; 
• To prevent any unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure; 
• To ensure that all revenue due to the municipality are collected; 
• To managed and safeguard all asset of the municipality; 
• To ensure that all information to ensure compliance with the provisions of the MFMA,  
2003 is submitted to the accounting officer as required; 
• To ensure compliance of the provisions of the MFMA, 2003 including Section 79.       
 
National Treasury (2004:21) indicates that to ensure effective cash management and the control 
of all banking accounts by the chief financial officer, including the primary bank account all 
bank accounts must be put under the responsibility of the chief financial officer. This is one of 
the most urgent reforms that must be implemented by a municipality. This is to end the practice 
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whereby any department or official of a municipality can set up a bank account, without the 
knowledge of the MM or council.  It is clear that the CFO is directly accountable to the MM 
concerning all financial activities including the implementation of the financial system, the 
accounting system and the financial control function within the municipality.    
 
4.8.5    Code of Conduct for Municipal Councils regarding Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) 
 
According to the National Treasury Supply Chain Management Regulations (2003:20), its 
Code of Conduct for Municipal councils regarding SCM states that all municipal officials and 
other role players involved in SCM chain management are in a position of trust implying a duty 
to act in the public interest.  In terms of the National Treasury, Supply Chain Management 
Regulations (2003:20) municipal officials and other role players should not perform their duties 
to unlawfully gain any form of compensations, payment or gratuities from any person or 
provider or contractor for themselves, their family or their friends.  Municipal officials 
responsible for or involved in supply chain management should perform their administrative 
duties in accordance with relevant legislation, policies and regulations.  Furthermore, 
municipal official should ensure that public resources are administered in an accountable and 
responsible manner. 
 
The National Treasury, Supply Chain Management Regulations (2003:20) requires that 
municipal officials and other role players involved in SCM should the following: 
 
• Municipal officials must perform their duties efficiently, effectively and with integrity, 
in accordance with the relevant legislation, policies and guidelines.   
• Municipal officials should ensure that public resources are administered responsibly. 
• Municipal officials and other role players involved in SCM should be fair and impartial 
in the performance of their functions.  They should at no time afford any undue 
preferential treatment to any group or individual or unfairly discriminate against any 
group or individual.  They should not abuse the power and authority vested in them. 
 
National Treasury (2003:20) further reiterates that municipal officials must declare to the 
accounting officer (MM) details of any private or business interest which that person, or any 
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close family member, partner or associate, may have in any proposed procurement or disposal 
process, or in any award of a contract by the municipality.  The National Treasury Supply 
Chain Management Regulations Code of Conduct for Municipal Councils (2003:20) states that 
functionaries (political and public officials) are accountable for their decisions and actions to 
the public. Moreover, it provides that the accounting officers or their delegates have the 
authority to commit the municipality to any transaction for the procurement of goods and 
services; all transactions conducted by a public official should be recorded and accounted for 
in an appropriate accounting system and that public officials should not make any false or 
misleading entries into such a system for any reason whatsoever.   
 
Except for the above National Treasury Supply Chain Management Regulations Code of 
Conduct for Municipal Councils (2003:20) requires that all municipal functionaries (political 
and municipal officials) must report to the MM any alleged irregular conduct in the supply 
chain management system which that person may become aware of, including aspects such as 
any alleged fraud, corruption, favouritism or unfair conduct; any alleged contravention of the 
policy on inducements, rewards, gifts and favours to municipalities or municipal entities, 
officials or other role players; and any alleged breach of this code of conduct; or any 
declarations made must be recorded in a register which the accounting officer must keep for 
this purpose. Lastly any declarations made by the accounting officer must be made to the Mayor 
or Executive mayor who must ensure that such declaration is recorded in the register. 
 
According to Mantzaris (2017:124), corruption in particular in SCM and procurement practices 
has occurred throughout the public sector of which local government cannot be excluded. 
Despite the existence of numerous laws and National Treasury SCM and procurement 
regulations and Code of Conduct about SCM, corruption related to SCM in all three spheres of 
government is a concern.  Munzhedzi (2016:2) warns that the continued noncompliance with 
SCM and procurement legislative framework, regulations tender irregularities remains a 
concern in all three spheres of government.  Mantzaris (2017:125) mentions that that one of 
the root causes of corruption in SCM and procurement is the fight for dominance amongst 
administrative and political leaders, which is the result of a party monopoly in power in most 
municipalities.  This leads to political interferences into the administration of the municipality 
and it further widens the gap among the political oversight and the municipalities 
administrators (Mantzaris, 2017:125).   
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In light of the above, the Auditor-General in the report for 2016-2017 (2018:56) confirms, that 
the continued disregards for procurement and SCM processes by the administrative and 
political leadership resulted in irregular expenditure, coupled with limited consequences for 
these transgressions is creating an environment open to misappropriation, wastage and the 
abuse of state funds.   The Auditor-General said in the report for 2017-2018 (AGSA, 2019:2) 
that a total of 74% of the municipalities did not adequately follow up on allegations of financial 
and SCM misconduct and fraud.  In the Free State province, especially, there is a total 
breakdown in controls and poor leadership responses towards improving accountability, 
capacity and stability. All municipalities (100%) in the Free State province financial position 
is very vulnerable due to an increase in irregular expenditure as a result of widespread 
indifference towards procuring goods and services in accordance of SCM and procurement 
legislation and regulations, and significant deficiencies in infrastructure projects (AGSA, 
2018:3 and AGSA, 2019:10).  The Auditor-General warns in the report for 2016-2017 (AGSA, 
2018:56) that the continued disregards for procurement processes by the administrative and 
political leadership of municipalities in the Free State province resulted in irregular 
expenditure, coupled with limited consequences for these transgressions, is creating an 
environment open to misappropriation, wastage and the abuse of state fund. Thus, despite of 
the existence of relevant SCM and procurement legislation, regulations and codes of conduct, 
it seems that continued non-compliance with SCM legislation in particular in municipalities of 
the Free State province as reported by the Auditor-General remains a challenge. The latter 
raises questions about the effectiveness of the political oversight and accountable 
administrative mechanism in these municipalities to prevent the continued non-compliance 
with relevant SCM and procurement legislation and regulations. 
 
4.9 INTERNAL AUDIT UNITS AND INTERNAL AUDIT COMMITTEES 
 
Van der Waldt (2015:59) mentions that the internal audit committee of the municipality is one 
of the key political oversight structures while, the internal audit unit can assist the municipal 
council in improving oversight of its financial function and in particular over municipal 
projects.  Sing (2003:92) maintain that South African municipalities are required to establish a 
system of internal control and institute a system of internal audit. Internal auditing is regarded 
as an independent appraisal of functions within the institution for review and evaluation of 
operations as a service to management.   According to Sing (2003:92), audits may be classified 
a pre-audit and post-audit depending on when transactions are examined. Pre-audits are 
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regarded as being part of the internal financial administration and management control system. 
The pre-audit is defined as an examination of financial transactions prior to their completion. 
Pre-audit is regarded as being part of the internal financial administration and management 
control system. The pre-audit approach achieves the traditional purpose of auditing, such as 
detection and protection of fraud and accounting errors. On the other hand, post-audit is 
conducted after transactions and events have occurred. 
 
Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:123) state that in terms of the MFMA, 2003 Section 166, 
each municipality must have an internal audit committee that acts as an independent advisory 
body. Section 166, of the MFMA, 2003 further indicates that the municipal audit committee 
must advise the municipal council; the political office-bearers and the accounting officer on 
matters relating to internal audits and internal financial control, accounting procedures and 
practices; risk and risk management; loss control and compliance with MFMA, 2003 and any 
applicable legislation. 
 
According to Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:123), the municipality’s internal audit 
committee has specific duties towards the internal audit unit, the Auditor-General, the 
municipal council and the MM. Van der Waldt (2015:59) avers that the internal audit 
committee of the municipality does not form part the municipal administration however, the 
head of the internal audit unit performs a secretarial function to assists the internal audit 
committee. The responsibilities of the internal audit committee include to evaluate the financial 
statements of the municipality in consultation with the Auditor-General and the internal audit 
unit. Furthermore, the internal audit committee has to review the integrity of the municipality’s 
financial report processes, both internal and external; and has to consider the Auditor-General’s 
opinion on the quality and appropriateness of the municipality’s accounting policies and that 
of its entities, as applied in the financial reporting. The internal audit committee should also 
report to the municipal council on any issues raised by the Auditor-General. The audit 
committee should also carry out any investigation into the financial affairs of the municipality 
or municipal entity (Fourie and Opperman in Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits, 2016:123) 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2015:113) also concur that in terms of MFMA,  2003, Section 166, each 
municipality must have an Audit Committee. An Audit Committee is an independent body 
which must advise the council, the political office-bearers, the MM and the management of the 
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municipality on matters related to internal financial control and internal audits; risk 
management; accounting policies; the adequacy, reliability and accuracy of financial reporting 
and information. The audit committee must also advise municipal council on performance 
management, effective governance and compliance with financial regulations (Fourie and 
Opperman, 2007:66). 
 
The internal audit committee must review the annual financial statements to provide the council 
with an authoritative and credible view of the financial position of the municipality, its 
efficiency and effectiveness. It must also respond to the council on any matters raised by the 
Auditor-General in the audit report (Fourie and Opperman, 2007:66).  According to Section 
166 of MFMA, 2003, there must be an audit committee of at least three persons with appropriate 
experience, of whom the majority may not be in the employ of the municipality or municipal 
entity. The chairperson must be appointed from one of the members who is not in the employ 
of the council or municipal entity. No councillor may be a member of an audit committee 
(National Treasury, 2003:24). 
 
The internal municipal audit committee reports should also include comments on the quality 
of management, and the monthly or quarterly reports submitted under the MFMA, 2003 and 
the Division of Revenue Act.  It is not required by legislation that municipal audit committees 
make a statement on the municipality as a going concern. Several municipalities in South 
Africa are in fact not a going concern. Community members (as the primary stakeholders) and 
clients of municipalities should be informed if their municipality is no longer a going concern 
(Pricewaterhouse and Coopers, 2010:7). 
 
According to Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:125), a challenge facing the implementation 
of the internal audit committee recommendations is that there is lack of sanctions taken against 
management for non-compliance with the MFMA, 2003. Another concern is that no attention 
is paid to keep deadlines provided for giving feedback to the internal audit committee. Van 
Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:125) maintain that it is difficult for members of the Audit 
Committee to function without accurate, reliable information from management and internal 
audit units. Another concern, according to Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:125), is that 
elements of mismanagement and corruption were hidden from the internal audit committee.  
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4.10 MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
 
According to Van der Waldt (2015:57), the performance audit committee is another key 
political oversight structure of the municipality.  It may access any records of the municipality 
for auditing and summon or request information from any official of the municipality.   In terms 
of Regulation 9 of the Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations of 2001 requires a 
municipality to appoint a separate performance audit committee to conduct the internal audit 
of the municipality’s performance. This committee reviews the quarterly reports submitted to 
it as well as the performance management system of the municipal council, makes 
recommendations and, twice during a financial year, submits an audit report to the municipal 
council as prescribed by National Treasury Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations 
of 2001 (Van der Waldt, 2015:57-60). 
 
Van der Waldt (2015:60) further argues that the Municipal Performance Audit Committee 
plays an important role in enhancing the oversight role of the municipal council. This 
improvement of the oversight role is done by reviewing the performance of municipal 
management and determining whether management in their execution of municipal council 
projects followed the legislative framework that governs performance management. 
 
De Visser, Steytler and Mays (in Van der Waldt (2015:58) argue that even though municipal 
committees might be representative of all political parties, it must be chaired by a member of 
the executive and accounts and reports to the executive. It could be further argued that the 
representativeness of these committees may exert a significant influence on the way in which 
oversight is conducted. The more the representative of different political parties the more 
effective oversight is exercised. 
 
4.11 MUNICIPAL PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (MPAC) AS A KEY 
MUNICIPAL OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE 
 
According to Van der Waldt (2015:60) and Sibanda (2017:313) the MPAC established in terms 
of Section 79 of Municipal Structures Act of 1998 serves as another key political oversight 
structure of the municipality.  The main purpose of the MPAC is to exercise oversight of the 
executive officials of the municipal council with the intention to promote good governance and 
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public accountability. Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:150-151) agree with the above by 
maintaining that the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) 
in support with National Treasury have issued guidelines for the establishment of the MPACs 
in each municipality to assist the municipal council to hold the executive and municipal 
administration to account with the aim to promote effective, efficient and transparent managed 
of municipal funds.    
 
Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:124) agrees with the above that the MPACs was 
established in terms of the MFMA, Circular 32 of 2006 to assists the municipal council in 
holding the executive and municipal administration to account, and to ensure the effective and 
efficient use of municipal resources. Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016:124) further argue 
that the primary duties of the MPACs is to promote transparency and accountability.   
 
Khalo (2013:589) observes that before 2005 municipalities did not fall within the responsibility 
of the Public Accounts Committees and at some point Parliament used to refer audit reports of 
municipalities to a separate committee such as the portfolio committee on Provincial and Local 
Government Affairs (currently known as Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs). 
This means that in the past SCOPA did not exercise financial oversight on municipalities in 
South Africa and further implication was that the void created by an absence of an oversight 
mechanism in this sphere of government accounted for the concomitant and sporadic 
mismanagement of funds, corruption and other unethical practices, hence the need to establish 
MPACs to ensure accountability (Khalo, 2013:589). 
 
Khalo (2013:589) further indicates that the key functions of accountability and oversight in 
municipal financial management is to improve performance and service delivery, safeguard 
against corruption, mismanagement of resources and abuse of power, as well as improve 
integrity and confidence in local government. The committee system is used to support and 
enhance the municipal council oversight function and, in particular, the MPACs performs the 
Municipal council’s oversight role over municipal finances (Khalo, 2013:589).   
 
CoGTA (2013:8) points out that together with SALGA and National Treasury they appoint 
MPACs to enhance oversight of the executive of the municipal structures. The MPAC is a 
committee of the municipal council, appointed in accordance with Section 79 of the Municipal 
Structures Act of 1998. In metros and large category B municipality it is, due to the number of 
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councillors, easier to appoint Section 79 oversight committees to provide oversight of the 
functions of the Section 80 committees. Many smaller municipalities do not have enough 
councillors to appoint such MPACs and can only appoint one oversight committee tasked with 
the complete oversight role (CoGTA, 2013:8). 
 
According to the Gauteng Local Government and Housing (2012:23), MPACs were first 
established in 2007, this enabled councils to fulfil their constitutional obligations to scrutinise 
and oversee executive action, in respect of financial management. MPAC also serves as 
accountability and oversight structure over public resources in the municipalities and ensures 
a total separation of powers between the executive and the municipal council. The provincial 
governments developed a framework on the establishment and operation of MPACs. The 
framework, proposes that these accountability and oversight structures, be established along 
the principles of the national and provincial Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Gauteng 
Local Government and Housing, 2012:23). 
 
In addition, the Gauteng Local Government and Housing (2012:23) indicates that the functions 
of MPACs, include inter alia, to examine financial statements of all executive organs of 
municipal councils, to examine any audit reports issued on those statements, to examine any 
reports issued by the Auditor-General on the affairs of any municipal entity; to examine any 
other financial statements or reports referred to the committee by councils; to examine annual 
reports on behalf of municipal council; and to make recommendations and to monitor the extent 
to which its recommendations and those of the Auditor-General are carried out (Gauteng Local 
Government and Housing, 2012:23). 
 
According to the Western Cape Government (2012:4), the MPACs will assist municipal 
council to hold the executive and municipal entities to account, and to ensure the efficient use 
of municipal resources (Western Cape Government, 2012: 2).  The MPAC may engage directly 
with the public and consider public comments when received and will be entitled to request for 
documents or evidence from the MM of the municipality or municipal entity. The MPAC can 
also request the support of both the internal and external auditors when necessary. It should be 
noted that the standard rules for the municipal council apply to MPAC (Western Cape 
Government, 2012:4).   
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The Western Cape Government (2012:4) further points out that the MPACs, similar to other 
committees of Municipal council should comprise solely of councillors appointed by resolution 
of a full municipal council meeting. However, the committee may invite representatives of the 
community and co-opt members of the public who have expertise in relevant specific fields to 
assist and advise in the deliberations when the need arise. These representatives will have no 
voting rights as they are not elected councillors.  The Western Cape Government (2012:4) 
maintains that the MPAC shall comprise of councillors excluding any councillor who is serving 
as executive mayor or deputy executive mayor, mayor or deputy mayor, speaker, chief whip, a 
member of mayoral committee, a member of the executive committee. Where the municipality 
has a sufficient number of councillors, councillors serving on the MPAC should preferably not 
serve in other committees of council to minimise possible conflict of interest (Western Cape 
Government, 2012:7). 
 
In light of the above, it is clear that the MPACs can be seen as a key oversight committee, 
however the Auditor-General warns in the 2017-2018 audit report that MPACs lack the legal 
mandate to enforce their recommendations on municipalities. The Auditor-General further 
mentions that in some municipalities the municipal managers refused to attend hearing, respond 
to questions or supply required information to MPACs.   Another challenge is that that not all 
municipalities implement the recommendations of MPACs because of the inadequate legal 
mandate of the committees to enforce recommendations (AGSA, 2019:28). 
 
4.12 OVERSIGHT REPORTS ON ANNUAL REPORTS 
 
Annual reports were discussed in Section 4.7 of this chapter; subsequently attention is given to 
the purpose of the oversight report of the municipality.  According to Sirovha and Thornhill 
(2017:151), in terms of Section 129(1) of the MFMA, 2003 the municipal council must consider 
the annual report of the municipality or that of any municipal entity under the control of the 
municipality. Mazibuko and Fourie (2013:137) concur that accountability is the cornerstone of 
financial reporting which are also fundamental to a municipality’s sustainability.   The 
oversight report of a municipality comments on the annual report, which must conclude by 
approving the report with or without reservations, reject the report or refer the report back for 
revision of those components that can be, revised. The municipal council must adopt an 
oversight report containing the municipal council commitment on the annual report, not later 
than two months from the data on which the annual report was tabled in the municipal council. 
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The oversight report must contain a statement on whether the municipal council has approved 
the annual report or whether the annual report was referred back for revision.   
 
4.13 ACCOUNTABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT OF MUNICIPALITIES 
 
Khalo and Vyas-Doorgapersad (in Van der Waldt et al., 2018:228) point out that in terms of 
Chapter 7 and 8 of the MFMA, 2003 the MM as the accounting officer if the municipality is 
responsible for financial and risk management within a municipality.  Fourie and Opperman 
(2015:45) state that although the MM is responsible for the management of risks, in practice 
the chief financial officer (CFO) and the heads of departments must accept joint responsibility 
for the management of risks including financial risks and in particular to report these risks to 
the relevant authority.  In addition, the National Treasury (2004:5) provides that the municipal 
council should ensure that the municipality has and maintains a comprehensive and effective 
risk management plan and process and that key risks are quantified.  Risk assessment should 
be done regularly and should adopt a top-down approach but should not be limited to strategic 
and high-end risks only. Operational risks should be part of the risk management plan.  
Although it may be problematic for smaller municipalities to do proper risk management and 
assessment, consideration should be given to a risk management unit established under the 
auspices of CoGTA the relevant provincial department to assist smaller municipalities and 
ensure skills transfer (Pricewaterhouse and Coopers, 2010:6). 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2015:456) state that although risk management if primarily an 
administrative responsibility it clearly has political and financial implications.  Therefore, the 
municipal council have to ensure that a relevant risk management policy is in place to counter 
in particular financial risks. The MFMA, 2003 provides a comprehensive framework 
concerning the management of the municipalities’ budgets, revenue and income to minimise 
any risks relating to the mismanagement of its budgetary and financial resources (Thornhill 
and Cloete, 2014: 115; Fourie and Opperman, 2015:456).    
 
Fourie and Opperman (2015:458) further maintain that the following aspects must be covered 
in the municipalities risk management policy: 
 
• Identification of risks. The identification of risks is in general the responsibility of a 
line manager.  Therefore, any activity which threatens the achievement of the 
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municipalities objectives or which may lead to any material loss or damage to the 
municipalities’ financial resources, or which may have any disruptive influence must 
be identified and assessed.  
• Measurement of risks.   All risks must be evaluated and assessed in quantitative terms 
(the potential costs) where possible to determine the potential impact on the 
municipality.  Qualitative terms such as a low, medium, high or extreme risk may also 
be used to determine the potential impact of the risk on the municipality.  
• Management of risks.  Effective identification and management of a potential risk will 
enable the municipality to minimise the impact of the risk. The MM, CFO and all heads 
of departments should be responsible for the management of risks and in particular 
financial risks.  
• Reporting of risks.   Any risk with a potential financial implication greater than a 
certain or agreed amount as determined by the MM and CFO must be reported to the 
accounting officer of the municipality.  The CFO is responsible to report on any 
financial risk-related matter to the municipal political structure.  Except for the financial 
risks as provided in the municipalities financial policies the following risks must be 
reported to the accounting office of the municipality; strategic impact, human resources, 
safety and security, health and environmental risks, service delivery related risks, legal 
compliance risks and any risk that have the potential to impact on the reputation of the 
municipality (Fourie and Opperman, 2015:459-461).   
 
In addition to the municipalities risk management policy the municipalities financial 
management policies the revenue management policy and by-laws must make provision for the 
tariffs, property rates, credit control and debt collection.   The latter form the basis on which 
the municipality tax property owners and consumers of municipal services.  In this regard 
Pricewaterhouse and Coopers (2010:8) warns that one of the major areas of concern in 
municipalities is the accuracy and condition or the municipalities billing systems. Members of 
the community and clients are frustrated by these systems and often find municipal billing 
incomprehensible. Incorrect and unclear municipal accounts exacerbate the problem even 
further and add to risks municipalities must face. Another concern by Pricewaterhouse and 
Coopers (2010:8) is the fact that municipalities lost billions of rand to uncollected debts.  The 
non-payment for municipal services often leads to serious financial challenges and is a financial 
risk for the municipality.  Therefore, the reconciliation of debtors and a proper credit control 
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system should take place to ensure that all debtors information is correctly capture on the billing 
system.  The credit control system which includes the effective implementation of credit 
control and revenue collection is also a key element of the municipalities risk management 
system (Pricewaterhouse and Coopers, 2010:8); Fourie and Opperman 2015; 466).      
 
Except for the above the management of the municipalities supply chain management (SCM) 
and procurement activities is susceptible to various risks. Munzhedzi (2016:2) aver that tender 
irregularities, bribery, corruption, non-compliance with SCM acts and regulations and the 
municipalities own SCM policy, incompetence and negligence of public officials are some of 
the concerns related to SCM and procurement practices.  The SCM policy of the municipality 
must guard against all the risks mentioned.  In this regard Thornhill and Cloete (2014:122-123) 
maintain that councillors are not allowed to attend any municipal bid committee meeting 
responsible for evaluating tenders, quotations, contracts or bids.  No politician, councillor or 
any other person can interfere or try to influence with the municipalities SCM and procurement 
system or amend or tamper with any tenders, quotations, contracts or bids after their 
submissions. Another concern is that most fraud and corruption in local government occurs 
through the SCM and procurement processes.  Prices are inflated, bid committees are not 
properly constituted, conflict of interest not properly management, tenders are not advertised 
as required by SCM Act, policies and regulations and contracts are awarded to friends and 
family members.   The latter pose a serious financial risk for the municipality and it defeats the 
aim of effective SCM and procurement management (Munzhedzi, 2016:2; Thornhill and 
Cloete, 2014:122-123).       
 
In terms of the National Treasury Municipal SCM Regulations (2003:10) the municipal council 
and the board of directors of a municipal entity is responsible for oversight of the 
implementation of the municipalities SCM policy. The municipality must report on the 
implementation of its SCM policy within 30 days of the end of each financial year.     
 
Another risk is that municipalities have to guard against are concerned with asset management.  
In this regard, Fourie and Opperman (2015:469) caution that except for the financial risk 
inherent in the loss of a fixed asset, the wastage of resources through the neglect or abuse of 
assets also pose a financial risk for the municipality.  The effective management of fixed assets 
is not only the responsibility of the accounting officer of the municipality, all line managers 
must safeguard the assets of a municipality.  The CFO must ensure that the data relevant to the 
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municipalities fixed asset are regular and correctly recorded in the asset register of the 
municipality.  Stock taking as an effective control measure must take place at the end of each 
financial year to identify any surpluses and losses of fixed and movable assets.   Apart from 
effective record keeping general control measures must be instituted to limit any risks and 
losses.  Regular inspections and reporting is critical to identify any risks or loss of the 
municipalities movable and immovable asset (Gildenhuys, 2018:193-194; Fourie and 
Opperman, 2015:469). 
 
In light of the above, the Auditor-General report for 2016-2017 reported that a total of 78% of 
all municipalities were in non-compliance relating to quality of financial statements.  In 
addition, a total of 73% of all municipalities were in non-compliance concerning the 
management of SCM and contract management (AGSA, 2017:29). A total of 72% of all 
municipalities were in non-compliance relating to the prevention and unauthorised, irregular 
and fruitless and wasteful expenditure.  A total of 395 of all municipalities have ineffective 
system of internal control for assets.  The latter leads to a financial loss and pose a threat to the 
effective financial management of municipalities. The Auditor-General, report for 2016-2017 
further states that the Free State province the continued disregard of SCM and procurement 
processes by the administrative and political leadership resulted in irregular expenditure with 
limited consequences and accountability for these transgressions. Effective oversight and 
accountability are critical in ensuring compliance with legislation to prevent financial losses 
and irregularities (AGSA, 2017:55).  Thus, effective risk management is an imperative to 
promote accountable local governance. 
 
4.14 OTHER INTERNAL FINANCIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
According to Ntonzima (2011:1011), the aim of financial controls is to ensure that there is 
reasonable transparency and accountability on how public finances are generated, managed and 
spend.  Financial controls ensure that spending of scarce financial resources take place in 
accordance, with prescribed legislation, policies, rules, regulations, directives, and that it 
incurred in line with predetermined plans such as the IDP and budgeted items.  Financial 
reporting is the most important means to determine the extent to which the accounting officer, 
the CFO and other municipal officials responsible for municipal finances fulfil their 
responsibilities. One of the key requirements of an effective financial control is the 
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establishment of an effective financial management system that consist of a planning system, 
a budget system, an accounting system, financial control systems and allocation systems.   
 
According to Sibanda (2017:320), the MM and senior management including the CFO as the 
head of the SCM of the municipality, must implement basic financial and performance controls. 
Financial and performance controls include proper record, keeping, relevant and accurate 
information that is addressable and available to support financial and performance reporting.  
Financial and performance controls include daily and monthly processing and reconciling 
transactions. 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2015:477) are of the opinion that the following internal controls must 
be instituted to promote effective financial management and accountability: 
 
• Control environment.  An effective control environment relates to the municipality’s 
overall governance and management functions.  It includes the institutionalisation of 
its value system and the municipality’s commitment to these values, integrity and 
accountability.  Sibanda (2017:318) avers that organisational structures such as the 
internal audit unit and audit committees are key elements of the control environment 
within the municipality.      
• Risk assessment.  It entails the identification, management and reporting of serious 
financial risks. The internal audit unit of the municipality prepares a risk-based audit 
plan and an internal audit programme for each financial year and advises the MM (as 
the accounting officer). It also reports to the audit committee on the implementation of 
the internal audit plan, internal controls, accounting procedures and practices, risks and 
risk management, loss control and compliance with the MFMA, 2003, DoRA and other 
relevant legislation and regulations (Sibanda, 2017:319).   
• Control activities. Control activities refer to external (legislative frameworks, acts, 
policies and regulations) and internal control activities (accurate and complete 
processing of transactions, accounting standards and systems, information reports and 
approval of physical control measures) which should limit fraud, losses and non-
compliance with legislation and other prescripts.   
• Information and communication. These are part of the internal control system of a 
municipality. They entail effective and reliable communication systems as well as 
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proper procedures, policies and reporting mechanisms. Information should be well-
managed, relevant and reliable as part of the reporting system and record management 
(Sibanda, 2017:318).   
• Monitoring.  Effective monitoring includes performance indicators to monitor 
activities, risks and progress. It also involves reporting on weaknesses and ensuring that 
appropriate corrective actions are taken.  
 
According to Sibanda (2017:317-318), financial control involves matters such as policies, 
procedures, reporting and auditing and reporting procedures to report wrongdoing, and 
transparent action when wrongdoing is discovered. Sibanda (2017:318) avers that 
organisational structures such as the internal audit unit and audit committees can be seen as 
key elements of the control environment that assist within the municipality.      
 
Considering the above, a concern was raised by Nbaba (in The Star, 27 June 2018) that the 
Auditor-General’s report for 2017-2018 financial year showed a total breakdown in internal 
control (AGSA, 2018:10).  Therefore, one could argue that internal controls are critical 
important to promote oversight and accountability. Thus, any decline in the effectiveness of 
internal controls, weakens oversight and accountability of the financial management of the 
municipality. 
 
4.15 CURRENT OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES OF 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE FREE STATE 
PROVINCE 
 
According to Mazibuki and Fourie (2013:138-140) and Khalo and Vyas-Doorgapersad (in Van 
der Waldt et al. 2018:220-221), municipalities face many serious overwhelming financial 
management challenge that have a particular effect on service delivery regarding delivering of 
water, electricity, sanitation housing and refuse collection.  Most municipalities including 
metropolitan municipalities which are supposed to be less dependent increasing relies on 
transfers of grants from national government. A concern is that most municipalities of the 
country are dysfunctional due to political interference, political faction infighting that weakens 
political oversight that often leads to mismanagement of limited financial resources.         
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As mentioned in Section 2.10 of Chapter 2 of this study the Auditor-General (2018:2) reported 
that municipal councils failed in 61% of all municipalities to conduct investigations concerning 
unauthorised irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure during 2016/2017 financial year. 
Other concerns that weakened oversight and accountability include the lack of relevant skills 
of municipal councillors and mayors that directly leads to a lack of oversight by municipal 
councils.  The latter led to insufficient implementation and maintenance of financial and 
performance management systems by municipal administrations.   Nbaba (in The Star, 27 June 
2019:1) mentions that the Auditor-General pointed out in the audit outcomes of the financial 
year 2017-2018 that accountability deteriorated while irregular expenditure remains very high.  
A concern is that only 18 of the 257 municipalities received clean audits in the 2017-2018 
financial year, which is an indication that accountability remains a challenge to hold 
municipalities to account for the management of their municipal finances.  Nbaba (in The Star, 
27 June 2019:2) further states that the financial health of municipalities in the country 
continued to worsen from a net liability positions of R4.8 billion in the 2016-2017 financial 
year to R6.1 billion in the 2017-2018 financial year.  Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality of 
the Free State province received for the second consecutive financial year a qualified audit 
opinion with comments.   Nbaba (in The Star, 27 June 2019:2) maintains that the Auditor-
General reported that since 2012-2013 financial year till date, Mangaung Metropolitan 
Municipality showed a total of R552 million of irregular expenditure, while a total of R4,460 
billion of unauthorised expenditure was reported.  During the 2017-2018 financial year the 
metro irregular expenditure was R127 million, the fruitless and wasteful expenditure was R26 
million and the unauthorised expenditure was R874.1 million.  One could argue that the latter 
is a clear indication of the functionality of oversight and accountability of the financial 
management of most of the municipalities in the country including all municipalities in the 
Free State province including the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality. The further 
deterioration of the financial affairs of the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, resulted in 
an intervention by the Free State provincial government.   According to Gericke (In “Die 
Volksblad” 30 Janaury 2020), Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality became the first 
metropolitan to be placed under provincial administration.  A concern is the continued 
disregard of internal controls including proper record keeping and financial reporting and 
compliance with key financial management legislation.  The continued inaction of municipal 
councils, mayors, MMs and other relevant executives to implement the recommendations of 
the Auditor-General weakened oversight and accountability of the financial affairs of most 
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municipalities. The above led to the creation of a culture of no consequences that weakens 




In this chapter the various mechanisms and strategies to promote accountable, ethical and 
responsible municipal financial management were discussed. The oversight and accountability 
role of senior municipal officials were scrutinised. The role of the national treasury and 
provincial treasuries to ensuring oversight and accountability of municipalities finances were 
discussed. It was emphasised that national treasury must execute its constitutional monitoring 
and oversight role over municipalities as it relates to adherence and compliance to the 
legislative framework governing local government.  A concern was raised that one of the main 
reasons why political oversight and accountability fails in most municipalities is due to a lack 
of the leadership of municipalities and provincial governments to hold municipalities to 
account for their continued blatant non-compliance with the constitutional obligation as 
provided in Chapter 7 of the Constitution, 1996 including non-compliance with key municipal 
legislation.   
 
It was accentuated in this chapter that since 2003 there was a significant rapid growth in 
transfers of grants from national government to local government. It is evident that 
municipalities dependence on grants from national government obscure the accountability of 
municipalities to raise and collect their own financial revenue as required in terms of MFMA, 
2003.  Oversight and accountability are the cornerstone of financial reporting of local 
government. It was emphasised that the annual report of the municipality is to promote 
accountability to the local community for the decisions made by the municipality in a given 
year.  The process of adoption of the annual report by the municipal is an indication of the 
importance of the annual report as an accountability instrument.  Another key oversight 
instrument over the municipal administration that was discussed is the mayor’s mid-year 
budget and performance assessment report. In this regard it was mentioned that the Auditor-
Generals reported on the audit outcomes of municipalities in the 2016-2017 and again in the 
2017-2018 financial year that financial reporting has rapidly weakened in most municipalities 
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In the discussion about the role players and internal mechanisms to promote financial oversight 
and accountability it was mentioned that one of the key instruments to promote transparency 
and public accountability in a municipality is the IDP of the municipality.  Therefore, the IDP 
must be reviewed annually to ensure effective implementation and budgets, which are an 
annual expression of the resource allocations for implementation of the municipality’s strategic 
priorities. It was further emphasised that municipal council together with the mayor and MM 
fulfil an important role to promote accountable financial management of the municipality. On 
the one hand the executive committee of the municipality is subject to the municipal council to 
ensure public accountability.  On the other hand, individual members of the municipal council 
(councillors) are accountable to the taxpayers/voters.  It was stressed that the mayor is expected 
to oversee and manage the MM to ensure delivery on the agreed outputs.  The municipal 
council must exercise oversight of the executive mayor or executive committee.  The municipal 
council must consider the annual audit report and adopt the oversight report containing the 
municipal council’s comments on the annual audit report. 
 
The CFO of the municipality is directly accountable to the MM concerning all financial matters 
including the implementation of the financial system, the accounting system and the financial 
control function within the municipality. It was mentioned that the internal audit committee of 
the municipality is one of the key political oversight structures while, the internal audit unit 
can assist the municipal council in improving oversight of its financial function and in 
particular over municipal projects.  However, concerns were raised about the functionality the 
internal audit committees. One of the concerns is that there is a lack of sanctions taken against 
management for non-compliance with the MFMA, 2003. Another concern is that no attention 
is paid to keep deadlines provided for giving feedback to the internal audit committee. Another 
concern is that it is difficult for members of the internal audit committee to function without 
accurate, reliable information from management and internal audit units. The performance 
audit committee is another key political oversight structure of the municipality. It was argued 
that that the representativeness of these committees may exert a significant influence on the 
way in which oversight is conducted. The more the representative of different political parties 
the more effective oversight is exercised. 
 
It was stressed that one of the key political oversight structures in terms of Section 79 of 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998 is the MPAC to exercise oversight of the executive officials of 
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the municipal council with the intention to promote good governance and public accountability.   
Effective oversight and accountability are critical to ensure compliance with legislation to 
prevent financial losses and irregularities. Therefore, effective risk management is an 
imperative to promote accountable local governance.  In terms of Chapter 7 and 8 of the 
MFMA, 2003, the MM as the accounting officer if the municipality is responsible for financial 
and risk management within a municipality.  However, it was mentioned in this chapter that 
the Auditor-Generals report on the audit outcomes of municipalities of the 2017-2018 financial 
year showed a total breakdown in internal control.  Therefore, one could argue that internal 
controls are critical important to promote oversight and accountability. Any decline in the 
effectiveness of internal controls, weakens oversight and accountability of the financial 
management of the municipality. 
 
The chapter emphasised that the continued disregard of internal controls including proper 
record keeping and financial reporting and compliance with key financial management 
legislation remains a concern.  The continued inaction of municipal councils, mayors, MMs 
and other relevant executives to implement the recommendations of the Auditor-General 
weakened oversight and accountability of the financial affairs of most municipalities.  It was 
emphasised that despite the existence of laws and numerous regulations and a code of conduct 
related to SCM and procurement, the continued noncompliance and irregularities in 
municipalities of the Free State province remains a concern.   The above led to the creation of 
a culture of no consequences that weakens effective oversight and accountability. 
 
The following chapter will provide theoretical review of administrative and social 
accountability and oversight in context. The accountability role of the municipal administrative 
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CHAPTER 5:  THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL 





South Africa is a constitutional democracy that requires that the administration and executives 
of all three spheres of government are monitored and held to account by a distinct organ of 
government. The municipal council of a municipality is directly elected by the electorate within 
the municipal area.  In order to promote transparency and accountability the municipal officials 
responsible for the administration (executives) of the municipality are answerable to the elected 
representatives (political officials) of the municipality. On the other hand, the elected 
representatives of the municipality are accountable to the electorate or broader community 
concerning service delivery and the performance of the municipality.  In this manner 
accountability is promoted through participatory governance and representation.  
 
In Chapter 1 of this study it was mentioned that administrative accountability refers to the 
constitutional and legislative framework, systems, processes and structures that were 
established to ensure accountability within the three spheres of government. Administrative 
accountability in the context of local government refers to internal systems of control, which 
include ethical codes of conduct, administrative reviews, norms and standards to promote a 
system of checks and balances (Sibanda, 2017:324). On the other hand, social accountability 
refers to an approach to ensure transparency and accountability by involving local communities 
and community organisations in the affairs of the municipality.      
 
In this chapter, the following was discussed, the statutory and legislative frameworks for 
administrative accountability and oversight, national and provincial support, followed by an 
overview of institutional arrangements to promote administrative accountability. The important 
role of staff development and training to promote administrative accountability were 
emphasised. The current challenges of administrative oversight and accountability were 
provided.  An overview about social accountability was provided, followed by a detail 
discussion about the statutory and legislative frameworks of community participation to 
promote social accountability. Conceptualisation of community participation was provided, 
followed by a detail discussion about the various mechanisms to promote community 
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participation in local government.  The importance of community participation during the 
different phases of a municipalities integrated development planning was also outlined.  The 
chapter concluded with an overview of the current challenges to promote community 
participation and social accountability at local sphere. 
 
5.2 STATUTORY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 
 
In this section the statutory and regulatory framework pertaining to administrative 
accountability and oversight was explained.  The statutory and regulatory framework 
establishes a basis for oversight and accountable administration and management of 
municipalities. 
 
5.2.1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
The Constitution, 1996 makes provision for the establishment of local government as a separate 
and distinct sphere of government., to deliver services to local communities through the support 
of national and provincial governments. Section 40(1) requires that national and provincial 
governments must support local government. Section 151(2) provides the responsibility and 
assign the functions of the municipal council which is the legislative and executive authority 
of a municipality. Section 152(a) of the Constitution, 1996 makes provision for the following 
objectives of local government namely; to provide a democratic and accountable government 
to local communities; to ensure the provision of services in a sustainable manner; to promote 
social as well as economic development; to promote a safe and healthy environment and to 
encourage the involvement of local communities in the affairs of local government. In terms 
of Section 153 of the Constitution, 1996 local government must fulfil its developmental 
mandate. In this regard the Constitution, 1996 requires from local government to structure and 
managed its administration in such a manner that municipalities must budget and plan 
effectively to prioritise the needs of local communities (Madumo, 2015:156; Sirovha and 
Thornhill, 2017136).  
 
In terms of Section 155(7) of the Constitution, 1996 the national government, subject to Section 
44 as well as the provincial governments, has the legislative and executive authority to oversee 
the effective performance of municipalities regarding their functions and the manner in which 
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they fulfil their service delivery functions listed in Schedule 4 and 5. Thus, municipalities are 
accountable to their local communities for the manner in which the municipality achieve its 
constitutional mandated objectives.  According to Landsberg and Graham (2017:164), Section 
139 of the Constitution, 1996 provides that provincial governments should intervene in the 
affairs of a municipality where it fails to fulfil an executive obligation. Such interventions may 
include instructions to requiring a provincial government to take over the responsibility to fulfil 
certain functions. A provincial government may issue instructions to a municipal council to 
take a particular action, or it may dissolve the municipal council and appointing an 
administrator.    Madumo (2015:158) points out that a provincial government is responsible for 
municipal oversight and support, and it may intervene in the affairs of a municipality, who 
cannot fulfil its constitutional mandate or its statutory ad legislator executive (administration) 
obligations.  
 
In terms of Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996 requires that public administration of which 
the administration of a municipality cannot be excluded, must strives to promote a high 
standard of professional ethics;  to provide services to communities impartially, fairly, 
equitable and without bias, to use resources in an effective, efficient and economic manner, to 
respond to people’s needs, to encourage the public to participate in policy making and public 
affairs, and to be accountable and that transparency to the public must be fostered through the 
provision of timely, accessible and accurate information.   
 
In order to fulfil these requirements an effective monitoring and evaluation system should 
promote accountability and transparency, but it should promote an efficient and effective public 
service that is responsive to the needs of its citizens.   Whereas, Van der Westhuizen (2016:147) 
point out that the values and principles as provided in Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996 set 
out important standards against which the performance of public officials should be measures. 
Section 215(1) requires that national, provincial and municipal budgets and budgetary 
processes must promote accountability and effective and efficient financial management.   
Section 216 of the Constitution, 1996 provides that the National Treasury is responsible for 
treasury control to ensure both transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of 
government by, introducing general recognised accounting practices, establishing uniform 
expenditure classifications, and by establishing uniform treasury norms and standards.   
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Thornhill (2015:81) maintain that by implications the municipal council is accountable and 
should be able to provide reasons for the manner in which the municipality achieved its 
constitutional mandated objectives and functions.       
 
5.2.2 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IGFA), 2005   
 
According to Kahn, Madue and Kalema (2011:252), and Landsberg and Graham (2017:163), 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution, 1996 each of the three spheres of government are distinctive, 
interrelated and interdependent.  Chapter 3 of the Constitution, 1996 further makes provision 
for the concept co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations.  The IGFA, 2005 was 
established to give effect to the constitutional requirements of c-operative governance and 
intergovernmental relations.  Kahn et al. (2016:174-175) maintain that the IGFA, 2005 
provides a framework for written implementation protocols as a mechanism by which organs 
of state must co-operate with each other to exercise a statutory power, perform a function, 
implement a policy or deliver a service.   
 
The IGFA, 2005 makes provision for monitoring and evaluation in the following ways; firstly, 
Chapter 1, Section 4(c) emphasises the important role of all three spheres of government to 
monitor and evaluate the effective implementation of policies and legislative frameworks in a 
co-operative manner.  Secondly, Chapter 2 Section 7 of the IGFA, 2005 states that the 
Presidents Co-ordinating Council (PCS) must reconcile the performance reports of the three 
spheres of government to national priorities. While, Section 11(b)(iii) and (c) and Section 
18(a)(viii) of the IGFA, 2005 states that the national intergovernmental forums must co-
ordinate and align the strategic and performance management plans, including priorities, 
objectives and strategies across the three spheres in order to detect failures and take corrective 
action in a timely manner (Landsberg and Graham, 2017:163). 
 
In terms of Chapter 3, Section 35(d) and (e) of the IGFA, 2005 each organ of state must work 
together to establish oversight and monitoring mechanisms for the effective implementation of 
the intergovernmental relations protocols. Section 47(e) of the IGFA, 2005 stipulates that the 
Minister of each of the various national departments in his or her capacity can issue specific 
regulations regarding indicators for monitoring and evaluation to promote the effective 
implementation of this Act. 
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5.2.3  Municipal Systems Act (MSA), 2000 (as amended by Act 7 of 2011) 
 
According to Madumo (2015:161), the MSA, 2000 makes provision for the establishment of an 
appropriate municipal administration including internal control systems to guaranteeing 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of municipal services.   In terms of Section 6 of the 
MSA, 2000 the municipalities’ administration must be governed in accordance with the 
constitutional values and principles for public administration.  Section 6(2) of the Act, provides 
that municipal administrations are responsible for the following; to be responsive to the 
developmental needs of their communities; to promote a culture of accountability and public 
service amongst its municipal officials; to take steps to prevent corrupt activities; to promote 
co-operation and communication with local communities; to provide the local community with 
accurate and reliable information about the level and standard of service delivery; and to inform 
and involve local communities and community organisations in the affairs of local government. 
While, Section 11 of the MSA, 2000 makes provision for the executive and legislative authority 
which is exercised by the municipal council.   
 
Section 51 of the MSA, 2000 states that the MM of a municipality is accountable for the overall 
performance and administration of the municipality.  Apart from the accountable functions of 
the municipal council and MMs, there are also committees and political officials who must 
fulfil the functions of oversight of municipal administration to ensure that municipalities are 
able to meet their constitutional obligations, such as the executive committees, mayoral 
committees, council portfolio committees, municipal public accounts committees and audit 
committees. Section 55 of the Act provides that the MM as head of administration is 
responsible and accountable for the development of an effective, efficient, economic and 
accountable municipal administration. Section 56 makes provision for the appointment of 
managers directly accountable to MM while, Section 57 set out the employment contracts for 
municipal mangers and managers directly accountable to MMs. In terms of Section 67 of the 
Act, a municipality must develop an effective, efficient and transparent municipal 
administration.  Section 68, of the MSA, 2000 provides that a municipality must develop its 
human resource capacity in such a manner that the municipality is able to exercise and performs 
its functions in an economical, effective, efficient manner.  
 
In addition, Chapter 10 of the MSA, 2000 provides in Section 105 the guidelines as to how the 
provincial government should monitor and evaluate the performance of municipalities, and to 
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assess the support needed to improve the performance of municipalities as well as to develop 
relevant capacity development initiatives.  In terms of Section 106 of the Act, when the 
Member of Executive Council (MEC) for Local Government has a reason to believe that the 
municipality does not perform its statutory obligations or that maladministration, fraud, 
corruption or any other serious malpractices are taking place, the MEC must request the 
municipal councillor MM as the head of administration to provide the MEC with information 
as required in a written notice. The MEC must also issue a written statement to the relevant 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP) to motivate the action (Madumo, 2015:161-162).   
 
A Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff Members is provided in Schedule 2 of the MSA, 2000 
which set out the general conduct of municipal officials who are part of the municipal 
administration.   
 
5.2.4   The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), 2003   
 
According to Sibanda (2017:326), Section 53(1)(c)(ii) of MFMA, 2003 provides that the 
municipalities Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) serves as a basis for 
performance agreements as the budget implementation plan. The Service Delivery and Budget 
Implementation Plan of a municipality must indicate the monthly projections of revenue that 
must be collected by source and it also makes provision for the operational and capital 
expenditure by vote. The SDBIP must further makes provision of the service delivery targets 
and performance indicators.   The SDBIP is an important administrative mechanism to promote 
administrative accountability within a municipality (Anon in Community Law Centre, 
2008:30-31).     
 
The MFMA, Circular 32 of 2006 provides the guidelines for the establishment of the Municipal 
Public Accounts Committee (MPAC). In terms of Section 66(1) of the MFMA, 2003 each 
municipality must have an audit committee that does not form part of the administration.   The 
purpose of the audit committee is to identify risks to which a municipality could be exposed, 
and to advise the Municipal council.  Section 166 of the MFMA, 2003 provides that each 
municipality must have an audit committee to advise the council on internal financial control, 
internal audits, risk management, accounting policies, the adequacy, accuracy, reliability of 
financial information and reporting. In terms of Section 71 of the MFMA, 2003, the MM must 
submit a statement on the state of the budget to the mayor at the end of each month.  The 
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statement must provide the following information; the actual revenue; the actual borrowing, 
the actual expenditure as per vote, the actual capital expenditure, as per vote, the amount of 
allocations that were received and the actual expenditure compared to the allocations. 
According to Anon in Community Law Centre (2008:32), the statement must also make 
provision for corrective or remedial action to be taken to ensure that the revenue and 
expenditure projections remain within the municipalities budget.     
 
5.2.5 Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (as amended by Act 51 of 2002) 
 
The Municipal Structures Act, 1998 was developed to give effect to the vision of the WPLG, 
1998, which includes among other things the development and implementation of an effective 
performance management system at the local sphere of government (Tsatsire, 2008:132). The 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998 predominantly makes provision for the following: 
 
• The establishment of municipalities in agreement with the requirements of the different 
types and categories of municipalities;  
• To establish criteria for determining the category of municipality for an area;  
• To provides an appropriate division of powers and functions for each of the categories 
of municipality;  
• To regulate the internal structures of political office and senior municipal officials; and  
• To provide for appropriate electoral systems.  
 
In this regard, Madumo (2015:161) avers that the Act provides for the appropriate division of 
powers and functions, depending on the different categories of municipality by ensuring a 
proper governing structure, which culminates in the election of municipal councils.  Sections 
79 and 80 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 make provision for the establishment of 
portfolio committees to exercise oversight of service delivery projects. 
 
5.2.6   Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations, 2006 and Performance 
Management Guide for Municipalities, 2001 
 
Section 37 of the Municipal Performance Regulations (2006:27) provides that the MM who is 
also the head of administration as well as the accounting officer of the municipality is 
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responsible to perform the following functions, which must be detailed in the MM’s job 
description: 
 
• responsible for municipal transformation and organisational development; 
• responsible for basic service delivery to the communities within the municipal area; 
• responsible for local economic development; 
• responsible for municipal financial viability and management; and  
• to promote good governance and public participation. 
 
According to Van der Waldt et al. (2014:126) the Municipal Performance Regulations for Section 57 
Employees, 2006 makes provision for employment contracts and performance agreements for MM and 
other Section 57 managers.  The Performance Management Guide for Municipalities, 2001 serves 
as a guideline for municipalities to develop and implement their own performance management 
systems.        
      
5.2.7 Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000  
 
Thornhill (2015:92) avers that the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 is critical 
important to promote accountability as it compels the municipality to make information of its 
actions and performance available to local communities.   In this manner the local community 
or electorate may call the municipality to account for any omission or inefficient or unethical 
right of access to information.    
 
5.2.8 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (Act 3 of 2000) 
  
In terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 was established to give effect to 
the right constitutionally right of all citizens to have access to fair administrative action, that is 
lawfully, reasonable and procedurally fair.   By implication it means that any person of a local 
community may call the relevant decision maker of a municipality to account for a decision or 
the failure to take a decision that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair (Thornhill, 
2015:93).     
 
An overview of the institutional arrangements to promote administrative accountability of local 
government were outlined in the discussion below.  
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5.3 NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL SUPPORT TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
 
According to Koma (2017:33), the supervisory powers of national and provincial governments 
over local government include the following; the power to regulate and to monitor local 
government; the power to support local government; and the power to intervene in the affairs 
of local government.  In this regard, Section 154(1) of the Constitution, 1996 requires from 
national and provincial governments to support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities 
to exercise and perform their functions and to manage their own affairs. Section 155(6) of the 
Constitution, 1996 provides that provincial governments must monitor and support the 
municipalities within the province.  Koma (2017:33) further avers that provincial governments 
must further promote the development the capacity of municipalities to ensure that they 
perform their functions and managed their own affairs.  Section 155(7) of the Constitution,  
1996 requires that national and provincial spheres of government have the authority (legislative 
and executive) to ensure that municipalities perform their functions as provided in Schedule 4 
and 5 of the Constitution, 1996. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.5 of this study, the Constitution, 1996 makes provision in Section 
139 for provincial supervision of local government when a municipality cannot or does not 
fulfil an executive obligation in terms of legislation, the relevant provincial executive any 
intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that obligation. The provincial 
executive must issue a directive to the municipal council, by describing the extent of the failure 
to fulfil its obligations by stating the required steps to meets its obligations.  Furthermore, the 
provincial executive must assume responsibility for the relevant obligation to maintain 
essential national standards or meet established minimum standard for the rendering of services 
or to prevent a municipal council to take any unreasonable action that is prejudicial to the 
interest of another municipality or to the province as a whole or to maintain economic unity.   
 
The former DPLG introduces in 2004 Project Consolidate as an intervention strategy to support 
struggling municipalities. Experts with relevant skills were deployed to provide support at these 
struggling municipalities.  As a result of numerous public protests about poor service delivery 
the Departments of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) conduct an 
assessment and its report on the State of Local Government, 2009 revealed major findings 
related to governance, administration, financial management, policy management and service 
delivery throughout the country.  The Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS) was 
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introduced in 2011 to address the challenges.  However, it failed to improve the capacity and 
performance of most municipalities and was replaced by the Back-to-Basic campaign, which 
was launched in 2014 with the aim to build effective, efficient, and viable municipalities that 
priorities the concerns and demands of local communities. The Back-to-Basic campaign 
focused on the improvement of good governance (administration), public participation, 
financial management, infrastructure and institutional capacity (Koma, 2017:28; Landsberg 
and Graham, 2017:174).          
 
Except for CoGTA other role players such as the Office of the Premier of the nine provincial 
governments, the Provincial Treasuries and SALGA must support and monitor all 
municipalities to ensure that the achievement of their constitutional mandate.  The role of 
CoGTA, Provincial Treasury, SALGA and district municipalities should include the following: 
 
• To ensure that municipalities have the required human and financial resources to assist 
in the implementation of their management, administration and financial systems and 
processes; 
• To monitor and co-ordinate the capacity building initiatives provided to municipalities; 
• To ensure that key vacancies within municipalities are filled. 
 
Koma (2017:34) is of the opinion that CoGTA should develop and maintain a database with 
the details of experienced, qualified and skilled individuals to ensure that key vacancies are 
filled as administrators in municipalities that are placed under supervision by a provincial 
government in terms of Section 139 of the Constitution, 1996.   Except for the above support 
mechanisms SALGA implemented numerous support programmes to capacitate municipalities 
such as the Councillor Induction Programme, the Municipal Audit Support Programme with 
the aim to improve the municipal administrative leadership, governance, institutional capacity, 
financial and administrative practices in local government.   
 
In terms of the IGFM, 2005 specific statutory structures or intergovernmental relations forums 
were established to facilitate co-operative governance to ensure integrated planning, co-
ordination and sharing of information between the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government.   
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
210 
 
A concern is that the strategies to assist struggling municipalities did not yield the required 
results.  A concern is that the Auditor-General, report for 2016-2017 (AGSA, 2017:1) raised 
concerns that accountability and the need for appropriate consequences for accountability 
failures still featured as prominent element of failures in most municipalities. A concern was 
raised by the Auditor-General that in particular in the Free State municipalities there is a 
continued lack of accountability and leadership failures (AGSA, 2017:2).  In light of the above, 
one could argue that the intention of the Back-to-Basic campaign to improve good governance 
(administration), public participation, financial management, infrastructure and institutional 
capacity did not achieve the required results in municipalities of the Free State province. 
 
Although, national and provincial governments are obligated by constitutional prescripts to 
support local government, a concern was raised by the Auditor-General in the report for 2016-
2017 (AGSA, 2017:3) that national and provincial governments did not sufficiently support 
municipalities.   The Auditor-General (AGSA, 2017:3) further argues that many of the financial 
and administrative challenges of municipalities could be turned around with, the support of 
provincial governments.   Thus, national and provincial governments should do more to support 
municipalities to ensure that the administration of municipalities are capacitated to achieve 
their constitutional mandate in an ethical, efficient and effective manner.     
 
The institutional arrangements to promote administrative oversight and accountability of local 
government were provided in the discussion below. 
 
5.4 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO PROMOTE ADMINISTRATIVE 
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
The executive institutions at local sphere consist of the political executive institutions 
(Executive mayor and executive committee) and the administrative executive institutions 
which, is undertaken by the municipal departments or municipal divisions. The MM as the 
head of the municipal administration is responsible and accountable to the executive mayor for 
the administration, management and performance of all the functions including as assigned by 
the municipal council and executive mayor (Van der Waldt, 2016;159-161; Thornhill, 2012:28-
32).  
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According to Thornhill (2014:28), the Constitution, 1996 does not specifically make provision 
for municipal, legislative, governmental and administrative functionaries (political office-
bearers). In terms of the MSA, 2000, Section 4(1)(b) the municipal council exercise the 
municipalities executive and legislative authority.  Section 4(2)(a) of the MSA, 2000 further 
states that the municipal council of a municipality must exercise the municipalities executive 
and legislative authority and use the resources of the municipality in the best interest of the 
local community. While, Section 4(2)(b) of MSA, 2000 clearly provide that the municipality 
has to do so without favour or prejudice, democratic and accountable government.    
 
Van der Waldt (2014:74) points out that the municipal council of a category A municipality 
(Metropolitan municipalities) have exclusive legislative and executive authority in their areas. 
The municipal council of a metropolitan municipality may make by-laws as provided in the 
Constitution, 1996 on all matters as listed in Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B.  In terms of the 
MSA, 2000, Section 4(1)(b) the municipal council exercise the municipalities executive and 
legislative authority. Local municipalities (Category B) and district municipalities (Category 
C) share the authority to make by-laws. While, the executive authority is vested in the 
municipal council.  The executive authority (municipal council) has the right to administer the 
local government matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution, 1996, subject to 
the division of powers regarding local and district councils as provided in Section 156(1) of 
the Constitution, 1996 (Landsberg and Graham, 2017:161).   
 
Van der Waldt (2014:74) further point out that a municipal council must develop a system of 
delegation of executive authority to the executive committee or executive mayor.  In the case 
of a metropolitan municipality the municipal council must develop a system of delegation of 
executive authority to the sub-council or ay political office-bearer or staff member to promote 
its administrative and institutional efficiency. Landsberg and Graham (2017:166-167) maintain 
that the executive committee or executive mayor and other delegates must report their decisions 
to the municipal council.  While, Section 4 of the MSA, 2000 imposes duties on the municipal 
council with regard to the exercise of their legislative powers and consultation with their 
communities about the provision of services, development as well as the provision of 
democratic and accountable government. 
 
The administrative executive institutions of a municipality are undertaken by the various 
municipal departments or directorates. The functions allocated to these 
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departments/directorates are in accordance with the areas of specialisation such as a health 
department, engineering department, financial department of the chief financial officer (CFO) 
and human resource management (Thornhill, 2012:32).    
 
The MSA, 2000 provides in Section 6(1) that a municipality administration must be governed 
by the democratic values and principles embodied in Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996 by 
doing the following: 
 
• To be responsive to the local need of local communities; 
• To facilitate a culture of public service and accountability amongst its staff members; 
• To take measures to prevent corruption; 
• To establish clear relationships and facilitate co-operation and communication, between 
it and the local community; 
• To give members of the local community full and accurate information about the level 
and standard of municipal services they are entitled to receive and inform the local 
community how the municipality is managed, of the cost involved and person in charge.    
 
Bearing the above in mind, the MSA, 2000 further provides in Section 11(1) the executive and 
legislative authority of a municipality is exercised by the council of the municipality.  The 
section further provides that that the municipal council must takes all the decisions of the 
municipality in accordance with Section 59 of the MSA, 2000. 
 
Anon (2008:29) avers that one of the most important tools to promote administrative 
accountability at local sphere is bureaucratic control.  Bureaucratic control also means that 
municipal councils may appoint the personnel (municipal officials) it requires to ensure the 
effective achievement of its constitutional mandate.  
    
5.4.1 Administrative oversight of the administration of a municipality  
 
According to Van der Walt et al. (2014:87), the political office-bearers such as the speaker, the 
mayor and in in an executive mayoral system the executive mayor fulfils the oversight role 
over the administration, to ensure that the municipal council resolutions and policies are 
executed by the administration.  Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:140) agrees that the executive 
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mayor and mayoral committee members is responsible to oversee the administration of the 
municipality to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery.   
 
In addition, it was discussed in Chapter 3 of this study that portfolio committees such as Section 
80 and Section 79 committees in terms of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, are significant 
structures to promote oversight of the municipal council. Portfolio committees are classified as 
Section 80 committees and are permanent structures in the municipal council. Section 80 
committees or portfolio committees have to report and is accountable to the mayoral 
committee, while Section 79 committees or portfolio committees report to the municipal 
council. In addition, Sections 79 and 80 portfolio committees also exercise oversight of service 
delivery projects in municipalities.   In particular, the MPAC as a Section 79 portfolio 
committee and the most important oversight mechanism, of the municipal council, to hold the 
executives and municipal administration to account and to ensure efficient and effective use of 
municipal resources (Kraai et al. 2017:64; Van der Waldt, 2015:58; Napier, 2007:387; Sirovha 
and Thornhill, 2017:151).      
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 4.11 MPACs, fulfil a key oversight role over the executives 
and administration of the municipality. The MPAC not only has to examine financial 
statements and financial reports, it has to examine annual reports on behalf of municipal council 
and it has to make recommendations and to monitor the extent to which its recommendations 
and those of the Auditor-General are carried out (Gauteng Local Government and Housing, 
2012:23). 
 
The municipal council must determine the functions and procedures of a portfolio committee 
and may delegate powers and duties to such a committee in terms of Section 32 of the 
Municipal Structures Act,  1998. Besides the powers allocated to portfolio committees in terms 
of Section 32 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, powers are delegated to elected 
representatives and senior officials heading the functional or cluster areas. A municipal council 
may establish a portfolio committee for a specific function or cluster of functions such as 
health, planning, finance, environment and social services, public safety and transport, 
governance and administration or local economic development (Van der Walt in Van der Waldt 
et al. 2018:83-84; Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:74; Napier, 2007:387).    
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In light of the above, municipal councils can be seen as an important link in the accountability 
chain, to create an enabling environment for good governance and public accountability 
(Krishnan, 2008:23). The Auditor-General (AGSA, 2018:87) maintains that mayors have a 
monitoring and oversight role within a municipality and municipal entities.  In terms of the 
MSA, 2000 mayors have to review the IDP, the budget and has to ensure that a municipality 
address the issues raised in the Auditor-General audit reports on local government.  However, 
the Auditor-General warns in the report for 2016-2017 that inadequate skills led to a lack of 
oversight by municipal councils and mayor and insufficient implementation and maintenance 
of financial and performance management systems by the administration (AGSA 2018:3).   In 
terms of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the mayor of a municipality presides at meetings 
of the executive committee and performs the duties, including any ceremonial functions, and 
exercises the powers delegated to the mayor by the municipal councillor the executive 
committee (Krishnan, 2008:23; Napier, 2007:386-387).   
 
Siddle and Koelble (2012:100) state that in the executive mayoral system, members of the 
mayoral committee are appointed by the executive mayor.  The choice of particular executive 
system will have an impact on the power relationships within a municipality. A mayor in a 
collective executive system may, be subject to the directives of the executive committee.  The 
powers and functions delegated to the executive committee are similar to those imposed on the 
executive mayor.  It may be argued that in a municipality with an executive mayoral system a 
vast range of powers are concentrated in a single office. One executive council member is 
elected to serve as mayor and has to presides over meetings of the executive committee and 
must performs any other functions as assigned to it by the municipal councillor executive 
committee. The executive committee members report not to the mayor but to the municipal 
council. In the executive mayoral system, by contrast, members of a mayoral committee are 
appointed by the executive mayor and report directly to and are accountable to the mayor, who 
may dismiss them. 
 
Landsberg and Graham (2017:167) maintain that the executive mayor must monitor the 
management of the municipalities administration in accordance with the policies of the 
municipal council.  The executive mayor is also responsible to recommend to the municipal 
council, strategies programmes and services to address the needs of the local communities 
through the IDP and estimates of revenue and expenditure.   
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SALGA (2015:21) states that the executive mayor and the mayoral committee or the executive 
committee headed by the mayor, together with Section 80 committees assisting the executive 
mayor and executive committee to fulfil the executive functions and oversight of the 
municipality. Thus, Section 80 committees are accountable to the executive mayor and not to 
the municipal council.  In terms of Section 8 of the Structures Act, 1998 a mayoral executive 
system allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive mayor in whom the 
executive leadership of the municipality is vested and who is assisted by a mayoral committee. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter of this study the mayor or executive mayor has a particular 
responsibility concerning budgetary control and oversight function concerning implementation 
of the budget. The mayor may also give instructions to the accounting officer to ensure that the 
budget is implemented in accordance with the service delivery and budget implementation plan 
(Thornhill and Cloete; 2013:112). The mayor or executive mayor has oversight role in 
municipal financial and administrative matters by providing general political guidance over 
fiscal and financial affairs of the municipality; taking reasonable steps to ensure that a 
municipality performs its constitutional obligations within the limits of the municipality’s 
approved budget, and reporting to the provincial executive if the budget has not been approved 
as required or if financial problems necessitates provincial intervention. The mayor must also 
perform oversight concerning municipal entities.  In terms of the MSA, 2000 mayors must 
review the IDP, the budget. Thus, the mayor or the executive mayor of a municipality fulfils a 
critical political oversight role in financial and administrative matters of the municipality 
(Thornhill and Cloete, 2013:112). 
 
From the above, one could argue that the executive mayor and mayoral committee members 
have to perform the governing function and oversee the administration of the municipality to 
ensure effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery.  The mayor or the executive mayor is 
also responsible to perform oversight concerning municipal entities.  As part, the mayor or 
executive mayor has to provide political guidance over fiscal and financial matters and has to 
take the necessary steps to ensure that a municipality performs its constitutional obligations 
within the limits of the municipality’s approved budget.  It is also the responsibility of the 
mayor or the executive mayor to reporting to the particular provincial executive if the 
municipalities budget was not approved and if any financial challenges necessitates provincial 
intervention.  
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5.4.2 Administrative structures and the accountable role of the municipal manager (MM) 
as the head of the municipal administration 
 
Botha and Khan (in Hussein 1999:42) indicate that administrative accountability refers to all 
the various control mechanisms that are created to keep the municipal administration or 
bureaucracy under surveillance and in check. The elective representatives are accountable to 
the local communities and therefore, municipal officials responsible for municipal 
administration must be accountable and answerable to the elected representatives.  Elected 
representatives are elected by the local communities, while municipal officials are appointed 
based on their qualifications, skills and competencies to perform a specific job (Landberg and 
Graham, 2017:169).  
 
5.4.2.1 The municipal manager (MM) 
 
According to Craythorne (2006:190), it is a statutory requirement of a municipality to have a 
municipal administration, the administrative leadership of the municipality is vested in the MM 
and the heads of departments/directorates. The MM and heads of departments/directorates are 
responsible for the implementation of policies, and programmes and the overall administration 
of the municipality.  The heads of departments/directorates have to report to the MM for the 
performance of their departments. The MM has to submit regular performance reports to the 
municipal council. The MM of a municipality is responsible and accountable for the 
development of an effective, efficient, and accountable municipal administration.  The MM as 
the head of the administration is accountable to the executive mayor for the administration, 
management and performance of all the functions as assigned by the municipal council and 
executive mayor.  Except for the above the MM of a municipality is responsible for the 
appointment of municipal officials and other personnel, subject to the Employment Equity Act, 
1998 (Act 55 of 1998) and the maintenance of discipline of municipal officials and other 
personnel Van der Waldt, 2011:74; Landsberg and Graham, 2017:168-169; Napier, 2007:386; 
SALGA; 2015:24).  
 
In terms of Section 2(1), of the Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels 
(2007:8) academic qualifications are a requirement and are attached to the position of the MM. 
The accounting officer of a municipality must generally have the skills, experience and 
capacity to can assume and fulfil their administrative responsibilities assigned to them.  Section 
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3 of the Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels (2007:9-10) provides that the 
accounting officer must comply with the minimum competency levels required for higher 
education.  The accounting officer must at least be in possession of a bachelor’s degree or 
relevant qualification at National Qualifications Framework (NQF) 7 with a minimum of at 
least 360 credits. 
 
According to Thornhill (2015:91-92), the head of the municipal administration namely the MM 
has to ensure the following:   
• To ensure that relevant administrative polities are established within which the 
administrative function of the municipality can performed; 
• To introduce relevant institutional arrangement within the municipality to maintain 
clear lines of communication and lines of authority among all administrative; 
• To ensure that proper procedures are in place to ensure that each municipal official will 
be able to render account for their actions; 
• To ensure that all municipal officials perform their duties an effective, efficient and 
ethical manner; and  
• To ensure that relevant control measures and mechanisms are in place to enable the 
head of the municipal administration to report on the achievement of the objectives as 
provided in its IDP through the most effective use of resources.   
 
In light of the above, the MM as the accounting officer and head of the municipality’s 
administration must ensure that proper administrative arrangements are in place to promote 
accountability of the administrative function of the municipality.  It was mentioned in the 
previous chapter of this study in Section 4.84 that the MM as the accounting officer is 
responsible to provide administrative leadership to the municipality.  The MM may develop a 
system of delegation to promote administrative and operational efficiency and to provide 
sufficient accountable mechanism, but the MM may not delegate any financial or any other 
administrative responsibilities to a political structure (Sibanda, 2017:320).     
          
According to Mazibuko and Fourie (2013:134), the MM has the most distinct responsibilities 
to fulfil in the municipality, namely, to ensure effective financial management and 
administration.  It requires that the MM must accept his/her responsibility and accountability 
for the administrative and administrative activities of the municipality. SALGA (2015:24-25) 
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point out that there must be consequences if a MM failed to give effect to his/her 
responsibilities, that should result in the removal of the MM from office.  The MM as the 
accounting officer can personally be held accountable for any loss of allocated funds or assets 
as a result of any deficiency in the administrative or managerial arrangements of the 
municipality (Thornhill, 2015:92). Thus, the MM is accountable for the performance of the 
municipality’s administration.  Failure to give effect to assigned responsibilities should result 
in the removal of the MM from office.            
 
5.4.2.2 Senior managers 
 
In terms of Section 56 of the MSA, 2000, the municipal council of a municipality, after 
consultation with the MM, appoints managers who are directly accountable to the MM.  Senior 
managers play an important accountable role regarding the administration of a municipality.  
According to Van der Waldt et al. (2014:83) senior managers will be held accountable for any 
transgressions in exercising their delegated responsibilities.  According to SALGA (2015:25), 
senior managers refers to the managers directly accountability to the MM, including the CFO, 
heads of departments/directorates, the heads of the internal audit unit and risk management unit 
as well as other managers appointed in terms of the MSA, 2000, Regulations on the 
Appointment and Condition of Service of Senior Managers.        
 
The CFO in an administrative capacity is responsible for the financial management and SCM 
activities of the municipality.  The MM depends on senior management, including the CFO of 
the municipality for designing and implementing effective financial and performance 
management controls to promote administrative and financial accountability.  Administrative 
accountability requires that municipal officials be accountable and answerable to the MM for 
the performance of their administrative functions (Sibanda, 2017:320). Napier (2007:380) is of 
the opinion that municipal officials or bureaucrats are accountable to their (line managers and 
the MM). Administrative and managerial municipal officials (head of municipal 
departments/directorates) have certain authorities and delegations to execute administrative 
functions in a municipality. The municipal officials and head of municipal departments/ are 
accountable to the MM for the performance of their administrative functions. The head of 
municipal departments/directorates and the MM must ensure that relevant administrative 
arrangements are established to ensure effective administrative performance and to obtain 
effective and efficient service deliver.   
© Central University of Technology, Free State
219 
 
According to Van der Waldt et al. (2014:84), senior managers are responsible to perform their 
delegated functions related to their departments/directorates. They must also determine IDP 
objectives, goals, strategies, projects and programmes.  They are responsible to compile budget 
of income and expenditure, control the implementation of the approved budget.  Senior 
managers are also responsible for the management of their personnel, providing sound labour 
relations and disciplinary measures. 
 
Landsberg and Graham (2017:168) aver that in a municipality with an executive mayor, the 
members of the mayor committee are assigned to specific departments/directorates to act as the 
political head of that department or directorate to ensure the effective and efficient 
administration of the particular department/directorate in close collaboration with the head of 
the department/directorate. Members of the mayoral committee should participate in the IDP 
and budgetary processes of the particular department/directorate to oversee the implementation 
of the IDP and relevant projects assigned to the particular department/directorate.  However, 
members of the mayoral committee as the political heads of departments/directorates should 
monitor and fulfil an oversight function and should not be involved in the activities and 
decisions associated with implementation of any administration function.  In this regard, the 
Auditor-General warns (AGSA, 2017:3) that political interference in the administration of 
municipalities weakened their oversight functions.   
 
5.5 OTHER MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
Mechanisms to promote administrative accountability include all the internal control 
mechanisms produced to keep the functionaries (political and public officials) under 
surveillance and in check. Except for the above institutional arrangements there are other 
mechanisms and tools to promote administrative accountability with particular reference to 
local government that will be outline in the discussion below. 
 
5.5.1  Code of Conduct for Municipal Officials 
 
According to Venter (2011:94), the Code of Conduct for Municipal Officials deals primarily 
with the relationships between the municipal officials and the political officials, relationships 
with the community and relationships with municipal officials as administrative officials. The 
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Community Law Centre (2008:29) notes that administrative accountability is an essential 
component of local democracy. The accountability of municipal officials to the elected 
representatives (political officials) is based on the premise that the elected representatives are 
accountable to local communities and therefore, municipal employees must be answerable to 
elected representatives. There are different institutional arrangements and mechanisms by 
which municipal officials responsible for the administration of local municipalities can be held 
accountable by the elected representatives.  
 
Sing and Ntshangase (2003:117) point out that the Code of Conduct for Municipal Officials 
was established to ensure that the municipal officials addresses the priority needs of the 
communities as well as to delivery services in an effective, efficient and accountable manner.  
In addition, all municipal officials must strive to promote the constitutional values and 
principles of public administration as provided in terms of Section 195 of the Constitution, 
1996.   
 
Cloete and Thornhill (2005:209-210) state that Section 69 and 70 as well as Schedule 2 of the 
MSA, 2000 provides for a Code of Conduct for Municipal Officials.  Cloete and Thornhill 
(2005:211) further state that it should be general practice for each MM to provide a copy to 
every municipal official. The MM of a municipality must ensure that the purpose, contents and 
consequences of the code are explained to staff members who could not read. 
 
Schedule 2 of the MSA, 2000 the Code of Conduct for Municipal Officials provides the 
following: 
 
• Municipal officials must always execute the lawful policies of the municipal council; 
• Municipal officials must perform their administrative functions in good faith, diligently 
and honesty and in a transparent manner to promote the basic values and principles of 
public administration as provided in Section 195 of the Constitution of 1996.    
• Municipal officials may not improperly influence or attempt to influence the municipal 
council of the municipality;  
• Municipal officials may not use any confidential information obtained as a staff 
member for private purpose or to improperly benefit another person; 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
221 
 
• Municipal officials may not take a decision on behalf of the municipality regarding a 
matter in which a municipal official or his/her spouse, partner or business associate, has 
a direct or indirect personal or private business interest; 
• Except with the prior consent of the municipal council of a municipality a municipal 
official may not be a party to a contract for the provision of goods or services to the 
municipality; or the performance of any work for the municipality otherwise than as a 
staff member; or obtain a financial interest in any business of the municipality; or be 
engaged in any business, trade or profession other than the official work of the 
municipality.  
 
Section 14(A) of the Municipal System Amendment Act, 2011 provides that any breach of the 
Code of Conduct of Municipal Officials is grounds for dismissal.   This implies any municipal 
official can be dismissed or relieved from their duties if the ethical prescripts of the Code of 
Conduct of Municipal Officials are not followed.  In this regard, Thornhill (2015:89) argues 
the above amendments to the Code of Conduct of Municipal Officials ensure that the Code of 
Conduct of Municipal Officials carries the same weight as the legal conditions of an Act of 
Parliament concerning the possible abuse of the ethical guidelines.  Sing and Ntshangase 
(2003:119) agrees that relevant disciplinary steps must be taken against any municipal official 
should there be a breach of conduct regarding any of the relevant prescripts of the Code of 
Conduct of Municipal Officials.  These disciplinary procedures should be part of as staff code 
of ethics that allows for the investigation of allegations of misconduct and complaints against 
any municipal official.  Furthermore, whenever any municipal official has reasonable grounds 
for believing that the Code of Conduct of Municipal Officials has been breached, the official 
must immediately report the matter to a supervisory officer and in particular the MM. 
 
5.5.2 Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the Service Delivery and Budget 
Implementation Plan (SDBIP)  
 
According to Madumo (2015:156), Section 153(a) of the Constitution, 1996 mandated 
municipalities to structure and manage its administration, budgetary and planning processes to 
promote social and economic development of the community. As part of the municipalities 
planning process the IDP mandates the municipal planning to be developmentally oriented.    
Kwele (in Draai et al., 2016:265) maintains that the IDP of a municipality is the five-year 
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strategic plan of a municipality for the short, medium and long term. The IDP as the key 
strategic management instrument of a municipality which, must capture the priorities and 
service delivery needs of the local communities. The IDP is legislated by the MSA, 2000 that 
supersedes all other plans that guide development in municipalities. The IDP must be in line 
with the national and provincial growth and developmental strategies (Madumo, 2015:158).   
 
Pillay, Tomlinson and Du Toit (2006:15) state that the IDP provides the vision for the 
municipality, detailed the priorities of the municipal council, co-ordinate and link sectoral plans 
and strategies, align human and financial resources with the priorities and needs of local 
communities, it supports and promote environmental sustainability and is serves as the basis 
for the annual and medium-term municipal budget.   
 
According to Motingoe (2011:18), the IDP consist of the following five sequential phases: 
 
• Phase 1:  The analysis phase.    The analysis phase deals with the current situation 
within the municipalities area.  It involves an analysis of the external and internal 
environment such at the legal, political, economic, social and technological aspects that 
has an impact on the functionality of the municipality.  Internal aspects refer to the 
municipalities internal administrative processes, its structures, resources and practices.  
Motingoe (2011:24) maintain that during this phase the municipality should identify its 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, to make certain conclusions and to 
translate these conclusions into strategic action plans.         
• Phase 2: The strategies phase.     During this phase the municipality formulate its 
vision statement, formulate of strategic objectives and strategies that the municipalities 
wants to achieve in the short, medium and long term.  Specific strategies in accordance 
with the municipality’s development mandate must be formulated (Motingoe, 2011:25; 
Van der Waldt and Knipe, 2001:182). 
• Phase 3: The projects phase.   Once strategies are formulated the identification, design 
and specifications of projects for implementation must be identified.   During this phase 
the municipality has to take into account the beneficiaries, the project location the target 
dates, who will manage the project and the funding requirements required for a specific 
project (Motingoe, 2011:26).       
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• Phase 4: The integration phase.   During this phase the municipality has to ensure that 
the identified projects are aligned to the municipalities, vision, objectives, strategies 
and resources to ensure an integrated process (Motingoe, 2011:26; DPLG, IDP Guide 
Packs: General Overview, 2000:17).  
• Phase 5: The approval phase.   During this phase all relevant stakeholders, interested 
parties, and local communities must have an opportunity to comment on the draft IDP 
plan, before the municipal council adopt the municipalities IDP (Motingoe, 2011:26).     
 
Fourie and Opperman, (2015:130) indicate that the municipalities annual budget must 
conforms with the IDP.  The municipalities budget must be outcomes-driven to ensure that the 
intended outcomes are align with the service delivery objectives as provided in the IDP.  Thus, 
the municipalities budget allocates resources to the ensure the achievement of defined 
objectives as priorities in the approved IDP of the municipality.    
 
Landberg and Graham (2017:169) point out that once the municipal council approves the IDP, 
the MM and the heads of departments/directorates, has to draft a Service Delivery and Budget 
Implementation Plan (SDBIP).  The municipalities IDP and budget are high-level strategic 
plans and are not implementation plans.  The IDP is operationalised through the SDBIP which 
is a detailed plan to execute the municipalities delivery of services, as provided in the IDP and 
the execution of the annual budget.  The SDBIP serves as a measurable implementation plans 
to give effect to the IDP of the municipality to ensure the operational alignment between the 
municipality’s budget and the IDP; as well as the performance agreements. Each 
department/directorate must design their own plans to execute programmes and projects as 
provided in the SDBIP.  The senior managers in the municipality must entered annually their 
performance agreements to ensure cohesion and alignment of individual plans to the strategic 
priorities as provided the IDP and budget (Krishnan, 2008:27; Motingoe, 2011:32; Landsberg 
and Graham, 2017:169-170).  
 
Van der Waldt (2015:55) agrees with the above by stating that the SBDIP serves as a key 
management, implementation and monitoring tool, which sets out the operational content and 
targets for service delivery as provided, in the municipalities IDP and annual budget. Van der 
Waldt (2015:55) further avers that the SDBIP must determine and ensure consistency with, the 
performance agreements between the mayor and the MM, and that of the MM and other senior 
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municipal officials. Furthermore, the SDBIP must be consistent with the agreements between 
the municipality and that of municipal entities and other private service providers.  The SDBIP 
as an implementation plan of the municipalities IDP and budget serves also as a tool to promote 
oversight and accountability to ensure that a municipality to deliver on its constitutional and 
developmental mandates.       
 
5.5.3 Performance management  
 
In the context of local government, performance management refers to a strategic approach to 
review or to measure the performance of the municipality and its employees based on specific 
targets and performance indicators. Performance management equips the management, 
employees and the community with a set of tools and techniques to plan, monitor and review 
continuously the performance of the municipality as well as the performance of its employees 
to promote effectiveness, efficiency and impact of service delivery (Fourie and Opperman, 
2015:353).   
 
Landsberg and Graham (2017:170) point out that performance measurement is seen as an 
administrative control mechanism to assign internal and external accountability.    In terms of 
Section 38 of the MSA, 2000 provides that a municipality must establish a performance 
management system to achieve the following: 
 
• To administer its affairs in an economical, effective, efficient and accountable manner; 
• To promote a culture of performance management among its political structures, 
political office-bearers, the municipal councillors and its administration (municipal 
officials); 
• To ensure that its performance management system is best suited for the specific 
circumstances and in line with the priorities, objectives, indicators and targets as 
indicated in the municipalities IDP. 
 
Overall, the MM of a municipality (as head of the municipal administration) is responsible for 
the formation and development of an economical, effective, efficient and accountable 
administration.  The MM should fulfil his/her functions within the municipalities performance 
management system, be responsive to the needs of the community and must ensure that the 
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community participate in the affairs of the municipality (Van der Waldt et al., 2014:127-128).    
In terms of Section 44(3) and 56(3) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the executive 
committee or the executive mayor is responsibility for the development of the performance 
management system including the development of evaluation criteria and key performance 
indicators (SALGA, 2011:48).  SALGA (2011:48) further argues that the MM must implement 
and managed the performance management reporting system and provides advise to the 
municipal council regarding the reporting system that must be adopted.  
 
Kwele (in Draai et al., 2016:266) indicate that in terms of Section 38 of the MSA, 2000 
municipalities must develop a performance management system that is commensurate with its 
resources and in line with the contents of its IDP. Section 55 of the MSA, 2000 provides that 
the MM of a municipality is responsible for the development of an economical, effective, 
efficient and accountable municipal administration, which operates in accordance with its 
performance management system.  Whereas, Section 66 of the MSA, 2000 requires that the 
MM within the municipal council frameworks must establish a process or mechanism to 
continuously evaluate the performance of the municipality and to review the performance of 
its personnel, as well as to review the remuneration and conditions of service of all personnel 
except managers appointed in terms of Section 57 of the MSA, 2000. 
   
Section 56 of the MSA, 2000 states that the municipal council of a municipality, after 
consultation with the MM, appoints managers directly accountable to the latter. Section 57 
makes provision for the employment contracts for MMs and managers directly accountable to 
MMs. It indicates that a person appointed as the MM or as a manager directly accountable to 
the MM may be appointed to that position only in terms of a written employment contract with 
the municipality, complying with the provisions of this MSA section and subject to a separate 
annual performance agreement.  
 
In terms of Section 57(5) of the MSA, 2000 the performance objectives and performance targets 
must be measurable, practical and based on the key performance indictors provided in the 
municipalities IDP. Section 57(6) of the MSA, 2000 provides that the employment contract for 
an MM and head of administration and the accounting officer of a municipality must:  
 
• be for a fixed term of employment not exceeding a period ending two years after the 
election of the next council of the municipality;  
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• include a provision for cancellation of the contract in the case of non-compliance with 
the employment contract or, where applicable, the performance agreement;  
• stipulate the terms of the renewal of the employment contract, but only by agreement 
between the parties; and  
• reflect the values and principles referred to in the relevant Code of Conduct as provided 
in Schedule 2 of the MSA, 2000. 
 
Fourie and Opperman (2015:355) maintain that a performance management system of a 
municipality must adhere to the following general requirements:  
 
• When developing a performance management system for a municipality it must 
demonstrate how the system is managed, how it will be reviewed and how reporting 
will take place;    
• The rate of reporting and the lines of accountability for performance must be 
determined; 
• The process of implementing the performance management in accordance with the 
municipalities integrated development planning process must be clarified; 
• The roles and responsibilities of all role payers concerning the development of the 
performance management system including the ward committee members to represent 
the community need to be clarified; and 
• It must indicate how the system relates to the performance management of its 
employees. 
 
In addition to the above (Community Law Centre, 2008:33) states that the mid-year budget and 
performance assessment report is a useful mechanism to ensure that the mayor of a 
municipality exercise his or her oversight role regarding the municipal administration.   In 
terms of Section 72(1(a) of the MFMA, 2003 the MM of a municipality have to assess the 
performance of the municipality by taking into consideration the monthly budget statements, 
the service delivery performance indicators and targets as well as the previous annual report 
and progress on previous challenges that were identified.  
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5.6 STAFF DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING TO PROMOTE ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
As a starting point the following concepts will be explained, training, staff development, 
education and capacity building.  Nel, Werner, Poisant, Sono, du Plessis and Ngalo (2011:359) 
describe training as a tool which aims to improve an employee’s job performance. Van der 
Waldt et al. (2014:194) outline training as the activities that are particularly designed to 
improve the skills of employees with the intension to improve the performance and 
productivity.  Reddy (1996:115) is of the opinion that training is primarily directed in preparing 
an employee to perform a task in relations to his/her abilities while, staff development is 
concerned with the growth of the employees. Reddy (1996:115) defines education as the 
combination of processes of general knowledge transfer that need not be related to improving 
the performance and productivity of employees.  
 
Nel et al. (2011:358-359) state that education refers to a systematic effort with the specific aim 
to transmit acquire knowledge, attitudes and values.  Therefore, education can be seen as a 
general basis to prepare an individual for life without the development of any specific job-
related skills.  Capacity building on the other hand, entails the transfer of knowledge, skills, 
and information through training with the aim to perform a specific task that could not be 
performed previously (Van der Waldt, et al., 2014:194).   
 
According to Nel et al. (2011:377-384), there are different training methods such as off-the job 
training methods that takes place away from an employee’s workplace and on- the-job- training 
methods which takes place within the workplace. Off-the job training methods takes place 
away from the workplace and include delivery methods such as lectures, case study methods, 
role-playing, in-basket training and management games. On-the-job training methods occurs 
at the workplace and the methods used includes coaching, job rotation, junior boards, job 
instruction training, mentoring, learner-controlled instruction.  While, contemporary methods 
of training which could take place at the workplace or away from the workplace includes online 
learning, computer-based training, web-based training, action learning and adventure training 
(Nel et al., 2011:381-385). 
 
It is important that local authorities create an environment and opportunities for employees to 
acquire skills and to develop their abilities in order to perform their duties in an effective 
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manner.   Section 68(1) of MSA, 2000 clearly provides that a municipality must develop its 
municipal officials in such a manner that they will be able to perform their functions and 
exercise their powers in an economical, effective and efficient and accountable way. In terms 
of Section 68(2) and (3) of MSA, 2000 a municipality may in addition to the provision for a 
training levy in terms of the Skills Development Levies Act, 1999 budget for the development 
and implantation of training programmes.  Furthermore, a municipality who does not have the 
financial means to makes provision for training programmes may apply to the Sector Education 
and Training Authority for Local Government for such funds. 
 
Thornhill and Cloete (2014:155) aver that all employees from so-called unskilled labourers to 
top officials require training, to meet the demands of specific positions. Each municipality 
should make its own arrangements for on-the job training opportunities or in-service training 
of its employees. Community Law Centre (2008:37) argues that capacity constraints within 
municipalities often results in malpractices and poor internal accountability.  Community Law 
Centre (2008:38) further point out that a skills shortage on the part of councillors have a 
negative impact on the ability of the municipal council to hold the administration accountable.  
Another concern is that often there is a skills and education gap between the elected 
representatives and the municipal officials who are in general more skilled and educated.  This 
situation often hampered the elected representatives to hold the municipal officials to account 
for their actions.  Thus, the administrative accountability of municipal officials is often very 
poor.      
 
Another concern is that since 2005 the South African municipal administration had faced many 
challenges as a result of transformation. Not only were valuable skills been lost, many 
municipalities make appointments on the basis of political or cadre deployment and family ties, 
while junior post in many municipalities were filled buy inadequately trained employees. 
Furthermore, the municipalities are plagued with serious service delivery bottlenecks and staff 
with a poor attitude towards delivering service in an effective and efficient manner.    
 
Nealer (in Van der Waldt et al. 2014:194) further warns that once an organisational culture of 
incompetence and nepotism is created, it is likely that skilled and employees with integrity may 
decide to resign and it will become very difficult to attract and retain skilled employees into 
municipalities.   Thus, municipalities have to invest in staff development, training and capacity 
building initiatives to ensure that all municipalities adhere to the constitutional requirements of 
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public administration and to ensure that the administrative function of municipalities is 
achieved in an effective, efficient and accountable manner.   
 
In the next sections the important role of social accountability to promote participatory local 
government will be discussed in detail. 
 
5.7 CURRENT CHALLENGES OF ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
After 25 years of South Africa’s democracy the performance of local governments performance 
remains a concerning.  Koma (2017:36-37) assert to this by indicating that the South African 
national government implement various interventions over the years to restore the performance 
including the administrative and financial performance of municipalities.  These interventions 
include Project Consolidate that was introduced from 2004 to 2006 to improved integration 
and co-ordination of provincial programmes, as well as to capacitate local government service 
delivery capacity through harmonised national and provincial interventions. The National 
Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) introduced the 
Local Government Turn Around Strategy (LGTAS) after their State of Local Government 
Report of 2009 revealed major challenges related to governance, service delivery, financial 
management, policy management and policy implementation issues.   After it became clear 
that the LGTAS failed to improve the institutional capacity and performance of most of the 
municipalities the Local Government Back-to-Basics campaign was introduced in 2014.   
 
The Local Government Back-to-Basics campaign focused on the improvement of good 
governance, public participation, financial management, infrastructure services and 
institutional capacity.  The main objectives of the Back-to Basic campaign was to ensure a 
suitable interface between political matters and administration, to develop effective credit 
control and debt collection policies, develop and implement audit and post-audit action plans, 
build institutional and administrative capacity, processes and systems and to provide capacity 
building initiatives for councillors (Koma, 2017:28; Van der Waldt et al. 2018:105; Van der 
Waldt in Landberg and Graham, 2017:164; Kroukamp, 2016:113).    
  
Kroukamp (2016:113-114) is of the view that the essential elements of the Back-to- Basics 
Approach is to establish a responsive municipal administration to ensure, political and 
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administrative stability, council committee and management meetings are held on a regular 
basis between the political and administrative branches of local government, to ensure that 
spending aligned with the IDP and that the capital budget is fully spend and that at least 7% is 
spend on maintenance; institutional administrative management is characterised by clear policy 
and delegation frameworks, community satisfaction is measured on an annual basis and proper 
financial management results in clean/unqualified audits.    
 
Except for the above strategies and interventions, SALGA also introduced numerous 
programmes such as the Councillor Induction programme and the Municipal Audit Support 
Programme (MASP) to improve municipal leadership, governance, administration, 
institutional capacity and financial management practices.  However, Koma (2017:28-29) is of 
the view that these interventions fail to improve the administration, institutional and financial 
performance of most municipalities.  The Auditor-General reports for 2016-2017 and 2017-
2018 confirmed that the accountability and the need for appropriate consequences for 
accountability failures of most municipalities featured as the prominent elements of the poor 
performance of most municipalities (AGSA, 2018:22; AGSA, 2019:12).  The slow response 
by the political and administrative leadership of municipalities in the Free State province to 
address the week internal control environment, the lack of consequences, and failure to adhere 
to the requirements of local government legislative frameworks are the main causes of poor 
performance of all municipalities in the Free State province (Auditor-General, 2018:6; Auditor-
General, 2019:3). 
 
Except for continued poor audit outcomes of most municipalities as shown in the Auditor-
General Consolidated Reports on local government audit outcomes SALGA (2015:19) 
purposes measures to strengthen accountability, governance, administration, and financial 
capacity of municipalities with clear consequences for non-performance.   Koma (2017:35) 
further point out that current service delivery protest engulfing most municipalities may 
necessitate the need for national government to revisit national interventions to restore the 
confidence in most municipalities. SALGA (2015:24) further states that although the 
appointment, functioning and roles of administrative leadership in municipalities are highly 
regulated, it does not necessarily lead to good governance, effective administrative and 
financial management and service delivery in the municipality.       
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In light of the above, Ambe (2016:26) points out that the lack of compliance and accountability 
remains a concern in most municipalities. The most municipalities fail to comply with SCM 
legislative frameworks, and these defaulters have not been held accountable for their actions. 
Municipal SCM practitioners who forms part of the municipality administration have defaulted 
in SCM processes without any action being taken against them.  Ambe (2016:26) further argues 
that there is an urgent need to rethink innovative ways of curbing corruption and other 
administrative malpractices within municipalities.  Other challenges in the administration of 
municipalities include the following; lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities of 
administrative technical staff and political office-bearers creates opportunities for 
interferences, that give rise to allegations or instances of corruption.  The Auditor-General in 
the report of 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 warns that political interferences in the administration 
weakened oversight and did not enable the effecting of consequences (AGSA, 2018:3; AGSA, 
2019:12). Many officials lack appropriate knowledge for proper implementation of SCM 
legislation.  Another concern is that SCM policies and regulations overlap.  This creates 
confusion for administrative staff responsible for SCM in municipalities and it inhibits proper 
implementation, which could lead to poor service delivery.  Lastly, there has been a lack of 
ethics, professionalism and a lack of consequences along SCM practices.         
 
Koma (2017:35) further point out that current service delivery protest engulfing most 
municipalities may necessitate the need for national government to revisit national 
interventions to restore the confidence in local government.  According to Subban and Wissink 
(2015:47-48), ongoing service delivery protest are an indication of local communities, 
frustration with the failures of municipalities.  Continued challenges of municipalities are the 
following; collapse in main municipal infrastructure services in some communities result in 
services are either not provide or provided at unacceptable low levels; slow responses to service 
delivery challenges are often linked to a lack of trust in municipalities and councillors by local 
communities.  Other challenges include inadequate involvement of local communities in the 
affairs of municipalities as a result of poor functioning of ward committees and ward 
councillors.   High vacancy rates in the administration of municipalities remain a challenge and 
corruption amongst functionaries further contributes to a breakdown in the functionality of the 
municipalities (Subban and Wissink, 2015:47-48).      
 
Koma (2017:34-35), Ambe (2016:27) and Kroukamp (2016:113-114) recommended the 
following to restore the functionality of most municipalities: 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
232 
 
• Strong ethical leadership in the administrative, financial and SCM practices in 
municipalities is critical important; 
• Sufficient human and financial resources to assist in the implementation of the 
municipalities administration and financial management systems and to ensure that 
there is effective co-ordination of capacity building opportunities; 
• Filling of key vacancies within the municipality must be an imperative to ensure sound 
administrative and financial management; 
• A database involving experienced and skilled individuals must be kept and maintained 
by CoGTA, to ensure that the right people are appointed as administrators in 
municipalities that are placed under supervision in terms of Section 139 of the 
Constitution, 1996.  Deployment of administrators cannot be afforded to appear to be 
learning on the job, this undermine the legitimacy and authority of the provincial 
intervention;    
• Municipal officials should understand the prescribed SCM policies and processes to 
prevent SCM irregularities;          
• Except for SCM, sound financial management systems and process must be developed 
and implemented; 
• Budgetary and spending processes must be aligned with the IDP;  
• Involvement of local communities is an imperative to promote accountability.  
Satisfaction of local communities must be measured annually.    
 
CoGTA should ensure that reports are submitted and analysed and that corrective actions are 
taken should it require interventions.  Implementing of strategic interventions should be 
monitored and evaluations of the success should be undertaken to ensure successful 
implementation. Lastly, non-compliance with SCM and other financial and administrative 
legislation, regulations and policies should have consequences and accountability must be 
enforced. In the next section an overview of social oversight and accountability were provided. 
 
5.8 AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
The involvement of citizens or local communities to ensure that municipalities provide 
democratic and accountable government is required in Section 152(1)(a) of the Constitution, 
1996.  While, Section 15(2)(e) of the Constitution, 1996 requires that local communities and 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
233 
 
community organisations must be encouraged to participate in the affairs of local government.  
To give effect to the constitutional requirements Section 16 of the MSA, 2000 mandates 
municipalities to establish systems to promote participatory governance. Section 16 of MSA, 
2000 further requires that community members should participate in the preparation, 
implementation and reviewing of its IDP, the municipal performance management system; the 
monitoring and review of the municipal performance and the impact of the performance, 
involvement in the preparation of the municipal budget; and to involve the local community in 
any strategic decisions related to the provision of municipal services. It does not mean that 
local communities have to intervene in the administrative duties of municipalities. However, 
municipalities are mandated to create conditions for all relevant stakeholders, including 
members of the community to be involve in the affairs of municipalities (Kwele in Draai et al., 
2016:269).   
 
According to Mavee (2014:204-205), civil society in terms of democratic governance include 
a range of self-reliant organised groups and institutions, such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGO), independent mass media, universities, and social and religious groups.  
Civil society as part of democratic societies fulfil an important role to hold government, 
political and public officials (functionaries) to account for their decisions and actions 
(Sikhakane and Reddy, 2011:92). Citizens or members of the local community are increasingly 
forming groups to place pressure on government to account in situation where there have been 
failures. These societal pressure groups such as community organisations express significant 
concerns regarding the implementation of government policies that results in debates to 
improve accountability (Ijeoma and Sambumbu, 2013:289).  These authors further state that 
increasing consultations with members of local community, requires that local government 
must consider ordinary citizens’ developmental needs, but it also improves the extent to which 
government policies and developmental programmes meets the needs of society. 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, Section 1.6.5 of this study, social accountability refers to citizen or 
community participation by assessing or generating relevant information and building a 
credible evidence that will serve to hold functionaries to account for their actions (Compte, 
2008:45). Camargo and Jacobs (2013:10) maintain that social accountability means that 
citizens must be able to express their preferences, opinions, views and demand accountability 
from government and functionaries.  Whereas, Adeyemi et al. (2012:83) are of the opinion that 
social accountability refers to the wide range of actions by civil society to hold government 
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and functionaries to account for their actions.  Adeyemi et al. (2012:83) further mention that 
community members must be able to participate and be allowed to assess the performance of a 
public institutions, such as a municipality.  However, Camargo and Jacobs (2013:10) point out 
that community members may not even be aware of their rights and the specific obligations 
that functionaries have to fulfil in the course of their work. Therefore, the opinions of 
community members as a result of social accountability need to be aggregated and articulated. 
It means that the opinions, views and demands of community members need to be transmitted 
to relevant role players or decision makers who can act upon the information. 
 
A concern is that the contributions of citizens, community pressure groups within society has 
limitations in, that they often intervene only after there have been failures to implement a policy 
or to address the needs of a particular community (Ijeoma and Sambumbu, 2013:282).  In this 
regard, Compte (2008:44) argues that the effectiveness of social accountability is that 
communities and community members have limited enforcement capacity.  Another concern 
is raised by Diale, Maserumule and Mello (2007:642) that the involvement of citizens or 
community members in the matters of local government faces many challenges, which 
functionaries can use as an excuse not to involve the public in their decision-making and policy-
making processes in an effective manner. One of the challenges is that social accountability 
can be time consuming, in that it requires that municipalities must arrange meetings with 
representatives of all relevant stakeholders.  Diale et al. (2007:643) further point out that most 
citizens are not keen to attend community participatory meetings.  Another concern is that 
community members often lack relevant competencies such as basic analytical and decision-
making skills or they are illiterate. The latter situation increases the cost of citizens’ 
involvement into the affairs of municipalities. The participation of ordinary citizens or 
members of local communities in the affairs of local government will lead to more 
accountability and responsiveness local communities (Diale et al., 2007:643).   Irrespective of 
the above concerns about the role of ordinary citizens or local communities to promote social 
accountability, municipalities are obliged to give effect to the constitutional requirements to 
provide a democratic and accountable local government.  The role of community participation 
to promote social accountability was outline in the discussion below.     
 
5.9   THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION TO PROMOTE SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
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A good starting point for the purpose of this study is to define the term community and 
community participation. Van der Waldt et al. (2014:26) state that the term community refers 
to a specific district or an area that falls under the jurisdiction of a municipality.  Van der Waldt 
et al. (2014:26-27) further explain that the community of a specific district or an area of 
jurisdiction where citizens or community members live, comprises the following: 
 
• Local residents within that area,  
• Community-based organisations within the area; 
• Small business owners within the area;  
• Public interest groups within the area; 
• Independent media in the area; 
• Labour market within the area; 
• Various schools within the area;  
• Various religious groupings; and  
• Various NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) in the area. 
 
De Beer and Swanepoel (2012:19) maintain that the term community in the context of 
developmental local government should be the main actors and main beneficiaries of 
development.  On the other hand, participation is connected to the actions of communities, 
groups or individuals related to the development initiatives within a specific area. Mavee 
(2014:207) views participation as the need to involve those who are supposed to benefit from 
any developmental activity.  The terms community, citizen and/or public participation or 
community participation are often used similarly. The WPLG (1998:53) refers to citizen 
participation, while the MSA, 2000 refers to community participation. Diale et al. (2007:642) 
state that citizen participation is the result of a social contract between elected representatives 
(political officials) and member of the municipal community which, include voters, non-voters 
and the members of the community who choose not to vote. The National Policy Framework 
for Public Participation (2007:4) refers to community participation as an accountable process 
through which members of a community can take part in the affairs of local government, to 
exchange views and to influence decision-making. As far back as 1996, Bekker (1996:133) 
maintains that citizen or community participation may mean different things to different 
people. While, Fox and Meyer (1995:20) clarify that community participation entails the 
involvement of citizens in aspects such as administrative policy-making activities, the 
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involvement of citizens to prioritise their developmental needs, and to determine the levels of 
service delivery. 
 
Tshabalala (2006:44) made a distinction between community participation and public 
participation.  Community participation involves the broader public that is not bound by a 
specific geographic area.  In addition, Brynard (in Tshabalala 2006:45) is of the opinion that 
community participation provides a mechanism though which the public exercise their 
democratic right to be involved in the planning and decision-making processes of local 
government. Thus, community participation refers to the involvement of the local community 
or community members in the affairs of a municipality while, public participation is not bound 
by a specific geographic area.  Therefore, the term community participation was used in this 
study.     
 
In light of the above, Ijeoma and Sambumbu (2013:282) warns that participation and 
involvement of the citizens or community members in the affairs of local government only 
validates the process for decision-making and cannot be treated as accountability.  The 
effectiveness of accountability should be measured accordance to factors such as information, 
justification and the consequences should be considered in combining different measures to 
improve accountability at local sphere. These measures to improve social or public 
accountability include political, administrative, judicial and societal mechanisms. In this 
regard, Craythorne (2006:314) argues that community participation must be focussed if it is to 
succeed. Therefore, further argues that community participation in the affairs of a municipality 
must take place through the various political structures for participation as provided in the 
Municipal Structures Act of 1998 such as sub-councils and ward committees.   Thus, mere 
involvement of citizens in the affairs of local government does not necessary constitute social 
accountability. Social accountability requires that community participation in the affairs of 
local governments must take part through established structures and mechanisms for 
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5.10 THE LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Since 1994 the government has put in place many policy and legislative frameworks which 
require some form of community participation in local government.   The Constitution, 1996, 
WPLG, 1998, the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, the MSA, 2000 and the MFMA, 2003 requires 
the involvement of the public in local matters to promote a democratic government.    
 
5.10.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996  
 
According to Meyer and Venter (2013:96), the Constitution, 1996 is the supreme law and 
provides for a developmental model of local government. Chapter 2 thereof makes provision 
for the Bill of Rights that includes the rights of all citizens to equality, human dignity, freedoms, 
environment and the right to housing, health care, food, water and social security. The notion 
of community participation is mandated in terms of Section 151(1) of the Constitution, 1996. 
Section 151(1) of the Constitution, 1996 places an obligation on local government to provide 
democratic and accountable government for all local communities; to ensure the provision of 
services to communities in a sustainable manner; to promote social and economic development; 
to promote a safe and healthy environment; and to encourage the involvement of communities 
and community organisations in the matters of local government (Van der Waldt in Landsberg 
and Graham, 2017:171).    
 
In terms of Section 40(1) of the Constitution, 1996 each sphere of government is distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated.  It means that local government as a distinctive sphere, is 
mandated to provide services to local communities but also to give effect to social and 
economic development for local communities.  Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:136) and Meyer 
and Venter (2013:96) assert that in terms of Section 152(a) and (e) of the Constitution, 1996 
the municipality is mandated to provide a democratic and accountable government for the local 
community. Sirovha and Thornhill (207:136) point out that the developmental duties of 
municipalities are rooted in Section 153 of the Constitution, 1996. Section 153 of the 
Constitution, 1996 further provides that the municipality must structure and manage its 
administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the 
community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community; a 
municipality must also participate in national and provincial development programmes.  
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According to Sibanda (2017:317) Section 195 (1) of the Constitution, 1996 provides the basic 
values and principles governing public administration that require that the people’s needs must 
be responded to and public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making matters. In this 
regard, Van der Waldt (in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:171) point out that municipal councils 
rely on the inputs from the local community to stay informed about their needs, concerns and 
priorities.  Therefore, well organised citizens and community interest groups can have a 
meaningful influence on municipal council decisions, actions and policies. What is 
contemplated from the above provisions is that local communities should fulfil an accountable 
role, to hold functionaries to account.  It further implies that local communities and community 
organisations must be involved in the matters of the municipality.   
 
5.10.2 White Paper on Local Government, 1998 
 
According to Meyer and Venter (2013:96), the WPLG, 1998 introduced the concept of 
developmental local government.  It defines developmental local government as a commitment 
to work with local communities to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and 
material needs, to improve the quality of their lives. Madumo (2015:160) states that the WPLG, 
1998 provides the following characteristics of developmental local government: 
 
• To maximise the social development and economic growth of local communities; 
• To integrate and to co-ordinate local development planning; 
• To give effect to the constitutional requirement to promote democratic development; 
and 
• To involve local communities to find solutions for local development challenges. 
 
According to Mathane (2013:107), the WPLG, 1998 makes provision for the following 
objectives of community participation: 
 
• To ensure that political officials of municipalities remain accountable to local 
communities and perform their oversight functions; 
• To allow community members to have an interest into local politics; 
• To allow local communities as the consumers of municipal services to view their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction about services delivery; and 
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• To afford organised civil society the opportunity to enter into partnerships and contracts 
with local government in order to mobilise additional resources. 
 
In addition, the WPLG (1998:53-54) provides that municipalities should develop mechanisms 
to ensure participation of local communities in the municipalities IDP processes, policy 
initiation and formulation, and to promote monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of decision-
making and implementation (Raga et al., 2011:155).  The WPLG (1998:5) further refers to the 
importance of municipalities as a space where citizens can participate to shape their own living 
environments and extend their democratic rights.  Thus, the intention of developmental local 
government is to give effect to the constitutional requirement to promote democratic 
governance and to promote accountability.     
 
5.10.3 Municipal Structures Act, 1998   
 
According to Netswere and Phago (2013:25), public participation is of such critical importance 
that it is prescribed in the Constitution, 1996 and the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 and MSA, 
2000.  Section 5(1) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 sets out the rights and duties of the 
members of local communities.  In terms of the Act the community has the right to contribute 
to the decision-making process of the municipality as well as to be able to submit written or 
oral recommendations, representations and complaints to the municipal council.  The Act also 
provides that a metropolitan municipality or local council may take administrative 
arrangements to enable ward committees to perform their functions and practice their powers 
effectively.  Madumo (2014:134) assert that Section 73 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 
provides that the council of a metropolitan municipality or a local municipality may decide to 
have ward committee structure.  The Act also sets out the powers and functions of a ward 
committee.   
 
In terms Section 73 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, a ward committee must be 
established for the various wards within the municipalities. The ward councillor must represent 
that ward on the municipal council.  The ward councillor must be the chairperson of the ward 
committee.  In addition, the municipal council must make rules regulating the ward committee 
including the procedure to elect ten other members of a particular ward to serve on the ward 
committee by taking into account equitably to ensure that woman is represented on the ward 
committee. The municipal council must indicate in the rules the frequency of meetings of ward 
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committees and the circumstances under which ward committee members must vacate their 
term (Van der Waldt in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:173; Mathane, 2013:108-109).  Thus, 
ward committees are structures that should promote community participation to ensure that 
local communities are involved in the affairs of the municipality.          
 
5.10.4 Municipal System Act (MSA), 2000  
 
The statutory principles for developmental local government are contained in the MSA, 2000 
in terms of Section 4 of the MSA, 2000 municipalities must consult with local communities 
concerning the quality and impact of municipal services provided by the municipality, either 
directly or through another service provider. The MSA, 2000 further requires that local 
communities should be informed about the decisions of the municipal council. Municipal 
councils are further obliged to kept local communities informed about the affairs of the 
municipality including the financial affairs of the municipality (Mathane, 2013:109; Meyer and 
Venter, 2013:96).     
 
According to Raga et al. (2011:156), Section 5(1)(a) to (e) of the MSA, 2000 provides that local 
communities have the right to take part in the decision-making processes of the municipality. 
Local communities may submit written or oral recommendations, representations and 
complaints to the municipal councillor to any political structure or administration of the 
municipality. Local communities must receive prompt responses to written or oral 
communications or complaints.  Local communities must be informed of the decisions of the 
municipal councillor another political structure or a political office-bearer of the municipality.  
Local communities have the right to regular disclosure of the state of affairs of the municipality 
and demand that proceedings of the municipal council and other committees must be open to 
the public.  
 
According to Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:136), Section 16(1) of the MSA, 2000 provides that 
a municipality should develop a culture of municipal governance that promotes a system of 
participatory governance.  Therefore, municipalities must encourage, and create conditions for 
local communities to participate in the preparation, implementation and review of the IDP and 
budgetary processes, monitoring and review of its performance management system, and 
related decisions about the provision of municipal services. 
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Mathane (2013:111) emphasises that Section 17 of the MSA, 2000 requires that local 
communities must participate in the affairs of the municipality through the political structures 
for participation as set out in the Municipal Structures Act of 1998.  Section 17 of the MSA, 
2000 further requires that municipalities must create conditions to allow members of the 
community, such as disabled people, other disadvantaged groups and people who are illiterate, 
to participate in the affairs of the municipality.  In terms of Section 18(1) of the MSA, 2000 
municipalities must communicate with local communities the available mechanisms, processes 
and procedures that are in place to encourage and facilitate participation. Section 19 of the 
MSA, of 2000 requires that the MM must give notice to the local community as determined by 
the municipal council, about the date, time and venue of every meeting and urgent meeting of 
the council and every special or urgent meeting of the council, unless time constraints make it 
impossible. In terms of Section 20 of the MSA, 2000 the meetings of the municipal council and 
its committees that discusses or votes on matters such as by-laws, budgets; and amendment to 
the IDP, the performance management system or amendments, and service delivery agreements 
must be open to the public and the media.  The Act further requires that municipal council 
meetings in which the annual report of a municipality will be discussed, or any decision will 
be taken about the annual report must be open to the public or any organ of state.  Raga et al. 
(2011:158) state that Section 42 of the MSA, 2000 provides that a municipality must involve 
members of the local community to participate in the development, implementation and review 
of the municipalities IDP and performance management practices. Other than the above, the 
Code of Conduct for Councillors as provided in Schedule 1 of MSA, 2000 provides that 
municipal councillors must be accountable to local communities and report back at least on a 
quarterly basis to constituencies concerning council matters, such as the performance of the 
municipality in terms of established performance indicators.    
 
5.10.5 Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), 2003  
 
According to Sibanda, (2017:317), and SALGA, The Ward Committee Resource Book 
(2005:17), states that one of the requirements of the MFMA, 2003 is to promote transparent 
and effective financial management in municipalities and municipal entities.  The MFMA, 2003 
requires that municipalities must involve local communities in the annual review processes of 
the IDP, related policies and the budgetary processes such as the preparation, tabling and 
approval of the annual budget.   Raga et al. (2011:158) maintain that the MFMA, 2003 also 
makes provision for the alignment between the municipalities IDP and the municipal budget. 
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The Act provides that a Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) serves as the 
mechanism that ensure that the IDP and the budget are aligned.  It can be inferred from the 
above that local communities must be involved in the preparation, implementation and review 
of the IDP and municipal budget.         
 
5.10.6 Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004 (Amended in 2009) 
 
According to Raga et al. (2011:156), the Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004 provides that 
before a municipality can adopt a rates policy, there must be community participation as 
prescribed in the MSA, 2000.  The Act further requires that the MM must make known the draft 
rates policy for a period of at least 30 days at the municipality’s head and satellite offices, at 
libraries and on an official website of the municipality to ensure that the public has access to 
the information. It should further be advertised in the local media newspapers. Mathane 
(2013:112) avers that the municipality must invite the local community to submit their 
comments to the municipality within a period specified in the notice which may not be less 
than 30 days. In addition, a municipal council must take all comments and representations made 
to it or received by it into account when it considers the draft rates policy. The Municipal 
Property Rates Act, 2004 also requires that public participation in amendments to a rates policy 
must be reflected through the municipality’s annual budget process.   
 
5.10.7 The National Policy Framework for Public Participation, 2007 
 
According to Mathane (2013:113), the National Policy Framework for Public Participation, 
2007, serves as a guideline to promote community participation in all municipalities.  It 
identifies requirements that all municipalities must meet to achieve its constitutional obligation 
concerning participatory governance. These requirements include the following: 
 
• All municipalities must implement a community complaints management system.   The 
municipality has to publish and distribute its own Public Participation Framework that 
indicates the public participation mechanisms that exist within the municipality.   
• Municipalities have to conduct satisfaction surveys within the local communities to 
become aware of the community satisfaction concerning service delivery within its 
area.   
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• Ward committees must be involved and participate in the key municipal administration 
processes such as the IDP, budgetary and performance management system processes. 
• Representatives from the ward committees should serve on the municipalities audit 
committees as well as on the personal performance evaluation panel. 
• Municipalities should keep comprehensive local stakeholders register, to encourage the 
involvement of as many community members as possible.       
• Public participation should be one of the key performance agreements of municipal 
officials to secure a basic threshold of participatory governance. 
 
Thus, all municipalities should ensure that the above requirements as provided in the Policy 
Framework for Public Participation, 2007 are in place to promote effective involvement of 
local communities in the affairs of the municipality.   
  
5.10.8 The South African National Development Plan, 2030  
 
According to the National Development Plan 2030 Executive Summary (2012:16), the aim of 
the NDP is to eradicate poverty and to reduce inequality by 2030.  In the context of community 
participation, the NDP provides the following priorities: 
 
• To encourage active citizenry with the aim to strengthen development, democracy and 
accountability; 
• To promote economic growth, higher investment and greater labour absorption; 
• To focus on key capabilities of communities and the state; 
• To promote and strengthen a capable and developmental state; and  
• To promote strong leadership from all spheres of government, business, labour and 
throughout society to resolve current challenges effectively  
 
The National Development Plan, 2030, Executive Summary (2012:44-45) further emphasised 
that more needs be done to resolve poor performance of the three spheres of government. In 
particular, transparency, oversight and accountability must be strengthened, and public interest 
needs to be promoted.  Especially municipalities should not undermine their accountable 
responsibilities related to the provision of municipal services and to involve local communities 
in the matters of local government.  It was mentioned in Chapter 2 of this study that the 
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Medium-Term Strategic Framework derived from the National Development Plan (NDP) 
provides the overall outcome for local government which is known as outcome 9 which, 
requires from municipalities to be a responsive, accountable local government, that focuses on 
its developmental role.  
 
From the above discussions, South Africa seems to have progressive legislator frameworks and 
policies in place to promote community participation, however there are some challenges in 
implementing these prescripts effectively to promote social accountability.   These challenges 
are discussed in Section 5.13 of this chapter.  The various mechanisms to promote social 
accountability in municipalities were outlined below.  
 
5.11 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
According to Davids and Theron (2014:121-126), community participation can take place at 
three levels. The first level is where councillors inform members of the community about 
activities of the municipality.  This takes place through flyers and general announcements with 
the monthly bill, legal notices, advertisements, press releases, reports, websites, radio and other 
media releases, and community or municipal newsletters. The second level is where the 
municipality allow members of local communities through consulting with them about service 
delivery issues. These include response sheets, electronic polling, structured surveys, 
questionnaires and opinion polls, face-to-face interviews or focus group discussion. Other 
consulting mechanisms include formal resident feedback registers, community forums such as 
CDWs who supply specific knowledge to local communities. The third level refers to 
participation through empowering participation strategies, such as public meetings where 
project leaders of a developmental project meet with the community at a public space.  
Conferences, symposia and workshops or key stakeholder meetings to provide information 
through mutual social learning. Advisory committees and panels are other advisory methods to 
help decision-makers and debate specific developmental issues, which often composed of 
community groups such as NGOs, CBOs or consulting representing the local community.  
Other platforms to address common concerns and which influence and direct future policy 
outcomes of the municipality include Imbizo’s and Indaba’s.    
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In addition to the above, Mathane (2013:103) cited the following seven levels of community 
participation to ensure participation in the affairs of local government: 
 
• The lowest level of community participation refers to information giving which is a 
very passive level of community participation.  An example of this type of community 
participation is when a municipal council of a municipality makes a policy without any 
proper consultation but only informs the community afterwards about the policy 
• Consultation is another level of community participation that is still relatively reactive.   
An example of this level of community participation is when the municipal council sets 
the agenda to formulate a policy, but also invites the community through community 
ward committee members to participate in the debates about the policy making process.  
It does not mean that the municipal council be committed to consider any of the 
outcomes of the debates about a specific policy (Mathane, 2013:103).      
• The third level of community participation refers to advice or advisory level.   An 
example of this level of community participation entails that community members and 
politicians jointly set the policy agenda and the community through the ward council 
committee participate during the policy, making process. 
• The fourth level and fifth level of community participation refers to co-producing and 
co-agenda setting that can be seen as a more interactive process of participation.  An 
example of this level of community participation is when the functionaries (political 
officials and public or municipal officials) and interest groups from the community 
jointly identify policy issues, and jointly set the agenda.  This level of community 
participation entails that the municipal council is then committed to the outcome of the 
joint policy decisions (Mathane, 2013:103). 
• The sixth level of community participation entails co-responsibility for policy decisions 
in that the community assist in assuring that the policy outcomes and the decisions taken 
are put into practice.      
• The fifth level of community participation refers to co-agenda setting  
 
The above discussion showed that active participative community participation is more 
acceptable than a passive approach such as in the case of information sharing and consultation.  
Interaction between the municipality and local communities depends on various aspects such 
as the general knowledge of citizens regarding local government matters, its structures and 
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processes, its policies and by-laws. Other aspects that could influence community participation 
include the attitude of municipal councillors and municipal officials towards community 
participation. The functionality of the municipalities participation mechanisms, policies and 
procedures as well as the availability of adequate resources to strengthen community 
participation could have an impact on the effectiveness of community participation to ensure 
that citizens fulfil their watchdog role (Van der Waldt in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:172; 
Shihakane and Reddy, 2017:92). 
           
Van der Waldt (in Landsberg and Graham 2017:172-173) further contend that there are various 
mechanisms available to engage local communities in the affairs of municipalities, such as 
local newspapers, open council meetings, suggestion boxes, ward committees and 
intergovernmental forums for example the IDP and LED forums. Municipality areas are 
divided into wards for the purpose of local elections.  The ward participatory system allows 
members of local communities to raise their local concerns through ward committees.  In this 
way ward committees are a vehicle for local communities to make their concerns known to 
municipal councils. Civil society organisations such as NGOs and other civil pressure groups 
can promote good local governance, through their watchdog function.  These include local 
elections, monitoring of municipal project implementation, and to take part in the IDP and 
budgetary processes of the municipality.   Thus, civil society, and civil organisations fulfil an 
important watchdog function, to hold municipalities and functionaries to account. 
 
Mathane (2013:129) and Sikhakane and Reddy (2011:94) concur that the following are ways 
to involve citizens in the affairs municipalities: 
 
• Local newspapers provide a means to keep local communities informed about the 
activities of the municipality, but it serves as a mechanism to keep citizens informed 
about concerns regarding to service delivery; 
• Dialogue forums such as the IDP or LED forums, sectoral forums and other applicable 
ward-based forums are platforms for local communities to participate in the 
developmental issues of the municipality; 
• Ward participatory structures such as ward committees that exist in many municipalities 
were established through formal provincial notices and requiring by by-laws; 
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• Using social surveys and advisory panels to consult with citizens to obtain their views 
on developmental and service delivery matters; and  
• Other mechanisms include community radio stations, local municipality websites as 
part of e- governance to keep community members informed about their activities.  
Other mechanism includes community centres or one stop centres where a range of 
public services are combined in one area, self service facilities and electronic services 
including help desks where all inquiries can be lodged.    
 
The above mechanisms should assist municipalities to keep local communities informed and 
to promote community participation. While, dialogue forums and ward committees should 
enable citizens to keep municipalities and functionaries to account for their policy, decisions 
and actions.   
 
Advantages of social accountability through community participation mechanisms it that it 
contributes to value added decision-making by involving members of the community to 
participate in the affairs of the municipality. Community participation provides a clear direction 
for communities to raise their concerns about service delivery issues and community related 
issues.  It serves as a mechanism to clear any misconceptions about community projects, their 
objectives and outcomes, when members of the community are well informed. they legitimise 
local authority and provide elected representatives with a mandate for action. Community 
participation.  Community participation enhances participatory democracy by promoting or 
ensuring the active interest and responsibility of not only the municipal functionaries but also 
that of citizens.  It could eliminate corruption which is flourishing at local government.  
(Sikhakane and Reddy, 2011:94-95; Van der Waldt in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:172; 
Mathane, 2013:126-127). 
 
The various community participation mechanism to promote social accountability such as local 
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5.11.1 Local elections as a community participation mechanism to promote social 
accountability  
 
In Chapter 1 of this study it was mentioned in the discussion about social contract theory that 
the society have a justification to resist any political authority by electing a new one to act in 
their best interest, if a political authority such as a municipal council who does not meet the 
required requirements and obligations (Van der Waldt in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:162). 
The right to vote is a constitutional right of all citizens from the age of eighteen years.  In this 
regard, Chapter 10 of the Constitution, 1996 provides that citizens have direct access to elected 
local government representatives.      
 
According to the World Bank (2005:5), in any democratic state elections is one of the 
mechanisms by which citizens hold the government to account.  Elections, however, have 
proved to be a very weak and blunt instrument with which to hold government accountable. 
Van der Waldt et al. (2014:38) holds that one of the building blocks for local democracy refers 
to representative and accountable local government in which municipal councils are elected.  
In this way members of local communities might feel that they have a stake in the municipal 
council in that the person for which they vote will represent them in the municipal council.   
The Local Government: Municipal Electoral (Act 27 of 2000) makes provision in Section 7 
for a proportional representation vote for every municipality as well as for segments of the 
voters roll to be divided with regards to the voting district. Diale et al. (2007:643) are of the 
opinion that voting can be seen as a mechanism by which ordinary citizens can show their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of elected representatives. Citizens have 
the option to vote the political party in power out of office if they are dissatisfied with their 
progress.  The election of public representatives (political officials) to represent the community 
in municipalities is one mechanism to promote accountability. Therefore, the public must play 
a direct role in holding decision makers (political representatives) to account for their decisions 
and their conduct.  In this way voters promote and ensure democratic accountability.          
 
Advantages of social accountability through community participation mechanisms it that it 
contributes to value added decision-making by involving members of the community to 
participate in the affairs of the municipality.  Community participation provides a clear 
direction for communities to raise their concerns about service delivery issues and community 
related issues.  It serves as a mechanism to clear any misconceptions about community projects, 
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their objectives and outcomes, when members of the community are well-informed, they 
legitimise local authority and provide elected representatives with a mandate for action. 
Community participation enhances participatory democracy by promoting or ensuring the 
active interest and responsibility of not only the municipal functionaries but also that of 
citizens.  It could eliminate corruption which is flourishing at local government.  (Sikhakane 
and Reddy, 2011:94-95; Van der Waldt in Landsberg and Graham, 2017:172; Mathane, 
2013:126-127). 
   
Thus, the various participation mechanism should promote opportunities for members of local 
communities to be involved in matters of the municipality.  It should serve as a key mechanism 
to ensure social accountability, which could be attained through voting incumbents out of office 
or demanding regular accounts of actions and policies. 
 
5.11.2 Citizen interest groups and other stakeholders 
 
According to Bovens (2005:16), in most of the western democracies there is a perceived lack 
of trust in government.  Therefore, there is a need for more direct and explicit accountability 
relations between public agencies such as municipalities and civil society. Influenced by the 
need for social responsibility, participatory governance, more attention has been being paid to 
the role of NGOs, interest groups and citizens as relevant stakeholders not only in determining 
policy, but also to hold local government to account. Community participation and information 
mechanisms constitute what is widely considered to be a critical feature of participatory 
governance and decentralisation. The form of participatory democracy which community 
participation provides, is considered a vital aide to the more formal forms of representative 
democracy. In this regard, the WPLG, 1998 requires that one of the key aspects of 
developmental local government is to involve members of local communities and community 
organisations in the matters of municipalities (Siddle, 2011:192). 
 
Bovens (2005:16) stresses that municipalities or individual functionaries must account for their 
performance to the public at large or, at least, to civil interest groups, and community 
organisations.  A step in this direction has been the institution of public reporting and the 
establishment of public panels (Bovens, 2005:16). The rise of the internet has given a new 
dimension to this form of public or social accountability. The results of inspections, 
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assessments and benchmarks must be made available to the citizens on websites of government 
institutions. 
 
Since 1994 there have been several initiatives to promote to social accountability and 
community participation. These have ranged from establishing statutory institutions, such as 
intergovernmental forums at all three spheres of government and ward committees at local 
government level, to non-statutory mechanisms such as ‘izimbizos’ and working groups. The 
Thusong Service Centres have also been established to achieve this objective (The Presidency, 
2015:21). 
 
Van der Waldt et al. (2014:39) believe that NGOs fulfil an important “watch dog” role. The 
South African National Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOGO) was 
established in 1995 to co-ordinate the input of NGOs into government policy. In this way 
NGOs promote that members of local communities must participation in public policy-making 
processes. The SANGOGO represent different types of NGOs from various range of 
developmental fields such as health, human rights, environment and land issues.  In this regard, 
the following NGOs fulfil and important role to promote local democracy: 
 
• The Democracy Development Programme (DDP) NGOs focus on capacity building 
at the governance and civil society level to promote meaningful citizen participation 
in governments social transformation (Van der Waldt et al., 2014:40). 
• The Open Democracy Advice Centre is another NGO, which focus on the promotion 
of transparent democracy. This NGO aims to promote a culture of corporate and 
government accountability by assisting citizens to realise their constitutional rights 
(Van der Waldt et al., 2014:40). 
• The Centre for Public Participation (CPP) is another NGO that aims to establish a 
well-informed social society who can participate and engage with municipalities, and 
accountable government structures such as ward committees and municipal councils, 
to participate in the development of developmental policies and local economic 
development policies in a participatory manner (Van der Waldt et al., 2014:40). 
 
Mavee (2014:205-206) agrees that NGOs should play an important role by educating citizens 
about their rights and obligations by encouraging them to participate by voting in elections.   
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NGOs fulfil an important role to capacitate citizens to express their views, to solve common 
problems and to take part in debates about municipal and other public matters.   In this way 
NGOs can provide forums for debating public policies and disseminating information about 
issues that affect local communities   
 
The above are some of the important non-governmental organisations that assist with the 
promotion of local participatory governance and democracy. Community-based Organisations 
(CBOs) for example civic and taxpayer associations also fulfil an important role to 
democratising municipal decisions. These, community-based organisations also contribute to 
aspects such as community development through training and skills development initiatives, 
with the aim to empower citizens with decision-making skills, to improve their participatory 
responsibilities (Van der Waldt, et al. 2014:41). However, a concern is that many of the CBOs 
are not well-informed how local government functions and how their community-based 
organisations could influence municipalities that it will benefit the communities in an effective 
manner. One could argue that in order to promote participatory governance and social 
accountability NGOs and CBOs should fulfil an important role to ensure that municipal 
councils and ward committees actively engage with communities and community members to 
address their needs in an effective manner at grassroots level.     
 
5.11.3 Ward Committees  
 
According to Sikhakane and Reddy (2011:95), ward committees fulfils and important role to 
promote participatory democracy in municipalities.  Ward committees serves as independent, 
advisory consultative committee structures is a mechanism through which local communities 
can express their dissatisfaction with the performance and service delivery of the municipality. 
Van der Waldt et al. (2014:64) assert that a ward committee may make recommendations on a 
matter affecting its ward to the ward councillor, or through the ward councillors to the 
metropolitan or local council, executive committee, executive mayor or the relevant sub-
council. Ward councillors are directly elected to represent a specific ward (Joseph, 2002:20).  
In terms of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 only metropolitan municipalities and local 
municipalities may have ward committees.  Section 73(1) and (2) of Municipal Structures Act, 
1998 stipulates that a ward committee must consist of the ward councillor representing the 
ward in the council, who must also be the chairperson of the ward committee. The Municipal 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
252 
 
Structures Act, 1998 or any other legislation do not make provision for any qualifications of 
ward committee members.  
 
Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:151) are of the opinion that ward committees and residents from 
the formal ward committee and those ward committees operating within the area of traditional 
leaders should attend municipal council meetings in which both the annual and oversight 
reports are tabled.  Thus, ward committees can be seen as key link between the municipal 
council and the local community.  Ward committees can also be seen as a key mechanism with 
which municipalities can communicate with local communities and also to promote and 
enhance efficient and effective service delivery.   
 
The objectives of ward committees are the following includes the following; to enhance 
participatory local governance; to assist the ward councillor on matters of the ward; to 
contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of all its residents; to make 
recommendations to the ward councillor or to the other structures of the metropolitan council; 
and to engage residents in matters of local governance (Raga and Taylor, 2005; 143; Sikhakane 
and Reddy, 2011:95; Van der Waldt et al., 2014:63-64). 
 
Van der Waldt et al. (2014:63-64) further submit that the ward participatory system of 
municipal government allows for the establishment of ward committees to facilitate community 
participation. Ward committees can improve communication between municipal council and 
local communities and play in identifying community needs. This gives residents a more direct 
voice in the governance of their neighbourhoods. It enhances participatory democracy in local 
government by providing a vehicle for local communities to make their views and needs known 
to the municipal council. 
 
According to the Handbook for Municipal councillors (2011:39-40), the main function of a 
ward committee is to be a formal communication channel between the local community and 
the municipal council. In terms of Section 21 of the MSA, 2000 concerning communication to 
the local community information of the municipality must be notified through the media to 
local communities, such as public notice boards, local newspapers, and radio broadcasts.  
Section 21(2) of the MSA, 2000 requires that such notifications must be in the official language 
determined by the municipal council. While, Section 18(2)(3) of the MSA, 2000 requires that 
the municipality must take into consideration the special needs of the local community such as 
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people who cannot read or write. Sikhakane and Reddy (2011:95) aver that the ward committee 
must ensure that pamphlets, posters and reports of the municipal council are made available at 
strategic places within the local community or ward including, libraries, clinics, community 
notice boards. The ward councillor can also display their own notices on community notice 
boards.  A critical mechanism to hold functionaries to account is when ward councillors 
establish a relationship with community newspapers and radio stations relating community 
participation opportunities. Sikhakane and Reddy (2011:96) emphasise that local newspapers 
or other media mechanism could promote social accountability by highlighting negative issues 
including poor service delivery, corruption and conflicts within the municipality.  In this 
regard, functionaries will refrain from unacceptable behaviour for fear of being exposed by the 
media.         
 
Except for the above methods of communication, the ward councillors must ensure that 
important information of the municipal council is communicated to local communities by other 
means such as radio and community newspapers.  According to the DPLG (2005:38) the roles 
and responsibilities of ward committees are: 
• To ensure that formal unbiased communication channels and co-operative partnerships 
between the municipality and the community within a ward are created; 
• To ensure that communities are made aware of the importance to pay for services 
through the ward committee system; 
• To facilitate public participation in the process of development, review and 
implementation management of the municipalities IDP and budgetary process; 
• Act as advisory and consultative structure to consult with local community on the 
municipal council’s policies and matters affecting the community and wards; 
• To serve as an effective citizen participatory structures of the municipality; 
• To make recommendations to the municipal council regarding any matter affecting the 
ward; 
• To execute any other functions as delegated by the municipality; 
• To ensure that ward committee members participate in their municipalities’ stakeholder 
cluster forums; and  
• To promote a harmonious relationship between the local community and the 
municipality.  
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In light of the above, the Handbook of Municipal Councillors, (2011:39) states that ward 
councillors are responsible for the following: 
 
• To explaining the decisions of the municipal council by providing local communities 
with a progress report relating to the IDP and budgetary processes of the municipality; 
• To monitoring whether the municipalities programmes and plans as provided in the IDP 
are having their intended objectives; 
• To assess whether municipal services are being delivered in a sustainable way; 
• To establishing whether capital projects as indicated in the IDP are met; 
• To ensure that the municipality communicate with their constituencies and involve 
members of local communities in the affairs of the municipality.   
 
Raga et al. (2011:158) agrees that local government legislation requires that members of local 
communities are required to participate in the preparation, adoption, implementation and 
review of the municipalities IDP and budgetary processes. The voices of citizens must be heard, 
and their input must feed into the IDP and budgetary processes of the municipality.  Thus, ward 
committees have a significant role to fulfil in conveying the needs of local communities and to 
ensure that their needs are adopted in the municipalities IDP and met by their respective 
municipal councils.     
 
The Presidency (2015:21) states that government established many forums and other 
participatory means to involve citizens in decision-making process such as ward committees 
and the Community Development Worker Programme (CDWP), which uses workers drawn 
from the community to assist citizens in accessing government services. Community 
Development workers (CDWs) and ward committees must be involved in the preparation, 
implementation and review of the municipalities IDP, budgetary processes and performance 
management systems.   
 
Raga et al.  (2011:158) point out that despite good intentions of government policies and 
legislation, to promote participatory governance through ward committee a concern is that 
delegation powers to ward committees are limited.  Therefore, ward committees do not have 
many decision-making powers, which limits their capacity to consult and to participate 
effectively with ward members of the municipal area.  Sikhakane and Reddy (2011:96) concur 
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that like any other participatory structure ward committees experience certain challenges to 
promote citizen accountability such as the following: 
 
• Participatory structures such as ward committees are still in the developmental stages 
and there are still challenges such as that communities do not know how to 
constructively engage with government.  One could argue that local communities still 
focuses on public protest rather than use participatory structures such as ward 
committees to engage with municipal councils; 
• Some local communities have low levels of education and cannot comprehend 
effectively on certain technical aspects and decisions which could prevent them to make 
meaningful contributions; 
• Ward committee members are reluctant to participate on a voluntary basis; and   
• Capacity building remains a challenge.  The municipality is responsible to ensure that 
ward committees are capacitated, and they must provide guidance and resourcing to 
promote effective citizen participation in the affairs of local government.   
 
As consultative advisory committees, ward committees fulfil a crucial linkage between the 
local community and the municipal council, the executive committee, the executive mayor or 
the relevant metropolitan sub-council.  Ward committees also fulfil a critical role to ensure 
citizen accountability by promoting citizen participation and to make recommendations on any 
matter affecting their wards.   However, a concern is that ward committees have limited 
decision-making powers.  The latter could limit the capacity of ward committees to consult and 
to participate effectively with ward members of the municipal area.       
  
Kahn et al. (2016:179) maintain that community surveys and other assessments identified a 
number of challenges with the functioning of ward committees.  The lack of clarity of the roles 
of the ward committees and the availability of resources to conduct their activities effectively 
are some of the challenges that were identified.   Other challenges include difficulties by the 
poor to participate in the activities of ward committees, poor representatively, poor election 
procedures, and the failure of ward councillors to attend to ward committee meetings on a 
regular basis.  Madumo (2014:139) argues that ward committees were established with the aim 
to enhance community participation in municipalities, however the efficacy through which the 
ward committees achieve this aim is doubtful.  Ward committees are lacking executive 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
256 
 
authority or power, the capacity to promote genuine community participation, clarity about 
their responsibilities and political stability.  Except for these challenges, Raga et al. (2011:162) 
point out that the findings of a study point out that the ward committee system is not functioning 
properly to promote public participation in government.   
 
Notwithstanding the above challenges ward committees fulfil and important role in 
municipalities, and if they are function effectively, ward committees could be effective and 
used in determining the needs and concerns of local communities. For ward committees to 
promote participatory governance and accountable local governance, it is imperative that they 
serve as a platform for local communities to raise their concerns and influence municipal 
policies that affect them. Ward committees should also seek answers from functionaries to hold 
them to account for their policies, decisions and actions. This will ensure that ward committees 
are function properly and that worthwhile contributions are made by the local community and 
will further enhance community participation in decision-making processes of the 
municipality.     
 
It can be inferred from the above that ward committees fulfil a critical important role to enhance 
community participation in the affairs of the municipality. It was emphasised that ward 
committees as the link between citizens and the municipal council should fulfil an important 
role to hold functionaries to account.  However, it appears that local communities in the Free 
State province failed to hold municipalities and functionaries to account for their poor 
performance, including poor financial performance, decisions and actions. It is confirmed by 
the Auditor-General (AGSA 2018:4) report of 2017-2018 that the financial performance and 
administrative control measures of all municipalities (100%) in the Free State province had 
deteriorated. The continued lack of accountability and leadership contributes to the 
development of a culture of no consequences in all municipalities in the Free State province.  
Social accountability should be promoted through citizen participation in participatory 
structures such as ward committees.  Thus, ward committees fulfil a key role to promote 
participatory democracy in local government.  
 
5.11.4 Traditional leaders 
 
According to Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:140-141), Section 211 of the Constitution, 1996 
provides that the institution, the status and role of traditional leaders are recognised, subject to 
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the Constitution, 1996.  Section 21(2) thereof provides that national or provincial legislation 
may provide for the establishment of houses of traditional leaders.   Section 21 of the 
Constitution, 1996, further provides that traditional leaders should fulfil an important role at 
local sphere concerning matters affecting local communities.  According to Van der Waldt et 
al. (2014:42), the task of participatory local government and democracy requires the 
participation of all leaders including elected religious and traditional leaders.  Therefore, 
municipalities should make provision to include traditional leaders in various policy 
development processes and programmes.    
 
According to Municipal Structures Act, 1998, Section 81(1), traditional authorities that 
traditionally observe a system of customary law in the area of a municipality, may participate 
through their leaders, in the proceedings of the council of that municipality, and those 
traditional leaders must be allowed to attend and participate in any meeting of the council. 
Section 81(3) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 further indicates that before a municipal 
council takes a decision on any matter directly affecting the area of a traditional authority, the 
council must give the leader of that authority the opportunity to express a view on that matter. 
However, it should be noted that the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 does not outline a clear 
accountability and oversight roles of traditional leaders in the municipal council. Section 
81(4)(b) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, only indicates that the MEC for local 
government in a province, after consulting the provincial House of Traditional Leaders, may 
by notice in the Provincial Gazette, prescribe a role for traditional leaders in the affairs of a 
municipality. 
 
Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:140-141) further avers that Section 5 of the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Act 41 of 2002) state that traditional leaders 
should be part of democratic leadership and governance structures in local government. It 
entails that traditional leaders should facilitate community participation regarding service 
delivery and policy decisions affecting rural communities.  Section 4 of the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2002 states that the functions of traditional 
councils are to support municipalities in identifying community needs, to make 
recommendations appropriate interventions that will contribute to development and service 
delivery in the area of jurisdiction of the traditional councils, and to participate in the 
development of policies and by-laws of the municipality.   Thus, traditional leaders should play 
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an important role to promote co-operative government, sustainable development and service 
delivery. 
 
Kahn et al. (2016:180-181) are of the view that the following challenges were identified on the 
role of traditional leaders and their responsibility to work together with municipalities; lack of 
clear understanding of the roles of both institutions; getting all role players to work together; 
reconstitution of all traditional councils in accordance with legislation; execution of the 
Capacitation Programme for all traditional leaders and traditional councils; inclusion of 
traditional leaders in ward committees; creation of a clear understanding of the status and roles 
of both municipalities and traditional institutions; and provision of resources to traditional 
councils to be able to perform their customary and statutory functions and co-operation with 
municipalities.  Thus, municipalities should harness the capacity of traditional leaders in the 
local developmental effort.  Municipalities should find ways to involve traditional leaders more 
effectively in planning and other developmental issues.  Kahn et al. (2016:182) further contend 
that municipalities should consult with traditional leaders and allow them to serve as ex-officio 
members of ward committees to enhance the participation of traditional leaders in local 
government. 
 
5.11.5 Open municipal council meetings and councillors 
 
In terms of Section 22 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 a metropolitan and a municipal 
council consist of a determined number of councillors. Section 157 of the Constitution, 1996 
provides that the municipal council consist of elected ward councillors and councillors 
nominated in terms of proportional representation on the basis of the number of votes cast in 
favour of their specific part in relation to the total number of votes. This means that a specific 
number of councillors are elected in accordance with the number of wards in its area of 
jurisdiction. An equal number of councillors must represent the various parties proportionally 
depending on the percentage of votes attained by the party during the general elections in the 
area. 
 
Municipal councillors are elected political representatives of local communities in a 
municipality (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:63-64. Therefore, they have the responsibility and 
accountability, as elected representatives, to govern on behalf of, and in the interest of citizens.  
The roles of municipal councillors are guided by the framework set out in the WPLG (1998:42-
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44) that proposes a developmental model of local government.  This means that municipal 
councillors must be familiar with how the local government is structured in order to operate. 
 
In order to effectively achieve the objectives of local government municipal councils are 
required to manage and structure their administration, budgeting and planning processes in 
such a manner that they are prioritising the needs of the community, that they ensure social and 
economic growth within their constituencies and to ensure the promotion of national and 
provincial development programmes including the promotion of the national development 
plans (SALGA, 2011:9). 
 
According to the WPLG (1998:40), municipal councils play a central role in the promotion of 
local democracy.  As such municipal councillors should promote the involvement of its 
communities and community groups in the design and delivery of its municipal programmes.   
In terms of Section 152(i)(e) of the Constitution, 1996 municipalities have to encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government.    
 
The open meeting requirements in Section 19 of the MSA, 2000, seem to go far enough to 
ensure that municipal meetings do not take place away from public scrutiny, thereby facilitating 
the accountability of local representatives to the public. The MSA, 2000, provides a clear 
obligation on the municipal manger to provide the public with notice that sets out the date, time 
and venue of all meetings (Community Law Centre, 2008:2).  Section 19(2) of the MSA, 2000 
provides that the municipal council may not exclude the public, including the media, when 
considering voting on any of the following matters; a draft by-law tabled in the council; a 
budget tabled in the council; the draft IDP, or any amendment of the IDP; the draft performance 
management plan, or any amendment of the plan tabled in council; the decision to enter into a 
service delivery agreement; or any other matter prescribed by regulation.            
 
The duty to conduct council meeting in public is one such type of accountability and oversight 
tool. The increasing expansion of the concept of accountability and its application is also 
accompanied with the introduction of new tools and instruments that are essential to promote 
accountability and oversight. With the expansion of the concept of accountability came, for 
example, the institutionalisation of performance measures and reports designed to provide 
more systematic information on government results. A final aspect of accountability and 
oversight relates to the extent to which the stakeholders in the accountability and oversight 
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system, which includes politicians, bureaucrats, political parties and civil society, are taking 
proper ownership of system. (Community Law Centre, 2008:9). 
 
5.11.6 Other mechanisms for consultation, participation and to provide information    
 
Another mechanism which does not directly establish public or social accountability but can 
be an important element to promote accountability is the flow of information about the 
performance of local government (Community Law Centre, 2008:9).  In terms of Section 20 
of the MSA, 2000, the meetings of the municipal council and its committees that discusses or 
votes on matters such as by-laws, budgets, amendments to the IDP, the performance 
management system and service delivery agreements must be open to the public and the media. 
All municipal council meetings in which the annual report of a municipality is discussed, or 
any decision taken about the annual report must be open to the public. In this way, 
municipalities’ accountability to the community for decisions made in the year under review is 
promoted.         
 
Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000:112) describe that direct participation means the empowerment 
of all citizens in such a manner as to allow them to articulate their will and their needs directly 
to political representative and public officials. This demands delimitation of small subunits for 
representation within the national, provincial and municipal boundaries. These are 
geographical constituencies and wards. The mechanisms through which locally elected 
representatives can be accountable to the public include, among other things, elections, public 
meetings and formal grievance procedures (Community Law Centre, 2008:2).  The use of the 
mass media, pressure groups and consultative groups has gained some credence in making 
functionaries accountable for their actions in the course of performing their duties. The mass 
media specifically the media and local newspapers have been in the forefront of revealing the 
various mismanagements committed by corrupt officials (Asha, 2014:400). 
 
5.12 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE MUNICIPAL INTEGRATED 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN (IDP) 
 
According to Sirovha and Thornhill (2017:148), the extensive impact of the IDP on the local 
community, participation is of critical importance.  One mechanism to ensure community 
participation is the IDP forum.  The IDP forum provides a structure for discussions, 
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negotiations, joint decision-making and participation in the planning and implementation 
process of the municipalities IDP processes (DPLG, IDP Guide Pack VI, 2000:120-123).   Van 
der Waldt et al. (2007:105) state that the following members should form part of the 
municipalities IDP Forum:  
 
• Members of the municipalities IDP committee; 
• Municipal councillors, including various districts council members; 
• Traditional leaders within the community; 
• Members of the ward committee; 
• MM and senior municipal officials;  
• Representatives from community group such as NGOs and CBOs; 
• Any other appropriate citizen representatives. 
 
Except for the IDP forums Meyer and Venter (2013:100) aver that ward committees serve as a 
mobilising agent for community action, through the IDP process and the municipalities’ 
budgetary process.   In terms of Section 16 of the MSA of 2000 the local community must take 
part in the preparation, implementation and review of the municipalities IDP. This mandated 
all municipalities to involve members of the local community to participate in the 
municipalities IDP processes.   
 
According to Mathane (2013:132) and Davids and Theron (2014:135-136), the community 
must participate in the different phases of the IDP namely, the analysis, strategy, programme 
and projects, integration and approval phases, which were discussed sections below. 
 
5.12.1 Phase 1. The situation analysis phase 
 
During Phase 1 (the situation analysis phase), the municipality identifies the needs and 
priorities of the community by involving local communities through an interactive 
participatory process. The situation analysis phase provides an opportunity to the local 
community to inform the municipality about their developmental needs. The municipality 
should engage with local communities through community meetings with IDP forum, ward 
committee or combined ward committee and ward meetings, sectoral engagements, stakeholder 
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meetings, surveys and opinion polls to collect information from members of the community 
about their developmental challenges and needs (Mathane, 2013:132-133; Davids and Theron). 
 
5.12.2   Phase 2:  Strategies to define local vision and the objectives phase 
 
During phase 2 (the strategy phase), the municipality review its vision, development objectives, 
strategies and appropriate various projects that it wishes to achieve.  It is important that the 
community supports the vision and strategic objectives of the municipality.  Therefore, the 
vision of the municipality should not merely be imposed upon local communities by the 
municipality (Tshabalala, 2006:62; Mathane, 2013:133-134). 
 
Van der Waldt et al. (2018:122) state that the vision is a roadmap of what a municipality wants 
to achieve in the future.  In order to achieve the vision, the municipality has to formulate 
objectives that serve as statements of what the municipality wants to achieve in the medium 
term to address its challenges. Thereafter, they should formulate specific strategies to achieve 
its objectives. At this stage the municipality should consult with the local community and allow 
them to debate on the appropriate strategies.  Community participation during this phase should 
take part through IDP forums, ward committee and organised community groups such as NGOs 
and CBOs (Tshabalala, 2006:62; Mathane, 2013:134).  
 
5.12.3 Phase 3:  The project phase 
 
According to Davids and Theron (2014:136), the municipality has to identify and design 
programmes and projects per strategy which are aligned with the developmental needs and 
priorities of the community as well as the identified main objectives that were identified in the 
previous phases. The local community should engagement with local communities by 
arranging meetings with relevant representatives and stakeholders on project sub-committees. 
During this phase the municipality should review its programmes and projects, finalise the draft 
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5.12.4 Phase 4: The integration phase 
 
According to Mathane (2013:134-135) the municipality has to ensure that the programmes and 
projects are linked to the main objectives, strategies and available resources of the municipality.  
Tshabalala (2006:64) states that during this phase the municipality has to consolidate its 
strategies with the integrated sectoral programmes.  These include the municipalities’ Local 
Economic Development Programme (LED), HIV/AIDS programme, environmental program, 
integrated institutional plan, the 5-year financial plan, the 5-year capital investment 
programme, Spatial Development Framework and its consolidated monitoring and 
performance management system.  During this phase the municipality has to arrange 
interdepartmental planning sessions, and IDP Indaba’s involving provincial government.  
Community participation takes place through the IDP forum meetings. 
 
5.12.5 Phase 5: Approval of the municipality’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 
 
Section 25 of the MSA of 2000 requires that the community must be given an opportunity to 
comment on the draft IDP of the municipalities within 14 days of the adoption its IDP. After 
the municipality amends its IDP by incorporating the input from the community, the municipal 
council must consider the IDP for approval. Thus, all relevant stakeholders and interested 
parties, including provincial government, must be granted the opportunity to comment on the 
draft IDP.    
 
From the above it can be deduced that community participation in all phases of the IDP process 
is an important mechanism to promote participatory governance and social accountability.  
Therefore, effective community participation of communities is required in all processes of 
IDP, mainly in identification of needs and priorities, strategy formulation, project 
implementation and monitoring and evaluation of achievements.  
 
5.13 CURRENT CHALLENGES CONCERNING PARTICIPATORY LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Despite numerous local government legislative and policy framework and community 
participation mechanisms to promote participatory governance and social accountability, the 
success of these prescripts and mechanism to effectively promote community participation and 
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social accountability remains a concern. Kroukamp (2016:110-116) contends that a lack of 
engagement with local communities and community organisations leads to a lack of 
accountability and responsibility of functionaries, undermines participatory democracy and 
community participation.   Furthermore, citizens are losing confidence in local government.   
Protest and violent confrontations about service delivery and continued underperformance of 
municipalities have become a regular occurrence throughout the country. The Auditor-General 
audit report of 2017-2018 (AGSA, 2019:27) indicates that service delivery protests have 
become a regular occurrence in municipalities in South Africa, with KwaZula-Natal, leading 
in the number of municipalities affected, followed by the Free State and the Eastern Cape. 
Thornhill (2009:43) warns that the future of local government in a developmental state has 
become uncertain. A concern is that citizens are often not consulted effectively or excluded 
from local policy making that undermines their constitutional rights. Municipalities are 
mandated to involve members of community and community organisations in the matters of 
local government.  Citizens should be afforded opportunities to raise their views, concerns, and 
needs and they must be certain that their issues will be accommodated in local policies.   Mavee 
(2014:216) argues that community participation is the key principle of participatory 
governance. Community participation not only empower local communities, it promotes 
accountability of elected political officials, delivery of services, formulation of policies and 
developmental initiatives.    
 
Asha, Belete and Moyo (2014:259) point out that a study that was conducted in Stellenbosch 
municipality, Dwars River Valley, during 2010, to assess the effectiveness of the participatory 
planning model showed that one of the key reasons for the ineffectiveness of its IDP in the area 
was the failure the community participation process and practices.  Community members must 
be afforded opportunities to actively participated in the municipality’s decision-making 
process, preparation of the IDP and budgetary processes, implementation of developmental 
projects, monitoring and evaluation to hold functionaries to account for their decisions.  
 
Asha (2014:398) indicates that participatory local planning and implementation of 
development initiatives is crucial for improving quality of life at grass root level. It has been 
noted that many South African local authorities have been producing IDPs, in order to comply 
with the policy and legal requirements. However, the poor planning and implementation of 
development initiatives is the biggest challenge in South Africa. Therefore, development 
organisations should critically assess their process of formulating and implementing 
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programmes and policies towards improving people’s quality of life. If the goal of development 
is to reduce poverty and deprivation, then development planning and implementation should 
be process-oriented, people-focused, institution-centred, and based on strategic decisions 
(Asha, 2014:398). 
 
Lack of administrative capacity, community trust or the constraining effects of poverty can 
further limit the success of social accountability projects, requiring due attention in project 
design and implementation. The challenges facing social accountability are however not solely 
practical in nature but also question the underlying assumptions and universal applicability of 
the model. This not only necessitates a deeper understanding of the contextual factors shaping 
the incentives of citizens to participate, but also an awareness of the limitations of the model’s 
applicability (Camargo and Jacobs, 2013:10). 
 
Asha (2014:400) stresses that another challenge is that lack of alignment in development 
processes in South Africa. The main challenge lies in poor translation of national development 
policies and plans into local contexts. It is related to the concern that whether national and 
provincial priorities are reflected in the municipal IDPs. Many municipalities are also 
experiencing shortage of capacity in terms of managing the process of integrated development. 
Because of this problem, small and rural based municipalities were compelled to outsource 
planning aspects to external consultants. This had caused chaos in relation to municipal 
expenses and the actual planning processes because consultants did not have adequate 
knowledge and understanding about the local situation. Though municipalities significantly 
reduced dependency on external consultants, IDP processes continue to show inadequate 
improvement in terms of meaningful participation of public in the decision-making process 
(Asha, 2014:400). 
 
The other concern is related to the implementation of IDPs. The violent service delivery 
protests are an indication of the failure of local governments to achieve their development 
mandates. Studies have further indicated that the implementation of programmes and projects 
has been inadequate, slow, had limited impact on lives of beneficiaries, and generally lacks 
sustainability (Asha, 2014:400). The failure of municipal development programmes and 
projects has contributed to violent service delivery protests across the country from 
communities angry at the slow pace of service delivery (Asha, 2014:400). The overall situation 
indicates that local governments, especially in rural areas have been weak in terms of 
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responding to the critical needs of the community at large. It also appears that the support 
measures taken so far by national and provincial Sphere were inadequate, in relation to the 
magnitude of challenges that local governments are facing towards achieving their 
developmental mandates.  
 
Mashamaite and Madzivhandila (2014:227) aver that most community members are not 
sufficiently informed on how to participate meaningfully in the affairs of the municipality.  
This makes municipal councillors and officials less willing to consider the views of local 
communities.  Another concern is that the majority of community members are not clear 
about the role of a municipality. According to Mashamaite and Madzivhandila (2014:227), 
the question may be asked whether the community is really capacitated to participate in 
municipal matters that have an impact on their lives.  Another concern is that a large 
proportion of the population do not vote, due to a lack of personal interest. Another 
contributing factor to the failure of effective participation is that the policies and by-laws of 
local government is not clearly understood by some of the illiterate citizens.  The lack of 
effective community participation in the affairs of the municipality hampers effective 
accountability to hold the functionaries to account.  On the other hand, a general dislike for 
and suspicion about community participation exists among functionaries, which further 
undermines social accountability.   Thus, the lack of effective participation by members of 
local communities, undermines social accountability to ensure that functionaries are 
accountable to the community they serve.  
 
 Except for the above, Sikhakane and Reddy (2011:96) mentioned that the following challenges 
concerning ward committees’ hampers accountability.   Firstly, there is a tendency that citizens 
do not know how to engage constructively with municipalities and development agencies.  
Some community members are not even aware that they are the backbone of development 
initiatives in their areas.  Thus, inadequate capacity building and information sharing and 
guidance on the side of municipalities hampers the function of ward committees.   One could 
argue that municipalities do not inform community members about the purpose of their 
participatory structures such as ward committees and community participatory forums that 
hinders meaningful participation.   The low levels of education of some communities make it 
difficult for them to comprehend effectively and to take part in decision that prevent them from 
making contributions. Baccus and Hicks (2008:534) are of the opinion that another concern is 
that community participation is voluntary, expensive and time consuming which requires some 
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commitment from community members to engage with the municipality through participatory 
structures such as ward committees.  The current high levels of poverty and unemployment in 
particular rural areas creates high expectations of employment. These people realised that 
community work is voluntary and that their specific expectations of employment should not be 
realised. Van der Waldt et al. (2018:123) are of the view that municipal councils must have 
approved strategies in place to promote community participation and social accountability. 
Thus, municipalities should devise proper information sharing and participation strategies, to 
ensure that communities are involved in the affairs of local government to promote social 
accountability through participatory structures such as the ward committees and community 
participatory forums. 
In light of the above, the continued poor performance of municipalities and in particular all 
municipalities in the Free State province raises a serious concern about the quality of 
community participation efforts to hold functionaries to account for their actions, decisions and 
policies.   The Auditor-General confirms in the report for 2017-2018 (AGSA 2019:4) that the 
deterioration of all municipalities in the Free State province is due to a total breakdown in 
controls and poor leadership responses towards improving accountability, capacity and 
stability. The deterioration of all municipalities (100%) financial position in the province is an 




This chapter dealt with administrative oversight and accountability and social accountability 
of local government.  The discussion showed that a comprehensive set of legislative framework 
and policies make provision for administrative oversight and accountability of local 
government.  It was emphasised that in terms of Section 51 of the MSA, 2000 states that the 
MM of a municipality is accountable for the overall performance and administration of the 
municipality. The discussion showed that apart from the accountable functions of the municipal 
council and MMs, there are also portfolio committees and political officials who must fulfil 
the functions of oversight of municipal administration to ensure that municipalities are able to 
meet their constitutional obligations. In this regard the executive mayor and mayoral committee 
is responsible to oversee the administration of the municipality to ensure effectiveness and 
efficiency in service delivery. Portfolio committees such as Section 80 and Section 79 
committees in terms of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, are significant structures to promote 
oversight of the municipal council.  It was emphasised that the MPAC, as a Section 79 portfolio 
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committee, is one of the key oversight mechanisms that assist the municipal council to hold the 
executive and municipal administration to account and to ensure efficient and effective use of 
municipal resources.   
 
It was further emphasised that national strategies and interventions such as the LGTAS and the 
latest Back-to-Basics campaign failed to yield the required results. Except for the above 
national strategies SALGA also introduced numerous programmes such as the Councillor 
Induction Programme and the Municipal Audit Support Programme (MASP) to improve 
municipal leadership, governance, administration, institutional capacity and financial 
management practices. It was highlighted that these interventions failed to yield the required 
results to improve the financial, administrative performance of most municipalities.  This was 
confirmed by the Auditor-General, report for 2016-2017 (AGSA, 2017:1) which raised 
concerns that accountability and the need for appropriate consequences for accountability 
failures who still featured as prominent element of failures in most municipalities. A concern 
was raised about the continued lack of accountability and leadership failures of the Free State 
municipalities. It was argued that national and provincial governments are obligated by 
constitutional prescripts to support local government particularly in struggling municipalities.  
The numerous service delivery protest engulfing most municipalities may necessitate the need 
for national government to revisit national interventions to restore the performance and public 
confidence in most municipalities. 
 
It was highlighted in the chapter that the MM (as the accounting officer and head of the 
municipality’s administration) must ensure that proper administrative arrangements are in 
place to promote accountability of the administrative function of the municipality.  It means 
that there must be consequences if a MM failed to give effect to his/her responsibilities, that 
should result in the removal of the MM from office.  The MM as the accounting officer can 
personally be held accountable for any loss of allocated funds or assets as a result of any 
deficiency in the administrative or managerial arrangements of the municipality. Failure to give 
effect to assigned responsibilities should result in the removal of the MM from office.  Another 
concern as emphasised in the chapter is that most municipalities fail to comply with SCM 
legislative frameworks, and these defaulters have not been held accountable for their actions.  
Municipal SCM practitioners who forms part of the municipality administration have defaulted 
in SCM processes without any action being taken against them.  It was argued that there is an 
urgent need to rethink innovative ways of curbing corruption and other administrative 
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malpractices within municipalities.  Many administrative municipal officials lack appropriate 
knowledge for proper implementation of SCM legislation.  It was mentioned that the above 
issues create confusion for administrative staff responsible for SCM in municipalities and it 
inhibits proper implementation, which could lead to poor service delivery.   
 
A concern was further raised of the various mechanisms and internal controls to promote 
administrative accountability to keep the functionaries (political and public officials) under 
surveillance and in check. The accountability of municipal officials to the elected 
representatives (political officials) is based on the premise that the elected representatives are 
accountable to local communities and therefore, municipal employees must be answerable to 
elected representatives. It was emphasised that there are different institutional arrangements 
and mechanisms by which municipal officials responsible for the administration of local 
municipalities can be held accountable by the elected representatives. The SDBIP as an 
implementation plan of the municipalities IDP and budget serves also as a tool to promote 
oversight and accountability to ensure that a municipality to deliver on its constitutional and 
developmental mandates.  It was mentioned that performance measurement is seen as an 
administrative control mechanism to assign internal and external accountability.  Other 
mechanisms that was emphasised include the mid-year budget and performance assessment 
report.  It was mentioned that these are useful mechanism to ensure that the mayor or executive 
mayor of the municipality exercise his or her oversight role regarding the municipal 
administration.  In terms of Section 72(1(a) of the MFMA, 2003 the MM of a municipality has 
to assess the performance of the municipality by taking into consideration the monthly budget 
statements, the service delivery performance indicators and targets as well as the previous 
annual report and progress on previous challenges that were identified.  
 
It was emphasised that the following must be in place to promote administrative accountability 
in the municipality such as; strong ethical leadership in the administrative, financial and SCM 
practices in municipalities is critical important; sufficient human and financial resources to 
assist in the implementation of the municipalities administration and financial management 
systems; and to ensure that there is effective co-ordination of capacity building opportunities; 
filling of key vacancies within the municipality must be an imperative to ensure sound 
administrative and financial management; budgetary and spending processes must be aligned 
with the IDP; and the involvement of local communities is an imperative to promote 
administrative and social accountability.     
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In the discussion about social accountability it was emphasised that in terms of Section 15(2)(e) 
of the Constitution, 1996 local communities and community organisations must be encouraged 
to participate in the affairs of local government. Section 16 of the MSA, 2000 mandates 
municipalities to establish systems to promote participatory governance. The elective 
representatives are accountable to the local communities and therefore, municipal officials 
responsible for municipal administration must be accountable and answerable to the elected 
representatives. It was further highlighted in the discussion that in order to promote public or 
social accountability it is an imperative that local communities should participate in the 
preparation, implementation and reviewing of its IDP and budgetary processes; monitoring and 
review of the municipal performance, and to involve the local community in any strategic 
decisions related to the provision of municipal services and developmental issues that will 
affect them.  The discussion emphasised that mere involvement of citizens in the affairs of 
local government does not necessary constitute social accountability. Social accountability 
requires that community participation in the affairs of local governments must take part through 
established structures and mechanisms for participation such as sub-councils or ward 
committees.    
 
It was emphasised in the discussion about ward committees that despite of the good intentions 
of government policies and legislation, to promote participatory governance through ward 
committee a concern is that delegation powers to ward committees are limited.  It was 
mentioned that the latter means that ward committees do not have much decision-making 
powers, which limits their capacity to consult and to participate effectively with ward members 
of the municipal area.    It was further argued that ward committees were established with the 
aim to enhance community participation in municipalities, however the efficacy through which 
the ward committees achieve this aim is doubtful.  It was further argued that it seems that ward 
committees in the Free State province fail to hold municipalities and functionaries to account 
for their poor performance, including poor financial performance, decisions and actions.  This 
is confirmed by the Auditor-General, report for 2017-2018 (AGSA, 2019:4) that the financial 
performance and administrative control measures of all municipalities (100%) in the Free State 
province deteriorated.  The continued lack of accountability and leadership contributes to the 
development of a culture of no consequences in all municipalities in the Free State province. 
 
In the next chapter the research methodology, design and findings of results of the empirical 
study was discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DESIGN AND FINDINGS OF 




The preceding chapters outlined the theoretical framework for the study.  An in-depth 
descriptive literature study supported by an empirical study were conducted, with the aim of 
achieving the research objectives and answering the research problem outlined in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.10.2 and section 1.11.2 respectively.   
 
This chapter seeks to articulate the processes involved in conducting research.  The main aim 
of the study as provided in Chapter 1, Section, 1.11.1 was to positively contribute to instituted 
oversight and accountability in municipalities of the Free State province by developing a 
framework for oversight and accountability.  The information obtained from the theoretical 
framework (Literature study) was used to draw up a structured questionnaire and a semi-
structured interview schedule, which were used in dealing with the data that was captured for 
this study. This chapter examines the research design, methodology, and approaches used in 
dealing with the data that was captured for this study. All data obtained was obtained from the 
completed research questionnaire distributed to the MMs, CFOs and mayors or executive 
mayors to collect information concerning the practice of oversight and accountability within 
municipalities.  Data was also obtained from conducting semi-structured interviews (Interview 
schedule) with the representatives from the ward committees of the selected local 
municipalities concerning social accountability through public participation.  The chapter 
further presents a statement of the findings and an analysis of data obtained from the structured 
questionnaire and the interviews at selected local municipalities.  The research methodology, 
and design was outlined in the next section, followed by a discussion on the research population 
and sampling, research instrument, data collection, data analysis.  The findings and results of 
the data analysis both instruments were provided.    
 
6.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
In this study, a comprehensive descriptive and post-positivism or interpretive paradigm 
(qualitative research) was applied by answering the research questions for this study. 
According to Terblanche, Durrheim and Painter (2006:561), research methodology refers to 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
272 
 
the procedures used in the research to create new knowledge. Babbie and Mouton (2001:647) 
observe that research methodology refers to the methods, procedures and techniques that were 
utilised in the process of implementing the research design. According to Webb and 
Auriacombe (2006:591), social scientists select appropriate techniques and methods to enable 
them to carry out their research task. While a research method refers to the means required to 
execute a certain stage of the research process, such as data collection methods.  Research 
techniques refer to the variety of tools that can be used when data is collected, such as 
questionnaires, interviews and observation. Webb and Auriacombe (2006:591) affirm that 
these techniques and methods are distinctively linked to quantitative or qualitative approaches.   
 
Maree et al. (2017:40) summarise the purpose of qualitative research as that of describing 
and understanding a distinct phenomenon within its context with the intention of developing 
an understanding of the meanings revealed by the respondents. Welman et al. (2008:188) 
state that qualitative research can be described as an approach rather than a particular design. 
Welman et al. (2008:188) are of the opinion that the qualitative approach is fundamentally 
a descriptive form of research.   This study followed a qualitative research approach to collect 
data about the research topic.   
 
A qualitative research design refers to a plan or strategy which needs to be followed to answer 
the research questions (Bless, et al.  2014:130).  Babbie and Mouton (2001:647) agrees by 
defining research design as a plan or structured framework of how a researcher intend to 
conduct the research process in order to solve the research problem. Nkatini (2005:28) explains 
that a research design refers to a plan which a researcher draws up when he/she embarks on a 
research project. This plan shows a step-by-step progression of the project, from the beginning 
to the end, including the type of research that is being undertaken, the data collection and data 
analysing methods that will be used to answer the research questions. In qualitative research 
the following research designs narrative studies, phenomenology, grounded theory, 
ethnography or case study designs can be used (Creswell et al. 2016:75-76; Du Plooy-Cilliers, 
et al. 2014:175-178).  Whereas, Salkind concurs that (2018:20) there are two types of research 
non-experimental (qualitative) and experimental research (quantitative) of which the most 
popular non-experimental research designs are grounded theory, case study, ethnography and 
historical research designs.  According to Zainal (2007:3), there are three types of case studies 
namely exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case studies. In Chapter 1, section 1.13.4 it 
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was mentioned that this study was based on a descriptive case study design. A case study design 
recounts a real-life context or situation by describing the specific circumstances of a specific 
occurrence or trend.   A descriptive case study design describes an intervention or phenomenon 
and the real-life context in which it occurred.      A case study design recounts a real-life context 
or situation by describing the specific circumstances of a specific occurrence or trend.   A 
descriptive case study design describes an intervention or phenomenon and the real-life context 
in which it occurred.     
6.3 Research population and sampling 
According to Bless et al. (2014:163), the entire set of objects about which the researcher wants 
to determine some characteristics is called the research population. In this study the research 
population comprised the municipalities in the Free State province, namely; Mangaung 
Metropolitan Municipality, the four district municipalities, and the eighteen local 
municipalities within the Free State province. 
Sampling is defined as the process of choosing a small group of respondents from a larger, 
defined target population. The idea is that the results discovered about the small group will 
allow the researcher to draw conclusions relating to the larger group (Hair, Bush and Ortinau, 
2003:3-33; Bless et al. 2014:162). In qualitative studies such as in this study there are no rules 
for the sampling size.  In qualitative studies, the sample size depends rather on what the 
researcher wants to determine, the purpose of the inquiry, what is credible and what can be 
done with available resources and time (Maree et al. 2017:84).   
 
Nkatini (2005:38) believes that sampling should be understood as a technical measurement that 
is used to explain how specific information is selected from which data may be drawn. 
Sampling can be done by using either probability sampling methods (quantitative studies) and 
non-probability sampling methods (qualitative studies).  While, Maree et al.  (2017: 197-198) 
indicate that non-probability sampling methods includes convenience sampling, quota 
sampling, snowball sampling and purpose sampling.  
 
Convenience sampling can be used when the sampling is selected on the grounds that elements 
of the population are easily and conveniently available (Maree et al. 2017:197). Nkatini 
(2005:39) further provides that in accidental/availability/convenience sampling, the researcher 
may visit a designated place where people of different classes will be available. The researcher 
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may then starts collecting samples from those people who are easily available, until the 
researcher reaches the required size of the study. In this way the researcher saved money and 
time, but it is risky to rely on samples that have been collected in this way in that their 
representativeness is questionable. Quota sampling refers to a sampling method where the 
researcher identifies quotas of the required number of people from the various categories of 
people that must be in the sample (Maree et al., 2017:197-198).  In quota sampling the 
researcher works out the number of elements from whom data must be collected and conducts 
the research in terms of the accidental procedure (Nkatini, 2005:39). Snowball sampling refers 
to cases where the population is difficult to find.  The researcher contacts people from the 
population and asks for more information about others with the same characteristics who can 
be contacted next (Maree et al. 2017:198). Lastly, purposive or judgemental sampling refers 
relies on the judgement of the researcher to select the sample or elements within the target 
population (Nkatini, 2005:39). Bless et al. (2014:172) agrees that purposive sampling is based 
on the judgement of a researcher to choose the sample.   Thus, a sample is chosen based on the 
judgement of what the researcher considers to be typical units or characteristics of the 
population.    
 
In this study the researcher made use of the non-probability, purposive or judgemental sampling 
method to select a sample size of nine local municipalities, out of a total population of 18 local 
municipalities of the Free State province.  Except for the selected nine local municipalities all 
four district municipalities and the one metropolitan municipality in the Free State province 
forms part of the sampling.  In this study, the municipalities below form part of the sample to 
whom the self-administered semi-structured questionnaire was distributed to elicit information 
from the MMs, CFO, mayor or executive mayor of the one metropolitan municipality, the four 
district municipalities and nine of the 18 local municipalities in the Free State province, 
namely:     
  
• Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality 
• Xhariep District Municipality 
• Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
• Fezile Dabi District Municipality  
• Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipality 
• Mohokare Local Municipality 
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• Kopanong Local Municipality 
• Letsemeng Local municipality 
• Tokologo Local Municipality 
• Tswelopele Local Municipality 
• Nala Local Municipality 
• Moqhaka Local Municipality 
• Ngwathe Local Municipality 
• Metsimaholo Local Municipality 
In addition, the researcher used the convenience sampling method which is also a non- 
probability sampling method to select representatives from the ward committee members of 
two of the affiliated local municipalities of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality namely, 
Tokologo Local Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality to conduct the semi-
structured interviews. Convenience sampling means that elements of the population are 
selected because they are easily and conveniently available (Maree et al. 2017:197).   
 
6.4 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
 
In this study the self-administered semi-structured questionnaire consisted of open-ended and 
closed-ended questions was used to elicit information about oversight and accountability of 
municipalities in the Free State province. A five-point Likert scale was used in the closed ended 
questions. According to Du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis and Bezuidenhout (2014:159), a five-point 
Likert scale requires respondents to indicate whether they strongly agree (1), agree (2), don’t 
know (3) disagree (4) and strongly disagree (5) on the variety of questions or statements. The 
self-administered semi-structured questionnaire was disseminated to the selected 
municipalities in the Free State province as indicated in the sample.  A five- point Likert scale 
(1 for least satisfactory and 5 for most satisfactory) was used in the close-ended questions of 
the semi-structured questionnaire and the semi-structured interview schedule  
 
A semi-structured interview schedule was also used consisting of structured (closed-ended) 
and unstructured (open-ended) questions/statements to conduct semi-structured interviews 
with representatives from the ward committees of the two selected affiliated local 
municipalities Tokologo Local Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality of the 
Lejweleputswa District Municipality to identify the current challenges pertaining to public 
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participation and social accountability.  Wellman et al. (2005:167) state that an interview 
schedule or guide consists of a list of topics and aspects that have a bearing on the given theme 
and that the interviewer can raise during the interviews. 
 
6.4.1 Validity and Reliability  
 
Validity and reliability are key measures in quantitative research while trustworthiness is more 
applicable to qualitative research. According to Salkind (2018:105, validity measures whether 
an instrument such as a questionnaire measures what it supposed to measures.  In this regard 
Welman et al. (2005:142) maintain that validity is used to determine whether the findings 
reflect what was measured. Babbie and Mouton (2004:122) agree that the results of an 
instrument is valid when the results provide the precise meaning that it intended to measure.  
Salkind (2018:105) and Welman et al. (20015:142-144) point out that there are different types 
of validity, namely content, construct and criterion validity. Content validity intends to measure 
how well the various items represent the whole universe of items or all components of all items 
(Salkind, 2018:105). It implies that an instrument has a high content validity if it looks at the 
various components holistically, not neglecting any of the component of the instrument (Bless 
et al. 2014:230).  Face validity refers to the appearance of the research instrument.  Bless et al. 
(2014: 233) explains that if the research instrument is too simplistic, it could mean that the 
respondents will not take the research seriously.  The same is applicable if it appears too 
difficult, the respondents could give up even before they began completing the research 
instrument.   
 
This study focussed on qualitative research, however, the content validity of the semi-
structured questionnaire was assessed by asking an expert through the pilot study to assess if 
the items in particular of the closed-ended questions of both of the semi-structured 
questionnaire and the semi-structured interview schedule assessed what the researcher intends 
to assess.    
 
Reliability means that the results of any measuring instrument must be consistent whenever 
tests are repeated (Welman et al., 2005:145; Bless et al., 2014:222). In qualitative studies as in 
this study reliability and validity of data can be acquired through the concept of trustworthiness 
which are based on four thoughts, credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability 
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(Bless et al. 2014:236-237; Du Plooy-Cilliers et al., 2014:253-254).  Credibility implies that 
the research findings must be trustworthy.  In this study credibility refers to the extent to which 
the researcher interpreted the data provided by the respondents to provide valid and trustworthy 
findings (Maree et al. 2016:123; Du Plooy-Cilliers et al., 2014:258).  Confirmability entails 
that the data which were collected from the respondents supports the findings and 
interpretations of the researcher (Maree et al. 2016:125; Du Plooy-Cilliers et al., 2014:259).  
Transferability means that when the findings be applied to a similar situation it will deliver 
similar results (Du Plooy-Cilliers et al., 2014:258).  In this study, transferability refers to the 
extent to which the research findings can be generalised.   Lastly, dependability refers to the 
quality of the process of integration it means that the data that was collected and analysed and 
the theory that was generated in this study must support the findings and interpretations (Du 
Plooy-Cilliers et al., 2014:259). In this study, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was used as a 
reliability internal consistency method to determine whether the items, particularly the closed-
ended items, in both the semi-structured questionnaire and the interview schedule provided 
consistent information on a measurement scale or test as outlined in section 6.4.2 below.   
 
A pilot study was conducted by the Director-General of the Free State Provincial Government 
who is regarded an expert in the field of oversight and accountability to test the quality and 
appropriateness of the semi-structured questionnaire and the interview schedule.   Any 
inconsistencies, ambiguities and uncertainties regarding the instruments were corrected before 
the actual research was conducted.  The purpose of the pilot study was to ensure the reliability 
and trustworthiness of the semi-structured questionnaires and the interview schedule.   
 
6.4.2 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) 
 
Reliability of a measuring instruments such as the semi-structured questionnaire and the semi-
structured interview schedule which was used in this study was also determined by using an 
internal consistency method such as the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. As a reliability internal 
consistency method Cronbach’s alpha provides a measure of the extent to which the items on 
a measurement scale provide consistent information. According to Chetty (2015:175), the scale 
in Cronbach’s reliability test ranges from zero to one, which entails that scores close to one 
means that the instrument has high reliability, while scores close to zero means that the 
reliability of the instrument is very low. Gliem and Gliem (2003) outline the guidelines for the 
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interpretation of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient have been suggested and the following scale 
seems generally accepted by researchers: 
 
• 0.90 – high reliability 
• 0.80- moderate or good reliability 
• 0.70 – acceptable reliability 
• 0.5 – poor reliability 
• 0.4 – unacceptable reliability 
 
6.4.2.1. Results of the Cronbach’s alpha of the semi-structured questionnaire    
 
On Section B of the semi-structured questionnaire, a reliability analysis on the political 
oversight and accountability scale comprising of 11 statements consisted of 11 items results in 
a Cronbach's alpha (α) of 0.73. Items 1, 3, 6, 9, 10 and 11 were reversed for the analysis, so 
that the opposite is true. The scale had an acceptable internal consistency (α > 0.60). Most 
items appeared to be worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted. 
 
On Section C of the semi-structured questionnaire, a reliability analysis on the municipal 
financial oversight and accountability scale comprising of 12 statements consisted of 12 items 
results in a Cronbach's alpha (α) of 0.89. Items 7, 8, and 9 were reversed for the analysis, so 
that the opposite is true. The scale had an acceptable internal consistency (α > 0.60). Most 
items appeared to be worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted.  
 
On Section D of the semi-structured questionnaire, a reliability analysis on the municipal 
administrative oversight and accountability scale comprising of 5 statements consisted of 5 
items results in a Cronbach's alpha (α) of 0.85. The scale had an acceptable internal consistency 
(α > 0.60). Most items appeared to be worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha 
if deleted.  
 
On Section E of the semi-structured questionnaire, a reliability analysis on the municipal social 
oversight and accountability scale comprising of 6 statements consisting of 6 items results in a 
Cronbach's alpha (α) of 0.62. Item 5 was reversed for the analysis, so that the opposite is true. 
The scale had an acceptable internal consistency (α > 0.60). Most items appeared to be worthy 
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of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted. The one exception to this was items 
1 and 3, which would increase the alpha respectively to 0.67 and 0.69.  
 
6.4.2.2 Results of the Cronbach’s alpha of the semi-structured interview schedule 
 
On Section 2 of the semi-structured interview schedule, a reliability analysis on public 
participation on the scale comprising of 11 items results in a Cronbach's alpha (α) of 0.93. 
Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 11 were reversed for the analysis, so that the opposite is true. The scale 
had an acceptable internal consistency (α > 0.60). Most items appeared to be worthy of 
retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted. On Section 3 of the semi-structured 
questionnaire, a reliability analysis on administrative accountability quality of service delivery 
comprising of 12 items results in a Cronbach's alpha (α) of 0.92. Items 8, 10 and 12 were 
reversed for the analysis, so that the opposite is true. The scale had an acceptable internal 
consistency (α > 0.60). Most items appeared to be worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease 
in the alpha if deleted. On Section 4 of the semi-structured questionnaire, a reliability analysis 
on administrative accountability service delivery performance comprising of 11 items results 
in a Cronbach's alpha (α) of 0.85. Item 10 was reversed for the analysis, so that the opposite is 
true. The scale had an acceptable internal consistency (α > 0.60). Most items appeared to be 
worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted. 
 
6.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Hussey and Hussey (1997:111) define a literature review as a written summary of the finding 
of a literature search, which demonstrates that the body of knowledge has been thoroughly 
engaged to get a clear understanding and clear insight of the previous researches.  
 
In this study a comprehensive descriptive approach was applied in this study by answering the 
research questions for this study.  The literature study was based on a comprehensive 
descriptive qualitative study which was covered in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5 of this study.  As part of the qualitative research a semi-structured interview schedule was 
used to conduct semi-structured interviews with selected respondents of the two selected local 
municipalities attached to the Lejweleputswa District Municipality of the Free State province. 
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A semi-structured questionnaire was also used to collect data from the selected municipal 
respondents of the selected municipalities of the Free State province.    
 
6.6 DATA COLLECTION  
 
According to Bless et al. (2014:184), there are many ways of collecting data as determined by 
the aim, research questions and objectives of the study.  Maree et al. (2017:37) agree with the 
above that there are many data collection sources, methods and techniques to collect qualitative 
data.  Some of the qualitative data collection includes methods entail observations, semi-
structured, unstructured interviews and document analysis.  
 
Bless et al. (2014:184) maintains that the collection of data can be classified into primary or 
secondary data sources. Information for this study was required from both secondary and 
primary data sources.  This method is preferred because both primary and to a larger degree, 
secondary information sources are available. According to Salkind (2018:179), primary data 
sources refer to original reports, journals abstracts and articles, scholarly books, documents, 
interviews, records of eyewitnesses, dairies.  Bless et al. (2014:184) maintain that secondary 
sources refer to data which was collected by other investigators either in connection with other 
research problems, or as part of the usual gathering of social data for a population census.  In 
this study specific information concerning oversight and accountability in the South African 
public sector in particular local sphere of government was extracted from recent research 
projects, scholarly journals, government reports and documents, and the data collected from 
the semi-structured questionnaire and the semi-structured interviews conducted for this study. 
Recent information and literature about oversight and accountability in local sphere of 
government were also collected from both primary and secondary sources.   
 
Nkatini (2005:30) illustrates that data could be collected through interviews which could be 
structured or semi-structured. In structured interviews the interviewer asks each respondent the 
same questions in the same way. In semi-structured interviews the interviewer poses open-
ended questions that allow both the interviewer and the interviewee (respondent) to discuss the 
given topic in detail. In unstructured interviews, rather than follow any structure, the 
interviewer covers as much ground on a given topic with the respondent as the latter may 
provide Nkatini (2005:30). While a scheduled interview is one conducted in terms of a given 
space and time, a structured or semi-structured scheduled interview keeps the same questions 
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for different respondents within a given space and time (Nkatini, 2005:30).  Carey (2009:111) 
reports that in-depth interviews, usually with a small number of participants on one on one 
basis, provide one of the most reliable means by which to build upon a literature review and 
explore the key themes and objectives of a research question. This is due to many factors, 
including a realization that through language people can often best articulate and explain their 
thoughts, opinions, emotions and experiences. Carey (2009:111) further indicates that 
interviews are also one of the most popular means of data collection, principally because they 
provide a convenient, cheap, often uncomplicated and effective means by which to collect and 
extensive amount of data in a relatively short period of time.   
 
Brewerton and Millward (2006:67) point out that if data is collected in a qualitative study, 
interviews can also be readily combined with other methods such as semi-structured 
questionnaires or observations. These authors contend that interviewing, like all data collection 
methods, is open to various biases and shortcomings, the most critical being the difficulty to 
achieve reliable and valid results (Brewerton and Millward, 2006:67). They laud the 
quantification and objectification of interview-derived data as being the best remedy and 
highlight the importance of the researcher maintaining an objective stance throughout the 
research process.  However, Salkind, (2009:144-145) confirms that semi-structured interviews 
are more flexible to both the interviewer and the interviewee. This flexibility allows for the 
interviewer to probe for more information to get a better understanding of the information, facts 
and uncertainties, provided by the interviewee.    
 
Nkatini (2005:30) avers that questionnaires are sets of questions that must be simple and short, 
unambiguous, understandable, not double-barrelled, and at the same time should not be leading 
the respondents. A questionnaire should be compiled after the researcher has made a list of 
topics that must be researched, followed by an analysis of the kind of data that must obtained. 
Engel and Schutt (2013:228) further argue that questionnaire involve the collection of 
information from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions. A questionnaire 
as a data collection instrument, consists of a standardised set of questions (Bless et al. 
1995:106-107).   
 
In this study a semi-structured interview schedule was used to conduct interviews with the 
selected respondents of the two selected local municipalities attached to the Lejweleputswa 
District municipality.   Except for the semi-structured interview schedule a semi-structured 
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questionnaire was used to collect data from MMs, chief financial officers and mayors from the 
selected municipalities of the Free State province.  The MM of each of the selected municipality 
assisted with the distribution and collection of the responses of the semi-structured 
questionnaire from the relevant municipalities.   
6.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis refers to a continuous process of describing, classifying and interpreting data. In 
addition, data analysis is the conversion of raw data, into valuable, meaningful information for 
the researcher (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005:148-150).  Nkatini (2005:40) proposes that while the 
researcher is busy reading, reviewing, listening, transcribing recorded material, organizing or 
indexing data for easy management and identification at a later stage, the researcher is of 
necessity, analysing the same. The real analysis of data involves the concretization of identified 
categories takes place when all data have been collected and systematically arranged. Nkatini 
(2005:40) further maintains that although data analysis takes place in terms of the rules and 
specifications of the discipline concerned, it is essential for the researcher to take note of how 
qualitative and quantitative data should be dealt with.    
 
According to Salkind (2017:132), descriptive statistics describe some of the characteristics of 
the distribution of the scores of the collected data including average scores on one variable or 
the degree that one score differs from another score.   In this regard Maree et al. (2017: 220) 
argue that in quantitative data analysis the researcher wants to go beyond just summarising and 
describing the collected data, therefore, inferential statistics which relies on probability theory 
is used.    
 
In qualitative data analysis Maree et al. (2017:204-205) are of the opinion that descriptive 
statistics is one of the methods that can be utilised in a graphical or numerical way.  The 
different response categories of a variable are shown numerically with the frequency of 
respondents (expressed as a percentage of the sample size) in each of the different categories. 
While the usage of a simple bar chart is another commonly used graphical way of summarising 
qualitative variables (Maree et al. 2017:204-205). Other than using descriptive statistics to 
analyse qualitative data, Du Plooy-Cilliers et al. (2014:250) point out that there are several data 
analysis methods to analyse qualitative data including coding, discourse analysis, conversation 
analysis, multimodal conversation analysis and semiotics. In this regard, Babbie (2010:418) 
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argues that three key tools for preparing data for qualitative data analysis are coding, memoing 
and concept mapping. In addition, researchers can take advantage of the capabilities of 
common software tools such as word processors, database programmes and spreadsheets.   
 
In this study the researcher was be assisted by an experienced statistician to analyse the data of 
the semi-structured questionnaire and the semi-structured interview schedule.  The data 
analysis include description as well as a summary of the information obtained from the semi-
structured questionnaire and semi-structured interviews.  Simple, graphs, bar charts, tables and 
percentages were used to present data which could be viewed from different perspectives.  In 
doing so, anomalies were identified and pursued.  The Statistical Package for social Sciences 
programme (SPSS) was used to analyse the data.  Davis, Pecar, Santana and Burke (2014:16) 
suggest that raw data, is often difficult to interpret because there are usually too many values 
to easily distinguish any patterns in the data.  Therefore, an Excel spreadsheet was used to 
summarise the data created by tables that report how often certain sections of the data appear 
in the data set. Presenting raw data in a table can make even the most comprehensive collection 
of data more readily understandable.  The data obtained from the semi-structured interviews 
was categorised into different themes and sub-themes or groups of meaning. The questions or 
statements were grouped into those themes to ensure a logical flow of information.    The data 
analysis included a description as well as a summary of the information obtained from the semi-
structured questionnaire and interview schedule. Only descriptive statistics were used in this 
study to analyse the data from the semi-structured questionnaire (qualitative), especially 
Section A of the semi-structured interviews.  Bless et al. (2014: 348) confirm that descriptive 
statistics can be performed on qualitative data provided inferential statistical test are not used 
with qualitative data.   
 
6.8 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS OF THE SELF-
ADMINISTERED SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE COMPLETED BY 
SELECTED MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS 
 
The semi-structured questionnaire consisted of the following sections: 
• Section A:  Biographical Information (Comprise of 6 close- ended statements and 1 
comments column (open-ended).  
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• Section B:  Political Oversight and Accountability (Comprise of 11 close-ended 
statements and 1 comments column (open-ended). 
• Section C: Municipal Financial Oversight and Accountability (Comprise of 12 close-
ended statements and 1 comments column (open-ended). 
• Section D: Municipal Administrative Oversight and Accountability (Comprise of 5 
close-ended statements and 1 comments column (open-ended). 
• Section E:  Social Accountability (Comprise of 6 close-ended statements and 1 
comments column (open-ended). 
 
6.8.1 Section A:  Biographical Information of senior municipal officials 
 
This section contains the results of the 17 municipal official’s biographical information which 
includes population group, gender, disability, language commonly used, age group, highest 
level of education completed, municipal council currently employed. The tables and figures 
will report on the frequencies and percentages for each variable.  
 
6.8.1.1 Population group 
 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 below identifies municipal officials according to their population 
group. Of the total sampled population of municipal officials, 82.4% were African, 11.8% were 
Coloured, 5.9% were white and there were no people of Indian origin. These findings roughly 
correlate with those of Statistics South Africa’s 2011 Census (2012:17) that the percentage 
distribution of the population, by population group and province in the Free State in 2011, was 
as follows: Blacks were at 87.6%, Coloured were at 3.1% and Indians were at 0.4%. 
 
Table 6.1: Population group of the municipal officials (n = 17) 
Population Group Frequency Percentage 
African 14 82.4 
Coloured 2 11.8 
Indian 0 0.0 
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Of the interviewed respondents, 52.9% were males, 17.7% were female and 29.4% did not 
respond to this question. Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 below tabulate respondents in terms of 
gender. 
 
Table 6.2: Gender of the municipal officials (n = 17) 
Population Group Frequency Percentage 
Male 9 52.9 
Female 3 17.7 
No response 5 29.4 
 













African Coloured Indian White














None of the respondents were disabled. 
 
6.8.1.4 Language commonly used 
 
Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 below describe respondents according to the language commonly 
used. The respondents’ responses were as follows; 70.6% were Sesotho speakers, 11.8% were 
Setswana and Afrikaans speaking. Of these respondents, 5.9% did not respond to the question. 
 
Table 6.3: Language commonly used (n = 17) 
Language Frequency Percentage 
Afrikaans 2 11.8 
Sesotho 12 70.6 
Setswana 2 11.8 
None 1 5.9 
 
Figure 6.3: Language commonly used (n = 17) 
 
 
6.8.1.5 Age group 
 
In this question, respondents within 30 to 39 years were 5.9%; respondents within 40 to 49 
years were 41.2%, those within 50 to 59 years were 11.8% and 41.2 did not indicate their age 
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Table 6.4: Age group (n = 17) 
 
Age group Frequency Percentage 
No Response 7 41.18 
30-39 1 5.88 
40-49 7 41.18 
50-59 2 11.76 
 
Figure 6.4: Age group (n = 17) 
 
 
6.8.1.6 Highest level of education completed 
 
Table 6.5 and Figure 6.5 show that, at 41.2%, the majority of the respondents did not indicate 
their highest level of education completed; 29.4% of respondents had a degree; 11.8% had a 
certificate or honours degree and 5.9% had a master’s degree. None of the respondents had a 
doctorate degree.  
 
Table 6.5: Highest level of education completed (n = 17) 
Level of Education Frequency Percentage 
No Response 7 41.2 
Degree 5 29.4 
Certificate 2 11.8 
Honours 2 11.8 
Masters 1 5.9 
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Figure 6.5: Highest level of education completed (n = 17) 
 
 
6.8.1.7 Summary on the interpretations of questions 6.8.1.1- 6.8.1.6 
 
This sub-section dealt with the results of the sampled municipal official’s biographical 
information which included population group, gender, disability, language commonly used, 
age group, highest level of education completed, and municipal council currently employed. 
Of the total sampled population of municipal officials, 82.4% were African origin, 11.8% were 
Coloured, 5.9% were white and there were no people of Indian origin. On gender of 
respondents, 52.9% were males, 17.7% were female and 29.4% did not respond to this 
question. None of the respondents were disabled. On the question on the language commonly 
used by the respondents, the responses were as follows; 70.6% were Sesotho speakers, 11.8% 
were Setswana and Afrikaans speakers. Of these respondents, 5.9% did not respond to the 
question. In the question of age group of respondents, respondents within 30 to 39 years were 
5.9%; respondents within 40 to 49 years were 41.2%, those within 50 to 59 years were 11.8% 
and 41.2 did not indicate their age group.  
 
On the question of the highest level of education completed by respondents, 41.2%; did not 
indicate their highest level of education completed. 29.4% of respondents have a degree, 11.8% 
have a certificate or honours degree and 5.9% have a master’s degree. None of the respondents 
had a doctorate degree. It is a concern that the majority of the respondents did not indicate their 
level of education. In Section 5.5.3 of Chapter 5 of this study, the MFMA, 2003 as amended, 
stated that senior managers of municipalities must at least have attained a bachelor’s degree, 
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6.8.2 Section B:  Political oversight and accountability 
 
Section B of the semi-structured questionnaire was designed to investigate the perceptions of 
municipal officials, mayors or Executive mayors regarding political oversight and 
accountability. A five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree, agree, strongly disagree, 
disagree and don’t know were used.  
 
6.8.2.1 Municipal elections are a good tool to ensure accountability and transparency for 
political office-bearers 
 
The Table 6.6 and Figure 6.6 below indicate whether municipal elections are a good tool to 
ensure accountability and transparency for political office-bearers. On the question of whether 
municipal elections are a good tool to ensure accountability and transparency for political 
office-bearers, 35.3% strongly agreed, 47.1% agreed, with 11.8% disagreeing. In Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5.1.2 of this study, it was mentioned by Adeyemi et al. (2012:84) that elections 
(national and municipal) can be used to revoke the electoral mandate of an elected official. 
However, voters do not have any direct way of holding elected representatives to account 
during the term for which they have been elected. The fact that ward councillors are directly 
linked to a constituency has not directly translated into local accountability.  The Community 
Law Centre (2008:1) cautions that this deficit in local accountability begs the question whether 
a recall procedure would be an appropriate vehicle to enhance local accountability. Neither the 
Constitution of 1996 nor any of the legislation provides for a recall procedure.  However, it 
was further argued in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1.2 of this study, that the municipal council is 
elected directly by the electorate it represents and has constitutional mandate to oversee the 
administration and the executive of the municipality. In performing this constitutional mandate, 
the administration and the executive undertake vast powers that need proper oversight and 
accountability to avoid abuse and poor performance. Thus, municipal elections are a 
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Table 6.6 Municipal elections are a good tool to ensure accountability and transparency 
for political office-bearers (n = 16) 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Municipal elections are a good tool to ensure accountability and transparency 
for political office-bearers (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.2.2 Municipal council meetings are always well attended by councillors  
 
Table 6.7 and Figure 6.7 below describe whether municipal council meetings are always well 
attended by councillors. 5.9% did not respond to the question, whereas 11.8% strongly agreed, 
47.1% agreed, 11.8% did not know and 23.5% disagreed with the statement. It is crucial for 
municipal councillors to take interest in the affairs of their constituencies and it is also noted 
that they attend their council meetings regularly. However, what is key is the quality of their 
inputs in such meetings. In Chapter 3, Section 3.6, Taaibosch (2015:90) points out that a 
councillor who is unable to perform legislative and governing activities will be less able to 
master administrative executive activities.  Thus, councillors who lack the necessary 
knowledge and insight concerning relevant municipal legislation and policies may not be able 
















accountability Frequency Percentage 
No Response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 6 35.3 
Agree 8 47.1 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 2 11.8 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
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Table 6.7: Municipal council meetings are always well attended by councillors (n = 16) 
Council meetings well 
attended by councillors Frequency Percentage 
No Response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 2 11.8 
Agree 8 47.1 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 4 23.5 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.7: Municipal council meetings are always well attended by councillors (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.2.3 Municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative functions of the 
municipality 
 
On the on whether municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative functions of the 
municipality, Table 6.8 and Figure 6.8 below show that 5.9% did not respond to the question, 
5.9% strongly agreed, 29.4% agreed, 5.9% indicated that they do not know and 47.1% 
disagreed and 5.9% strongly disagreed.  The reason the majority of the respondents disagreed 
and strongly disagreed municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative functions 
of the municipality could be that these respondents are not telling the truth.  It also means that 
municipal councillors do not adhere to the requirement of Section 11(a) of the Code of Conduct 
of municipal councillors, which clearly provides that a councillor may not, except as provided 
in law interfere in the management or administration of any department of the municipal 
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The above statement is contradicted by Thornhill in Du Plessis (2013:57) as indicated in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.6 of this study, who stresses that a major inhibiting phenomenon in the 
public sector is the increased interference of politicians in the normal administrative activities 
of the state. Du Plessis (2013:57) further pointed out in Chapter 3 that the practice of 
interference in the administrative activities of public organisations is especially widespread at 
the municipal sphere of government, and especially in human resources, where the appointment 
of senior executives such as the MM, is often done primarily on the basis of party political 
considerations (Du Plessis, 2013:57).  It was also highlighted in Chapter 4, Section 4.13 of this 
study that no politician, councillor or any other person is allowed to interfere or try to influence 
with the municipalities SCM and procurement system or amend or tamper with any tenders, 
quotations, contracts or bids after their submissions.  It was confirmed in Chapter 3, Section 
3.10 of this study, that the Auditor-General in the report of 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 warned 
that political interferences in the administration weakened oversight and did not enable the 
effecting of consequences (AGSA, 2018:3; AGSA, 2019:12).  Thus, political interference of 
municipal councillors of which municipalities of the Free State cannot be not only has a 
negative impact on the administrative functions of municipal official’s it has a negative impact 
on their accountable role and on effective service delivery.  
 
Table 6.8: Municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative functions of the 
municipality (n = 16) 
Councillors interfere in 
administrative functions Frequency Percentage 
No Response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 5 29.4 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 8 47.1 
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Figure 6.8: Municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative functions of the 
municipality (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.2.4 Local government legislative acts and policies are understood by all political 
officials 
 
Table 6.9 and Figure 6.9 below, show whether local government legislative acts and policies 
are understood by all political officials. The results indicate that 17.6% strongly agreed with 
the statement, 35.3% agreed, 41.2% disagreed and 5.9% strongly disagreed. Respondents who 
agreed and strongly agreed with the statement are slightly in the majority, with a margin of 
5.8%. However, in Chapter 3, Section 3.6 of this study, Taaibosch (2015:90) points out 
councillors who lack the necessary knowledge and insight concerning relevant municipal 
legislation and policies may will not be able to fulfil their oversight and accountable functions 
effectively, nor will they be able to make sound decision.  A concern is that although the 
majority of the respondents agreed that local government legislative acts and policies are 
understood by all political officials, the Auditor-General as indicated in Chapter 4 of this study, 
warned that the vulnerable financial position of all (100%) of the municipalities in the Free 
State is the result of the increase in irregular expenditure due to non-compliance with legislated 
rules and regulations.   Thus, one could argue that municipal councillors must have a sound 
knowledge of relevant municipal legislation and SCM regulations to ensure that municipal 
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Table 6.9: Local government legislative acts and policies are understood by all political 
officials (n = 17) 
Local government legislative 
acts understood by political 
officials 
Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Agree 3 17.6 
Agree 6 35.3 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 7 41.2 
Strongly Disagree 1 5.9 
 
Figure 6.9: Local government legislative acts and policies are understood by all political 
officials (n = 17) 
 
 
6.5.2.5 Local government legislations, rules and policies are always implemented by all 
officials 
 
On whether local government legislations, rules and policies are always implemented by all 
officials as depicted in Table 6.10 and Figure 6.10 below, 5.9% of the respondents strongly 
agreed, 35.3% agreed, whereas 52.9% disagreed and 5.9% strongly disagreed.  It was 
confirmed in Chapter 3, Section 3.12 of this study, that most municipalities bluntly ignore key 
legislation and SCM regulations.  It was also emphasised in Chapter 4, Section 4.16 that the 
continued disregard of internal controls including proper record keeping and financial 
reporting and non-compliance with key financial management legislation remains a challenge 
in most municipalities.  The continued inaction of municipal councils, mayors, MMs and other 
relevant executives to implement the recommendations of the Auditor-General weakened 
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the creation of a culture of no consequences that weakens effective oversight and 
accountability.   
 
In Chapter 3, Section 3.6 of this study, Du Plessis (2013:57) pointed out that considering the 
role of elected representatives, the argument is for them to have detailed knowledge of the 
organisational functioning of public institutions, including relevant municipal legislative 
frameworks and policies to ensure that municipal officials implement municipal legislation and 
policies in an effective manner.  In this regard one could argue that the poor audit reports of 
municipalities in the Free State province as emphasised in Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this 
study, by the Auditor-General is a clear indication that the prescripts of the MFMA, 2003 are 
not effectively implemented by any of the municipalities in the province.  Thus, one could 
argue that relevant municipal legislation is not effectively implemented by municipalities of 
the Free State province.   
 
Table 6.10: Local government legislations, rules and policies are always implemented by 
all officials (n = 17) 
Local government 
legislations implemented by 
political officials 
Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 6 35.3 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 9 52.9 
Strongly Disagree 1 5.9 
 
Figure 6.10: Local government legislations, rules and policies are always implemented by 
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6.8.2.6 Academic qualifications are important for municipal councillors 
 
Table 6.11 and Figure 6.11 below show as to whether academic qualifications are important 
for municipal councillors. 17.6% of respondents strongly agreed, 52.9% agreed, 23.5% 
disagreed and 5.9% strongly disagreed that academic qualifications are important for municipal 
councillors.  It was argued in Chapter 3, Section 3.6 of this study, that Section 21 of the 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998 does not make prevision for any specific educational or 
academic qualifications for a municipal councillor.  Section 21 provides that every citizen who 
is qualified to vote for a specific municipal council has the right to stand as a candidate in an 
election for that council.  Thus, one could argue there are no specific educational or academic 
requirements for a member to serve as a councillor on a municipal council.   However, it was 
argued in Chapter 3, Section 3.6 of this study, that although the Municipal Structures Act of 
1998 does not make provision for any educational or academic qualifications for municipal 
councillors they must have a clear knowledge of the relevant municipal legislative frameworks 
and policies including the functions a municipality to ensure that municipal officials are hold 
to account for their administrative functions and effective implementation of applicable 
municipal legislation and policies. It further implies that political considerations and the 
popularity of individuals play a larger part in the election of candidates than a detailed 
knowledge of local government and its structures. This raises the question of whether the afore-
mentioned places municipalities at a disadvantage.   
 




Strongly Agree 3 17.6 
Agree 9 52.9 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 4 23.5 
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Figure 6.11: Academic qualifications are important for municipal councillors (n = 17) 
 
 
6.8.2.7 Reports of corruption at local government sphere are grossly exaggerated 
 
On the question whether reports of corruption at local government sphere were grossly 
exaggerated, Table 6.12 and Figure 6.12 below show that, 11.8% of respondents strongly 
agreed, 47.1% agreed, 5.9% didn’t know, 29.4% disagreed and 5.9% strongly disagreed with 
the statement. This differs from the literature as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.9.2 of this 
study. Venter (in Van der Waldt et al. (2018:105) emphasised in Chapter 2, Section 2.9.4 of 
this study, that as far back as in 2009 the State of Local Government Report (2009:71-75) 
showed that poor financial management, a lack of control and accountability systems in the 
majority of the municipalities give rise to an increase in fraud, corruption and the misuse of 
municipal assets and funds.   In Chapter 2, Section 2.10 of this study, it was further mentioned 
by Van der Waldt (2015:52) that the lack of effective oversight leads to instability and 
dysfunctionality of municipalities which creates an environment open to fraud and corruption.  
Thus, the findings from the majority of the participants who agreed that reports of corruption 
at local sphere are grossly exaggerated is a concern.   Corruption is often a result of continued 
disregard of legislative and regulations. In Chapter 4, section 4.16 of this study it was 
emphasised by Munzhedzi (2016:2) that tender irregularities, bribery, corruption, non-
compliance with SCM acts and regulations and the municipalities own SCM policy, 
incompetence and negligence of public officials are some of the concerns related to SCM and 
procurement practices throughout most municipalities. In Chapter 4, Section 4.23 of this study, 
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especially, has occurred throughout the public sector of which local government cannot be 
excluded. Despite the existence of numerous laws and National Treasury SCM and 
procurement regulations and Code of Conduct about SCM, corruption related to SCM in all 
three spheres of government is a concern.  Furthermore, Mantzaris (2017:125) mentioned that 
that one of the root causes of corruption in SCM and procurement is the fight for dominance 
amongst administrative and political leaders, which is the result of a party monopoly in power 
in most municipalities.  This leads to political interferences into the administration of the 
municipality and it further widens the gap among the political oversight and the municipalities 
administrators (Mantzaris, 2017:125).   
 
In Chapter 4, Section 4.8.5 of this study, it was confirmed by the Auditor-General in the report 
for 2017-2018 (AGSA, 2019:2) that a total of 74% of the municipalities did not adequately 
follow up on allegations of financial and SCM misconduct and fraud.   In the Free State 
province, especially, there is a total breakdown in controls and poor leadership responses 
towards improving accountability, capacity and stability.  The Auditor-General in the report 
for 2016-2017 (AGSA, 2018:56) further confirms that that the continued disregards for 
procurement and SCM processes by the administrative and political leadership resulted in 
irregular expenditure, coupled with limited consequences for these transgressions is creating 
an environment open to misappropriation, wastage and the abuse of state funds.  
 
Table 6.12: Reports of corruption at local government sphere are grossly exaggerated (n 
= 17) 
Reports of corruption 
exaggerated Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Agree 2 11.8 
Agree 8 47.1 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 5 29.4 
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6.8.2.8 State capture reports at local government sphere are a creation of the agents of 
the white monopoly capital 
 
On the statement as to whether state capture reports at local government sphere are a creation 
of the agents of the white monopoly capital, Table 6.13 Figure 6.13 below show that the 
majority 11.8% of respondents strongly agreed, 41.2% agreed and 5.9% did not know. On the 
other hand, 35.3% of respondents disagreed with the statement that claim that state capture 
reports at local government sphere are a creation of the agents of the white monopoly capital 
and 5.8% strongly disagreed with the statement.  
 
In Chapter 2, Section 2.9.2 of this study, Martin and Solomon (2017:2) point out that the 
shocking allegations of state capture not only undermine the efficiency of the state, especially 
where there is a direct relationship between state capture and corruption but it also undermines 
the rule of law. Furthermore, state capture also undermines the efficiency of the state and the 
constitutional mandated government bodies instated to maintain oversight and accountability. 
It was further mentioned by Martin and Solomon (2017:2) in Chapter 2, Section 2.9.2 of this 
study, it was mentioned state capture happens when governance structures, systems, laws and 
policies were disobeyed. Furthermore, there are no consequences for any wrong doings as a 
result of a lack and weakening of oversight, transparent and accountability structures and 



















Agree Don’t Know Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Reports of corruption are grossly exaggerated 
Percentage
© Central University of Technology, Free State
300 
 
of state capture damaged the integrity of the constitutional mandated oversight organs of state 
and constitutional bodies to hold executives to account for their actions or inactions. Therefore, 
it is a concern that the majority of the participants agreed with the statement that state capture 
reports at local government sphere are a creation of the agents of the white monopoly capital. 
One could argue that the participants are either not well informed about the allegations of state 
capture and related corrupt activities of which municipalities cannot be excluded or it is an 
indication of the development of a culture of no consequences for alleged corrupt activities and 
state capture. 
 
Table 6.13 State capture reports at local government sphere are a creation of the agents 
of the white monopoly capital (n = 17) 
State capture reports  
are a creation of the agents of 
the white monopoly capital 
Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Agree 2 11.8 
Agree 7 41.2 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 6 35.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 5.8 
 
Figure 6.13: State capture reports at local government sphere are a creation of the agents 
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6.8.2.9 Municipal councillors clearly do not understand the role of Portfolio Committees, 
Audit Committees and Municipal Performance Audit Committee 
 
According to Table 6.14 and Figure 6.14 below, on whether municipal councillors clearly do 
not understand the role of portfolio committees, audit committees and Municipal Performance 
Audit Committee, 11.8% of respondents strongly agreed, 41.2% agreed, 47.1% disagreed. It is 
a concern that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the above 
statement.  In Chapter 4, Section 4.11 of this study, Khalo (2013:58) points out that the   
committee system is used to support and enhance the municipal council oversight function and 
MPACs especially perform the municipal council’s oversight role over municipal finances. In 
Chapter 3, Section 3.9.1 of this study, it was mentioned that the portfolio committees are 
classified as Section 80 committees and are permanent structures in the municipal council. 
Portfolio committees advise the executive committees on policy matters and make 
recommendations to the municipal council. Section 80 committees or portfolio committees 
report to the mayoral committee and are therefore accountable to it. Section 4.11 of this study 
stressed that MPACs, key oversight and accountable mechanisms in the municipality, were 
established in terms of Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998. In Chapter 4 of this 
study, it was further highlighted that the Auditor-General warned in the 2017-2018 audit report 
that municipal councils do not implement the recommendations of the internal audit, audit 
committees or that of MPACs (AGSA, 2019:28). It was further mentioned in Chapter 4 of this 
study that these committees, including MPACs, lack the legal mandate to enforce their 
recommendations on municipalities, other concerns were that not all municipalities implement 
the recommendations of MPACs because of the inadequate legal mandate of the committees to 
enforce recommendations (Auditor-General, 2019:28).  In Section 4.9, in Chapter 4 of this 
study, it was mentioned that internal audit committees must review the annual financial 
statements to provide the municipal council with an authoritative and credible view of the 
financial position of the municipality, its efficiency and effectiveness. It must also respond to 
the council on any matters raised by the Auditor-General in the audit report (Fourie and 
Opperman, 2007:66).  However, it was further mentioned in Section 4.9 of this study that the 
internal audit committee lacks the mandate to take any action against municipal management 
for non-compliance with the MFMA, 2003. It was also argued that it is difficult for members 
of the internal audit committee to function without accurate, reliable information from 
management and internal audit units (Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits, 2016:125).  One can argue 
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that committee can function effectively if the political leaders (mayor or municipal council 
members) do not understand the function of Section 80 portfolio committees or the function of 
a key oversight committee such as MPACs. 
   
Table 6.14: Municipal councillors clearly do not understand the role of portfolio 
committees, audit committees and municipal performance audit committee (n =17) 
Municipal councillors do not 
understand the role of 
committees 
Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Agree 2 11.8 
Agree 7 41.2 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 8 47.1 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.14: Municipal councillors clearly do not understand the role of portfolio 
committees, audit committees and municipal performance audit committee (n = 17) 
 
 
6.8.2.10 There is no consequence management for breaking the code of conduct for 
municipal councillors 
 
On the statement as to whether there is no consequence management for breaking the code of 
conduct for municipal councillors, Table 6.15 Figure 6.15 below show that 41.2% of 
respondents strongly agreed, 23.5% agreed and 5.9% did not know. On the other hand, 17.7% 
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management for breaking the code of conduct for municipal councillors and 11.8% strongly 
disagreed with the statement. The majority of respondents specify that there is no consequence 
management for breaking the code of conduct for municipal councillors and this is also stressed 
in Chapter 2, Section 2.10 of this study, where Pauw et al. (2015:3016-307) state that 
corruption thrives when laws and policies are flawed and in particular when there are no 
consequences for corrupt conduct and any acts of unethical conduct and acts of dishonesty.  In 
Chapter 4, Section 4.8.5 of this study it was confirmed by the Auditor-General in the report for 
2016-2017 (AGSA, 2018:56) that the continued disregards for procurement and SCM 
processes by the administrative and political leadership resulted in irregular expenditure, 
coupled with limited consequences for these transgressions is creating an environment open to 
misappropriation, wastage and the abuse of state funds.  The Auditor-General report for 2017-
2018 (AGSA, 2019:2) indicated that a total of 74% of the municipalities did not adequately 
follow up on allegations of financial and SCM misconduct and fraud. It was further mentioned 
that in the Free State province there is a total breakdown in controls and poor leadership 
responses towards improving accountability, capacity and stability, that further contributes to 
a lack of accountability and no consequences for non-compliance with key legislated rules 
including the code of conduct for municipal councillors in local government. 
 
Table 6.15: There is no consequence management for breaking the code of conduct for 
municipal councillors 
No consequence 
management for breaking 
code of conduct 
Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Agree 7 41.2 
Agree 4 23.5 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 3 17.7 
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6.8.2.11 I have not heard or read about cases of corruption being experienced in my 
municipality in the past year 
 
On the question of whether respondents have not heard or read about cases of corruption being 
experienced in their municipality in the past year, 5.9% strongly agreed, 23.5% agreed, with 
5.9 stating that they do not know and 47.1% of respondents disagreed and 17.6% strongly 
disagreed with the statement.  Table 6.16 and Figure 6.16 below indicate whether whether 
respondents have not heard or read about cases of corruption being experienced in their 
municipality in the past year. A concern is that a total of 29.14% of the respondents replied that 
they have not heard or read about cases of corruption experienced in their municipality in the 
past year.  It could mean, that these respondents did not tell the truth.  In Chapter 4, Section 
4.8.5, of the study, it was mentioned that the Auditor-General warned in the report for 2016-
2017 (AGSA, 2018:56) the Free State municipalities continued disregards for procurement 
processes by the administrative and political leadership resulted in irregular expenditure, 
coupled with limited consequences for these transgressions, is creating an environment open 
to misappropriation, fraud, wastage and the abuse of state fund.  The Auditor-General further 
warned in Chapter 4 of this study that the deterioration of the local government environment 
of municipalities in the Free State province was evident in the vulnerable financial position of 
all (100%) of the municipalities due to the increase in irregular expenditure and non-
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General reported that the majority of the municipalities of which the municipalities of the Free 
State cannot be excluded did not investigate any of the findings reported on by the Auditor- 
General (AGSA, 2019:9) concerning possible fraud or improper conduct related to SCM 
findings, which is a concern.        
 
It was further confirmed in Chapter 4, Section 4.8.5 of the study, that the Auditor-General 
stated in the report for 2017-2018 (AGSA, 2019:2) that a total of 74% of the municipalities did 
not adequately follow up on allegations of financial and SCM misconduct and fraud. One could 
argue that the current vulnerable financial position of all municipalities in the Free State 
province, and the fact that municipalities not investigate any of the findings reported on by the 
Auditor- General (AGSA, 2019:9) concerning possible fraud or improper conduct related to 
SCM findings as required is a concern.   The latter contributes to the culture of no consequences 
in municipalities in the Free State to promote accountability and to investigate findings of 
Auditor-General related to indicators of possible fraud and improper conduct related to SCM 
and the indicators of possible fraud and improper conduct. 
 
Table 6.16: I have not heard or read about cases of corruption being experienced in my 
municipality in the past year 
Not heard or read about 
cases of corruption  
Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 4 23.5 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 8 47.1 
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Figure 6.16: I have not heard or read about cases of corruption being experienced in my 
municipality in the past year 
 
 
6.8.2.12 Summary on the interpretations of questions 6.8.2.1 – 6.8.2.11 
 
On the question of whether municipal elections are a good tool to ensure accountability and 
transparency for political office-bearers, the majority (82.4%) of the respondents strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement. In Chapter 3, of this study, Ola and Effiong in Adeyemi, 
et al. (2012:84) concurs that elections (national and municipal) can be used to revoke the 
electoral mandate of an elected official. However, voters do not have any direct way of holding 
elected representatives to account during the term for which they have been elected. The 
Community Law Centre (2008: 1) cautions that this deficit in local accountability begs the 
question whether a recall procedure would be an appropriate vehicle to enhance local 
accountability. Neither the Constitution, 1996 nor any of the legislation provides for a recall 
procedure.  Therefore, one could argue that municipal elections are not a good tool to ensure 
accountability of political office-bearers. 
 
On the question as to whether municipal council meetings are always well attended by 
councillors, the majority (58.9%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed, with this 
statement. Attending council meetings is important for good municipal governance. According 
to the South African Local Government Association (SALGA, 2011:182), municipal 
councillors must make decisions on behalf of their constituents they serve; represent the needs 
and interests of their constituents; fulfil leadership roles in municipal councils; act as custodians 
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officials and accounting officers; and be responsive to the communities they serve.  Thus, 
municipal councillors must attend council meetings to fulfil their oversight role effectively.   
 
On the question whether municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative functions 
of the municipality, the majority of the respondents (53%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
this statement. It was argued that the reason the majority of the respondents disagreed and 
strongly disagreed that municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative functions 
of the municipality could be that these respondents were not telling the truth.  It also means 
that municipal councillors do not adhere to the requirement of Section 11(a) of the Code of 
Conduct of municipal councillors, which clearly provides that a councillor may not, except as 
provided in law interfere in the management or administration of any department of the 
municipal council, unless mandated by the municipal council.   
 
On the question of whether local government legislative acts and policies are understood by all 
political officials, the majority of the respondents (52.9%) strongly agreed, or agreed with the 
statement, while at total of 47% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
the statement. The respondents who agreed and strongly agreed with the statement are slightly 
in the majority, with a margin of 5.8%.  A concern is that although the majority of the 
respondents agreed that local government legislative acts and policies are understood by all 
political officials, the Auditor-General as indicated in Chapter 4 of this study warned that the 
vulnerable financial position of all (100%) of the municipalities in the Free State is the result 
of the increase in irregular expenditure due to non-compliance with legislated rules and 
regulations. It was argued that municipal councillors must have a sound knowledge of relevant 
municipal legislation and SCM regulations to ensure that municipal officials are held to account 
for the implementation of municipal related legislative frameworks.  
 
On the question whether, local government legislations, rules and policies are always 
implemented by all officials, the majority (58.8) of the respondents disagreed, or strongly 
disagreed with this statement. In Chapter 4 of this study, it was mentioned that the mayor is 
expected to oversee and manage the MM to ensure delivery on the agreed outputs, and the 
municipal council must exercise oversight of the executive mayor or committee to ensure they 
fulfil their responsibility of oversight (National Treasury, 2004:6). Therefore, it was argued 
that if political leaders do not have a sound knowledge of applicable local government 
legislation how will they be able to hold the executives to account for non-compliance with 
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legislative rules. The Auditor-General, in Chapter 4 of this study, confirmed that the 
deterioration of the local government environment of municipalities in the Free State province 
was evident in the vulnerable financial position of all (100%) of the municipalities due to the 
increase in irregular expenditure and non-compliance with legislated rules. The above is a clear 
indication that local government legislation are not effectively implemented by municipalities 
in the Free State province. 
 
On the question as to whether academic qualifications are important for municipal councillors, 
the majority of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed, with the statement. In Chapter 3 of 
this study, it was emphasised that the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 does not make 
provision for any educational or academic qualifications for municipal councillors.  It was also 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.6 of this study, that political considerations, as well as the 
popularity of individuals, play an overriding part in the election of candidates, rather than a 
detailed knowledge of local government and its structures.  It was argued that the latter practice 
places municipalities at a disadvantage (Du Plessis, 2013:56).    
 
On the question of whether reports of corruption at local government sphere are grossly 
exaggerated, the majority of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, 
while only 35.3% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. In 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, an argument is made on how rife corruption is in state 
institutions in South Africa, of which municipalities in the Free State province cannot be 
excluded.  It was further confirmed in Chapter 4 of this study that the Auditor-General reported 
that the majority of the municipalities of which the municipalities of the Free State cannot be 
excluded did not investigate any of the findings reported on by the Auditor- General (AGSA, 
2019:9) concerning possible fraud or improper conduct related to SCM findings, which is a 
concern.        
 
On the statement as to whether state capture reports at local government sphere are a creation 
of the agents of the white monopoly capital, the majority (53%) of the respondents strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement.   On the other hand, (41.1%) of the respondents either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. The findings contradicted the discussion 
stated in Chapter 2, Section 2.9.2, of this study.   In Chapter 2, Section, 2.9.2 of this study, it 
was argued that there is no doubt that the various corrupt activities and the shocking allegations 
of state capture damaged the integrity of the constitutional mandated oversight organs of state 
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and constitutional bodies to hold executives to account for their actions or inactions.  Therefore, 
it is a concern that the majority of the participants agreed with the statement that state capture 
reports at local government sphere are a creation of the agents of the white monopoly capital. 
One could argue that the participants are either not well informed about the allegations of state 
capture and related corrupt activities or it is an indication of the development of a culture of no 
consequences for alleged corrupt activities and state capture. 
 
On whether municipal councillors clearly do not understand the role of portfolio committees, 
audit committees and Municipal Performance Audit Committee, a slight majority (53%) of the 
respondents strongly agreed, or agreed, while 47.1% disagreed with this statement.  It is a 
concern that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed that municipal 
councillors clearly do not understand the role of portfolio committees, audit committees and 
Municipal Performance Audit Committee. It was argued that no committee can function 
effectively if the political leaders (mayor or municipal council members) do not understand the 
function of Section 80 committees or the function of a key oversight bodies such as MPACs. 
In Chapter 4 of this study, it was highlighted that Section 80, portfolio committees are 
mandated to provide advice to the executive mayor, while MPACs, established in terms of 
section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, are key oversight committees.  
 
On the statement as to whether there is no consequence management for breaking the code of 
conduct for municipal councillors, the majority (64.7%) of the respondents strongly agreed or 
agreed with this statement. On the other hand, 29.5% of the respondents disagreed, or strongly 
disagreed with the statement. The majority (64.7%) of respondents stated that there is no 
consequence management for breaking the code of conduct for municipal councillors.  This 
finding is in agreement with the literature provided in Chapter 3, Section 3.10 of this study, 
where it was mentioned that the development of a culture of no consequences is a result of 
inadequate oversight and performance systems and process; and disobeying and continued non-
compliances with key municipal legislations creates an environment that makes it easy to 
commit fraud and corruption within municipalities (AGSA, 2019:9). 
 
On the question of whether respondents have not heard or read about cases of corruption being 
experienced in their municipality in the past year, only 29.4% of the respondents either strongly 
agreed, or agreed, while the majority (64.7%) of the respondents either disagreed, or strongly 
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disagreed with the statement.  The above findings are in contradiction with the findings of the 
Auditor-General.  In Chapter 4 of this study, it was highlighted that the Auditor-General 
warned that the deterioration of the local government environment of municipalities in the Free 
State province was evident in the vulnerable financial position of all (100%) of the 
municipalities due to the increase in irregular expenditure and non-compliance with legislated 
rules (AGSA, 2019:10). It was further confirmed in Chapter 4, that the Auditor-General 
reported that the majority of the municipalities of which the municipalities of the Free State 
cannot be excluded did not investigate any of the findings reported on by the Auditor- General 
(AGSA, 2019:9) concerning the indications of possible fraud and improper conduct on the 
findings on SCM, which is a concern. Therefore, one could argue that there is a possibility that 
the respondents who agreed and strongly agreed that they have not heard or read about cases 
of corruption being experienced in their municipality in the past year are not telling the truth. 
  
6.8.3 Section C:  Municipal financial oversight and accountability 
 
Section C of the semi-structured questionnaire was designed to investigate the perceptions of 
municipal officials, mayors or Executive mayors regarding municipal financial oversight and 
accountability. A five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree, agree, strongly disagree, 
disagree and don’t know were used.  
 
6.8.3.1 Municipal political and administrative officials have a proper understanding of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 
 
On the statement as to whether municipal political and administrative officials have a proper 
understanding of the MFMA of 2003, Table 6.17 Figure 6.17 below show that 5.9% of 
respondents strongly agreed, 23.5% agreed and 5.9% did not know. On the other hand, 58.8% 
of respondents disagreed with the statement that claim municipal political and administrative 
officials have a proper understanding of the MFMA of 2003 and 5.8% strongly disagreed with 
the statement. About 5.9% the respondents indicated that they did not know. From this 
question, the majority (64.6%) of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed that 
political and administrative officials properly understand the MFMA, 2003.  In Chapter 4 of 
this study, it was mentioned that the Auditor-General reported in the 2017-2018 audit outcomes 
of municipalities in the Free-State, that the deterioration of the local government environment 
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of municipalities in the Free State province was evident in the vulnerable financial position of 
all (100%) of the municipalities, due to the increase in irregular expenditure and non-
compliance with legislated rules of which the MFMA, 2003 cannot be excluded. 
 
Table 6.17: Municipal political and administrative officials have a proper understanding 
of the MFMA of 2003 (n=17) 
Political and administrative 
officials have a proper 
understanding of the MFMA 
of 2003 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 4 23.5 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 10 58.8 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.17: Municipal political and administrative officials have a proper understanding 
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6.8.3.2 The Free State Provincial Treasury is assisting local municipality councils with 
compliance with the MFMA, 2003 
 
On the question as to whether the FS Provincial Treasury is assisting local municipality 
councils with compliance with the MFMA, 2003, 11.8% did not respond, 41.2% strongly 
agreed with the statement, again 41.2% agreed. 5.9% of the respondents indicated that they do 
not know, and none disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. In Chapter 4, Section 
4.4 of this study, Fourie and Opperman (2007:393) indicate that the Provincial Treasury must 
monitor compliance with MFMA, 2003, by municipalities in the province.  The provincial 
treasuries must further, monitor the preparation by municipalities in the province of their 
budgets, monitor monthly outcome of those budgets and monitor the submission of reports by 
municipalities. The Provincial Treasury may assist municipalities in the province in the 
preparation of their budgets and may also take appropriate steps if a municipality commits a 
breach of the MFMA, 2003.  In Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, the National Treasury 
(2004:6) also agrees that the Minister of Finance has encouraged National and Provincial 
Treasury and finance officials to form a new professional body to support and develop such 
municipal officials.   Despite the National Treasury (2004:6), urging Provincial Treasury to 
support local governments with their financial management, on the contrary in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4 of this study, the Auditor-General (2017:55) reported that the Free State local 
government political and administrative leadership lacks accountability to address and to 
improve, the audit outcomes.  Table 6.18 and Figure 6.18 below show that as to whether the 
Free State Provincial Treasury is assisting local municipal councils with compliance with the 
MFMA of 2003.  
 
Table 6.18: The Free State Provincial Treasury is assisting local municipality councils 
with compliance with the MFMA, 2003 (n = 15) 
Responses Frequency Percent 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 7 41.2 
Agree 7 41.2 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
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Figure 6.18: The Free State Provincial Treasury is assisting local municipality councils 
with compliance with the MFMA, 2003 (n = 15) 
 
 
6.8.3.3 Municipal mayors clearly understand their respective oversight roles in municipal 
financial management and administration 
 
Table 6.19 and Figure 6.19 below explain whether municipal mayors clearly understand their 
respective oversight roles in municipal financial management and administration. A total of 
11.8% did not respond to the statement, 5.9% strongly agreed, 29.4% agreed, while 17.6% 
pointed out that they did not know. 35.3% of the respondents disagreed with the statement that 
say municipal mayors clearly understand their respective oversight roles in municipal financial 
management and administration. In this question respondents are at 50%/50% divided. In 
Chapter4, Section 4.8.2 of this study, Thornhill and Cloete (2013:112) maintain that the mayor 
or executive mayor has an important oversight role regarding municipal financial matters by 
providing general political guidance over fiscal and financial affairs of the municipality; taking 
reasonable steps to ensure that a municipality performs its constitutional obligations within the 
limits of the municipality’s approved budget, and reporting to the provincial executive if the 
budget has not been approved as required or if financial problems necessitates provincial 
intervention. The mayor must also perform oversight concerning municipal entities. In Chapter 
4, Section 4.8.5 of this study, the Auditor-General reported in the report for 2016-2017 (AGSA, 
2018:55) that the slow response by the political leadership and the administrative leadership to 
address weak control environment, a lack of consequences and the continued disregard for 
legislative prescripts resulted in findings on compliance with legislation at all 18 municipalities 

















Agree Don’t Know Disagree Strongly
Disagree
© Central University of Technology, Free State
314 
 
emphasised that the Auditor-General warned in the report for 2016-2017 that inadequate skills 
led to a lack of oversight by municipal councils and mayor and insufficient implementation 
and maintenance of financial and performance management systems by the administration 
(AGSA, 2018:3).  Considering the above, one could argue that mayors as one of the key 
political leaders (including mayors) within the municipality clearly do not understand their 
respective oversight roles in municipal financial management and administration. 
 
Table 6.19: Municipal mayors clearly understand their respective oversight roles in 
municipal financial management and administration (n=15) 
Mayors understanding their 
oversight roles in municipal 
financial management 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 5 29.4 
Don’t Know 3 17.6 
Disagree 6 35.3 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.19: Municipal mayors clearly understand their respective oversight roles in 
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6.8.3.4 The executive mayor or executive committee oversees the performance of its 
officials by taking budgetary monthly reports seriously 
 
Table 6.20 and Figure 6.20 show whether the executive mayor or executive committee oversees 
the performance of its officials by taking budgetary monthly reports seriously. Of the sampled 
population, 11.8% did not respond to the statement, 29.4% strongly agreed and 5.9% agreed 
with the statement. On the other hand, 52.9% of the respondents indicated that they do not 
know. None of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed.   It is a concern that the 
majority of the respondents indicated that they do not know whether, the executive mayor or 
executive committee oversaw the performance of officials by taking monthly budgetary reports 
seriously.  It could mean that monthly reports are not submitted or a monthly basis or it could 
mean that the respondents are not aware whether the monthly reports are submitted. In 
Chapter4, Section 4.8.2 of this study, it was mentioned that The MM is responsible and 
accountable to the executive mayor for the management of the administration as well as the 
performance of the functions and responsibilities assigned to him/her by the municipal council 
and the executive mayor. In Section 4.8.2 of this study, it was mentioned that the executive 
mayor or executive committee of the municipality fulfil a key oversight role by overseeing the 
performance of the municipal officials.  The executive mayor has to use the SDBIP to monitor 
the performance through monthly progress reports and by submitting the annual report to the 
municipal council.  It is expected from non-executive councillors to hold both the executive 
mayor or committee and the officials accountable for performance, based on monthly, quarterly 
and annual reports (National Treasury, 2004:5).     
 
Table 6.20: The executive mayor or executive committee oversees the performance of its 
officials by taking budgetary monthly reports seriously (n=15) 
Mayor or Committee 
oversees the performance of 
its officials 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 5 29.4 
Agree 1 5.9 
Don’t Know 9 52.9 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
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Figure 6.20: The executive mayor or committee oversees the performance of its officials 
by taking budgetary monthly reports seriously (n=15) 
 
 
6.8.3.5 The non-executive councillors always hold the executive mayor or committee 
accountable by monthly, quarterly and annual financial reports 
 
On the question of whether the non-executive councillors always hold the executive mayor or 
committee accountable by monthly, quarterly and annual financial reports, Table 6.21 and 
Figure 6.21 below outlines that 11.8% officials did not respond to the question, 5.9% of 
respondents strongly agreed and 41.2% agreed with the statement. At the same time, 35.3% of 
respondents disagreed and 5.9% strongly disagreed with the statement.  The majority (47.1%) 
of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement.  A concern is that 41.2% of 
the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.  It was emphasised in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.8.1 of this study, that non-executive councillors are expected to hold both 
the executive mayor or committee and the officials accountable for performance, based on 
monthly, quarterly and annual reports (National Treasury, 2004:5).  In Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1 
of this study, clarity is further given on the role of municipal councillors. In terms of Section 
2, the objective of MFMA, 2003, is that of developing sound financial governance within every 
municipality. This means all municipalities must develop a comprehensive system clarifying 
and separating the responsibilities of mayors, councillors and officials. According to the 
National Treasury (2004:5), the responsibilities of accountability and oversight, are only 
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Table 6.21: The non-executive councillors always hold the executive mayor or committee 
accountable by monthly, quarterly and annual financial reports (n = 15) 
Non-executive councillors 
hold the executive mayor or 
committee accountable by 
financial reports 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 7 41.2 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 6 35.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 5.9 
 
Figure 6.21: The non-executive councillors always hold the executive mayor or committee 
accountable by monthly, quarterly and annual financial reports (n = 15) 
 
 
6.8.3.6 The municipal executive mayor or executive committee implements the 
recommendations of the Auditor-General 
 
On the statement as to whether the municipal executive mayor or executive committee 
implements the recommendations of the Auditor-General, Table 6.22 and Figure 6.22 below 
show that 11.8% of officials did not respond to this question, 5.9% of respondents strongly 
agreed, 11.8% agreed, while 11.8% did not know. A total of 47.1% of the respondents 
disagreed and 11.8% strongly disagreed with the statement, which is a concern. In Section 4.8.3 
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that the municipality (MM) must address all aspects raised by the Auditor-General in an audit 
report. The mayor of the municipality must ensure compliance of this provision.  In Chapter 4, 
section 14.15, of this study it was mentioned that the continued inaction of municipal councils, 
mayors, MMs and other relevant executives to implement the recommendations of the Auditor-
General weakened oversight and accountability of the financial affairs of most municipalities.  
In Chapter 4, Section 4.7 of this study, it was mentioned that the Auditor-General findings 
warned that the that the lack of commitment by municipalities towards responding to 
recommendations made by the Auditor-General further contributes to a lack of consequences 
for transgressions and irregularities (AGSA, 2019:9).  In addition, it was mentioned in Chapter 
3, Section 3.5.3 of this study that the Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 is encouraging as it 
will tighten the accountability and oversight role of the Auditor-General. The Public Audit 
Amendment Act, 2018 Section 3(1B) further indicated that the Auditor-General has the power 
to take any appropriate remedial action; and issue a certificate of debt, as prescribed, where an 
accounting officer or accounting authority has failed to comply with remedial action. 
 
Table 6.22: The municipal executive mayor or executive committee implements the 
recommendations of the Auditor-General 
Municipal executive mayor 
or committee implements the 
recommendations of the A-G 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 2 11.8 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 8 47.1 
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Figure 6.22: The municipal executive mayor or executive committee implements the 
recommendations of the Auditor-General 
 
 
6.8.3.7 Municipal budget is always aligned to the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of 
the municipality 
 
Table 6.23 and Figure 6.23 below indicate that 35.3% of respondents strongly agree that 
municipal budget is always aligned to the IDP of the municipality, 52.9% agreed, 5.9% did not 
know and none of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.  The 
majority of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. Chapter 2, Section 
2.5.12 of this study affirmed the above findings, which stated that in terms of Section 53 (6) of 
the MFMA, 2003, the mayor of a municipality must ensure that the annual budget of a 
municipality should indicate how it will implement the objectives set out in its IDP over the 
next three years. In addition, the municipality should also indicate how its IDP will be revised 
by taking into consideration the budget and spending commitments. In Chapter 4, of this study 
it was further confirms that in terms of Chapter 5 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, the 
municipal council must to ensure that the allocated budget inputs relate to the priorities as set 
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Table 6.23: Municipal budget is always aligned to the IDP of the municipality (n = 16) 
Municipal budget is always 
aligned to the IDP  
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 6 35.3 
Agree 9 52.9 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.23: Municipal budget is always aligned to the IDP of the municipality (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.3.8 Municipal council does not do proper oversight function concerning municipal 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
 
Table 6.24 Figure 6.24 show that 11.8% of respondents strongly agreed and 52.9% agreed that 
municipal council does not do proper oversight function concerning municipal SCM, on the 
other hand, 17.6% disagreed with the statement. 5.9% of the respondents did not answer this 
question and 11.8% indicated that they did not know.  The majority of the respondents strongly 
agreed and agreed with this statement.   In Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1 of this study, it was 
emphasised that Thornhill and Cloete (2013:112) maintain that the mayor or executive mayor 
has an important oversight role regarding municipal financial matters of which SCM cannot be 
excluded by providing general political guidance over fiscal and financial affairs of the 
municipality.  In Section 4.4 of this study, Selebano (2018:2) cautions that public institutions, 
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obtain tender contract. Selebano (2018:2) further warns that although National Treasury, RSA, 
2011 and amended National Treasury, 2017 allow deviations from these regulations in extreme 
exceptional circumstances, public institutions, including municipalities, misused this clause to 
justify fruitless and wasteful expenditure including corruption with the allocation of tenders. A 
concern is that most SCM policies of municipalities do not specify procurement spent targets, 
which leaves the municipality to award contracts to establish suppliers who often take 
advantage of the weak procurement management practices and charge double prices.   This 
confirms that municipal council does not do proper oversight function concerning municipal 
SCM.  It was further mentioned in Chapter 4 of this study that deviations from National 
Treasury regulations and SCM procedures contributes to irregularities in the municipalities 
bidding and other SCM processes.  
 
In Chapter 4, Section 4.8.5, of the study, Mantzaris (2017:124) mentioned that corruption has 
occurred particularly in SCM and procurement practices throughout the public sector of which 
local government cannot be excluded. Despite the existence of numerous laws and National 
Treasury SCM and procurement regulations and Code of Conduct about SCM, corruption 
related to SCM in all three spheres of government is a concern.   In this regard the Auditor-
General warns in the report for 2016-2017 (AGSA, 2018:56) confirms that in the Free State 
municipalities the continued disregards for procurement processes of which SCM cannot be 
excluded by the administrative and political leadership resulted in irregular expenditure, 
coupled with limited consequences for these transgressions, is creating an environment open 
to misappropriation, wastage and the abuse of state funds.       
 
Table 6.24: Municipal council does not do proper oversight function concerning SCM 
Council does not do proper 
oversight function 
concerning municipal SCM 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 2 11.8 
Agree 9 52.9 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 3 17.6 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
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Figure 6.24: Municipal council does not do proper oversight function concerning SCM 
 
 
6.8.3.9 Municipal manager (MM) as accounting officer is responsible for all funds 
managed by the municipality 
 
On the statement as to whether MM as accounting officer is responsible for all funds managed 
by the municipality, Table 6.25 and Figure 6.25 below show that 5.9% of officials did not 
respond to this question, 17.6% strongly agreed and 76.5% agreed with the statement, and none 
of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed. Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3, in this study, is 
also in agreement with the statement. The MFMA, 2003, emphasises the responsibilities, 
accountability and oversight and reporting in each municipality. National Treasury (2004:20) 
stressed that the MM must be the accounting officer responsible for all funds managed by the 
municipality.  In Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this study, it was further mentioned by Ndaba 
(2019:2) that the oversight structures must be improved to ensure that municipalities and 
municipal councils, MMs and relevant executives are accountable for the performance of their 
finances.         
 
Table 6.25: Municipal manager as accounting officer is responsible for all funds managed 
by the municipality (n = 16) 
MM as Accounting Officer is 
responsible for funds 
managed by the municipality 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 3 17.6 
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Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.25: Municipal manager as accounting officer is responsible for all funds 
managed by the municipality (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.3.10 Mayor or councillor can authorise the spending of municipal funds 
 
On the question of whether mayor or councillor can authorise the spending of municipal funds, 
Table 6.26 and Figure 6.26 below indicate that 35.3% of the respondents agreed with the 
statement, 11.8% of respondents said they did not know, whereas 35.3% disagreed and 11.8% 
strongly disagreed that mayor or councillor can authorise the spending of municipal funds. The 
majority of the respondents who disagreed and strongly disagreed with the above statement are 
also substantiated in Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this study, where the National Treasury 
(2004:20) outlined that MM must be the accounting officer responsible for all funds managed 
by the municipality. It indicated that no Mayor or councillor or official can be responsible for 
any funds or authorise the spending of funds. In Section 4.8.1 of this study, Khalo, (2013:584) 
stated that the mayor or any other councillor is prohibited by the MFMA, 2003 to interfere in 
the financial management responsibilities assigned to the accounting officer or CFO.  It is a 
concern that the majority of the respondents were of the opinion that the mayor or a councillor 
can authorise the spending of municipal funds, while the National Treasury provided that no 
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Table 6.26: Mayor or councillor can authorise the spending of municipal funds (n = 16) 
Mayor or councillor can 
authorise the spending of 
municipal funds 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Agree 6 35.3 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 6 35.3 
Strongly Disagree 2 11.8 
 
Figure 6.26: Mayor or councillor can authorise the spending of municipal funds (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.3.11 The report of the Auditor-General is accessible to all stakeholders in the 
municipality  
 
In Table 6.27 and Figure 6.27 below, it is pointed out that 5.9% of respondents strongly agreed 
that the report of the Auditor-General is accessible to all stakeholders in the municipality and 
76.5% agreed to the statement. 5.9% did not respond to this question. Fourie and Opperman 
(2015:109) asserted in Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this study, that the MM must table a copy of 
the audit report and financial statements in the municipal council within one month of receiving 
the audit report from the Auditor-General and submit copies of the municipality’s annual 
report, the financial statements and the audit report to the National Treasury and the Provincial 
Treasury. In addition, in Chapter 4, Section 4.7 of this study, it was mentioned that Section 
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statements and any corrective action taken or to be taken in response to the issues raised in the 
audit reports must be included in the annual report of the municipal council.    
 
Table 6.27: The report of the Auditor-General is accessible to all stakeholders in the 
municipality (n = 16) 
Report of the A-G is 
accessible to all stakeholders  
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 13 76.5 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 2 11.8 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.27: The report of the Auditor-General is accessible to all stakeholders in the 
municipality (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.3.12 The municipality holds public meetings on the Auditor-General’s report on the 
municipality every financial year-end 
 
On whether municipality holds public meetings on the Auditor-General’s report on the 
municipality every financial year-end, Table 6.28 and Figure 6.28 below show that 5.9% 
officials did not respond, 5.9% strongly agreed, 29.4% agreed with the statement. The majority 
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meetings on the Auditor-General’s report on the municipality every financial year-end which 
is a concern.  The findings are in contradiction with the provisions of the MFMA, 2003 and 
MSA, 2000.  In Chapter 4, Section 4.7 of this study, it was indicated that that in terms of Section 
121(2) of the MFMA, 2003, the Auditor-General’s audit report and financial statements and 
any corrective action taken or to be taken in response to the issues raised in the audit reports 
must be included in the annual report of the municipal council.  In Chapter 5 Section 5.10.4 of 
this study, it was mentioned that, in terms of Section 19 of the MSA, 2000, meetings of the 
municipal council and its committees must be open to the public.  
  
Table 6.28: The municipality holds public meetings on the Auditor-General’s report on 
the municipality every financial year-end (n = 16) 
Municipality holds public 
meetings on the A-G’s report 
on the municipality every 
financial year-end 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 1 5.9 
Agree 5 29.4 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 9 52.9 
Strongly Disagree 1 5.9 
 
Figure 6.28: The municipality holds public meetings on the Auditor-General’s report on 
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6.8.3.13 Summary on the interpretations of questions 6.8.3.1-6.8.3.12 
 
On the statement as to whether municipal political and administrative officials have a proper 
understanding of the MFMA, 2003, the majority (64.6.8%) of respondents disagreed with the 
statement. The findings correspond with the findings of the Auditor-General, 2017-2018 audit 
outcomes of municipalities in the Free-State, which confirmed that that the deterioration of the 
local government environment of municipalities in the Free State province was evident in the 
vulnerable financial position of all (100%) of the municipalities due to the increase in irregular 
expenditure and non-compliance with legislated rules of which the MFMA, 2003 cannot be 
excluded.   
 
On the question as to whether the FS Provincial Treasury assists local municipality councils 
with compliance with the MFMA of 2003, the majority of the respondents strongly agreed and 
agreed with the statement. In Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, Fourie and Opperman 
(2007:393) maintain that National Treasury and Provincial Treasury may monitor and assess 
compliance by municipalities and municipal entities with MFMA, 2003. It was argued that 
Provincial Treasury has to strictly monitor the municipalities of the Free State province 
compliance with MFMA, 2003.  Despite the support from National Treasury and Provincial 
Treasury, The Auditor-General reported in the 2017-2018 audit report that all municipalities 
of the Free State municipalities financial position deteriorated, and it resulted in the increase in 
irregular expenditure and non-compliance with MFMA, 2003 and SCM regulations.  
 
On the question as to whether municipal mayors clearly understand their respective oversight 
roles in municipal financial management and administration, the findings of the respondents 
were equally divided.  A total of 35.3% of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed, while 
35.3% of the respondents disagreed with the statement.  The latter is a concern it was mentioned 
in Section 4.4.1 of this study, it was emphasised that Thornhill and Cloete (2013:112) maintain 
that the mayor or executive mayor has an important oversight role regarding municipal 
financial matters by providing general political guidance over fiscal and financial affairs of the 
municipality.  The above findings that 50% of the respondents strongly disagree or disagreed 
that municipal mayors clearly understand their respective oversight roles in municipal financial 
management and administration corresponds with the findings of the Auditor-General, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4 of this study, that municipal councils including municipal mayors 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
328 
 
clearly do not understand their respective oversight roles in municipal financial management 
and administration.     
 
On the question as to whether the executive mayor or executive committee oversees the 
performance of its officials by taking budgetary monthly reports seriously, the majority of the 
respondents (52.9%) indicated that they do not know, which is a concern.   In Chapter 4, Section 
4.8.2 of this study it was emphasised that the executive mayor or the executive committee is 
expected to oversee the performance of its officials, using the SDBIP and monitoring 
performance through monthly progress reports.  
 
On the question of whether the non-executive councillors always hold the executive mayor or 
committee accountable by monthly, quarterly and annual financial reports, the majority of the 
respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. A concern is that 35.3% of 
respondents disagreed and 5.9% strongly disagreed with the statement. It was emphasised in 
Section 4.8.2 of this study that non-executive councillors are expected to hold both the 
executive mayor or committee and the officials accountable for performance, based on 
monthly, quarterly and annual reports (National Treasury, 2004:5).     
 
On the statement as to whether the municipal executive mayor or committee implements the 
recommendations of the Auditor-General, the majority of the respondents strongly disagreed 
or disagreed with the statement.  The above findings support the findings of the Auditor-
General, that in 62% of municipalities of which municipalities in the Free State province cannot 
be excluded, that municipal councils failed to conduct the required investigations into all 
instances of unauthorised, irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure reported in the 
previous year (AGSA, 2019:9).    
 
On the statement as to whether budget is always aligned to the IDP of the municipality, the 
majority of the respondents strongly agree or agreed with the statement.  Chapter 3 of this study 
affirmed that in terms of Section 53 (6) of the MFMA, 2003, the Mayor of a municipality must 
ensure that the annual budget of a municipality should indicate how it will implement the 
objectives set out in its IDP over the next three years. On the question of whether the municipal 
council does not do a proper oversight function concerning municipal SCM, the majority of 
the respondents, strongly agreed and agreed with the statement.  In Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1 of 
this study, it was emphasised that mayors and councillors must critically assess information 
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and SCM deviations before making any decisions.   It was further emphasised, in Chapter 4 of 
this study, that the mayor or executive mayor has an important oversight role regarding 
municipal financial matters of which SCM matters cannot be excluded, by providing general 
political guidance over fiscal and financial affairs of the municipality.  
  
On the statement as to whether MM as accounting officer is responsible for all funds managed 
by the municipality, the majority of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed with the 
statement, and none of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed. In Chapter 4 of this 
study, it was mentioned that the National Treasury (2004:20) emphasised that the MM as the 
accounting officer of the municipality is responsible for all funds managed by the municipality.   
 
On the question of whether mayor or councillor can authorise the spending of municipal funds, 
the majority of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed with the statement. This 
disagreement is also substantiated, in Chapter 3 of this study, where the National Treasury 
(2004:20) maintained that the MM must be the accounting officer responsible for all funds 
managed by the municipality. It follows that no Mayor or councillor or official can be 
responsible for any funds or authorise the spending of funds. 
 
On the question on whether the report of the Auditor-General is accessible to all stakeholders 
in the municipality, a majority 76.5% agreed to the statement.  In Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of 
this research study, Kumar et al. (2003:13) also agreed that the accounting officer for a 
municipality must keep full and proper records of the financial affairs of the municipality. 
Fourie and Opperman, (2015:109) assert that the MM must table a copy of the financial 
statements and the audit report in the municipal council within one month of receiving Auditor-
General’s audit reports, and submit to the National Treasury and the Provincial Treasury copies 
of the municipality’s annual report, the financial statements and the audit report.  
 
On whether municipality holds public meetings on the Auditor-General’s report on the 
municipality every financial year-end, the majority 52.9% of respondents disagreed and 5.9% 
strongly disagreed that municipality holds public meetings on the Auditor-General’s report on 
the municipality every financial year-end.  In Chapter 5, Section 5.10.4 of this study, it was 
mentioned that in terms of Section 19 of the MSA, 2000 meetings of municipal council and its 
committees must be open to the public.  
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6.8.4 Section D:  Municipal administrative oversight and accountability 
 
Section D of the semi-structured questionnaire was designed to investigate the perceptions of 
municipal officials, mayors or Executive mayors regarding municipal administrative oversight 
and accountability. A five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree, agree, strongly 
disagree, disagree and don’t know were used.  
 
6.8.4.1 The municipal manager (MM) is responsible and accountable to the executive 
mayor for the management and administration of the municipal council 
 
Table 6.29 and Figure 6.29 below tabulate that 29.4% and 52.9% of respondents respectively 
strongly agreed and agreed that the MM is responsible and accountable to the executive mayor 
for the management and administration of the municipal council. Of the remaining population 
sample, 5.9% did not respond and 5.9 of the respondents disagreed. In Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 
of this study, Van der Waldt (2011:74) also submits that as head of administration the MM of 
a municipality is responsible and accountable for the formation and development of an 
economical, effective, efficient, cost-effective and accountable administration. The MM is 
responsible and accountable to the executive mayor for the management of the administration 
as well as the performance of the functions and responsibilities assigned to him/her by the 
Municipal council and the Executive mayor.  
 
Table 6.29: The municipal manager is responsible and accountable to the executive 
mayor for the management and administration of the municipal council (n = 16) 
MM is responsible and 
accountable to the Mayor for 
the management and 
administration 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 5 29.4 
Agree 9 52.9 
Don’t Know 1 5.9 
Disagree 1 5.9 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
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Figure 6.29: The municipal manager is responsible and accountable to the executive 
mayor for the management and administration of the municipal council (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.4.2 The municipal manager (MM) is responsible for the appointment of municipal 
staff 
 
Table 6.30 and Figure 6.30 below show that 17.6% of the respondents strongly agreed and 
35.3% agreed to the statement that the MM is responsible for the appointment of municipal 
staff, whereas 29.4% disagreed. 5.9% of the officials did not respond to this question and 11.8% 
indicated that they did not know if the MM is responsible for the appointment of municipal 
staff. This statement was supported in Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this study, Van der Waldt 
(2011:74) stressed that the MM of a municipality is responsible for the appointment of staff 
subject to the Employment Equity Act, 1998 and the maintenance of discipline of staff.  
 
Table 6.30: The municipal manager is responsible for the appointment of municipal staff 
MM is responsible for the 
appointment of municipal 
staff 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 3 17.6 
Agree 6 35.3 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 5 29.4 
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Figure 6.30: The municipal manager is responsible for the appointment of municipal staff 
 
 
6.8.4.3 The municipal manager (MM) is tasked with advising of the political structures 
and political office-bearers 
 
Table 6.31 and Figure 6.31 below show that 11.8% of the respondents strongly agreed, and 
70.6% agreed, that the MM is tasked with advising of the political structures and political 
office-bearers, whereas 11.8% of respondents indicated that they did not know and 5.9% did 
not respond to the question. Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this study, Van der Waldt (2011:74) 
affirms that the MM is tasked with the advising of the political structures and political office-
bearers of the municipality, managing communications between municipal’s administration 
and its political office-bearers and carrying out the decisions of the political structures and 
political office-bearers of the municipality. 
 
Table 6.31: The municipal manager is tasked with advising of the political structures and 
political office-bearers (n = 16) 
MM is tasked with the 
advising of the political 
structures and political 
office-bearers 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 1 5.9 
Strongly Agree 2 11.8 
Agree 12 70.6 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
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Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.31: The municipal manager is tasked with advising of the political structures 
and political office-bearers (n = 16) 
 
 
6.8.4.4 The chief financial officer (CFO) must advice the municipal manager (MM) on 
his/her accounting duties 
 
On the question of whether the CFO must advice the MM on his/her accounting duties, Table 
6.32 and Figure 6.32 below indicate that 23.5% of the respondents strongly agreed, and 64.7% 
agreed, with the statement, and 11.9% did not respond to the question. Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 
of this study, supports the majority of respondents who agreed with the above statement. Van 
der Waldt (2011:77) confirms that as head of the budget and treasury officer, the CFO must 
advice the MM on his/her accounting responsibilities, as well as other senior managers on their 
financial accountabilities.  
 
Table 6.32: The chief financial officer must advice the municipal manager on his/her 
accounting duties (n = 15) 
CFO must advice the MM on 
his/her accounting duties 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 4 23.5 
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Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.32: The chief financial officer must advice the municipal manager on his/her 
accounting duties (n = 15) 
 
 
6.8.4.5 Municipal Performance Management System for the municipal manager (MM) 
and other Section 56 managers is effectively implemented 
 
On the question of whether Municipal Performance Management System for the MM and other 
Section 56 Managers is effectively implemented, Table 6.33 and Figure 6.33 outline that 17.6% 
of the respondents agreed, with the statement, 11.8% indicated that they did not know, and 
52.9% disagreed, and 5.9% strongly disagreed, with the statement.   In Chapter 5, Section 5.5.3 
of this study, it was mentioned that Section 56 of the MSA, 2000 states that the municipal 
council of a municipality, after consultation with the MM must appoint managers directly 
accountable to the MM.  It was further mentioned, in Chapter 5 of this study, that in terms of 
Section 44(3) and 56(3) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the executive committee or the 
executive mayor is responsibility for the development of the performance management system 
including the development of evaluation criteria and key performance indicators, whereas the 
MM must implement and managed the performance management reporting system and 
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Table 6.33: The Municipal Performance Management System for the municipal manager 
(MM) and other Section 56 managers is effectively implemented (n = 15) 
Municipal Performance Management 
System for the MM and other Section 56 
managers is effectively implemented 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Agree 3 17.6 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 9 52.9 
Strongly Disagree 1 5.9 
 
Figure 6.33: The Municipal Performance Management System for the municipal 
manager (MM) and other Section 56 managers is effectively implemented (n = 15) 
 
 
6.8.4.6 Summary on the interpretations of questions 6.8.4.1 to 6.8.4.5. 
 
On the question as to whether the MM is responsible and accountable to the executive mayor 
for the management and administration of the municipal council the majority (82.3%) of 
respondents agreed with the statement. In Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this study, Van der Waldt 
(2011:74) also agreed that as head of administration, the MM is responsible and accountable 
to the executive mayor for the management of the administration as well as the performance of 
the functions and responsibilities assigned to him/her by the Municipal council and the 
Executive mayor.  On the question as to whether, the MM is responsible for the appointment 
of municipal staff a majority (52.9%) of the respondents strongly agreed, and agreed to the 
statement, whereas 29.4% disagreed. This statement is also supported in Chapter 4, Section 
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is responsible for the appointment of staff subject to the Employment Equity Act, 1998 and the 
maintenance of discipline of staff.  
 
On the question as to whether the MM is tasked with advising of the political structures and 
political office-bearers the majority (82.4%) strongly agreed and agreed with the statement. In 
Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this study, Van der Waldt (2011:74) affirmed that the MM is tasked 
with the advising of the political structures and political office-bearers of the municipality, 
managing communications between municipal’s administration and its political office-bearers 
and carrying out the decisions of the political structures and political office-bearers of the 
municipality.   On the question of whether the CFO must advice the MM on his/her accounting 
duties, the majority (88.2%) of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed with the statement. 
Chapter 4, Section 4.8.3 of this study, supported the above-mentioned statement. Van der 
Waldt (2011:77) submitted that as head of the budget and treasury officer, the CFO must advice 
the MM on his/her accounting responsibilities, as well as other senior managers on their 
financial accountabilities. On the question of whether Municipal Performance Management 
System for the MM and other Section 56 Managers is effectively implemented, the majority of 
the respondents (58.8%) disagreed, and strongly disagreed with the statement which is a 
concern. In Chapter 5 of this study, it was mentioned that in terms of Section 44(3) and 56(3) 
of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the executive committee or the executive mayor is 
responsibility for the development of the performance management system, including the 
development of evaluation criteria and key performance indicators. The MM must implement 
and managed the performance management reporting system and provides advise to the 
municipal council regarding the reporting system that must be adopted.    
 
6.8.5 Section E: Municipal social oversight and accountability 
 
Section E of the semi-structured questionnaire was designed to investigate the perceptions of 
municipal officials, mayors or Executive mayors regarding municipal social oversight and 
accountability. A five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree, agree, strongly disagree, 
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6.8.5.1 Local communities fully understand the mandate of the local government sphere 
 
Table 6.34 and Figure 6.34 below indicate whether local communities fully understand the 
mandate of the local government sphere, wherein 11.8% of the respondents strongly agreed, 
with the statement, 23.5% agreed, whilst 23.5% disagreed, and 29.4% strongly disagreed, with 
the statement. 11.8% did not respond to the question. The majority (52%) of the respondents 
disagreed, with the statement. The latter was confirmed in Chapter 5, Section 5.13 of this study, 
in which Mashamaite and Madzivhandila (2014:227) aver that most community members are 
not sufficiently informed to participate meaningfully in municipal government. This makes 
municipal councillors and officials less willing to consider the views of community. Also, most 
members of the community are not clear about the role of a municipality. According to 
Mashamaite and Madzivhandila (2014:227), the question may be asked whether the 
community is really competent to participate in municipal issues that would influence them 
directly, especially planning issues. One could argue that members of ward committees and 
community participation forums as the representatives of a particular community, should be 
capacitated to make meaningful contributions about the affairs of their municipalities.  
 
Table 6.34: Local communities fully understand the mandate of the local government 
sphere (n = 15) 
Local communities fully understand 
the mandate of the local government 
sphere 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 2 11.8 
Agree 4 23.5 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 4 23.5 
Strongly Disagree 5 29.4 
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Figure 6.34: Local communities fully understand the mandate of the local government 
sphere (n = 15) 
 
 
6.8.5.2 Local communities and their organisations fully participate in activities organised 
by ward committees and ward councillor 
 
Table 6.35 and Figure 6.35 below, show that 29.4% of the respondents agreed that local 
communities and their organisations fully participate in activities organised by ward 
committees and ward councillor, whereas 17.6% of the respondents indicated that they do not 
know, 35.9% disagreed with the statement and 5.9% strongly disagreed. It could be noted that 
the majority (41.8%) of the respondents disagreed, and strongly disagreed that local 
communities and their organisations fully participate in activities organised by ward 
committees and ward councillor. In Chapter 2, Section 2.5.20 of this study, the NDP 2030, 
Executive Summary (2012:44-45) concurs that municipalities should avoid undermining 
democratic accountability for service delivery. Thus, more needs to be done to make it easier 
for citizens to raise their concerns concerning service delivery.  The rising number of service 
delivery protests indicates that the state also needs to promote effective public participation to 
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Table 6.35: Local communities and their organisations fully participate in activities 
organised by ward committees and ward councillor (n = 15) 
Local communities and their 
organisations fully 
participate in activities 
organised by Ward 
Committees and Ward 
councillor 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 2 11.8 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Agree 5 29.4 
Don’t Know 3 17.6 
Disagree 6 35.9 
Strongly Disagree 1 5.9 
 
Figure 6.35: Local communities and their organisations fully participate in activities 
organised by ward committees and ward councillor (n = 15) 
 
 
6.8.5.3 The Integrated Development Plan (IDP) is an effective tool for local community 
participation 
 
On the question of whether, IDP is an effective a tool for local community participation, Table 
6.36 and Figure 6.36 below indicate that 41.2% of the respondents strongly agreed, with the 
statement, 35.3% agreed, whilst 5.9% disagreed, and 17.6% did not respond to this question. 
The majority (76.5%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement.  In 
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different phases of the IDP.  However, Theron and Mchunu (2007:6-7) argued in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.12 of this study, that most of the municipal officials and the ward community 
members do not have the capacity to manage and implement effective public participation 
concerning the municipalities IDP. One could argue that municipalities together with CoGTA 
needs to do more to ensure that all ward committee members are capacitated to make 
recommendations concerning the IDP during municipal council meetings. 
 
Table 6.36: The IDP is an effective tool for local community participation (n = 14) 




No response 3 17.6 
Strongly Agree 7 41.2 
Agree 6 35.3 
Don’t Know 0 0 
Disagree 1 5.9 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 
 
Figure 6.36: The IDP is an effective tool for local community participation (n = 14) 
 
 
6.8.5.4 Municipal councillors regularly report back at least quarterly to their 
constituencies on the performance of the municipality 
 
Table 6.37 and Figure 6.37 below outline that 23.5% agreed that municipal councillors 
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municipality, whereas 41.2% disagreed with the statement, 5.9% strongly disagreed and 11.8% 
indicated that they do not know. The majority (47.1%) of the respondents disagreed, or strongly 
disagreed with the statement.  The findings contradicted the requirements provided the Code 
of Conduct for Councillors as provided in Schedule 1 of MSA, 2000 that councillors must be 
accountable to local communities and report back at least on a quarterly basis to constituencies 
concerning council matters, such as the performance of the municipality in terms of established 
performance indicators.  In Chapter 5, Section 5.13 of this study, Mashamaite and 
Madzivhandila (2014:227) argued that, the concept of public accountability in current 
municipal administration is weak to the point of being non-existent.  One could argue that 
municipalities must give effect to the constitutional obligation to promote accountable local 
government to local communities by involving communities in the affairs of local government.  
 
Table 6.37: Municipal councillors regularly report back at least quarterly to their 
constituencies on the performance of the municipality (n = 14) 
Councillors regularly report 
back at least quarterly to 
their constituencies on the 
performance of the 
municipality 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 3 17.6 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Agree 4 23.5 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 7 41.2 
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Figure 6.37: Municipal councillors regularly report back at least quarterly to their 
constituencies on the performance of the municipality (n = 14) 
 
 
6.8.5.5 Local government is characterised by patronage politics, weak leadership and 
capacity, financial mismanagement and corruption  
 
Of the population of municipal officials sampled, Table 6.38 and Figure 6.38, show that 23.5% 
strongly agreed, that their local government is characterised by patronage politics, weak 
leadership and capacity, financial mismanagement and corruption, 11.8% agreed, with the 
statement, and 29.4% disagreed, and 5.9% strongly disagreed. 11.8% indicated that they do not 
know, with 17.6% not responding to the statement. In this statement respondents are equally 
matched in their responses, 35,3% of the respondents either strongly agreed, or agreed, while 
35% of the respondents disagreed, or strongly disagreed.    The discussion in Chapter 5, Section 
5.13 of this study, confirmed that local governments are characterised by patronage politics, 
weak leadership and capacity, financial mismanagement and corruption. According to CoGTA 
(2009:11), the culture of patronage and nepotism is now so widespread in many municipalities 
that the formal municipal accountability system is ineffective and inaccessible to many citizens. 
In addition, Ndaba (in The Star, 27 June 2019:1) avers in Chapter 4, Section 4.8.1, that there is 
a rapid deterioration of accountability as showed in the Auditor-Generals audit outcomes of 
municipalities of the 2017-2018 financial year.  It was further mentioned that the latter is a 
clear indication that MMs as the accounting officers, mayors, CFOs and relevant officials in 
most municipalities including metropolitan municipalities should be accountable for any 
financial losses incurred by municipalities during their term in office.  It was further argued 
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in that the political leadership of the provincial government and those in all municipalities in 
the province exhibited no responses to improve political oversight and accountability for 
financial and performance management. 
 
Table 6.38: Your local government is characterised by patronage politics, weak 
leadership and capacity, financial mismanagement and corruption (n = 14) 
Your local government is 
characterised by patronage 





No response 3 17.6 
Strongly Agree 4 23.5 
Agree 2 11.8 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 5 29.4 
Strongly Disagree 1 5.9 
 
Figure 6.38: Your local government is characterised by patronage politics, weak 
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6.8.5.6 There had being no service delivery conflicts/protests within the local municipality 
 
Table 6.39 Figure 6.39 below show that 5.9% of respondents agreed, that there had being no 
service delivery conflicts/protests within the local municipality, 58.8% disagreed, with the 
statement and 5.9% strongly disagreed. The majority (64.7%) of the respondents disagreed that 
there had being no service delivery conflict/protects within their local municipality.  In Chapter 
5, Section 5.13 of this study, the matter on service delivery protests is outlined. Asha 
(2014:400) points out that violent service delivery protests are an indication of the failure of 
local governments to achieve their development mandates. The findings correspond with the 
Auditor-General audit report of 2017-2018 (AGSA, 2019:27), as indicated in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.13 of this study, that service delivery protests have become a regular occurrence in 
municipalities in South Africa, with KwaZula-Natal, leading in the number of municipalities 
affected, followed by the Free State and the Eastern Cape. Kroukamp (2016:110-116) further 
argues in Chapter 5 that a lack of engagement with local communities and community 
organisations leads to a lack of accountability and responsibility of functionaries, undermines 
participatory democracy and community participation. One could argue that municipalities of 
the Free State province have to do more to give effect to the constitutional requirement to 
promote accountable local government to local communities.    
 
Table 6.39: There has been no service delivery conflicts/protests within the local 
municipality (n = 14) 
There have being no service 
delivery conflicts/protests 
within the local municipality 
Frequency Percentage 
No response 3 17.6 
Strongly Agree 0 0 
Agree 1 5.9 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 
Disagree 10 58.8 
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Figure 6.39: There has been no service delivery conflicts/protests within the local 
municipality (n = 14) 
 
 
6.8.5.7 Summary on the interpretations of questions 6.8.5.1-6.8.5.6 
 
On the statement whether, local communities fully understand the mandate of the local 
government sphere, the majority (52.9%) of the respondents, disagreed, and strongly 
disagreed, with the statement. This statement supports the literature discussed in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.13, of the study, that most community members are not sufficiently informed to 
participate meaningfully in municipal government. On the statement whether, local 
communities and their organisations fully participate in activities organised by ward 
committees and ward councillor, a slight majority of 41.8% of the respondents disagreed, 
or strongly disagreed, with the statement. It is clear that more needs to be done to involve 
local communities in the activities of ward committees.  On the statement of whether, the 
IDP is an effective a tool for local community participation, a majority (76.5%) of the 
respondents strongly agreed, or agreed, with the statement. The importance of the 
involvement of local communities in the different phases of the IDP was emphasised in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.13, of this study.  It was argued that more needs to be done to capacity 
ward committee members to ensure that they can make meaningful contributions during 
council meetings, related to the IDP processes of the municipality.   
 
On the statement on whether, municipal councillors regularly report back at least quarterly to 
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respondents disagreed, or strongly disagreed, with the statement. This is in contradiction with 
the requirements provided in the Schedule 1 of the Code of Conduct for Councillors, MSA of 
2000 that councillors must be accountable to local communities and report back at least on a 
quarterly basis to constituencies concerning council matters, such as the performance of the 
municipality in terms of established performance indicators.    
 
The results of the responses of the respondents are equally divided on the statement as to 
whether, local government is characterised by patronage politics, weak leadership and capacity, 
financial mismanagement and corruption. The findings correspond with the discussion 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1.2 of this study, that local governments are characterised 
by patronage politics, weak leadership and capacity, financial mismanagement and corruption.  
CoGTA (2009:11) warned that a culture of patronage and nepotism is now so widespread in 
many municipalities that the formal municipal accountability system is ineffective and 
inaccessible to many citizens.  It was further argued that MMs as the accounting officers, 
mayors, CFOs and relevant officials in most municipalities including metropolitan 
municipalities should be accountable for any financial losses incurred by municipalities during 
their term in office.  It was further argued that most municipalities in the Free State province 
showed a total collapse in internal controls in that the political leadership of the provincial 
government and those in all municipalities in the province exhibited no responses to improve 
political oversight and accountability for financial and performance management (Ndaba, in 
The Star, 27 June 2019:1). 
 
On the question on whether, there had being no service delivery conflicts/protests within the 
local municipality a majority (64.7%) of respondents of either disagreed, or strongly disagreed, 
with the statement.  In Chapter 5 of this study, it was emphasised that the that service delivery 
protest has become a regular occurrence in municipalities in South Africa, with KwaZula-
Natal, leading in the number of municipalities affected, followed by the Free State and the 
Eastern Cape.  The latter is an indication of local communities’ dissatisfaction with the overall 
performance of municipalities. One could argue that political leaders and municipal officials 
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6.9 RESULTS AND FINDINGS OF THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
SCHEDULE WITH SELECTED WARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS  
 
In this study one semi-structures interview schedule was used consisting of structured (closed-
ended) and unstructured (open-ended) questions to conducted semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from the ward committees of two of the local municipalities, Tokologo and 
Tswelopele, of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality to identify the current challenges 
pertaining to public participation and social accountability.  
 
The semi-structured interview schedule consisted of the following themes: 
• Section 1: Biographical Information. 
• Section 2: Theme 1:  Public Participation (10 sub-themes) 
• Section 3:  Administrative Accountability. Theme 2:  Quality of Service Delivery (8 
sub-themes). 
• Section 4: Administrative Accountability. Theme 3: Current Service Delivery 
Performance of municipal council (15 sub-themes).   
 
6.9.1 Section 1:  Biographical Information 
 
This section contained the results of the respondent’s biographical information.   Simple bar 
charts were used to illustrate the findings of the respondent’s biographical information.   As 
mentioned in Section 6 of this chapter descriptive statistics may be used in qualitative findings.  
This was confirmed by Bless et al. (2014:348) that that descriptive statistics may be used on 
qualitative data such as in the case of a semi-structured questionnaire or semi-structured 
interview schedule as long as no inferential statistic are not used.  
 
6.9.1.1 Population group (n = 5) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6.40 below all respondents sampled were of African origin, which is 
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Figure 6.40 Population Group (n = 5) 
 
 
6.9.1.2 Gender  
Figure 6.41 below indicated that 60% of sampled respondents were female and 40% were male. 
Thus, the majority of the respondents were females. 
 




Figure 6.42 showed that 20% of the respondents were disabled and 80% were able-bodied 
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Figure 6.42 Disability (n = 5) 
 
 
6.9.1.4 Language most commonly used (n = 5) 
 
On the language commonly used by participants, 80% were Sesotho speakers and 20% were 
Setswana speakers.  
 
Figure 6.43 Language most commonly used (n = 5) 
 
The majority of the respondents (ward committee members) were Sesotho speaking, followed 
by the Setswana speaking ward committee members (respondents). 
 
6.9.1.5 Age Group  
 
Figure 6.44 below showed that 40% of respondents fall within the 30-39 and 40-49 age groups 
and 20% fall within the 50-59 age group.  The majority of the ward councillors (respondents) 
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Figure 6.44 Age Group (n = 5) 
 
 
6.9.1.6 Highest level of education completed (indicate only one of the following) 
 
Figures 6.45 below explained the highest level of education completed by respondents. 
According to the information presented, 20% of respondents had primary education as the 
highest level of education completed, 60% had secondary education and another 20% had a 
degree. On the same question in the previous self-administered semi-structured questionnaire, 
municipal officials responded poorly in this question on academic qualifications. Table 6.5 and 
Figure 6.5 showed that the majority of municipal official’s respondents of 41.2%; did not 
indicate their highest level of education completed. 29.4% of respondents have a degree, 11.8% 
have a certificate or honours degree and 5.9% have a master’s degree. None of the respondents 
had a doctorate degree. In Chapter 5, Section 5.11.3 of this study, it was mentioned that the 
Municipal Structures Act of 1998 or any other legislation do not make provision, for any 
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Figure 6.45: Highest level of education completed (n = 5) 
 
 
6.9.1.7 Summary on the interpretations of questions from 6.9.1 – 6.9.1.6 
 
All respondents sampled were of African origin, which is 100% and this is because respondents 
were mainly from township ward committees. Findings indicated that 60% of the respondents 
were female and 40% were male, and 20% were disabled and 80% were able-bodied persons. 
In Chapter 5 of this study it was emphasised that in terms of Section 17 of the MSA, 2000 
municipalities must create conditions to allow members of the community, such as disabled 
people, other disadvantaged groups and people who are illiterate, to participate in the affairs of 
the municipality. The language most commonly used by the respondents is Sesotho which is 
80% and Setswana which is 20% and 40% of respondents fall within the 30-39 and 40-49 age 
groups and 20% fall within the 50-59 age group. The information regarding respondents’ 
highest level of education completed showed that 20% of respondents had primary education 
as the highest level of education completed, 60% had secondary education and another 20% 
had a degree.  It was confirmed that the Municipal Structurers Act, 1998 or any other legislation 
required that ward committees must have any qualifications.   
 
6.9.2 Section 2: Theme 1:  Public Participation (10 Sub-themes) 
 
6.9.2.1 Findings on the question on how your local community is informed about 
municipal council meetings  
 
This question sought to determine what communication methods (sub-theme 1) are used to 
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• Responses:  The question was answered by all respondents.   Three respondents 
indicated that the municipality are using public notice boards to inform the local 
community about municipal council meetings while two of the respondents mentioned 
that the municipality informed the local community by using a load hailing system.  
None of the respondents mentioned that the municipalities make use of radio 
announcement, local newspapers, municipal accounts, ward committee meetings to 
inform the local community about municipal council meetings.   The responses were 
illustrated in Figure 6.46 below.   
 
• Interpretation:  The majority of the respondents indicated that the municipality make 
use of public notice boards, to inform the local community about municipal council 
meetings, while only two respondents indicated that their municipality make use of 
other communication methods such as a load hailing system to inform the local 
community about municipal council meetings. In Chapter 5, Section 5.11.3 of this 
study, it was mentioned that in terms of Section 21 of the MSA, 2000 municipalities 
should provide information to local communities through the media, such as local 
newspapers, and radio broadcasts.  It was argued that community participation is a 
constitutional requirement, therefore, the MM of the affiliated local municipalities of 
the Lejweleputswa District Municipality should use more than one method to inform 
the community about open council meetings.   
 







Sub theme:   Communication methods to 
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6.9.2.2 Findings on the question how often do you attend local council meetings 
 
The aim of the question was to determine how often the ward councillors attend the municipal 
council meetings (sub-theme 2). 
 
• Responses:  Two of the respondents mentioned that they attended all municipal council 
meetings, while one respondent indicated occasionally, and two respondents responded 
that they attend the municipal council meetings only once. The responses are illustrated 
in Figure 6.47 below.  
 
• Interpretation:  The majority of the respondents mentioned that they either attended 
every meeting or only once.  A concern is that one ward councillor mentioned that 
he/she only attend the municipal council meetings occasionally.  In Chapter 5, Section 
5.10.3, Section 5.10.4, and Section 5.10.5 of the study it was mentioned that ward 
councillors must attend all municipal council meetings.   
 
Figure 6.47: Attendance of local municipal council meetings 
 
 
6.9.2.3 Findings on the questions about local community participation forums  
 
The following three questions were asked: 
• Question 1.  In your local municipal council what forums exist for community 
participation (Sub-theme 3)? 
• Question 2.  How often did you attend any of these forums for community participation 










Every meeting Occasionally Attended once
Sub theme:  Attendance of council meetings
Percentage
© Central University of Technology, Free State
354 
 
• Question 3.  In your opinion how effective are the forums for community participation 
in your local municipal council l (Sub-theme 5)? 
 
The aim of the questions was to determine what forums exist, how often have the ward 
councillors attend these forum meetings and how effective are the IDP forum, and the ward 
committee to promote community participation within the municipality.   
 
• Responses:  On question 1 two of the respondents responded that the Community Work 
Participation (CWP) forum exists in their municipality concerning community 
participation.  Two of the respondents (ward committee members) indicated that they 
don’t know what community participation forums exist for community participation, 
while one ward councillor indicated that there are no forums for community 
participation in their municipality. It appears that only one of the two local 
municipalities established a community participation forum.  Concerning question 2, a 
total of 3 of the respondents indicated that they never attended any community 
participation forum meetings, while two respondents mentioned that they attended the 
community participation forum meeting only once.  It was argued above that it seems 
that only one of the local municipalities establish a community participation forum and 
therefore, only two respondents indicated that thy attended the community participation 
forum.  On question 3 two of the respondents mentioned that the forums for community 
participation is non-existent in their municipality, while two respondents mentioned it 
is effective and only one respondent mentioned very effective. The responses were 
illustrated in Figure 6.48, Figure 6.49 and Figure 6.50 below.  
 
• Interpretation:  The responses to question 1 reveal that there is only one municipal 
council forum for community participation, namely the CWP forum in the two affiliated 
local municipalities, namely, Tokologo and Tswelopele, of the Lejweleputswa District 
Municipality.  In Chapter 5 of this study it was mentioned that community participation 
is a constitutional requirement.  It was further accentuated in Chapter 5, Section 5.11 
of this study, that municipalities should established many forums and other 
participatory means to involve citizens in decision-making process such as dialog 
forums such as the IDP or Local Economic Development (LED) forums, sectoral 
forums and other applicable ward-based forums.  From the above findings one could 
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argue that although at least one forum exists, namely the Community Development 
Work (CDW) forum, the local municipalities should prioritise community participation 
and ensure that more community forums are established to give effect to the 
constitutional requirement of community participation.   One could further argue from 
the responses on question 2 and question 3 above that the ward committee members 
who are the custodians of community participation should be involved in community 
participation forums to promote effective participation of local communities and 
therefore the ward committee members should ensure that they attend the community 
forum meetings. 
 
Figure 6.48 Local municipal council forums for community participation 
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Figure 6.50: Effectiveness of the forums for community participation  
 
 
6.9.2.4 Findings on the questions about recommendations made by ward committee 
members to the municipal council and about the representativeness of ward committees   
 
Question 1.  Do you, through the ward committees or through the IDP meetings make 
recommendations to the municipal council regarding developmental priorities (Sub-theme 6)? 
Question 2.  Is the ward committee representative in terms of gender, disability, variety of 
stakeholders, race, geographical location and age (Sub-theme 7)? 
 
The aim of the question was to determine whether the ward committees make any 
recommendations to the municipal council concerning developmental priorities of the local 
community either through the ward committee or the IDP meetings.  The aim of question 2 
was to determine the representativeness of ward committees. 
 
• Responses:  On question 1 above two of the respondents responded that they don’t 
know, one said never, while two respondents mentioned that the ward committees/IDP 
committee made recommendations to the municipal council concerning the 
developmental priorities of the local community.  On question 2 two of the respondents 
answered that there is representativeness in the ward committee related to gender and 
to disability, while only one respondent that race is represented in the ward committee.  
None of the respondents refer to any of the other categories of representativeness such 
as geographical location, age and variety of stakeholder.  The responses were illustrated 
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• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could interpret that the half of the 
respondents mentioned that the ward committee never made or they don’t know 
whether the ward committee made any recommendations to the municipal council, 
while the other half of the respondents agree that the ward committee made any 
recommendations regarding the developmental priorities of the local community. In 
Chapter 5 of this study it was mentioned that in terms of Section 5 of the MSA, 2000 
that members of the local community have the right to contribute to the decision-
making processes of the municipality by submitting written or oral recommendations, 
representations and complaints to the municipal council. In Chapter 5, Section 5.11.3 
of this study, it was accentuated that the ward committee is the mechanisms through 
which the developmental needs of the local community should be communicated.  
Therefore, one could argue that the ward committee must make recommendations to 
the municipal council regarding the developmental priorities of the local community. It 
is a concern if ward committee members are not sure or indicated that the ward 
committee never made any recommendations to the municipal council regarding the 
developmental priorities of the local community.  Either the ward committee members 
are not well informed about their role to make recommendations to the municipal 
council concerning the developmental priorities or one could argue that the ward 
committees itself has a functionality challenge.  From the responses concerning the 
representativeness of the ward committee one could interpret that it is positive that the 
committee makes provision for people with special needs (disabled people) to serve on 
the ward committee however, it is a concern that none of the respondents made any 
mentioned about the representativeness of a variety of stakeholder, geographical 
location and age. In particular, the various stakeholder should be involved such as 
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Figure 6.51: Ward committee give recommendations to municipal council regarding 
development priorities  
 
 
Figure 6.52: Ward committees’ representativeness 
 
 
6.9.2.5 Findings on the questions about co-ordination of community participation and 
consultative meetings regarding the municipal budget and conflicting matters  
 
Question 1.  Is there someone within the local municipal council who is responsible for /co-
ordinating community participation (Sub-theme 8)? 
Question 2.  How many consultative meetings were held to discuss the most recent municipal 
budget (Sub-theme 9)? 
Question 3.  Has there any conflict within the municipal council in the past year, and if any 
what was the conflict about (Sub-theme 10)?   
 
The aim of the question 1 above was to determine whether the local municipality makes 
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sought to determine whether the local municipality consult with the local community regarding 
the annual budget.  Question 3 sought to determine if any conflict existed within the municipal 
council, what the conflict was, whether it was water and or electricity supply, road conditions, 
corruption, and or poor performance of councillors or officials, unemployment, crime or any 
other type of matters.  
 
• Responses:  On question 1 above two of the respondents mentioned that there is 
someone in the local municipality responsible to co-ordinate community participation, 
while two of the respondents mentioned that there is no one within the local 
municipality who co-ordinate community participation while one respondent 
mentioned that he/she did not know.  On question 2 about the number of consultative 
meetings held to discuss the municipal budget two respondents responded that no 
consultative meetings took place to discuss the budget, while one respondent mentioned 
four consultative meetings took place and two respondents mentioned that two 
consultative meetings took place to consult on the recent municipal budget.  On 
question 3 above about the occurrence of conflict within the municipal council, two 
respondents mentioned yes, one respondent said no, and two respondents said they 
don’t know.  None of the respondents provided any insight about whether the conflict 
was about water and or electricity supply, road conditions, corruption, and or poor 
performance of councillors or officials, unemployment, crime or any other type of 
conflicting matters. The responses were illustrated below in Figure 6.53, Figure 6.54 
and Figure 6.55.  
 
• Interpretation:  From the above responses about question 1 above one could interpret 
that only one respondent (ward committee member) are aware that someone within the 
local municipality are responsible for community participation, while the other 
respondents don’t know or said there is no one within the local municipality to co-
ordinate community participation.  In Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1.2 it was mentioned that 
in terms of Section 37 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the speaker is responsible 
to co-ordinate the functions of the ward committee.  A concern is that most of the 
respondents were not sure who must co-ordinate the functions of the ward committee.  
One could argue that the functions of the ward committee is not a priority in both 
Tokologo Local Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality of the 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
360 
 
Lejweleputswa District Municipality.  It is a concern that two of the respondents 
mentioned that there were no consultative meetings about the recent municipal budget 
to consult with the local community.  One could argue that the reason why the 
respondents responds in this manner on question 2, could be that in Section 6.9.2.2 only 
two of the respondents mentioned that they attended all municipal council meetings, 
while one respondents responded occasionally, and two respondents responded that 
they attend the municipal council meetings only once. It was mentioned in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.10.3, Section 5.10.4, and Section 5.10.5 of the study, that ward councillors 
must attend all municipal council meetings.  It was further mentioned, in Chapter 5 of 
this study, that in terms of Section 19(2) of the MSA, 2000 provides that the municipal 
council may not exclude the public, including the media, when considering voting on 
any of the following matters; a draft by-law tabled in the council; a budget tabled in the 
council; the draft IDP, or any amendment of the IDP; the draft performance 
management plan, or any amendment of the plan tabled in council; the decision to enter 
into a service delivery agreement; or any other matter prescribed by regulation.  In 
Chapter 5, Section 5.11.3 of this study, it was mentioned that the municipal council 
must inform the community, including the ward councillors who represent the local 
committee on the date, time and venue of consultative municipal council meetings.  One 
could further argue that this could also be an indication that the ward committee 
members are not well informed about consultative meetings of the municipal council.  
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Figure 6.54 Number of budget consultative meeting with local communities 
 
 
Figure 6.55 Conflict within local municipal council in the past year 
 
 
6.9.2.6 Summary on the interpretations of questions 6.9.2.1 to 6.9.2.5 
 
On the question on how their local community is informed about Municipal council meetings, 
40% of respondents stated that they are informed through loud hailing and 60% indicated that 
they get informed by public notice boards. On the question on how often respondents attended 
local municipal council meetings, findings showed that 40% of respondents attend every 
meeting, 20% of respondents occasionally attend municipal council meetings and another 40% 
attended municipal council meeting once a year. It was argued that except for public notice 
boards and load hailing systems, more communication methods such as radio and community 
newspapers should be used to inform the community about municipal council meetings. 
 
On whether they had knowledge of forums for public participation in their municipality, 40% 
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they do not know. It was argued that the speaker is responsible to co-ordinate the functions of 
the ward committee. On the attendance of these forums for community participation in the past 
year, 60% of respondents never attended any of these forums for community participation in 
the past year and 40% indicated that they only attended once in the past year. On how effective 
forums were for community participation in their local municipal council, 40% of respondents 
indicated that the effectiveness of community forums is non-existent, 20% claimed that 
community forums are very ineffective and 40% said they are effective. It was argued that the 
establishment of community participation forums such as CDW, IDP, LED and other sectoral 
forums in all affiliated local municipalities of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality should 
be prioritise, to promote effective community participation in the affairs of the municipality.   
 
On the question of whether respondents give recommendations to local municipal council 
through their ward committees regarding their development priorities, 40% of respondents 
indicated that they had never given recommendations, 20% said they regularly give 
recommendations and 40% claimed that they do not know. In Chapter 5 of this study it was 
mentioned that in terms of Section 5 of the MSA, 2000 that members of the local community 
have the right to contribute to the decision-making processes of the municipality by submitting 
written or oral recommendations, representations and complaints to the municipal council. It 
was further argued that one of the roles of a ward committee is to make recommendations to 
the municipal council regarding any matter affecting the ward. One could argue, that more 
needs to be done to capacitate the ward committees in all affiliated local municipalities of the 
Lejweleputswa District Municipality, to actively participate in the affairs of the municipality 
including to make recommendations to the municipal council regarding the matters that affect 
the ward. 
  
On whether Ward Committees are representatives of the general community stakeholders, 40% 
of respondents indicated that gender is well represented, another 40% illustrated that various 
stakeholders are represented and 20% believe that geographical location is represented. It was 
emphasised that in terms of Section 17 of the MSA, 2000 municipalities must create conditions 
to allow members of the community, such as disabled people, other disadvantaged groups and 
people who are illiterate, to participate in the affairs of the municipality.  On the question of 
whether there is someone within the local municipal council who is responsible for co-
ordinating community participation, 40% of respondents believed that there is someone 
responsible for co-ordinating community participation and the other 40% said they do not 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
363 
 
know. 20% pointed out that there is no one. In terms of section 37 of the Municipal Structures 
Act of 1998 the speaker must co-ordinate the functions of the ward committee.  On the question 
on how many consultative meetings were held to discuss the most recent municipal budget, 
40% of respondents specified that there were two consultative meetings held to discuss the 
most recent municipal budget, 20% held that there were four such meetings in a year, and 40% 
said at least five times. It was argued that in terms of Section 19(2) of the MSA, 2000 that the 
municipal council may not exclude the public, including the media, when considering voting 
on any of the following matters; a draft by-law tabled in the council; a budget tabled in the 
council; the draft IDP, or any amendment of the IDP; the draft performance management plan, 
or any amendment of the plan tabled in council; the decision to enter into a service delivery 
agreement; or any other matter prescribed by regulation.  On the question of whether has there 
been any conflict within their local municipal council in the past year, 40% of respondents said 
there were conflicts within their local municipality, another 40% claimed that there were no 
conflicts and 20% said they do not know.  
 
6.9.3 Section 3:  Administrative Accountability Theme 2:  Quality of Service Delivery (8 
Sub-themes) 
 
Findings of the closed-ended statements based on the five-point Likert scale (1-very poor, 2 -
poor, 3 -fair, 4 -good and 5- excellent) of each of the sub-themes statements attached to the 
administrative accountability theme 2, quality of service delivery were discussed below.     
 
6.9.3.1 Statement 1.  Sub-theme 1:  Employees of the municipality have the knowledge to 
answer the questions of the local community. 
 
• Responses:  On this question the more than 50% majority of respondents ranked 
municipal employees from poor to fair.  
• Interpretation:  It is discontenting to note that respondents actually do not think highly 
of municipal employees. If people tasked with informing local communities about 
services provided by the municipalities seem to be ignorant, then communities at local 
government will remain misinformed and uninformed. Uninformed communities easily 
resort to unbecoming actions such as violent protests.   
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6.9.3.2 Statement 2.   Sub-theme 2: The local municipal council has employees who give 
members of the local community personal attention 
 
• Responses: Respondents rated municipal workers fair; again, none ranked them good 
to excellent.  
• Interpretation:  A seemingly forgotten Batho-Pele principles is lacking in these 
municipalities. It is the duty of administrative personnel to attend to the needs of 
community members without bias or favour. 
 
6.9.3.3 Statement 3.  Sub-theme 3:  When the local municipal council promises to do 
something by a certain time it does so 
 
• Responses: In this question almost all five respondents ranked their municipal council 
as very poor, with only one respondent indicating fair.  
• Interpretation:  One could observe that the level of trust is low and maybe this could 
be related to a few promises normally made during election time but never fulfilled. 
However, it was argued, in Chapter 5, Section 5.13 of this study, that most community 
members are not sufficiently informed on how to participate meaningfully in the affairs 
of the municipality that makes municipal functionaries less willing to consider the 
views of local communities.    
 
6.9.3.4 Statement 4.  Sub-theme 4. The local municipal council make repairs the first time 
and quickly when reported 
 
• Responses:  Again, on this statement the majority of the respondents indicated that 
repairs take long to be done and at times they are not done at all. Respondents ranked 
their local municipality at very poor to poor.  
• Interpretation:  The infrastructure of the two municipalities is in a state of disrepair 
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6.9.3.5 Statement 5.  Sub-theme 5:  The local municipal council has adequate resources 
(vehicles, personnel etc.) to perform its functions 
 
• Responses:  Respondents ranked their local council as poor to fair, but none ranked 
them as good or excellent.  
• Interpretation:  This showed that municipalities are under-resourced to perform their 
service delivery mandate. Another concern is that the lack of skilled and ethical 
personnel at times lead to misuse of budgeted local government financial resources.   In 
Chapter 3 of this chapter it was mentioned that the executive mayor is responsible to 
review the performance of the municipality to improve the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of the municipality.  Thus, more needs to be done to ensure that both local 
municipalities improve their overall performance to ensure that they fulfil their 
statutory obligations to provide services to the local community.    
 
6.9.3.6 Statement 6.  Sub-Theme 6:  Employees of the municipality are always willing to help 
members of the local community 
• Responses:  On this statement, respondents ranked municipal employees from poor to 
fair with none responding as good or excellent.  
• Interpretation:  As primary providers of basic services, municipal employees are 
expected to understand the needs of their communities and attend to them in the most 
effective and efficient manner. 
 
6.9.3.7 Statement 7.  Sub-theme 7: Employees of the municipality are always punctual and 
willing to work extra hours to help members of the local community 
 
• Responses:  Again, respondents ranked municipal employees from poor to fair.  
• Interpretation:  The above responses showed that the two local municipalities are 
underperforming. It was argued that late coming is a sign of unmotivated or indolent 
municipal personnel. This poor ranking also pointed to municipalities that have 
inadequate accountability and oversight mechanisms in their structures to hold 
functionaries to account for their actions or inactions.  As mentioned, in Chapter 5 of 
this study, the MM is responsible and accountable to the municipal council for the 
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performance of the municipality’s administration.  Thus, the MM needs to do ensure 
that administrative staff are always punctual and fulfilling their administrative tasks. 
 
6.9.3.8 Statement 8.  Sub-theme 8: The municipality area/environment is clean, and refuse is 
collected regularly 
• Responses:  In this question respondents ranked their local municipality as very poor 
to poor.  Piles of uncollected rubbish could be seen in many open spaces and street 
corners. 
• Interpretation:  Regular refuse removal is one of the services required from the 
municipality in terms of Schedule 5 (Part B) of the Constitution, 1996.   
 
6.9.3.9 Summary on the interpretations of administrative accountability theme 2, quality 
of service delivery  
 
The provision of service is a constitutional obligation provided in Schedule 4 (Part B) and 
Schedule 5 (Part B). In Chapter 3 of this study it was provided that in terms of Section 56 of 
the Municipal Structures Act, the executive mayor must oversee the provision of services to 
communities in the municipality in a sustainable manner.  From the above feedback of the 
responses and interpretations of theme 2 quality of service delivery and the 8 sub-themes, one 
could argue that both Tokologo Local Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality of the 
Lejweleputswa District Municipality have serious challenges in the provision of quality service 
delivery.  Responses from the interviews of the ward committee members showed that quality 
of service delivery is at the lowest, from very poor to poor.  Noticeable interventions and visible 
consequence management should be implemented to address this apparent lack of 
accountability and oversight functions to give effect to the constitutional requirement to 
promote accountable local government to local communities.  
 
6.9.4 Section 4: Administrative Accountability. Theme 3: Current Service Delivery 
Performance of the municipality (15 Sub-themes) 
 
Findings of the closed-ended statements based on the five- point liker scale (1-very poor, 2 -
poor, 3 -fair, 4 -good and 5- excellent) of each of the sub-themes (statements attached to the 
administrative accountability theme 3, current service delivery performance were discussed 
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below. The delivery of services is a constitutional obligation provided in Schedule 4 (Part B) 
and Schedule 5 (Part B) of the Constitution, 1996.   In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 of this study, 
it was indicated that the executive mayor of the municipality is responsible to oversee the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner. The executive mayor reports to 
the municipal council concerning the provision of services.   
 
6.9.4.1. Statement 1.  Sub-theme 1: Overall cleanliness of town/street (refuse removal) 
 
• Responses:  On the overall cleanliness of town/street (refuse removal), this statement 
solicited responses ranking from very poor to poor with none indicating good or 
excellent service delivery.  
• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could interpret that both selected local 
municipalities under performed in the provision of refuse removal and the overall 
cleanliness of town/streets. This poses a health risk for the particular community.  As 
mentioned above, refuse removal is a constitutional obligation as provided in Schedule 
5 (Part B) of the Constitution, 1996.    
 
6.9.4.2 Statement 2.  Sub-theme 2: Quality of roads and streets 
 
• Responses:  Respondents ranked the quality of roads and streets as very poor.  Tarred 
roads are now full of potholes and are in a state of disrepair. In some areas such as 
Dealesville, an apartheid era tar road is now a gravel road. Houses get flooded because 
of the absence of proper drainage system. 
• Interpretation:  From the responses one could argue that both selected municipalities 
performance related underperformed in the provision of quality of roads and streets. 
Tarred roads are now full of potholes and are in a state of disrepair. In some areas such 
as Dealesville, a tar road from the era before 1994 democratic elections, is now a gravel 
road. Houses get flooded because of the absence of proper drainage system.  The 
maintenance of municipal roads is a constitutional obligation as provided in Schedule 
5 (Part B) of the Constitution, 1996. In terms of Schedule 4 (Part B) of the Constitution, 
1996 the municipality is responsible for storm water management systems in build-up 
areas.  Thus, the executive mayor has to oversee the provision of services, of which 
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municipal roads and storm water management systems cannot be excluded, to 
communities in the municipality in a sustainable manner.  
6.9.4.3 Statement 3.  Sub-theme 3: Provision of housing 
 
• Responses:  On the statement provision of housing the respondents ranked the 
performance as poor to fair. A noticeable number of informal settlements with no basic 
services could be observed on the outskirts of formal housing settlements. 
• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could interpreted that both local 
municipalities underperform in the provision of housing. 
 
6.9.4.4 Statement 4.  Sub-theme 4: Overall provision and control of water 
 
• Responses:  On the statement overall provision and control of water, respondents 
ranked their local municipality as fair, with one respondent indicating that it is good. 
The problem that respondents indicated is frequent water cuts. 
• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could argue that both municipalities 
provide water services to local residents in a fair to good manner, but frequent water 
cuts remain a challenge.  In terms of Schedule 4 (Part B) the provision of water and 
sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic wastewater 
and sewage disposal systems is   
 
6.9.4.5 Statement 5.  Sub-theme 5: Quality of water 
 
• Responses:  On the statement about the quality of water supplied, the respondents were 
divided, with one respondent indicating that it is excellent while others claimed that it 
is poor to fair.  
• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could interpret that the majority of the 
respondents indicated that the two selected municipalities underperforms in the 
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6.9.4.6 Statement 6. A Sub-theme 6: Assistance to small-scale communal farmers  
 
• Responses: On the statement about the assistance to small-scale communal farmers, all 
the respondents indicated very poor to poor.  
• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could argue that both of the selected 
local municipalities underperforms in the area of assistance to small-scale communal 
farmers.  The quality of livestock grazing on barren overgrazed fields around townships 
is a testimony to these responses. 
 
6.9.4.7 Statement 7. Sub-theme 7: Provision of electricity 
 
• Responses:  On the statement about the provision of electricity, respondents ranked 
their municipality from fair to excellent. Some complained of frequent load-shedding.   
• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could interpret that the performance of 
both selected local municipalities is fair to excellent irrespective of frequent load-
shedding that could be directly attributed to late or non- payment by municipalities for 
services rendered by ESKOM.     
 
6.9.4.8 Statement 8.  Sub-theme 8: Recreational facilities (parks, playing grounds etc.) 
 
• Responses: Respondents ranked their municipality from very poor and to poor 
concerning access to recreational facilities such as parks and playing grounds.    
• Interpretation:  From the responses it is clear that in both of the selected local 
municipalities underperform with the provision of recreation facilities.  From the 
responses one could further argue that children do not have safe places to play after 
school hours and this may be the result of social ills prevalent in these communities.  
 
6.9.4.9 Statement 9. Sub-theme 9: Provision of sanitation 
 
• Responses:  On the statement about the provision of sanitation, respondents ranked 
provision of sanitation as poor to fair. In one town the whole community does not have 
a sewage system, with residents using either buckets system or pit toilets or sceptic 
tanks buried in their properties. 
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• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could interpret that on one of the 
selected local municipalities, underperforms in the provision of sanitation services to 
the local community due to the fact that the residents of one local community still make 
use of either buckets systems of pit toilets or sceptic tanks.  The responses from the 
other selected local municipality rated the performance of the provision of sanitation 
services as fair.   The municipal council should ensure that the developmental needs 
including the provision of proper sanitation services is listed as a priority in its IDP. 
 
6.9.4.10 Statement 10. Sub-theme 10: Public facilities (toilets, taxi/bus ranks) 
 
• Responses:  On the statement about public facilities (toilets, taxi/bus ranks) the 
respondents ranked public facilities such as toilets, taxi or bus ranks as very poor to 
poor. From the observation, taxi ranks are informal or not properly maintained and there 
are no public toilets. 
• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could interpreted that the two local 
municipalities underperform in the area of the provision of public facilities such as 
public toilets, taxi/bus ranks.  
 
6.9.4.11 Statement 11. Sub-theme 11: Provision of primary health services 
 
• Responses: On the statement about provision of primary health services respondents 
ranked their municipalities as fair to good. The provision of primary health service is 
however a function performed by the provincial government on behalf of these local 
municipalities. 
• Interpretation:  From the above one could argue that the communities of the two 
selected local municipalities have access to primary-health services as provided by the 
Free State Provincial Department of Health on behalf of the local municipalities.    
 
6.9.4.12 Statement 12.  Sub-theme 12: Wi-Fi and internet connectivity 
 
• Responses: On the statement regarding Wi-Fi and internet connectivity, all respondents 
ranked their municipalities as very poor. It should be noted that public provision of Wi-
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Fi and internet connectivity in public spaces such as public libraries are still unheard of 
in the two selected local municipalities. 
• Interpretation:  From the above responses one could interpret that the two selected 
local municipalities underperformed by providing Wi-Fi and internet connectivity in 
public areas such as public libraries    
 
6.9.4.13 Statement 13.  Sub-theme 13: Assistance to informal traders and small businesses 
e.g. trading spaces 
 
• Responses: All respondents of the two local municipalities ranked their municipal 
council assistance to informal traders and small business by providing public trading 
space as very poor. Informal traders and small businesses conduct their businesses in 
open spaces or make-shift structures. 
• Interpretation:  The two selected local municipalities underperform in the provision 
of public spaces for informal traders and small business. 
 
6.9.4.14 Statement 14.  Sub-theme 14: Provision of fire services 
 
• Responses: All respondents ranked their municipalities as very poor to poor on this 
question. Fire services are located far away at district offices and are shared by many 
towns. 
Interpretation:  From the above responses one could argue that the provision of fire services 
is non-existent in the two local municipalities because fire services are located far away at 
district offices and are shared by many towns. 
 
6.9.4.15 Statement 15. Sub-theme 15: Provision of site-and service residential sites for 
middle income groups 
• Responses: On the statement about the provision of site-and-service residential sites 
for middle income groups, respondents ranked their municipality as very poor. There 
is an overall lack of housing opportunities for middle income groups resulted in local 
municipalities not being able to recruit top-class talent to the area.    
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• Interpretation:  The provision of site-and residential site services for middle income 
groups remain a challenge, therefore one could argue that the two selected local 
government municipalities underperform in this area.   
 
6.9.4.16 Summary of the interpretations of theme 3 - current service delivery 
performance of the municipality 
 
The provision of service is a constitutional obligation provided in Schedule 4 (Part B) and 
Schedule 5 (Part B). In Chapter 3 of this study it was provided that in terms of Section 56 of 
the Municipal Structures Act, the executive mayor must oversee the provision of services to 
communities in the municipality in a sustainable manner.  From the responses and 
interpretations of findings of theme 3 one could argue that the current service delivery 
performance of local both Tokologo Local Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality 
of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality remains a challenge. Apart from sub-themes 
provision of primary health services and provision of electricity, almost all respondents 
indicated very poor to poor service delivery performance at municipalities. It should however 
be noted that primary health care is provided by the provincial government and electricity is 
partly distributed by ESCOM. Both municipalities must ensure that they pay ESCOM for 
services rendered to the municipality.  That municipalities do not intervene in creating 
opportunities for communities to be self-sufficient and self-reliant is of concern. Assisting 
small-scale live-stock farmers and informal traders would go a long way in addressing 
unemployment and poverty reduction.   
 
That children do not have recreational parks and facilities creates a worrisome behaviour from 
the youth. Anti-social behaviour such as drug abuse and crime strive easily in an environment 
where much of the youth is roaming the streets aimlessly. It is also disturbing to note that a 
facility such as Wi-Fi provision is still a luxury enjoyed by those who can afford it. Lately, 
internet connectivity is viewed as one of the basic services provided by local governments. The 
much talked about fourth industrial revolution is based on communities that are technologically 
savvy. Lack of public ablution facilities naturally create a health hazard with serious 
consequences. Lastly, lack of housing opportunities for middle income groups resulted in local 
municipalities not being able to recruit top-class talent. That emphasis is on provision of low-
cost housing and neglecting middle-income earners show lack of holistic planning on the part 
of municipal administrative personnel and their political principals. 
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6.10 SUMMARY  
 
This chapter outlined the research methodology followed in the study and discussed the 
analysis and interpretations of the data, giving empirically derived interpretations in each case. 
The demographic profile of the respondents was firstly examined. 
 
From the findings of the self-administered semi-structured questionnaire completed by MMs, 
chief financial manager, mayor or executive mayor of the Mangaung Metropolitan 
Municipality, the four district municipalities, and 10 of the 18 local municipalities in the Free 
State province, it was emphasised that the majority (82.4%) of the respondents strongly agreed 
or agreed that municipal elections are a good tool to ensure accountability and transparency for 
political office-bearers. However, it was argued voters do not have any direct way of holding 
elected representatives to account during the term for which they have been elected. It was 
further argued the latter deficit in local accountability begs the question whether a recall 
procedure would be an appropriate vehicle to enhance local accountability. Neither the 
Constitution, 1996 nor any of the legislation provides for a recall procedure.  
 
It was accentuated that, the majority of the respondents (53%) disagreed, or strongly disagreed 
with the statement on whether municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative 
functions of the municipality. This finding is in contradiction with the Auditor-General reports 
for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, the Auditor-General warned that political interferences in the 
administration weakened oversight (AGSA, 2018:3; AGSA, 2019:12).  It was argued that that 
most municipalities of the country of which municipalities in the Free State province cannot 
be excluded are dysfunctional due to political interference, political faction infighting that 
weakens political oversight that often leads to mismanagement of limited financial resources.   
 
It was mentioned that although the majority of the respondents confirmed that local government 
legislative acts and policies are understood by all political officials the findings is in 
contradiction with the Auditor-General report on the audit outcomes of 2017-2018, that that 
the vulnerable financial position of all (100%) of the municipalities in the Free State, is the 
result of the increase in irregular expenditure and non-compliance with legislated rules and 
SCM regulations. It was argued that if political officials do not have a sound knowledge of 
applicable local government legislation, how will they be able to hold the executives to account 
for non-compliance with legislative rules.  It was argued that the political leaders responsible 
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for oversight should receive training concerning the key local government legislated rules and 
SCM regulations to ensure that they will oversee the effective implementation thereof.  
 
It was accentuated that 47.1% disagreed with the statement that municipal councillors do not 
clearly understand the role of portfolio committees, audit committees and municipal 
performance audit committees. It was argued that no committee can function effectively if the 
political leaders (mayor or municipal council members) do not understand the function of 
Section 80 committees or the function of a key oversight bodies such as MPACs.  Another 
concern is that, the majority (64.7%) of the respondents strongly agreed, or agreed with the 
statement, that there is no consequence management for breaking the Code of Conduct for 
Municipal Councillors as contained in Schedule 1 of MSA, 2000.  It implies that that there is 
no consequence management for breaking the Code of Conduct for Municipal Councillors in 
their municipalities. It was argued that this finding is in agreement with the literature provided 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.10 of this study, where it was mentioned that the development of a 
culture of no consequences is a result of inadequate oversight and performance systems and 
process; and disobeying and continued non-compliances with key municipal legislations 
creates an environment that makes it easy to commit fraud and corruption within 
municipalities. It was argued that municipal councillors must receive training concerning the 
Code of Conduct for Municipal Councillors.  It was further highlighted that the majority 
(64.7%) of the respondents either disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the statement that they 
have not heard or read about cases of corruption being experienced in their municipality in the 
past year.  The above findings are in contradiction with the findings of the Auditor-General.  It 
was argued that most fraud and corruption in local government occurs through the SCM and 
procurement processes.   
 
It was accentuated that the majority (64.6.8%) of respondents disagreed with the statement that 
statement that the municipal political and administrative officials have a proper understanding 
of the MFMA, 2003. The findings correspond with the findings of the Auditor- General, 2017-
2018 audit outcomes of municipalities in the Free-State, which confirmed that that the 
deterioration of the local government environment of municipalities in the Free State province 
was evident in the vulnerable financial position of all (100%) of the municipalities due to the 
increase in irregular expenditure and non-compliance with legislated rules of which the MFMA, 
2003 cannot be excluded. It was argued that despite the support from National Treasury and 
Provincial Treasury, The Auditor-General reported in the 2017-2018 audit report that all 
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municipalities of the Free State municipalities financial positions had deteriorated, and it 
resulted in the increase in irregular expenditure and non-compliance with MFMA, 2003 and 
SCM regulations.  
 
It was that 50% of the respondents strongly disagree or disagreed that municipal mayors clearly 
understand their respective oversight roles in municipal financial management and 
administration corresponds with the findings of the Auditor-General as mentioned, in Chapter 
4 of this study, that municipal councils including municipal mayors clearly do not understand 
their respective oversight roles in municipal financial management and administration. The 
discussion about the findings, on the question as to whether the executive mayor or executive 
committee oversees the performance of its officials by taking budgetary monthly reports 
seriously, the majority of the respondents (52.9%) indicated that they do not know, which is a 
concern.   In Chapter 4, Section 4.8.2 of this study, it was emphasised that the executive mayor 
or the executive committee is expected to oversee the performance of its officials, using the 
SDBIP and monitoring performance through monthly progress reports.  The findings on the 
question of whether the non-executive councillors always hold the executive mayor or 
committee accountable by monthly, quarterly and annual financial reports, it was indicated that 
the majority of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. It was emphasised 
in Chapter 4, Section 4.8.2, of this study that non-executive councillors are expected to hold 
both the executive mayor or committee and the officials accountable for performance, on the 
basis of monthly, quarterly and annual reports (National Treasury, 2004:5).  
 
The findings, on the statement as to whether the municipal executive mayor or committee 
implements the recommendations of the Auditor-General, the majority of the respondents 
strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement.  It was emphasised in Chapter 4 of this 
study there is a rapid deterioration of accountability of all municipalities of the Free State 
province, as showed in the Auditor-Generals audit outcomes of municipalities of the 2017-
2018 financial year.  It was argued that it is a clear indication that MMs as the accounting 
officers, mayors, CFOs and relevant officials in most municipalities including metropolitan 
municipalities should be accountable for any financial losses incurred by municipalities during 
their term in office.  It was argued that in the Free State province especially, most municipalities 
showed a total collapse in internal controls in that the political leadership (mayors or executive 
mayors and municipal councils) in all municipalities in the province exhibited no responses to 
improve political oversight and accountability for financial and performance management. 
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It was found that the majority of the respondents, strongly agreed and agreed that the municipal 
council does not fulfil their oversight function concerning municipal SCM effectively. In 
Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1 of this study, it was emphasised that mayors and councillors must 
critically assess information and SCM deviations before making any decisions.  
 
A concern is that the majority of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed with the 
statement on whether mayor or councillor can authorise the spending of municipal funds. This 
disagreement is also substantiated, in Chapter 3 of this study, where the National Treasury 
(2004:20) maintained that the MM must be the accounting officer responsible for all funds 
managed by the municipality. It follows that no mayor or councillor or official can be 
responsible for any funds or authorise the spending of funds. 
 
The findings on the statement as to whether, municipal councillors regularly report back at 
least quarterly to their constituencies on the performance of the municipality, showed that the 
majority (47.1%) of the respondents disagreed, or strongly disagreed, with the statement. This 
is in contradiction with the requirements provided in the Schedule 1 of the Code of Conduct 
for Councillors, MSA of 2000 that councillors must be accountable to local communities and 
report back at least on a quarterly basis to constituencies concerning council matters, such as 
the performance of the municipality in terms of established performance indicators.  The results 
of the responses of the respondents are equally divided on the statement as to whether, local 
government is characterised by patronage politics, weak leadership and capacity, financial 
mismanagement and corruption. The findings correspond with the discussion mentioned in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1.2 of this study, that local governments are characterised by patronage 
politics, weak leadership and capacity, financial mismanagement and corruption. CoGTA 
(2009:11) warned that a culture of patronage and nepotism is now so widespread in many 
municipalities that the formal municipal accountability system is ineffective and inaccessible 
to many citizens. On the question on whether, there had being no service delivery 
conflicts/protests within the local municipality a majority (64.7%) of respondents of either 
disagreed, or strongly disagreed, with the statement.  In Chapter 5 of this study it was 
emphasised that the that service delivery protest has become a regular occurrence in 
municipalities in South Africa, with KwaZula-Natal, leading in the number of municipalities 
affected, followed by the Free State and the Eastern Cape. The latter is an indication of local 
communities’ dissatisfaction with the overall performance of municipalities. One could argue 
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that political leaders and municipal officials should do more to promote accountable local 
government to local communities. 
 
The findings and interpretations of the semi-structured interviews that were conducted with 5 
representatives from the ward committees of two of the local municipalities, Tokologo and 
Tswelopele, of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality were summarised below.  A total of 3 
themes and 33 sub-themes (theme 1 (public participation) consisted of 10 sub-themes, theme 
2 (quality of service delivery) consisted of 8 sub-themes, and theme 3 (current service delivery 
performance of municipal council) consisted out of 15 sub-themes) were used to identify the 
current challenges pertaining to public participation and social accountability.  
   
From theme 1 it was accentuated that excepts for public notice boards and communication 
through load hailing systems, more communication methods should be used to communicate 
with local communities. A concern was raised concerning the poor attendance of council 
meetings by ward councillors. It was argued that it is expected from ward councillors to attend 
all municipal council meetings. The municipal council should further ensure that community 
forums function effectively to promote community participation and local accountability.  It 
was argued that community participation is a constitutional requirement, therefore more needs 
to be done to establish and capacitate community participation forums to actively participate 
in the affairs of local government. It was further argued that that more needs to be done to 
capacitate the ward committees in all affiliated local municipalities of the Lejweleputswa 
District Municipality, to actively participate in the affairs of the municipality including to make 
meaningful recommendations to the municipal council regarding the matters that affect the 
ward.   
  
Firstly, there is a tendency that citizens do not know how to engage constructively with 
municipalities and development agencies inadequate capacity building and information sharing 
and guidance on the side of municipalities hampers the function of ward committees. One could 
argue that municipalities do not inform community members about the purpose of their 
participatory structures such as ward committees and community participatory forums that 
hinders meaningful participation and accountability.   The low levels of education of some 
communities make it difficult for them to comprehend effectively and to take part in decision 
that prevent them from making contributions or to hold the municipality to account for their 
actions or inactions.  The low levels of education in some communities make it difficult for 
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them to understand and participate in decision-making, thus preventing them from making 
contributions. Municipalities should devise proper information sharing and participation 
strategies, to ensure that communities are involved in the affairs of local government to 
promote social accountability through participatory structures such as the ward committees and 
community participatory forums. 
 
From theme 2 it was emphasised that both municipalities have serious challenges in the 
provision of quality service delivery in both Tokologo Local Municipality and Tswelopele 
Local Municipality of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality.  It was accentuated that service 
delivery is a constitutional obligation.  It was further mentioned that in terms of Section 56 of 
the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 the executive mayor must oversee the provision of services 
to communities in the municipality in a sustainable manner.  Responses from the interviews of 
the ward committee members showed that quality of service delivery is at the lowest, from 
very poor to poor. Since questions from the interview schedule were mainly about work ethics 
of municipal personnel, it could be deduced that there is lack of accountability and oversight 
with administrative section of these municipalities.  The MM, as the accounting officer, must 
ensure that administrative staff implement action and conduct in accordance with the Code of 
Conduct for Municipal Staff members as contained in Schedule 2 of the MSA, 2000. The 
apparent absence of accountability and oversight has led to local municipalities’ 
underperformance and the resultant negative audit findings. From theme 3 it was argued that 
the current service delivery performance of the municipal councils of both the Tokologo Local 
Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
is of poor quality. Almost all respondents indicated very poor to poor service delivery 
performance at municipalities, except for the sub-themes provision of primary health services 
and provision of electricity. It was found that municipalities do not intervene in creating 
opportunities for communities to be self-sufficient and self-reliant is of concern.   It was argued 
that noticeable interventions and visible accountable and consequence management should be 
implemented to address this apparent lack of accountability and oversight functions in all 
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In Chapter 6, data was analysed, interpreted and linked with the literature review chapters to 
make some recommendations related to the objectives and research questions of the study.   
 
This final chapter gives a full overview of the entire study. The proposed framework for 
oversight and accountability of municipalities of the Free State province was discussed and 
recommendations made from the literature and empirical study. Possible limitations are 
acknowledged to enlighten the reader of the shortcomings of the study, thereby adding 
credibility to the findings and recommendations about possible further research from this study 
are also made. 
 
7.2 THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
The aim of the study was to contribute positively to instituted oversight and accountability in 
municipalities of the Free State province by developing a framework for oversight and 
accountability to promote democratic local governance. To achieve this aim, a step-by step 
research process was undertaken.  Firstly, the research problem was formulated. Thereafter, 
the study was placed within a theoretical framework and an approach (research methodology, 
design) developed to collect and to analyse data. The study followed a qualitative research 
approach and a descriptive case study research design to reach the research objectives and 
answer the research questions. In addition, the results and findings of the empirical study were 
discussed. Lastly, conclusions were drawn, and recommendations made. The proposed 
framework for oversight and accountability for municipalities of the Free State province were 
illustrated and the components explained.  
 
7.2.1 Step One 
 
This step was the introduction and background of the study, followed by a clearly delineated 
research problem, the aims, objectives and a detailed description of the research questions. 
Literature from various sources such as scientific journals, dissertations, related books, 
policies, Acts and government reports were examined to gain a thorough understanding of 
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oversight and accountability in the South African local government context.  Subsequently, A 
conceptual framework was developed to guide the research process followed in this study. 
Relevant theoretical frameworks of oversight and accountability were examined. Lastly, the 
research methodology, design, research population and sampling, as well as data collection and 
data analysis were outlined.  
 
7.2.2 Step Two 
 
The literature study for this research was qualitative and included statutory and regulatory 
legislative frameworks, journal articles, books, conference papers, internet sources and 
government reports about oversight and accountability of local government. The literature was 
spread over four chapters (Chapter 2 to 5).    
 
7.2.3 Step Three 
 
An empirical study was conducted by administering a semi-structured questionnaire and a 
semi-structured interview schedule.  Chapter 6 of the study outlined the research methodology 
as well as the findings and results of the empirical study. The result was a rich blend which 
ensured that the findings were consistent, allowed for applicability, and emphasised the truth. 
An experienced statistician used three computer-aided programmes, namely, Excel 
spreadsheets, and statistical package, SAS Version 9.2, for analysing the data. Descriptive 
statistics were used to analyse the data of the semi-structured questionnaire and the semi-
structured interviews.  For this study, Cronbach's Alpha coefficient was used to achieve the 
internal reliability and consistency of the research instruments.   
 
7.2.4 Step Four 
 
The last step was to make sense of the findings of the study by drawing conclusions and making 
recommendations. The proposed framework for oversight and accountability of municipalities 
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7.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, Section 1.11.2 of this study, the main objective of the study was to 
develop a proposed oversight and accountability framework to promote oversight and 
accountability within municipalities of the Free State province based on literature analysis and 
an empirical study. Subsequently, the main research question of this study was: What aspects 
should be taken into account in the literature analysis and empirical study to development the 
proposed oversight and accountability framework to promote oversight and accountability in 
municipalities in the Free State province? 
 
The following secondary objectives were formulated: 
• To investigate, through an extensive literature study, the statutory and regulatory 
legislative frameworks, principles and requirements of oversight and accountability in 
the South African public sector, local government particularly.   
• To investigate through an extensive literature, study the political, administrative, 
financial and social accountability structures, requirements, principles, internal and 
external control mechanisms and measures to promote oversight and effective 
accountability within municipalities.  
• To determine the current practices and challenges of oversight and accountability 
(political, administrative, financial and social) in selected municipalities of the Free 
State province. 
• To determine the current challenges pertaining to public participation and social 
 accountability in selected municipalities of the Free State province.   
• To make specific recommendations based on research findings to improve oversight 
 and accountability in municipalities of the Free State province.      
 
The following secondary research questions were used to achieve the objectives as stated 
above:  
 
• What are the principles and requirements of the statutory and regulatory legislative 
framework related to oversight and accountability in the South African public sector, 
especially local government? 
• What structures, principles, requirements, internal and external control mechanisms and 
measures are available based on the extensive literature study to promote oversight and 
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effective political, administrative, financial and social accountability within 
municipalities?    
• What are the current challenges of oversight and accountability (political, 
administrative, financial and social accountability) in selected municipalities of the 
Free State province? 
• What are the current challenges pertaining to public participation and social 
accountability in selected municipalities of the Free State province? 
• What specific recommendations, based on research findings, could be made to improve 
oversight and accountability in municipalities of the Free State province?   
 
7.3.1 Achievement of the research aim, research objectives of this study 
 
7.3.1.1 The aim and main objective of the study  
  
As mentioned in Section 7.2, the aim of the study was to positively contribute to instituted 
oversight and accountability in municipalities of the Free State province by developing a 
framework for oversight and accountability to promote democratic local governance.  The step- 
by-step research process that was undertaken to achieve the aim of the study was discussed in 
Section 7.2 above.    
 
The main objective of the study was to develop a proposed oversight and accountability 
framework to promote oversight and accountability within municipalities of the Free State 
province based on the literature analysis and empirical study. This proposed framework will 
be illustrated and discussed in Section 7 of this chapter. 
 
7.3.1.2   Secondary objective 1 
 
The first secondary objective was to investigate, through an extensive literature study, the 
statutory and regulatory legislative frameworks, principles and requirements of oversight and 
accountability in the South African public sector, specifically local government. While the 
general statutory and regulatory framework and policy guidelines concerning oversight and 
accountability of the three spheres of government were outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.5, the 
key legislative prescripts and policies concerning political, financial, administrative and social 
oversight and accountability were discussed in Chapters 3 to 5 of this study. 
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It was stressed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1 of this study, that Section 151 of the Constitution,  
1996 grants a municipal council legislative and executive powers. Additionally, Section 151(4) 
of the Constitution, 1996 provides that the national and provincial governments may not 
impede or compromise local governments’ right to perform its functions effectively. Based on 
the above, the objectives of local government, as detailed in Section 152(1) of the Constitution, 
1996 were discussed and it was emphasised that local government is mandated to provide 
democratic and accountable government for local communities as well as encourage their 
involvement and those of community organisations in the matters of local government.      
 
It was further accentuated in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3 of this study, that the Public Audit 
Amendment (Act 5 of 2018) empowers the Auditor-General not to just recommend remedial 
action for public financial mismanagement and abuse, but also to enforce them. The Public 
Audit Amendment Act, 2018, Section 3(1B) stipulates that the Auditor-General has the power 
to take any appropriate remedial action, and to issue a certificate of debt, as prescribed, where 
an accounting officer or accounting authority has failed to comply with remedial action. 
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.9 of this study, the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 
predominantly makes provision for the establishment of the different categories of 
municipalities, the division of powers and functions among the categories of municipalities and 
regulates the internal structures of political office-bearers and senior municipal officials.  It 
also specifies the delegation of functions to committees such as established oversight 
committees.  Section 32(1) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 submits that a municipal 
council must develop a system of delegation that will maximise administrative and operational 
efficiency and allow adequate checks and balances. In accordance with that system, appropriate 
powers that may be delegated by a municipality include all powers except the power to approve 
its integrated development plan. These powers and functions may be delegated to the executive 
committee if there is one; the executive mayor if there is one; metropolitan sub-councils if there 
are such councils; ward committees if there are; other committees; elected office-bearers; the 
MM; or any other officials.   
 
Section 44(1) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides the principal committee of the 
municipal council of a municipality that is entitled to establish such is the executive committee. 
This committee receives reports from other committees of the council and must forward these 
reports together with recommendations to the municipal council when it cannot dispose of the 
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matter in terms of its delegated powers. In terms of Section 55(1) of the Municipal Structures 
Act, 1998, if a municipal council chooses to have an executive mayor, he or she is entitled to 
receive reports from committees of the municipal council and to forward these reports together 
with recommendations to the municipal council when the matter cannot be disposed of by him 
or her in terms of his or her delegated powers. 
 
In Section 2.5.9 of this study, it was highlighted that Section 4(2) of the MSA, 2000 specifies 
that the municipal council has the duty to exercise the municipality’s executive and legislative 
authority.  This section holds that the municipal council must use the resources of the 
municipality in the best interests of the local community to promote a democratic and 
accountable local government. It further encourages that municipalities should involve local 
communities in municipal affairs and ensure that municipal services are provided in a 
financially and environmentally sustainable manner to local communities.   
 
It was highlighted in Chapter 2 and 5 of this study, that in terms of Section 5(1)(a) of the MSA, 
2000, members of the local community have the right to contribute to the decision-making of 
the municipality by submitting written or oral recommendations, representations and 
complaints to the municipal councillor, other political structures, political office-bearer or the 
administration of the municipality. Section 5(1)(c) of the MSA, 2000 indicates that members of 
the local community have the right to be informed of decisions of the municipal council, other 
political structures or any political office-bearer of the municipality that affect community 
members’ rights, property and reasonable expectations. 
 
7.3.1.3 Secondary objective 2  
 
The second secondary objective was to investigate, through an extensive literature study, the 
political, administrative, financial and social accountability structures, requirements, 
principles, internal and external control mechanisms and measures to promote oversight and 
effective accountability within municipalities. These political, administrative, financial and 
social accountability structures, requirements, principles, internal and external control 
mechanisms and measures to promote oversight and effective accountability within 
municipalities were discussed in detail in Chapter 3 to 5 of this study. 
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7.3.1.4 Secondary objective 3 
 
The third secondary objective was to determine the current practices and challenges of 
oversight and accountability (political, administrative, financial and social accountability) in 
selected municipalities of the Free State province. These were discussed in the literature 
chapters (Chapter 3 to 5) of this study.  Specific practices and challenges were identified in the 
empirical chapter (Chapter 6) of this study.  
 
In Chapter 2, Section 2.10 of this study, it was mentioned that the Auditor-General (AGSA, 
2018:22) has stated that the majority of municipalities, not excluding those of the Free State 
province, are still facing a number of challenges amongst which the promotion of accountable 
government for local communities.  The failure of municipalities to comply with regulatory 
legislative frameworks and regulations was also cited in this chapter as one of the major 
concerns of promoting effective oversight and accountability.  The Auditor-General (AGSA, 
2018:22) reported that one of the root causes of accountability failures that weakens oversight 
at local government is political interference and infighting of municipal councillors in the 
administration of the municipality.   
 
In Chapter 3 of this study, it was argued that the poor performance of municipalities in the Free 
State province has raised concerns about the key functionality of municipal councils, the 
speaker, mayor and MPAC (Section 79) committees as oversight and accountable structures 
and bodies. It was stated that politicians (mayor or executive mayors) and municipal officials 
in many municipalities are often in conflict resulting in factions within the municipal councils. 
It was reasoned that this situation has a negative impact on service delivery and is not conducive 
to political accountability to citizens. Based on the latest findings of the Auditor-General for 
the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 financial years’ audit outcomes of municipalities in the Free 
State province, one could argue that political oversight and accountability remains a serious 
concern within municipalities of the province. Despite municipal councils being instrumental 
in maintaining representative accountability within the municipality, the Auditor-General’s 
findings of the audit outcomes were that municipal councils of most municipalities, including 
those of the Free State Province, are unable to fulfil their accountability and oversight role 
effectively.  
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In Chapter 4, Section 4.19 of this study, concerns were raised about the functionality of the 
internal audit committees. One of the concerns is that there is a lack of sanctions against 
officials for non-compliance with the MFMA, 2003. Another concern is that nobody pays heed 
to deadlines for giving feedback to the internal audit committee. Another concern is that it is 
difficult for members of the internal audit committee to function without accurate, reliable 
information from management and internal audit units. It was further highlighted, in Chapter 
4, that the municipal council together with the mayor and MM fulfil an important role to 
promote the accountable financial management of the municipality.  The executive committee 
of the municipality is subject to the municipal council to ensure public accountability, while 
individual members of the municipal council (PR councillors) are accountable to the 
taxpayers/voters.  Although the municipal council may delegate some of the financial functions 
to the CFO but, it remains accountable for the municipality’s finances. In addition, the mayor 
is expected to oversee and manage the MM to ensure delivery on the agreed outputs and is 
answerable to the municipal council for promised outcomes. Thus, additional to the municipal 
council exercising oversight of the executive mayor or executive committee it must also 
consider the annual audit report and adopt the oversight report containing the comments on the 
annual audit report.  
 
The continued disregard of internal controls which include proper record keeping, financial 
reporting and compliance with key financial management legislation was also raised as another 
concern. In Section 4.15 of Chapter 4 of this study, it was also accentuated that the continued 
inaction of municipal councils, mayors, MMs and other relevant executives to implement the 
recommendations of the Auditor-General weakened the oversight and accountability of the 
financial affairs of all municipalities in the Free State province.  Moreover, it was highlighted 
that despite there being laws, numerous regulations and a code of conduct related to SCM and 
procurement, continued non-compliance and irregularities, especially in the Free State 
province, have led to a prevailing culture of non-consequences that weakens effective oversight 
and accountability of these municipalities.  It was argued that any decline in the effectiveness 
of internal controls weakens oversight and accountability of the financial management of the 
municipality.    
 
In Chapter 5, Section 5.13 of this study, it was mentioned that the executive mayor and mayoral 
committee oversee the administration of the municipality to ensure effectiveness and efficiency 
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in service delivery. Portfolio committees, such as Section 80 committees, are significant 
structures to promote oversight of the municipal council. Also, as a Section 79 portfolio 
committee, an MPAC is one of the key oversight mechanisms to assist the municipal council 
in holding the executive and municipal administration to account and to ensure the efficient 
and effective use of municipal resources.  Moreover, it was extrapolated in Chapter 5 of this 
study that national strategies and interventions such as the LGTAS and the Back-to-Basic 
campaign (the latest) have failed to yield the required results. Other programmes, such as the 
MASP, to improve municipal leadership, governance, administration, institutional capacity and 
financial management practices were introduced by SALGA to supplement the national 
strategies but failed to produce the required results.  It was also stated in Chapter 5 of this study 
that the MM, as the accounting officer and head of the municipality’s administration, must 
ensure that proper administrative arrangements are in place to promote accountability of the 
administrative function of the municipality. It was argued that failure to give effect to assigned 
responsibilities should result in the removal of the MM from office. 
 
One of the numerous concerns in Chapter 5 of this study was discussed in Section 5.13 and 
concerns defaulters who contributed to most municipalities’ failure to comply with SCM 
legislative frameworks not being held accountable for their actions. This means that municipal 
SCM practitioners (who are part of the municipality administration) have defaulted in SCM 
processes without any action being taken against them.  It was argued that there is an urgent 
need to think of innovative ways to curb corruption and other administrative malpractices 
within municipalities. Another challenge that was emphasised about the administration of 
municipalities (not excluding those in the Free State) was that the lack of clarity of roles and 
responsibilities of administrative technical staff and political office-bearers creates 
opportunities for interference, thereby giving rise to allegations or instances of corruption.  
Many administrative municipal officials’ confusion comes from a lack of knowledge regarding 
who is responsible for the proper implementation of SCM legislation in municipalities. This 
inhibits proper implementation and could lead to poor service delivery.   
 
The functionality of the various mechanisms and internal controls to promote administrative 
accountability to keep the functionaries (political and public officials) under surveillance and 
in check was also raised in Chapter 5 of this study. The accountability of municipal officials to 
elected representatives (political officials) is based on the premise that since elected 
representatives are accountable to local communities, municipal employees must be 
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answerable to said representatives. It was emphasised that there are different institutional 
arrangements and mechanisms such as the SDBIP, the municipality’s IDP and monthly, 
quarterly, mid-year budgets and performance assessment report by which municipal officials 
responsible for the administration of local municipalities can be held accountable by the elected 
representatives.  These are useful mechanism to ensure that the mayor or executive mayor of 
the municipality exercises his or her oversight role regarding the municipal administration.  
However, it appears that local communities in the Free State province fail to hold municipalities 
and functionaries to account for their poor performance (financial, decisions-making and 
actions). The Auditor-General (AGSA 2018:4) report of 2017-2018 confirms that the financial 
performance and administrative control measures of all municipalities (100%) in the Free State 
province has deteriorated.  As such, this continued lack of accountability and leadership 
contributes to the development of a culture of no consequences in all municipalities in the Free 
State province. 
 
In Chapter 5 of this study, it was mentioned that since 2005 the South African municipal 
administration has faced many challenges as a result of transformation, one being that valuable 
skills have been lost. Many municipalities make appointments based on political or cadre 
deployment and family ties. Thus, many junior posts in many municipalities are filled by 
inadequately trained employees. Consequently, municipalities are plagued with serious service 
delivery bottlenecks and staff with a poor attitude towards delivering services effectively and 
efficiently.  It was emphasised in Chapter 5 that the following are important requirements to 
promote administrative accountability in the municipality: strong ethical leadership in the 
administrative, financial and SCM practices in municipalities; sufficient human and financial 
resources to assist in the implementation of municipalities’ administration and financial 
management systems; effective co-ordination of capacity building opportunities; the urgent 
filling of key vacancies within the municipality to ensure sound administrative and financial 
management; budgetary and spending processes that are aligned with the IDP; and the 
involvement of local communities in promoting administrative and social accountability.  
 
In Chapter 5 of the study it was mentioned that the Auditor-General (AGSA, 2017:1) report 
for 2016-2017 that accountability issues, such as appropriate consequences for accountability 
failures, still feature prominently in most municipalities (of which municipalities of the Free 
State Province cannot be excluded).  The chapter under discussion, mainly raised a concern 
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about the continued lack of accountability and good leadership of the Free State municipalities. 
It was argued that national and provincial governments are obligated by constitutional 
prescripts to support local government, particularly struggling municipalities.  The Auditor-
General in the report of 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 warns that political interferences in the 
administration weaken oversight and are not conducive the effecting of consequences. Both 
reports indicate that the blatant disregard for controls and compliance with key legislation leads 
to deteriorating accountability within municipalities, those in the Free State included (AGSA, 
2018:55; AGSA, 2019:12).  A major concern for the province is that the Mangaung 
Metropolitan Municipality became the first municipality of its kind to be placed under 
provincial administration.  The continued disregard of internal controls such as proper record 
keeping, financial reporting, compliance with key financial management legislation and the 
continued failure of municipal councils, mayors, MMs and other relevant executives to 
implement the recommendations of the Auditor-General undermined oversight and 
accountability of the financial affairs of this and most other municipalities. The culture of no 
consequences that prevails also affects the effectiveness of oversight and accountability. 
 
Current practices and key challenges of oversight and accountability (political, administrative, 
financial and social accountability) in selected municipalities of the Free State province were 
identified in the empirical chapter (Chapter 6) of this study. Practices concerning political 
oversight and accountability were also identifified from the findings of the semi-structured 
questionnaire (respondents of municipal officials) and are discussed below.   
 
The majority of the respondents confirmed that municipal elections for political office-bearers 
are a good tool to ensure accountability and transparency. On whether there are any 
consequences for breaking the code of conduct for municipal councillors, the majority of the 
respondents agreed with the statement. On whether municipal councillors clearly understood 
the role of portfolio, audit and MPACs, the majority of the respondents agreed. These 
committees are key oversight mechanisms for municipalities.  
 
The Auditor-General reports for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 warned that the continued lack of 
accountability and leadership failures were the main causes of governance failures (AGSA, 
2018:55; AGSA 2019:12). Thus, the slow response by political and administrative leadership 
in addressing the decrepit control environment further contributes to the lack of consequences 
and poor oversight and accountability. The majority of the respondents concurred that there are 
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no consequences for municipal councillors breaking the code of conduct. The majority also 
agreed that the FS Provincial Treasury assists local municipal councils with compliance with 
the MFMA, 2003.  On the question of whether non-executive councillors always held the 
executive mayor or committee accountable through monthly, quarterly and annual financial 
reports, the majority of the respondents also agreed.  Most of the respondents also agreed that 
municipal councils fulfilled their oversight function regarding the municipal SCM. The 
Auditor-General cautioned in the 2016-2017 report that mayors and councillors should 
critically assess information such as procurement deviations before making any SCM related 
decisions (AGSA, 2018:57).       
 
Key challenges identified from the findings of the semi-structured questionnaire include,  
firstly, that the majority of the respondents (municipal officials) disagreed and strongly 
disagreed that municipal councillors interfere in the normal administrative functions of the 
municipality. This finding contradicts the Auditor-General finding in the 2016-2017 and 2017-
2018 reports (Chapter 3, Section 3.10 of this study) that political interference in the 
administration weakened oversight and did not enable the effecting of consequences (AGSA, 
2018:3; AGSA, 2019:12). While the majority of the respondents also agreed that local 
government legislative acts and policies are understood by all political officials, most of them 
disagreed that local government legislations, rules and policies are always implemented. In 
addition, most of the respondents indicated that corruption at local government sphere is 
grossly exaggerated, again contradicting the Auditor-General (AGSA, 2019:2) report for 2017-
2018 that a total of 74% of the municipalities did not adequately follow up on allegations of 
financial and SCM misconduct and fraud as discussed in Chapter 4 of this study. What was 
surprising and concerning was that most of the respondents disagreed that municipal political 
and administrative officials properly understood the MFMA, 2003. This corroborates the 2016-
2017 and 2017-2018 report findings by the Auditor-General that the blatant disregard for 
controls and compliance with key legislation leads to decreasing accountability within 
municipalities (AGSA, 2018:55; AGSA, 2019:12).   
 
Another finding by the Auditor-General in the 2015-2016 report indicated that municipal 
mayors clearly do not understand their respective oversight roles in municipal financial 
management and administration. The Free State local government’s political and 
administrative leadership were especially cautioned to take accountability for, and address 
control weaknesses to improve, the audit outcomes. According to the Auditor-General report 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
391 
 
for 2017-2018 (AGSA, 2019:2), a clear breakdown in controls and poor leadership responses 
to improving accountability, capacity and stability in municipalities were the main causes of 
transgressions in the Free State province. The deterioration of the local government 
environment is evident in the vulnerable financial position of 100% of the municipalities in the 
province which confirms that political officials do not clearly understand or fulfil their 
respective oversight roles concerning the financial management and administration of the 
municipality. The above is refuted by the majority of the respondents in the empirical study 
indicating that municipal mayors clearly understood their respective oversight roles in 
municipal financial management and administration.  
 
The majority of the respondents indicated that they do not know whether the executive mayor 
or executive committee oversees the performance of municipal officials through monthly 
budgetary reports. Yet, the analysis of monthly budgetary and financial reports is key to 
promoting good governance and effective oversight of the financial affairs of the municipality.  
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 of this study that non-compliance with the Auditor-General’s 
recommendations had resulted in municipal councils in the Free State not getting any clean 
audit reports in 2016-2017 and 2017-2018. This seems to hold true since most of the 
respondents disagreed that the municipal executive mayor or executive committee 
implemented the recommendations of the Auditor-General. This also contributes to a culture 
of no consequences. In Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2 of this study it is indicated that the Public 
Audit Amendment Act of 2018 authorises the Auditor-General to act against public officials 
who engage in financial mismanagement and abuse. Section 3(1B) of this Act further states 
that the Auditor-General has the power to take appropriate remedial action such as issue a 
certificate of debt, as prescribed, where an accounting officer or accounting authority has failed 
to comply with remedial action.  
 
Since most of the respondents disagreed with this point, it seems that a practice that is ignored 
is that of the municipality having public meetings about the Auditor-General’s report on the 
municipality every financial year-end. The majority of the respondents disagreed that there are 
such meetings. It was stated in Section 4.7 (Chapter 4) and Section 5.10.4 (Chapter 5) that 
council meetings in which the audit reports are to be discussed must be open to the public.  
Again, the majority of respondents disagreed that local communities fully understand the 
mandate of the local government sphere or that they and their organisations fully participate in 
activities organised by ward committees and ward councillors. Lastly, the majority of the 
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respondents disagreed that municipal councillors regularly report back, at least quarterly, to 
their constituencies on the performance of the municipality. The findings from the interview 
schedule indicate that both Tokologo and Tswelopele Local Municipalities of the 
Lejweleputswa District Municipality have serious challenges in providing quality services. 
 
7.3.1.5 Secondary objective 4  
 
The fourth secondary objective was to determine the current challenges pertaining to public 
participation and social accountability in selected municipalities of the Free State province.   
 
In Chapter 5 of this study, it was highlighted that in order for a municipality to promote public 
or social accountability it is imperative that local communities participate in the preparation, 
implementation and reviewing of the IDP and budgetary processes; monitoring and reviewing 
municipal performance; and any strategic decisions related to the provision of municipal 
services and developmental issues that will affect communities. However, mere involvement 
in the affairs of local government does not necessarily constitute social accountability.  Social 
accountability calls for community participation in the affairs of local government through 
established structures and mechanisms such as sub-councils or ward committees. The 
involvement of citizens or community members in the matters of local government faces many 
challenges though, which functionaries can use as an excuse not to involve the public in 
effective decision and policy-making processes. Taking the above into consideration and that 
municipalities must arrange meetings with public representatives of all relevant stakeholders, 
social accountability can be quite time-consuming. In addition, community members might 
also often lack relevant competencies in basic analytical and decision-making skills or be 
illiterate and unable to make valuable inputs or hold functionaries to account for their actions 
or inactions.  These could increase the cost of involvement in the affairs of municipalities.   
 
Ward committees were established to enhance community participation in municipalities, but 
their efficacy is doubtful. Despite the good intentions of government policies and legislation to 
promote participatory governance through ward committees, powers delegated to them are 
limited. They do not have much decision-making powers, restricting their capacity to consult 
and to participate effectively with ward members in their municipal area. Among others, they 
also lack executive authority or power; the capacity to promote genuine community 
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participation; clarity about their responsibilities; and political stability.  Lastly, it was argued 
in Chapter 5 of this study that ward committees in the Free State province has failed to hold 
municipalities and functionaries to account for their poor performance financially, in decision-
making and acting timeously. The Auditor-General (AGSA, 2019:4) report for 2017-2018 
indicated that the financial performance and administrative control measures of all 
municipalities (100%) in the Free State province have declined and that the continued lack of 
accountability and leadership contributes to the development of a culture of no consequences. 
 
The following practices and key challenges concerning political oversight and accountability 
were identifified from the findings of the semi-structured interviews (Chapter 6) with ward 
counsillors from the Tokologo and Tswelopele Local Municipalities affiliated to the 
Lejweleputswa District Municipality.   
 
The findings from theme two (public participation) showed that the majority of the respondents 
agreed that the municipality informed their local community members about municipal council 
meetings. The majority of the respondents indicated that the municipality makes use of public 
notice boards to inform the local community about municipal council meetings, while only two 
respondents indicated that their municipality uses other communication methods such as a load 
hailing system to inform the local community about municipal council meetings. One of the 
key challenges identified was that half of the respondents indicated uncertainty or did not know 
whether ward councillors ever made any recommendations to the municipal council regarding 
developmental priorities of the local community. From the responses concerning the 
representativeness of the ward committee, one could interpret that it is positive that the 
committee makes provision for people with special needs (disabled people) to serve on the 
ward committee. Regardless, it is a concern that none of the respondents made any mentioned 
about the representativeness of a variety of stakeholders, such as community-based 
organisations (CBO), to serves on ward committees to promote effective community 
participation. Another key challenge identified was that only one respondent (ward committee 
member) was aware of someone in the local municipality responsible for community 
participation, while the other respondents did not know or said there was no one within the 
local municipality to co-ordinate community participation.   
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In terms of Section 53 of the MSA, 2000, the speaker is responsible for the establishment and 
functioning of ward committees. It was argued in Chapter 5 of this study, that the municipal 
council must ensure that a person is appointed to monitor the functions of the ward committee 
in the absence of a speaker.  Another key challenge that was identified from the semi-structured 
interviews was that ward councillors and ward committee members are not well-informed 
about their role to make recommendations to the municipal council concerning the ward’s 
developmental priorities.  Therefore, one could argue that ward committees are not functioning 
effectively. In Section 5.11.3 of this study, it was mentioned that the municipal council must 
inform the community and the ward committee members who represent local committees about 
the date, time and venue of consultative municipal council meetings.  However, the majority 
of the respondents only attend municipal council meetings once a year or occasionally.  
 
Findings from theme three (quality of service delivery) revealed that both the Tokologo and 
Tswelopele Local Municipalities have serious challenges in quality service delivery in the two 
local municipal councils. The semi-structured interviews indicated that service delivery at both 
these municipalities is of the lowest quality and were rated poor to very poor. Since questions 
from the interview schedule of theme three were mainly about work ethics of municipal 
personnel, it can be argued that there is a lack of accountability and oversight within the 
administrative section of both. It can further be argued that the apparent absence of 
accountability and oversight has led to the local municipalities underperforming and the 
resultant negative audit findings. Noticeable interventions and visible consequence 
management should be implemented to address this apparent lack of accountability and 
oversight functions. 
 
From the findings of theme four (current service delivery performance of the municipal 
council) it was evident that, with the exception of the sub-themes provision of primary health 
services and electricity, the current service delivery performance of the local municipal 
councils at both the Tokologo and Tswelopele Local Municipalities is of a poor quality. It 
should be noted however that primary health care is provided by the provincial government 
and electricity is partly distributed by ESCOM. Disappointingly, neither of the municipalities 
try to create opportunities for communities to be self-sufficient and self-reliant. It was 
mentioned that assisting small-scale live-stock farmers and informal traders would go a long 
way in addressing unemployment and poverty reduction.  Also found to be lacking were 
recreational parks and facilities to try and curb the current worrisome behaviour from the youth. 
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Anti-social behaviour such as drug abuse and crime thrive easily in an environment where most 
of the youth are roaming the streets aimlessly. It is also disturbing to note that Wi-Fi is still a 
luxury enjoyed by those who can afford it even though internet connectivity has lately come to 
be viewed as one of the basic needs provided by local governments. It seems that the much 
talked about fourth industrial revolution is based on communities that are technologically 
savvy. A lack of public ablution facilities was also noted and that this naturally creates a health 
hazard with serious consequences. Lastly, with the emphasis on the provision of low-cost 
housing, neglecting middle-income earners, the lack of housing opportunities for middle 
income groups has resulted in local municipalities not being able to recruit top-class talent. 
That shows an inadequacy in holistic planning on the part of municipal administrative 
personnel and their political principals.    
 
7.3.1.6 The last secondary objective   
 
The last secondary objective was to make specific recommendations based on research findings 
with the view to improve oversight and accountability in municipalities of the Free State 
province. Recommendations based on these research findings are provided in Section 7.5 of 
this chapter. 
 
7.4 REVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS  
 
Chapter 1 introduced the study by giving the background as well as the conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks of the study.  The background to the problem, the problem statement, 
aim, research objectives and questions, research methodology, design, and ethical 
considerations and limitations were discussed briefly. 
 
Chapter 2 of this study was an intensive overview of the literature, and the statutory and 
regulatory legislative frameworks, functions, principles and requirements of oversight and 
accountability in the three spheres of government with specific reference to local sphere. 
Concepts and functions of oversight and accountability were explained in-depth. In addition, 
key statutory and regulatory legislative frameworks promulgated to strengthen accountability 
and oversight at municipal councils, such as the Constitution, 1996, Municipal Structures Act, 
1998, Municipal Systems Act 2000, and a myriad of other Acts, policies and regulations were 
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dealt with in detail.  The role of constitutional bodies to strengthen accountability and oversight 
in the public institutions, especially at local government sphere were also outlined.   This 
chapter concluded by briefly discussing good practices of oversight and accountability in 
international local governments from the following countries: Britain, Botswana, Namibia, 
Kenya, Brazil and China. Being former British colonies and members of the Commonwealth, 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Kenya still have cultural and economic links with 
Britain. Also, China and Brazil are fellow BRICSA members with South Africa. As an 
emerging international economic block, BRICSA could have a noticeable influence on the 
South African economic and political outlook. 
 
Chapter 3 dealt mainly with the theoretical review of legislative, and political oversight and 
accountability. In this chapter, each various literature sources were used to explain and discuss 
the concepts of legislative and political oversight and accountability. Legislative mechanisms 
to promote accountability and oversight at local government sphere were presented and 
discussed comprehensively. The Constitutional mandate of the Public Protector and the 
Auditor-General were debated from different points of view of different literature reviews. 
Other key legislative mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight such as the Office 
of Serious Economic Offences (OSEO), ad-hoc bodies like commissions of enquiry, special 
investigative units and special tribunals were all explained. 
 
Political accountability and oversight and the function of elections to promote representational 
accountability at municipal councils also formed part of this chapter. It was questioned whether 
elections without recall systems by the electorate are enough to hold municipal councillors 
accountable. Since this study’s focus was on local government, an overview of financial 
oversight and accountability at local sphere was also given together with in-depth discussions 
about various mechanisms and strategies to promote accountable, ethical and responsible 
municipal financial management. The accountability roles of senior municipal officials such as 
the MM, the CFO and departmental heads and managers accountable to the MM were 
scrutinised.  
 
This chapter was concluded by discussing the concept of state capture in South Africa where 
corruption on a large scale was allegedly undertaken by powerful families and individuals. 
Martin and Solomon (2017:2) define state capture as the actions of individuals or groups, in 
the public and private sectors, influencing the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other 
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government policies to their own personal advantage. These authors caution that since, the state 
and the economy cannot be conceived as two separate entities when discussing state capture, 
economic and political power is therefore fused. They also state that capture comes in many 
forms (Martin and Solomon 2017:2). Firstly, at one end of the spectrum, it can occur in terms 
of an individual or family that exerts control over both the state and the economy. Or, it could 
be oligarchies developing with a quasi-feudal structure of dependents or a complex range of 
networks with more equal and reciprocal relations. This is especially the case where laws and 
institutions become the product of corrupt transactions so that what counts as legality is itself 
a function of corruption. 
 
In Chapter 4, the roles of National and Provincial treasuries were outlined. Fourie and 
Opperman (2007:393) submitted that National Treasury and Provincial Treasury, in their 
oversight and accountability roles, may monitor and assess compliance by municipalities and 
municipal entities with the MFMA, 2003, and any applicable standards of generally recognised 
accounting practices and uniform expenditure and revenue classification systems. National 
treasury may investigate any system of financial management and internal control in any 
municipality.  
 
Fourie and Opperman (2007:393) indicate that Provincial Treasury must monitor compliance 
with the MFMA, 2003 by municipalities in the province, monitor the preparation of budgets, 
the monthly outcomes of those budgets and the submission of reports by the municipalities in 
the province. Provincial Treasury may assist municipalities in the province with the preparation 
of their budgets and may take appropriate steps if a municipality commits a breach of the 
MFMA, 2003. National Treasury (2004:23) holds that in order to strengthen the oversight role 
of councillors and prevent conflicts of interest, councillors are not allowed to serve on any bid 
or tender committee.  
 
The directive of the MFMA, Circular 32 of 2006, and guidelines for the establishment of 
Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) were outlined. Van Niekerk and Dalton-
Brits (2016:124) state that MPACs were established to help the municipal council in holding 
the executive and municipal administration to account and ensure the effective and efficient 
use of municipal resources. These authors maintain that the Auditor-General of South Africa’s 
2012-2013 Consolidated Report on Local Government identifies the primary duty of MPACs 
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as that of promoting transparency and accountability (van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits, 
2016:124).  
 
Chapter 5 dealt with theoretical literature reviews of administrative and social accountability 
and oversight within the local government sphere. An in-depth theoretical review of 
administrative and social accountability and oversight was presented. Among several concepts 
discussed, the Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 was of interest. Makwetu (2019:5) explains 
that the central feature of the amendments of this Act introduced the concept of material 
irregularity which refers to any fraud, theft, breach of a fiduciary duty or non-compliance with 
or contravention of the law that could result in material loss, the misuse or loss of a material 
public resources or substantial harm to the public sector or the public. 
 
The Public Audit Amendment Act, 2018 authorises the Auditor-General not just to recommend 
remedial action for public financial mismanagement and abuse, but also to enforce them. 
Section 3(b) of this Act states that the Auditor-General may, as prescribed, refer any suspected 
material irregularity identified during an audit performed to a relevant public body for 
investigation, and the relevant public body must keep the Auditor-General informed of the 
progress and the final outcome of the investigation. Section 3(1B) indicates that the Auditor-
General has the power to (a) take any appropriate remedial action; and (b) issue a certificate of 
debt, as prescribed, where an accounting officer or accounting authority has failed to comply 
with remedial action. 
 
Chapter 6 provided the findings and results of the empirical study.  This chapter outlined the 
research methodology followed in the study and discussed the analysis and interpretations of 
the data, giving the results and findings in each case. A self-administered semi-structured 
questionnaire consisting of closed and open-ended questions/statements was used to elicit 
information from the MMs, chief financial manager, mayor or executive mayor of the 
Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, the four district municipalities, and nine of the 19 local 
municipalities in the Free State province. The findings of some of the questions of the semi-
structured questionnaire for municipal officials were at times contrary to the findings from the 
literature and in particular with the findings of the Auditor-General on the audit outcomes of 
the 2016-2017 and again 2017-2018 financial years of the municipalities of the Free State 
Province as discussed in the literature chapters of this study. It was argued that political 
oversight and accountable structures and role players of the municipalities in the Free State 
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must clearly understand and fulfil their oversight and accountable roles as required in the 
Constitution, 1996 and applicable local government legislation.  A concern is that most of the 
respondents indicated that there are no consequences for continued non- compliance with 
municipal legislated rules and codes of conduct.  This is a clear indication that the oversight 
and accountable structures within municipalities of the Free State are not functioning 
effectively. 
 
An interview schedule was also used to conduct semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from the ward committees of two local municipalities, namely, Tokologo Local 
Municipality and Tswelopele Local Municipality of the Lejweleputswa District Municipality. 
This interview schedule was used to identify the current challenges pertaining to public 
participation and social accountability. The findings and results relating to the interview 
schedule, in which semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected ward committee 
members, also yielded results which were at times contrary to the findings from the literature 
review, especially the Auditor-General audit outcomes of 2016-2017 and again 2017-2018 of 
the municipalities of the Free State province as discussed in the literature chapters of this study.  
It is concerning that ward committees and community participation forums in both the selected 
local municipalities, are not successful in promoting effective community participation. 
 
Chapter 7 is the last chapter of the study and deals with the recommendations of this study 
informed by the literature review, recommendations from the comparative analysis chapter and 
the empirical study. The development of the proposed oversight and accountability framework 
for municipalities in the Free State Province occurs in this chapter. Lastly, the limitations of 
the study are outlined together with implications for further research. It concludes with a short 
summary.  
 
7.5  RECOMMENDATIONS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Since this study was mainly based on an interpretive paradigm that focused on qualitative 
research, the following recommendations were made from the literature chapters (Chapters 2 
to 4) of this study.  
 
The first recommendation was that all municipalities of the Free State province must give effect 
to the provisions of the Constitution, 1996 and other applicable local government legislative 
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frameworks, policies and SCM regulations and defaulters must be held accountable for their 
actions. Thus, there must be consequences for non-compliance with local government 
legislation, policies and SCM regulations. Continued non-compliance with key local 
government legislation and SCM processes in these municipalities results in irregularities and 
limited consequences for transgressions weakening oversight and accountability.  A concern 
was raised in the 2017-2018 audit report on municipalities of the province that none of the 
municipalities, including the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, received clean audits.  The 
audit outcomes of nine of the province’s municipalities regressed with no improvements noted. 
In addition, financial statements of nine municipalities were late or not submitted by the cut-
off date for inclusion in the Auditor-General’s report which led to their audit outcomes being 
outstanding (AGSA, 2019:10).  
 
Municipal councillors should give effect to Section 11(a) of the Code of Conduct of 
Councillors, as contained in Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000. It states that a councillor may not 
interfere in the management or administration of any department of the municipal council, 
unless so mandated by council or by the law.  Defaulters must be held to account for their 
actions, especially since the Auditor-General (2018:3) warns that political interferences and 
conflict as a result of political factions weakens the councils oversight function. This function 
is further worsened by political influence to appoint cadres and family members, particularly 
with the appointment of service providers and SCM related processes. Interference in the 
administrative activities of public organisations is especially widespread at the municipal 
sphere of government, most notably in human resources, where the appointment of senior 
executives such as the MM, is often done primarily based on party political considerations. 
This practice is commonly known as deployment in South Africa. Political interference of 
municipal councillors not only has a negative impact on the administrative functions of 
municipal officials, it also has a negative impact on their accountable role and on effective 
service delivery. Therefore, it is recommended that the roles and responsibilities of the 
municipal council should always be carried out with a clear distinction between oversight and 
political interference in administration as defined in the Section 52 and Section 103 of the 
MFMA, 2003, as well as in the Code of Conduct for Councillors as provided in Schedule 1 of 
the MSA, 2000. 
Municipal councils must give effect to Section 152(1) of the Constitution, 1996 points out that 
the objective of local government is to provide democratic and accountable government for 
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local communities. In addition, the Code of Conduct for Councillors states that councillors 
represent local communities on municipal councils and should ensure that there are structured 
mechanisms to hold municipalities accountable to these communities in meeting their priority 
needs by providing services equitably, effectively and sustainably within the means of the 
municipality. It is therefore recommended that community members should be informed and 
empowered to understand their role to hold municipal councils to account for their actions or 
inactions, enabling them to effectively participate in local government matters. In this regard, 
it is further recommended that constant advocacy should be undertaken by SALGA to train 
councillors and educate members of communities about their responsibilities to hold municipal 
councils to account for their performance and actions or inactions. Electorates who are 
educated would make informed decisions during elections and this will empower them to hold 
municipal councils and PR councillors to account for their actions or inactions.   
 
For this reason, the oversight role of the speaker, municipal council, mayor or executive mayor 
and the MPACs needs to be strengthened in municipalities of the Free State province so that 
the executive can be held to account and to ensure the efficient and effective use of municipal 
resources.  CoGTA, SALGA and the MEC for local government of the Free State must ensure 
that mechanisms are in place to capacitate political office-bearers to clearly understand their 
oversight role to promote accountable local government. The Auditor- General (AGSA 
2018:57) reported that the political leadership in the municipalities of the Free State province 
should create a culture that will result in a responsive, accountable, effective and efficient local 
government as envisaged in the Constitution, 1996 and the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework.      
 
The MM, as the accounting officer, should personally be held accountable for any loss of 
allocated funds or assets as a result of any deficiency in the administrative or managerial 
arrangements of the municipality. Failure to give effect to assigned responsibilities should 
result in the removal of the MM from office. Afterall, the Public Audit Amendment Act of 
2018 provides that if the accounting officer fails to implement remedial action, the Auditor-
General may issue a certificate of debt in the name of the relevant accounting officer.    
 
It is critical that internal controls that prevent irregularities and deviations from the MFMA of 
2003 and SCM regulations be reinforced in all municipalities of the Free State province. This 
would be possible if political office-bearers fulfil their critical oversight role concerning the 
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SCM and procurement processes of their municipalities. The Auditor-General (AGSA, 
2018:57) observes that mayors and councillors of Free State municipalities should critically 
assess information such as SCM and procurement deviations before making any decisions. In 
the 2016-2017 audit report, the findings for all 18 municipalities showed poor compliance with 
legislation owing to the slow response by the political and administrative leadership to address 
the weak control environment, lack of consequences, and the continued disregard for legislative 
prescripts (AGSA 2018:55). Although there are various critical mechanisms and internal 
controls to prevent irregular, unauthorised, fruitless and wasteful expenditure and keep 
functionaries under surveillance and in check, in the 2017-2018 financial year, oversight and 
accountability by the political leadership of municipalities and the provincial government failed 
completely which led to a complete breakdown of the Free State municipalities (AGSA, 
2019:10). Blatant disregard for control measures, such as proper record keeping, and blatant 
non-compliance with key legislation and SCM regulations make it easy to commit fraud. In the 
literature chapters of this study, concerns related to SCM and procurement practices were 
shown to be tender irregularities, bribery, corruption, non-compliance with SCM Acts and 
regulations and the municipality’s own SCM policy, incompetence and negligence of public 
officials. It is very troubling that most fraud and corruption in local government occurs through 
the SCM and procurement processes such as: inflated prices; bid committees not being properly 
constituted; conflict of interest not properly managed; tenders not advertised as required by 
SCM Acts, policies and regulations; and contracts awarded to friends and family members.  
The latter poses a serious financial risk for the municipality and defeats the aim of effective 
SCM and procurement management. 
 
To promote participatory governance and accountable local governance, more should be done 
to empower ward committees and strengthen their role as a key link between the municipal 
council and the local community.  They serve as a platform for local communities to raise their 
concerns and influence municipal policies that affect them.  As such, they should seek answers 
from functionaries to hold them to account for their policies, decisions and actions. This 
requires that to promote participatory governance and accountable local governance, ward 
committees and residents from the formal ward committee and those ward committees 
operating within the area of traditional leaders should attend municipal council meetings in 
which both the annual and oversight reports are tabled.    
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Although no legislative prescripts make provision for a recall procedure it is recommended that 
SALGA investigate the possibility of implementing the recall procedure of councillors and 
mayors as a mechanism to improve public accountability in local government.  In this way 
delinquent’s political office-bearers could be recalled. Additionally, SALGA should 
investigate the possibility to establish an independent local government ombudsperson to 
address the crisis of perennial service delivery protests in municipalities. This ombudsperson 
should be empowered to investigate transgressions and complaints submitted by individuals 
and community organisations within a municipality. Such transgressions and complaints 
should then be speedily referred to law enforcement agencies for prosecution if found to have 
committed crimes. 
 
It is imperative that key vacancies such as those of senior managers should be filled timeously 
to ensure sound administrative and financial management within the municipality of the Free 
State province. Of huge importance also, is that provincial government should ensure that it 
supports and effectively monitor the performance of all municipalities within the province. In 
addition, CoGTA should ensure that reports are submitted, analysed, and corrective actions are 
taken should interventions be required.  Lastly, strategic interventions should be monitored, 
and their results evaluated to ensure successful implementation. 
 
7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FROM EMPIRICAL STUDY  
 
Based on the findings of the empirical study (Chapter 6), the following are recommended:  
 
• That CoGTA investigate the possibility of establishing a recall procedure.  A concern 
is that municipal elections can be used to revoke the electoral mandate of an elected 
official. However, voters do not have any direct way of holding elected representatives 
to account during the term for which they have been elected. 
• That SALGA ensures that all municipal councillors clearly understand their role and 
those of portfolio committees, MPACs, audit committees and municipal performance 
audit committee as promoting oversight and accountability in municipalities. 
• That municipal councillors receive training regarding the difference between oversight 
and political interference in the administration of the municipality. 
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• That speakers, mayors, executive mayors and municipal councillors receive training on 
key municipal legislation and SCM regulations to fulfil their oversight role effectively 
so that they can ensure the municipal administration’s successful implementation 
thereof.  
•  That National Treasury and Provincial Treasury should ensure functionaries have a 
clear understanding of the MFMA, 2003. 
• That the MM must ensure the actions and conduct of administrative staff of the 
municipality are in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff Members 
as contained in Schedule 2 of the MSA, 2000.  
• That mayors clearly understand their respective oversight roles in municipal financial 
management and administration. In the 2015-2016 report, the Auditor-General urged 
the Free State local government political and administrative leadership to take 
accountability for and address control weaknesses to improve audit outcomes. 
Municipal mayors not clearly understanding their respective oversight roles in 
municipal financial management and administration could be the reason that Free State 
municipalities’ non-compliance with the Auditor-General’s reports had resulted in 
municipal councils not getting any clean audit reports in 2016-2017 and 2017-2018.  
The Auditor-General warns in the report for 2016-2017 that mayors and councillors 
should critically assess information such as procurement deviations before making any 
decisions so that they do not contribute to a culture of no consequences. 
• That the municipal council and mayor ensure the MM implements the 
recommendations of the Auditor-General.  The continued inaction of municipal 
councils, mayors, MMs and other relevant executives to implement the 
recommendations of the Auditor-General weakens the oversight and accountability of 
the financial affairs of most municipalities. 
• That more should be done to educate and inform local communities about the mandate 
of the local sphere of government.  
• CoGTA must support municipal councils of all municipalities in the Free State province 
with empowering ward councillors and ward committee members to bolster community 
participation.  Also, in the absence of a speaker, someone must be appointed to co-
ordinate the activities of the ward committees. 
• Municipal councils should ensure that more community participation forums are 
established to promote participatory governance. 
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• That more needs to be done to ensure that local communities and organisations fully 
participate in activities organised by ward committees and ward councillors.  
• That there must be proper interventions at all municipalities (including Tokologo and 
Tswelopele) to address their serious backlogs and challenges in quality service delivery.   
 
7.7 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF THE FREE STATE PROVINCE 
 
The main objective of this study was to develop a proposed oversight and accountability 
framework (based on literature analysis and an empirical study) to promote oversight and 
accountability within municipalities of the Free State province.  This proposed framework is 
illustrated in Figure 7.1 below.
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Political oversight and accountability:
Political structures, political office-bearers,  
committees and support structures to promote 
political oversight and accountability within 
municipalties
Administrative oversight and accountability:
Structures, functionaries, committees and support 
structures to promote administrative oversight and 
accountability within municipalities
Financial oversight and accountability:
Structures, role players, committees and support 
structures to promote financial oversight and 
accountability within municipalities
Social oversight and accountability:
Structures, role players, ward committees and other 
community participatory mechanisms and support 
structures to promote social oversight and 
accountability within municipalities and local 
communities
Statutory and regulatory 
legislative framework 
policies and regulations to 
promote oversight and 
accountability of local 
government
Oversight structures must ensure consequences for non-compliance with legislation, policies, regulations, 
serious maladministration in connection with the affairs of municipalities, and other transgressions and 
irregularities.  Enforcement agencies should conduct investigations of any reported transgressions and the 
required disciplinary steps need to be taken.    
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The proposed framework provides a coherent and holistic approach by identifying key statutory 
and regulatory legislative frameworks, policies, regulations, structures, role players, support and 
enforcement structures required to promote political, financial, administrative and social oversight 
and accountability within municipalities of the Free State province. Oversight structures must 
ensure consequences for non-compliance with legislation, policies, regulations, serious 
maladministration in connection with the affairs of municipalities, and other transgressions and 
irregularities. Enforcement agencies should conduct investigations of any reported transgressions 
and requisite disciplinary steps need to be taken. The proposed framework also submits that there 
should be consequences for non-compliance and non-performance. Thus, mayors, accounting 
officer, CFOs and relevant officials should be accountable for any financial losses incurred by 
municipalities during their term in office. The framework holds that the political office-bearers 
must give effect to the constitutional mandate to promote accountable local government to local 
communities. The components of the proposed framework are discussed below. 
 
7.7.1 Statutory and regulatory legislative framework, policies and regulations to promote 
oversight and accountability in local government 
 
To promote effective oversight and accountability, municipalities and municipal entities must give 
effect to the key statutory and regulatory frameworks as illustrated in Figure 7.1.  The key statutory 
and regulatory framework policies and regulations to promote oversight and accountability are the 
following: 
 
• Section 139(1) of the Constitution, 1996 provides that when a municipality cannot or does 
not fulfill an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or any other legislation, the 
relevant provincial executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure 
fulfillment of that obligation.  
• Section 155(6) of the Constitution, 1996 requires that provincial government monitor and 
give support to local governments in the province, as well as promote the development of 
local government capacity in such a way that it will enable all municipalities to perform 
their functions and manage their own affairs in an effective manner.    
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• Section 151(b) of the Constitution, 1996 confers the municipal council with legislative and 
executive powers so that the municipal council can hold the executives to account for their 
functions and actions. 
• Section 152(2) of the Constitution, 1996 mandates local government to provide democratic 
and accountable government for local communities by ensuring the provision of 
sustainable services to communities, to promote social and economic development and a 
safe and healthy environment and encourage the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in the matters of local government. 
• Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996 makes provision for the basic values and principles 
necessary to govern public administration in all three spheres of government, including 
municipalities of the Free State province.  
• The Public Audit Amendment Act (Act 5 of 2018) empowers the Auditor-General not just 
to recommend remedial action for public financial mismanagement and abuse, but to 
enforce them. Section 3(b) states that the Auditor-General may, as prescribed, refer any 
suspected material irregularity identified during an audit, performed under this Act, to a 
relevant public body for investigation, and the relevant public body must keep the Auditor-
General informed of the progress and the final outcome of the investigation. Section 3(1B) 
further indicates that the Auditor-General has the power to (a) take any appropriate 
remedial action; and (b) issue a certificate of debt, as prescribed, where an accounting 
officer or accounting authority has failed to comply with remedial action. 
• Section 19 of the MSA, 1998 states that the municipal council retains responsibility for 
approving policy and exercising oversight of its mayor, and that the administration is 
accountable to the municipal council, via the mayor.  
• Section 36 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 of provides that each municipal council 
must have a chairperson who will be called the speaker.   
• Section 56 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that the executive mayor must 
receive reports from committees of the municipal council, to be forwarded with 
recommendations to the municipal council when the matter cannot be disposed of by the 
executive mayor in terms of the executive mayor’s delegated powers. Section 56(3)(a) 
states that the executive mayor must review the performance of the municipality in order 
to improve its economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. According to Section 53(3)(d), the 
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executive mayor must monitor the municipality’s administration in accordance with the 
directions of the municipal council and Section 56(3)(e) provides that the executive mayor 
must oversee the provision of sustainable services to communities. In Section 56(5) it is 
stated that the executive mayor must report to the municipal council.  
• Section 37 of the Municipal Structures, 1998 provides that the speaker of the municipal 
council should perform the duties and exercise the powers delegated to the speaker in terms 
of Section 59. 
• Section 49(b) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that the mayor of the 
municipality should perform the duties and exercise the powers delegated to him or her by 
the municipal council or the executive committee.  
• In terms of Sections 44 and 56 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, the executive mayor 
or committee is responsible for providing the municipality with political leadership, 
proposing policy and overseeing implementation thereof. 
• Section 44(1) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 holds that the executive committee is 
the principal committee of the council of the municipality that is entitled to establish such. 
It and the committee of the municipal council receive reports from other committees and 
forward them with recommendations to the council when they cannot dispose of the matter 
in terms their delegated powers.  
• Section 55(1) of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 indicates that if a municipal council 
chooses to have an executive mayor, he or she is entitled to reports from committees of the 
municipal council and to forward these reports with a recommendation to the council when 
he or she cannot dispose of a matter in terms of the executive mayors delegated powers.   
• Section 59 of the MSA, 2000 provides that a municipal council should have a system of 
delegation that will maximise administrative and operational efficiency and provide for 
adequate checks and balances. The council may delegate appropriate powers to any of the 
municipality’s other political structures, political office-bearers, councillors or staff 
members to perform any of the municipality’s duties and withdraw any delegation or 
instruction. Exceptions to powers that may be delegated are those mentioned in Section 
160 (2) of the Constitution, 1996: setting tariffs; deciding to enter into a service delivery 
agreement in terms of Section 76(b); and approving or amending the municipality’s 
integrated development plan (IDP).  Section 59(3) provides that the municipal council (or 
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at least one quarter of the councillors) may, in accordance with procedures in its rules and 
orders, request in writing to review any decision taken by a political structure, political 
office-bearer, councillor or staff member in consequence of a delegation or instruction, and 
either confirm, vary or revoke the decision subject to any rights that may have accrued to 
a person.  Section 56(5) provides that the executive mayor must report to the municipal 
council.  
• Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that a municipal council may 
establish one or more committees necessary for the effective and efficient performance of 
any of its functions or to exercise of any of its powers. 
• Section 80 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 provides that a municipal council with an 
executive committee or executive mayor may appoint, in terms of Section 79, a committee 
or councillors to assist the executive committee or mayoral committee. 
• Section 4(1)(b) of the MSA, 2000 provides that municipal councils exercise municipalities’ 
executive and legislative authority, without improper interference. 
• According to Section 6 of the MSA, 2000, the municipalities’ administration must be 
governed in accordance with the constitutional values and principles for public 
administration. Section 6(2) of the Act provides that municipal administrations are 
responsible for the following: to be responsive to the developmental needs of their 
communities; to promote a culture of accountability and public service amongst municipal 
officials; to take steps to prevent corrupt activities; to promote co-operation and 
communication with local communities; to provide the local community with accurate and 
reliable information about the level and standard of service delivery; and to inform and 
involve local communities and community organisations in the affairs of local government. 
• Section 16 of the MSA, 2000 makes provision for the development of a culture of municipal 
governance that complements formal representative government with a system of 
participatory governance. Section 17 makes provision for mechanisms, processes and 
procedures for community participation in the affairs of the municipality.     
• In terms of Section 38 of the MSA, 2000, a municipality must administer its affairs in an 
economical, effective, efficient and accountable manner. 
• Section 39 of the MSA, 2000 provides that the performance management system must 
measure the performance of the municipality. 
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• Section 51 of the MSA, 2000 states that the MM of a municipality is accountable for the 
overall performance and administration of the municipality. 
• Section 53 of the MSA, 2000 defines the specific governance roles and areas of oversight 
and accountability of each political structure and political office-bearer.  Section 53(5) of 
the MSA, 2000 emphasises that the municipality must determine the relationships among 
political structures, political office-bearers and MMs when defining their respective roles 
and areas as well as how they must interact. Their appropriate lines of accountability and 
reporting should also be outlined.  
• Section 55(1)(a) of the MSA, 2000 provides that, as head of administration, the MM of a 
municipality is subject to the policy directions of the municipal council and responsible 
and accountable for forming and developing an economically effective, efficient and 
accountable administration.  
• In terms of Section 56 of the MSA, 2000, the MM is appointed by the municipal council, 
as are the managers directly accountable to him or her.  
• The Code of Conduct of Municipal Councillors, provided in Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000 
states that a councillor must perform the functions of office in good faith, honestly and 
transparently and act in the best interest of the municipality at all times so that the 
credibility and integrity of the municipality is not compromised. 
• The Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff as in Schedule 2, Section 2 of the MSA, 2000 
states that staff, as members of the municipality, must perform the functions of office in 
good faith, diligently, honestly and transparently and act in the best interest of the 
municipality at all times and in such a way that the credibility and integrity of the 
municipality are not compromised. Staff should therefore be impartial and treat all people, 
including other staff members, equally and without favour or prejudice. 
• Section 5(1) of the MFMA, 2003 provides that National Treasury may monitor the budgets 
of municipalities to establish whether they are consistent with national government’s fiscal 
and economic policy. Section 5(2) further provides that National Treasury must investigate 
any system of financial management and internal control in any municipality or municipal 
entity and recommend improvements.   
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• Section 10(1) of the MFMA, 2003 points out that the accounting officer must administer 
the entire municipality's bank accounts since he or she must account for it to the municipal 
council which must enforce compliance with the Act.  
• Section 52 of the MFMA, 2003 establishes the role of a mayor or executive mayor in 
municipal financial matters. He or she is responsible for the fiscal and financial affairs of 
the municipality as well as monitoring and overseeing the responsibilities assigned to the 
accounting officer and the chief financial officer. However, he or she may not interfere in 
the exercising of these responsibilities.  
• Section 60 of the MFMA, 2003 states that the MM of the municipality is the accounting 
officer of the municipality. He or she must therefore exercise the functions and powers 
assigned to the accounting officer in terms of the Act and provide guidance and advice on 
compliance with the Act to the political structures, political office-bearers and officials of 
the municipality as well as any municipal entity under the sole or shared control of the 
municipality.   
• Section 61(1)(a) of the MFMA, 2003 provides that the accounting officer of the 
municipality must act with fidelity, honesty, integrity and in the best interest of the 
municipality in managing its financial affairs. Section 61(1)(b) requires that he or she 
disclose to the municipal council and the mayor all material facts which are available to 
him or her; reasonably discoverable; and which might influence the decisions or actions of 
the council or the mayor in any way.   
• Section 73 of the MFMA, 2003 compels the accounting officer to inform the provincial 
treasury, in writing, of any failure by the municipal council to adopt or implement a budget-
related or chain management policy or about non-compliance by political structures or 
office-bearers of the municipality with any such policy. 
• Section 74 of the MFMA, 2003 sets out that the accounting officer of the municipality must 
submit any information requested by National Treasury, the relevant Provincial Treasury, 
the department for local government in the province or the Auditor-General. 
• Section 129(1) of the MFMA, 2003 specifies that the municipal council must consider the 
annual report of the municipality or of any entity under the control of the municipality. 
• According to Section 131(1) of the MFMA, 2003, the MM must address all aspects raised 
by the Auditor-General in an audit report and the mayor must ensure the MM’s compliance.  
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• Section 62 of the MFMA, 2003 specifies the general financial management functions of the 
accounting officer who is responsible and accountable for the financial administration of 
the municipality.  
• Section 165 of the MFMA, 2003 requires municipalities to establish internal audit units to 
exercise effective financial control.  
• In terms of Section 166 of the MFMA, 2003, each municipality and municipal entity is 
required to establish an audit committee as a committee of the municipal council.    
• National Treasury and the MFMA (Circular 32 of 15 March 2006) give municipal 
councillors practical guidance regarding municipal financial management and their 
oversight role within the municipal council. They delineate what the municipal council 
must do when considering the annual report and producing the oversight report of the 
municipality.    
• National Treasury and the Guide for Accounting Officers of Municipalities and Municipal 
Entities of 2005 provides that every municipality and municipal entity must adopt and 
implement an SCM policy, which gives effect to Section 217 of the Constitution, 1996.  
Section 3 of the Code of Conduct requires that SCM practitioners be accountable for their 
decisions and actions to the public and should use public property scrupulously. Only 
accounting officers or their delegates have the authority to commit the government to any 
transaction for the procurement of good and services. All transactions conducted by a 
practitioner should be recorded and accounted for in an appropriate accounting system. 
 
Considering the above, the Constitution, 1996 and applicable Acts make provision for the function 
and roles of oversight and accountable structures and functionaries within municipalities to give 
effect to Section 152(1)(a) of the Constitution to provide democratic and accountable government 
for local communities.  However, the latest findings of the Auditor-General, Kim Makwetu, 
concerning the local government 2017-2018 audit outcomes confirm that blatant non-compliance 
with key municipal legislation is getting worse. Since mayors, municipal mangers and municipal 
councils are not taking their oversight and accountable role serious, the culture of non-compliance 
ultimately reigns. The oversight structure (municipal councils) of municipalities of the Free State 
Province must ensure that statutory, regulatory and legislative frameworks, policies and SCM 
regulations are implemented and that disciplinary actions are taken for non-compliance.     
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Attention is given below to the requirements for political, administrative, financial and social 
oversight and accountability as illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
7.7.2 Political Oversight and Accountability 
 
Political accountability, as indicated in figure 7.1 above, refers to the political accountability of 
politicians to the public for representing them. It requires that municipal councils and political 
office-bearers render account to the local communities for the way in which they fulfil the 
functions and responsibilities assigned to them. This implies that the political structure and 
political office-bearers of the municipality are responsible for political oversight and 
accountability.  Therefore, Figure 7.1 illustrates that certain political structures, political office-
bearers, committees and support structures must promote political oversight and accountability to 
give effect to Section 152 of the Constitution, 1996 to promote democratic and accountable 
governance to local communities. The Auditor-General notes that continued and blatant non-
compliance with key municipal legislation shows that municipal councils, mayors, and MMs in 
the Free State are not serious about their oversight and accountable role which ultimately leads to 
non-compliance as a culture. He also expresses that mayors do not understand their oversight role 
otherwise they and councillors would critically assess information such as procurement deviations 
before making any decisions. The weak internal control environment, the lack of consequences, 
and failure to adhere to the requirements of local government legislative frameworks and the slow 
response by the political and administrative leadership of municipalities in addressing these issues 
are the reason are the reasons the Free State performs so poorly (AGSA, 2018:55-57). Overall bad 
performance is also the reason that the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality was the first 
metropolitan municipality to be placed under provincial administration. For any improvement, the 
political oversight and accountable structures and role players of the municipalities in the Free 
State must understand and fulfil their oversight and accountable roles as required in the 
Constitution, 1996 and other applicable local government legislation. 
 
Chapter 1 of the MSA, 2000 identifies the municipal council, committee or other collective 
structure of a municipality as the key political structure of a municipality. In terms of the Laws 
Amendment Act, 2008, political office-bearer refers to the speaker, mayor, executive mayor, deputy 
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executive mayor, deputy mayor, or member of the executive committee as referred to in the 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998. The specific governance roles and areas of oversight and 
accountability of each political structure and political office-bearers are provided in Section 53 of 
the MSA, 2000. 
 
Section 151(2) of the Constitution, 1996 points out that the executive and legislative authority of 
the municipality is vested in its municipal council which is responsible for oversight of the 
executive (municipal administration). Members of the council are individually and collectively 
accountable to local communities for local government’s achievement of objectives as provided 
in Section 152 of the Constitution, 1996. Moreover, Section 2 of Schedule 1 of the MSA, 2000, 
determines that for the oversight and accountability role of municipal councils, councillors should 
perform the functions of office in good faith, honestly and transparently. At all times, they should 
act in the best interest of the municipality so that its credibility and integrity are not compromised. 
 
As part of the system of delegation provided in Section 59 of the MSA, 2000, the municipal council 
may establish one or more committees necessary for the effective and efficient performance of any 
of its functions and it may exercise any of its powers, including that of overseeing committees. 
One key oversight committee that reports directly to the municipal council is the MPAC. The 
MPAC is responsible for overseeing executive functionaries (political and municipal officials) of 
the municipal council and to ensure the good governance and performance of the municipality. 
The fact that local government legislation does not mandate MPACs’ enforcement of their 
recommendations on municipalities means that they are only implemented by a few municipalities. 
The chairperson of this committee therefore consults directly with the speaker of the municipality, 
who is also the chairperson of the municipal council and the person who can ensure that MPAC 
recommendations are implemented. 
 
The municipal council may also appoint portfolio committees such as Section 80 committees to 
assist the executive mayor.  A concern, however, is that municipalities with a mayoral executive 
system and Section 80 portfolio committees, with few or no Section 79 committees, significantly 
reduces the municipal council’s capacity to fulfil its oversight role over the executive. This also 
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means that in a municipality with few to no Section 79 committees, ordinary councillors’ capacity 
to exercise oversight of executives is limited. 
 
In terms of Section 59 of the MSA, 2000, the municipal council must develop a system of 
delegation for adequate checks and balances (oversight) and instructing any political structure, 
political office-bearer, councillor or staff member to perform any of the municipality’s duties.   
One of the key political office-bearers, as illustrated in Figure 7.1 above, is the speaker.  SALGA 
(2011:16) promulgates that the speaker’s role depends mostly on the internal arrangements made 
by the municipality but that the formulation of the terms of reference should be regulated in terms 
of Section 53 of the MSA, 2000 which makes provision for the roles and responsibilities of political 
structures and office-bearers. Section 37 of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 sets out the 
functions of the speaker, namely, to chair council meetings; maintain order during council 
meetings; implement the Code of Conduct for Municipal Councillors (Schedule 1 of MSA, 2000); 
and exercise delegated functions as required in Section 59 of the MSA, 2000. These functions 
include facilitating public participation regarding legislative matters; the establishment and 
functioning of ward committees; and supporting councillors.  The speaker therefore has a key role 
in ensuring oversight, accountability, integrity, discipline and efficiently running the municipal 
council.  He or she is also the guardian of the integrity of the municipal council and of council 
members’ privileges and interests (Schedule 1 of MSA, 2000).  
 
The mayor, who is the chairperson of the executive committee within a collective executive 
system, is another important political office-bearer. Section 49 of the Municipal Structures Act,  
1998 ordains that the mayor should preside at meetings of the executive committee, perform duties 
and exercise powers delegated to him or her by the municipal council or executive committee. 
Section 44 of this Act identifies the executive committee as a municipal council committee that 
receives reports from other committees of the council and forwards them with recommendations 
to the council when it cannot dispose of the matter in terms of its delegated powers. This committee 
must also report all its decisions to the municipal council. In terms of Section 44(d), this committee 
must ensure that regard is given to public views and report on the effect of consultation about 
decisions of the municipal council. As the political head of municipalities with a mayoral executive 
system, the executive mayor, also has a key oversight and accountability role over the executives 
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of the municipality. The statutory functions of the executive mayor are provided in Section 56 of 
the Municipal Structures Act, 1998.  In terms of Section 56(1) thereof, an executive mayor is 
entitled to receive reports from committees of the municipal council and to forward these reports 
with recommendations to the council when the matter cannot be disposed of in terms of the 
executive mayor’s delegated powers.   
 
The most important support structures to assist the municipal councils include national and 
provincial governments and SALGA. In terms of Section 154(1) of the Constitution, 1996, the 
national and provincial governments, through legislative and other measures, must support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to exercise their powers and perform their functions.   
Provincial government is responsible for municipal oversight and support and may intervene in 
the affairs of a municipality which cannot fulfil its constitutional mandate or its statutory and 
legislator executive obligations (administration). Section 139 of the Constitution, 1996 provides 
that provincial governments should intervene in the affairs of a municipality which fails to fulfil 
an executive obligation. Based on this decree, the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality of the 
Free State province was the first metropolitan of its kind that was placed under administration by 
the provincial government. This shows how bad the municipal council and functionaries were at 
oversight and accountability. In the 2017-2018 audit outcomes report of local government, the 
Auditor-General reported that municipalities of the State Province that were placed under 
administration had shown no improvement during the financial year. It was argued in the study 
that the functionality of political oversight of the Free State provincial government and of the 
municipalities under administration could be questioned. 
 
The Organised Local Government Act of 1997 recognises SALGA as representing organised local 
government. The role of SALGA is to contribute to the development of municipalities throughout 
the country, through the provision of specialised services to supplement and strengthen the 
capacity of municipalities; research and information dissemination; facilitating shared learning 
between municipalities; human resource development and councillor training. The poor 
performance of municipalities in the Free State province, as indicated in the Auditor-General’s 
audit reports of 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, is an indication that the national and provincial 
governments as well as national and provincial treasuries must fulfil their role to support and 
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monitor the performance of municipalities. SALGA should therefore invest in the proper training 
of municipal councillors to ensure that they fulfil their oversight role as members of the municipal 
councils effectively and hold functionaries to account for their actions or inactions. 
 
The most important constitutional bodies and or enforcement agencies include the Auditor-
General, Public Protector, SIU, NPA and SAPS. The Public Audit Amendment Act of 2018 
empowers the Auditor-General to both recommend and enforce remedial action for public 
financial mismanagement and abuse. Section 3(1B) stipulates that the Auditor-General has the 
power to (a) take any appropriate remedial action; and (b) issue a certificate of debt, as prescribed, 
where an accounting officer or accounting authority has failed to comply with remedial action.  
Furthermore, Section 5A (1) of the Act also grants him or her the power to take remedial action if 
the accounting officer or accounting authority of the municipality fails to implement the 
recommendations contained in the audit report. Although, this means that the Auditor-General 
may issue a directive to determine the amount of the loss and recover that loss, as required in terms 
of any applicable legislation, from the responsible person., the investigation of serious 
maladministration in connection with the affairs of municipalities, inter alia, is the domain of the 
Special Investigation Unit (SIU). Evidently, the current poor performance of 100% of the 
municipalities of the Free State demands that the relevant enforcements agencies, including the 
Auditor-General, take the required remedial action as required in applicable legislation.  
 
7.7.3 Financial oversight and accountability 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7.1 above, financial accountability requires that all public resources 
entrusted to municipalities be used judiciously for the programmes and projects for which they are 
intended and not be diverted for private use. As elected political representatives, councillors may 
be held responsible, individually and collectively, for the collection, safeguarding and the efficient 
and effective use of public funds. Section 16 of the MFMA, 2003 imposes financial executive 
obligations on every municipal council as the key political structure of any municipality.  Firstly, 
the municipal council must approve the budget of the municipality. Secondly, it must preside over 
the tabling of the annual budget, approval of the SDIP or the singing of annual performance 
agreements as required in Section 53(2) of the MFMA, 2003.  Lastly, the council must adopt and 
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annually review the SCM policy as required in Chapter 11 of the MFMA, 2003. In terms of Section 
67 of the MSA, 2000, the municipal council must enforce the code of conduct for the councillors 
and officials concerned and exercise oversight of the executive mayor or executive committee. All 
municipal councils of the Free State Province must give effect to the above financial executive 
obligations to promote effective financial oversight and accountability.   
 
The annual report of the municipality is another key mechanism to promote financial oversight 
and accountability.  It is the mechanism through which the municipal council accounts to the local 
community for the decisions made by the municipality in any given year.  This way, both the 
council and the local community can hold the political and municipal office-bearers to account for 
their decisions and actions. The MFMA, Circular 32 of 15 March 2006 provides guidance on the 
oversight process that the municipal council must follow when considering the annual report and 
producing the oversight report of the municipality.   
 
The mayor’s mid-year budget and performance assessment report are also key oversight 
mechanisms over the municipal financial administration. The mayor or the executive mayor of the 
municipality, in terms of Section 52 of the MFMA, 2003 must provide guidance over the fiscal and 
financial affairs of the municipality. In addition to monitoring and overseeing the CFO and the 
MM in the exercising of their responsibilities, the mayor is also responsible for overseeing the 
preparation of the annual budget; providing political guidance over the budgetary process and the 
priorities that must guide the budget; ensuring that the municipality performs its statutory functions 
in the limits of the approved budget; and  tabling the draft budget before the municipal council. 
Moreover, as part of the accountability function, the mayor must submit quarterly reports to the 
municipal council on the implementation of the budget and the financial status of the municipality 
and  ensure that reports to the municipal council will adequately facilitate the latter’s oversight 
functions in relation to the executive committee and him or herself. The mayor must also ensure 
that the public have access to the SDBIP of the municipality by making it available no later than 
14 days after its approval.  In terms of Section 52 to 59 of the MFMA, 2000, the powers and duties 
assigned to the executive mayor may be delegated to another member of the mayoral committee.    
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Section 60 of the MFMA, 2003 regulates the accounting officer of the municipality, that is, the 
MM.  The MM is responsible for the effective and efficient management and safeguarding of all 
funds received as well as all payments made by the municipality.  He or she also has some general 
and specific responsibilities related to developing and maintaining effective, efficient and 
transparent systems of financial and risk management, internal control, budget and expenditure 
control, control of assets and liabilities and reporting. With the financial function delegated to the 
CFO, the MM must submit monthly budget progress reports to the mayor and provincial treasury, 
a mid-year budget report and performance assessment to the mayor, National Treasury and 
Provincial Treasury by 31 January each year.  In addition, he or she must also report on prescribed 
withdrawals from bank accounts to municipal council each quarter as well as unforeseen or 
unavoidable expenditure or expenditure that is deemed to be unauthorised, irregular or fruitless 
and wasteful. Within one month of receiving the Auditor-General audit reports, it and a copy of 
the financial statements should be tabled in the municipal council. The MM must also submit 
copies of the municipality’s annual report, the financial statements and the audit report to National 
Treasury and the Provincial Treasury. For oversight, he or she should monitor whether the CFO 
of a municipal entity that functions under the control of the municipality acts in accordance with 
the prescripts of the MFMA, 2003. Any non-compliance with the MFMA, 2003 must be reported 
to the municipal council and the Provincial Treasury.  In terms of Section 131(1) of the MFMA, 
2003, the MM has to address all aspects raised by the Auditor-General in an audit report.  
 
Another key role player in the municipality’s financial affairs is the CFO who must be appointed 
by the municipal council and who is directly accountable to the MM. CFOs may sub-delegate in, 
accordance with the MFMA, 2003, any of the delegated functions to an official in the budget and 
treasury office, any other municipal official or, with prescribed safeguards, to any other person 
contracted by the municipality. In term of Section 77(1) and (2) of the MFMA, 2003, the CFO 
must assist the MM in managing and co-ordinating the financial administration of the municipality. 
The CFO is accountable to the MM for his or her delegated functions and responsible for the 
financial management, budgetary process, accounting, analysis, financial reporting, cash 
management, debt management and other review functions delegated by the MM.  As part of the 
administrative functions, the CFO oversees the budget and treasury office of the municipality.    
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Financial controls are key mechanisms that promote effective financial management in the 
municipality.  They and performance controls include proper record keeping and relevant and 
accurate information that is addressable and available to support financial and performance 
reporting. Both include daily and monthly processing and reconciling of transactions. One of the 
key requirements of effective financial control is the establishment of an effective financial 
management system that incorporates a planning system, a budget system, an accounting system, 
financial control systems and allocation systems.  Financial reporting is the most important means 
to determine the extent to which the accounting officer, the CFO and other municipal officials 
responsible for municipal finances fulfil their responsibilities. Thus, financial controls ensure that 
the spending of scarce financial resources occurs in accordance with prescribed legislation, 
policies, rules, regulations, directives, and in line with predetermined plans such as the IDP and 
budgeted items. Apart from effective record keeping, general control measures must be instituted 
to limit any risks and losses.   
 
Section 59 of the MSA, 2000 makes provision for the establishment of Section 79 oversight and 
Section 80 portfolio committees. Another important committee is the municipal audit committee.  
The municipal audit committee is an advisory committee that advises the municipal council, 
political office-bearers and the accounting officer on matters relating to internal audits, internal 
financial controls, accounting procedures and practices, risks and risk management, loss control, 
compliance with the MFMA, 2003 and any applicable legislation. The internal audit unit can help 
the municipal council improve its financial oversight function of municipal projects especially. It 
is concerning when the internal audit committee’s recommendations are not implemented by the 
municipal council and no sanctions are taken against members of the council for non-compliance 
with the MFMA, 2003. Another concern is that elements of mismanagement and corruption that 
are hidden from the internal audit committee impedes it effective functioning.   
 
There are also external structures or role players that should monitor, support and enforce 
compliance with the MFMA, 2003. Section 5(1) of the MFMA, 2003 provides that National 
Treasury may monitor the budgets of municipalities to establish whether they are consistent with 
national government’s fiscal and economic policy.  Section 5(2) of the MFMA, 2003 provides that 
the National Treasury may enforce compliance with the measures provided in Section 216 of the 
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Constitution, 1996 as well as investigate any system of financial management and internal controls 
in any municipality or municipal entity and recommend improvements. In terms of Section 3, the 
Provincial Treasury must assist the National treasury in enforcing compliance with the measures 
in Section 216 of the Constitution, 1996.  In addition, Provincial Treasury must monitor 
compliance of municipalities with the MFMA, 2003, the preparation of the municipal budgets, 
monthly outcomes of those budgets, and submissions of reports. Appropriate steps must be taken 
if a municipality or municipal entity violates the MFMA, 2003.   
 
Other key external role players include the MEC for Local Government, Auditor-General, CoGTA, 
Offices of the Premier of the nine provincial governments, and SALGA.  All these entities must 
support and monitor all municipalities to ensure they attain their constitutional mandate. A concern 
raised by the Auditor-General (AGSA, 2018:3) in the report for 2016-2017 was that national and 
provincial governments did not sufficiently support municipalities to comply with the MFMA, 
2003. As indicated in the section, other constitutional bodies and enforcement agencies include the 
Public Protector, SIU, NPA and SAPS.  
 
The study highlighted that despite numerous legislative frameworks which include the MFMA,  
2003, SCM regulations and a code of conduct related to SCM and procurement, continued non-
compliance and irregularities remain concerns, especially in municipalities of the Free State.  In 
the 2017-2018 audit outcomes, the Auditor-General a total breakdown in controls and poor 
leadership in improving the accountability, capacity, and stability in these municipalities. Among 
his concerns were the vulnerable financial position experienced by 100% of the municipalities of 
the Free State Province, the increase in irregular expenditure as result of blatant and continued 
non-compliance with legislated rules and SCM regulations and significant deficiencies in 
infrastructure projects. The study also emphasised that the most common irregular expenditures 
by of Free State municipalities are that bids are not competitive, bid adjudication committees are 
not composed properly, and the use of contracts appropriated from other organs and that do not 
meet the requirements of National Treasury MFMA, Circular 32 of 15 March 2006 (also known as 
the SCM Regulations 32 of 2006).  A culture of no consequences that weakens effective oversight 
and accountability seems to prevail since the municipal council and political office-bearers are 
failing to ensure compliance with MFMA, 2003 and applicable SCM regulations. The Auditor-
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General and National and Provincial Treasuries should therefore enforce compliance with key 
local government legislation and ensure that remedial action is taken against functionaries for non- 
compliance and transgressions.  Moreover, to promote consequences for non-compliance with 
local government legislation and SCM regulations, enforcement agencies should investigate 
transgressions and take required disciplinary steps against any transgressors.   
 
7.7.4 Administrative oversight and accountability 
 
Administrative accountability, as illustrated in Figure 7.1 above, refers to all the internal control 
mechanisms, relationships among structures, appropriate lines of accountability and reporting, and 
systems and processes of interaction within a municipality to keep the bureaucracy under 
surveillance and in check. The statutory obligations of the he municipal council, which has a key 
oversight role of municipal executives (administration), is provided in Section 4(2) of the MSA,  
2000.  These include that the council should, within a municipality’s financial and administrative 
capacity, be the executive and legislative authority and use the resources of the municipality in the 
best interest of the community. Therefore, the council should, without favour, provide a democratic 
and accountable local government to local communities, involve communities in the affairs of 
local government; ensure that municipal services are provided to local communities in a financially 
and environmentally sustainable manner; consult the community about the level, quality, range 
and impact of municipal services; and assess available options for service delivery. Due to 100% 
of the municipalities of the Free State’s continued transgressions in overall performance, municipal 
councils must revisit the regulatory obligations of the municipal council to strengthen their 
oversight role over the executives (administration).   
 
Section 55 of the MSA, 2000 provides that, as head of administration, the MM is responsible and 
responsible for developing an effective, efficient and economical municipal administration as 
required by applicable legislation. Afterall, the accounts to the executive mayor for the 
management, the overall performance and administration of the municipality as well as the 
functions and responsibilities that were assigned by the municipal council.  In addition, he or she 
is responsible for the implementation of the municipality’s IDP and managing the provision of 
sustainable and equitable services to the local community. The MM must further advise the 
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political structure (municipal council) and political office-bearers, ensure the effective 
implementation of all the decisions of the municipal council and maintain discipline amongst staff.  
 
Section 6(2) of the MSA, 2000 provides that municipal administration is responsible for the 
following: be responsive to the developmental needs of their communities; promote a culture of 
accountability and public service amongst municipal officials; take steps to prevent corrupt 
activities; promote co-operation and communication with local communities; provide the local 
community with accurate and reliable information about the level and standard of service delivery; 
and inform and involve local communities and community organisations in the affairs of local 
government. As part of the MM’s administrative responsibilities he or she should implement 
municipal by-laws, policies and other applicable legislation; perform all duties; and exercise all 
powers delegated by other authorities regarding the IDP or performance management systems.   
 
Due to 100% of the municipalities of the Free State’s political and administrative leadership’s 
continued slow reaction in addressing weak control environments, its disregard of legislative 
prescripts, the increase in the vacancy rates of senior managers, and poor performance reporting, 
findings on compliance with legislation of all 18 municipalities, including the Mangaung 
Metropolitan Municipality, were bad. This shows that municipal councils, political-office-bearers 
and municipal managers of all municipalities in the Free State should ensure that they give effect 
to the legislative prescripts and exercise their functions in accordance with applicable legislative 
frameworks, policies and SCM regulations to ensure administrative oversight and accountability.  
       
The MM may delegate certain powers and functions to respective managers. However, these 
managers then become accountable for any transgressions their delegated responsibilities. 
Regardless, the MM is not totally divested of the responsibility for the exercise of a delegated 
power and must still oversee and monitor the performance of senior managers. Apart from the MM 
and municipal council’s accountable functions, there are also committees and political officials 
who must fulfil the functions of oversight of municipal administration to ensure that municipalities 
are able to meet their constitutional obligations.  These include executive committees, mayoral 
committees, council portfolio committees, MPAC committees and audit committees.  
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Chapter 10, Section 105 of the MSA, 2000 provides guidelines of how provincial governments 
should monitor and evaluate the performance of municipalities, assess the support needed to 
improve the performance of municipalities and develop relevant capacity development initiatives. 
Although CoGTA initially established the LGTAS, that was replaced with the Back-to-Basics 
campaign to establish a responsive municipal administration and ensure political and 
administrative stability. This study showed neither intervention has the desired effect. The 
Auditor-General reports on the audit outcomes for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 confirm that 
accountability and the need for appropriate consequences for the accountability failures of most 
municipalities were the most prominent reasons for their poor performance (AGSA, 2018:22; 
AGSA, 2019:12).  National government and the Free State provincial government should do more 
to ensure that the municipalities of the Free State province are capacitated to achieve the objectives 
of local government that are provided in Section 152 of the Constitution, 1996. 
 
7.7.5 Social Oversight and Accountability 
 
Social accountability refers to citizen participation by assessing or generating relevant information 
and building credible evidence that will serve to hold political and public officials accountable for 
their actions. Municipal councils of all municipalities must give effect to the constitutional 
obligation to involve local communities and community organisations in the affairs of local 
government in accordance with Section 152 of the Constitution, 1996.  Section 17 of the MSA,  
2000 states that local communities should participate in the affairs of their municipalities through 
the political structures for participation as set out in the Municipal Structures Act, 1998. However, 
citizen involvement in the affairs of local government alone does not necessarily constitute social 
accountability. Another part of social accountability is communities’ participation in the affairs of 
local governments through established structures and mechanisms for participation such as sub-
councils or ward committees.  
 
The MM is responsible for facilitating local communities’ participation in the affairs of the 
municipality through participation mechanism such as imbizos, budget and IDP reviews and 
council meetings.  Municipal councils of must also ensure that their and their committees’ 
meetings that discuss or vote on matters such as by-laws, budgets, amendments to the IDP, 
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performance management system amendments, service delivery agreements, and the annual report 
are open to the public or any organ of state.  This way, the local community can fulfil an oversight 
role and they hold functionaries to account for their actions or inactions.  The speaker is responsible 
for communication with the community. To ensure regular and proper community participation 
takes place, the office of the speaker manages ward committees (one of the key structures to 
promote community participation) and liaises with respective councillors.  
 
In terms of Section 73 and 74 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, metropolitan and local 
municipalities may decide to have a ward committee structure. These ward committees may make 
recommendations to ward councillors on any matters that affect them. Such committees are 
bestowed delegated duties and powers by the metro or local council in terms of Section 59 of MSA, 
2000. The study indicated that a critical mechanism to hold functionaries to account is when ward 
councillors establish a relationship with community newspapers and radio stations relating 
community participation opportunities. This study shows that, despite the good intentions of 
government policies and legislation to promote participatory governance through ward 
committees, powers delegated to them are limited as they do not have many decision-making 
powers. This limits their capacity to consult and participate effectively with ward members of their 
municipal area. The lack of clarity of the roles of the ward committees and the availability of 
resources to conduct their activities effectively are some of the challenges that were highlighted in 
the study as limiting social accountability. 
 
Other mechanisms through which locally elected representatives can be accountable to the public 
include, among others, elections, public meetings and formal grievance procedures. Lately, the 
mass and social media, and pressure and consultative groups have gained some credence in making 
functionaries accountable for their actions in the course of performing their duties. Local 
newspapers especially have been at the forefront of revealing the various mismanagements by 
corrupt officials.    
 
In this study it was argued that it seems that local communities of the municipalities of the Free 
State province have failed to hold municipalities and functionaries to account for their poor 
financial performance, bad decisions and actions. The Auditor-General report of 2017-2018 shows 
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alarming deterioration in the financial performance and administrative control measures of all 
municipalities (100%) in the Free State province (AGSA 2018:4). This deterioration indicates 
citizens’ failure to hold functionaries to account for poor performance.  The need to ensure that 
political oversight structures and MMs give effect to the constitutional obligations to involve 
community members and community organisations in the affairs of local government is dire. This 
calls for relevant support structures, such as CoGTA, to ensure that mechanisms are in place to 
promote social accountability. Ward committees should also be capacitated to fulfil their role to 
promote participatory democracy in local government.  
             
7.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
The following were identified as factors that hampered or imposed limitations to the research: 
 
• General limitations. The vastness Free State and poor road infrastructure made 
contributed to making the data collection data very costly. Travelling between 
municipalities was also time-consuming. 
• Generalisation of findings.  The findings of the study are restricted to respondents based 
in one particular geographical location, namely, the Free State province. Therefore, caution 
should be exercised regarding the generalisation of the findings to other provinces or 
municipalities in the country and beyond.  
• Participants’ willingness to participate.   There was a sense of fear and mistrust from the 
respondents (municipal officials) as some wrongly interpreted academic research as some 
form of investigation. Although a letter requesting permission to conduct the research was 
given to officials and the purpose of the study was clearly outlined, most municipal officials 
reluctant to participate. It took a visit to a municipal council and several telephone calls to 
get a response. 
• Municipal officials’ unavailability and lack of commitment or honesty. Municipal 
officials’ unavailability and their lack of commitment due to fear that they may be caught 
for certain non-compliance issues could also mean that some resolved not to tell the truth.  
© Central University of Technology, Free State
428 
 
This fear might have influenced the respondents’ perceptions and their answers in the self-
administered semi-structured questionnaire. 
 
7.9 IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
Further research could be undertaken by doing a comparative study with other municipalities in 
other provinces in South Africa regarding their challenges with oversight and accountability.  This 
comparative study could cover municipalities that have consistently been getting clean audits in 
their Auditor-General Annual Reports and are known for good governance. A study of this nature 
could open possibilities of shared good practices, services and functions regarding oversight and 
accountability within the context of local government.   Further research of the current study could 
examine the challenges of oversight and accountability of SCM practices within municipalities of 
the Free State province. Another study could be conducted to assess the functionality of the Section 
79 committees and portfolio committees to promote oversight and accountability within 
municipalities of the Free State.  
 
7.10 SUMMARY  
 
The aim of the study was to positively contribute to instituted oversight and accountability in 
municipalities of the Free State province by developing a framework for oversight and 
accountability to promote democratic local governance. It was accentuated in this study that 
municipalities are obliged in terms of Section 152(1) of the Constitution, 1996 to provide 
democratic and accountable government for local communities and ensure the provision of 
services to communities in a sustainable manner.  In terms of Section 4(2) of the MSA, 2000, the 
municipal council must exercise the executive and legislative authority of the municipality and use 
the resources thereof in the best interest of the local community.  As the highest authority in the 
municipality, the council has significant approval powers and oversight responsibilities. The 
speaker (also the chairperson of the municipal council) and MPACs have critical oversight roles 
in that they must hold political executives to account for their actions. The mayor (in a municipality 
with an executive committee) or executive mayor (where there is no executive committee) is the 
political leader and must provide political guidance over the fiscal and financial matters of the 
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municipality. This means that he or she should monitor the performance of the accounting officer 
and the CFO but not interfere with their exercising of their responsibilities.  The executive mayor 
also oversees that the provision of services to communities in the municipality is sustainable.   
 
As mentioned elsewhere in this study, the municipal council, in terms of Section 59 of the MSA, 
2000, must develop a system of delegation that will maximise the administrative and operational 
efficiency of the municipality. This allows for adequate checks and balances and enables the 
municipal council to delegate certain powers to any of the municipality’s political structures, 
political office-bearers, councillors, or staff members to perform any of the municipality’s duties 
and / or withdraw any delegation or instruction.   According to Section 60 of the MFMA, 2003, the 
MM is the accounting officer of the municipality accountable for safeguarding all municipal funds 
received and for all payments made by the municipality. He or she is responsible and accountable 
for the municipality’s revenue (income), expenditure, asset management, discharge of all 
liabilities, and ensuring compliance with legislation regulating local government.  The MM should 
therefore be accountable for promoting the sound financial management of the municipality.   
    
Despite numerous legislative prescripts and the establishment of mandated oversight and 
accountable structures, municipalities in the Free State province have failed to provide accountable 
local government to local communities. This is evidenced by the Auditor-General reporting in the 
2017-2018 audit report that the financial positions of all (100%) the municipalities of the Free 
State province had deteriorated to a total breakdown in financial controls. It was argued in this 
study that the political leadership (mayors, executive mayors and municipal councils) showed no 
inclination to improve political oversight and accountability for the financial and overall 
performance of these municipalities.  
 
The findings from the empirical study show that most of the respondents agreed about there not 
being any consequences for breaking the Code of Conduct for Municipal Councillors, as contained 
in Schedule 1 of MSA, 2000. Another issue that came out in the empirical study was that mayors 
seem not to understand their respective oversight roles. This raises the question of whether non-
executive councillors hold the executive mayor or executive committee to account for their 
municipalities. Another question was whether municipalities of the Free State province ever held 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
430 
 
public meetings every financial year-end to discuss the Auditor-General’s report on their 
performance. The findings of the empirical study indicate an apparent lack of accountability and 
oversight being the reason local municipal underperform and get negative audit findings. In 
addition, local communities of the municipalities of the Free State fail to hold municipalities and 
functionaries to account for poor performance (financial performance, decisions and actions). 
Citizens failure to hold functionaries to account for poor performance could partly be responsible 
for the deterioration of all Free State municipalities’ financial position. There is an urgent need for 
political oversight structures and the MM to give effect to the constitutional obligations to involve 
community members and community organisations in the affairs of local government. Noticeable 
interventions and visible consequence management should also be implemented to address the 
apparent lack of accountability and oversight functions in all local municipalities affiliated to the 
Lejweleputswa District Municipality. 
 
For this purpose, the proposed framework provides a coherent and holistic approach by identifying 
key statutory and regulatory legislative framework, policies, regulations, structures, role players, 
support and enforcement structures required to promote political, financial, administrative and 
social oversight and accountability within municipalities of the Free State province. Oversight 
structures must ensure consequences for non-compliance with legislation, policies, regulations, 
serious maladministration in connection with the affairs of municipalities, and other transgressions 
and irregularities. Enforcement agencies that undertake investigations of any reported 
















Anon. 2019a.  Municipalities’ of the Free State Province.  Available at:  
https://www.gov.za/aboutgovernment/contact-dictory/fs-municipalities. (Accessed on 31 August 
2018). 
 
Anon. 2019b. The Richest and Poorest Provinces of South Africa. Available at:  
https//www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-richest-and-porest-privince-of-south-africa-html.  
(Accessed on 31 March 2019).   
 
Adeleke, F.  2017.  South Africa has work to do to make government more accountable.  11 January 
2017.  Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2017-01-11-south-africa-has-work-to-do-to-make-
government-more-accountable.  (Accessed on 31 March 2017). 
 
Adeyemi, O.O., Akindele, S.T., Aluko, O.A. and Agesin B. 2012. Review: Institutionalizing the 
culture of accountability in local government administration in Nigeria.  African Journal of 
Political Science and International Relations, 6(4), 81-91.  
 
Ajam, T. and Fourie, D.J.  2014.  The role of the provincial treasury in driving budget reform in 
South Africa’s decentralised fiscal system.  Administraito Publica, 22(3), 43-61. 
  
Alexander, G. and Kane-Berman, J. 2014. The 80/20 Report: Local Government in 80 Indicators 
Over 20 Years. Holborn, L. and Kane-Berman, J. (Eds). In: South African Race Relations. 
Johannesburg: SARR. 
 
Ambe, I.M. 2016.  Insight into supply chain management in a municipal context.  Public and 
Financial Management, 5(2), 20-29. 
 
Aranha, A.L.M. 2017.  Accountability, corruption and local government: mapping the control 
steps. Brazilian Political Science Review, 11(2), 1-29. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
432 
 
Asha, A. 2014. Towards effective planning and implementation of the local development 
initiatives in Limpopo province, South Africa. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(20), 
398-400. 
 
Asha, A., Belete, A. and Moyo, T. 2014. Analysing community participation in the municipal 
Integrated Development Planning processes in Limpopo Province, South Africa. Mediterranean 
Journal of Social Sciences, 5(25), 257-258. 
 
Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA). 2013. MFMA 2003: Consolidated General Report on the 
Audit Outcomes of Local Government 2011-12. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA). 2015. MFMA 2003: Consolidated General Report on the 
Audit Outcomes of Local Government 2014-15. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA). 2018. Consolidated General Report on the audit 
outcomes of local government 2016-2017.  Pretoria:  Government Printer. 
 
Auditor- General South Africa.  (AGSA) 2018.  Media Release.   Auditor-General laments lack of 
accountability as he releases declining local government audit results. 23 May 2018 Available at: 
www.agsa.co.za/media-reease-2016-2017/MFMA, 2003/Media/Release.  (Accessed on 31 March 
2019).    
 
Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA). 2019. Consolidated General Report on the audit 
outcomes of local government 2017-2018.  Pretoria:  Government Printer. 
 
Auriacombe, C.J. 2006. Understanding and planning measurement. Journal of Public 
Administration. 41(3.1), 641 – 642. 
 
Babbie, E. 2010. The practice of social research. Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
433 
 
Babbie, E and Mouton, J. 2001. The practice of social research. Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Babbie, E. and Mouton, J.  2004.  The practice of social research.  Cape Town:  Oxford Press.   
 
Badenhorst, C.  2012.  Research writing, breaking the barriers.  Pretoria:  Van Schaiks Publishers.  
 
Bekker, K. (ed.). 1996. Citizen participation in local government. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Bekker, J. 2009. Public sector governance: accountability in the state. Paper presented for CIS 
Corporate Governance Conference on 10 and 11 September 2009. 
 
Bless, C. and Higson-Smith, C.  1995.  Social research methods.  An African perspective.  Kenwyn:  
Juta and Company. 
 
Bless, C., Higson-Smith, C. and Sithole, S.L.  2014.  Fundamentals of Social Research Methods – 
An African Perspective. 5th edition.  Lansdowne:  Juta and Company.   
 
 
Botha, T. and Khan, S. In Hussein, M.K.  1999.  Enhancing Accountability in Local Government:  
An Assessment of the Enforcing Mechanisms. Unpublished mini dissertation.  Johannesburg: 
Randse Afrikaanse University  
 
Bovens, M. 2005. Public accountability: a framework for the analysis and assessment of 
accountability arrangements in the public domain. Utrecht: Utrecht University. 
 
Brassington, F. and Pettitt, S. 2013. Principles of marketing. London: Prentice Hall. 
 
Brewerton, P. and Millward, L. 2006.Organisational research methods: a guide for students and 
researchers. London: Sage Publications. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
434 
 
Brynard, P.A. and Hanekom, S.X.  2006.  Introduction to the research management.  Pretoria:  Van 
Schaik Publishers. 
 
Burns, J.P.  and Zhiren, Z. 2010. Performance Management in the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China: Accountability and Control in the Implementation of Public Policy. OECD 
Journal on Budgeting, (2), 1 -28. 
 
Caiden, G.E. 1991. What really is public maladministration? Public administration review, 51(6), 
486-493.  
 
Camargo, C.B and Jacobs, E. 2013. Social accountability and its conceptual challenges: An 
analytical framework. Basel: Basel Institute on Governance.  
 
Cambell, J.  2019.  Zondo Commission Witness Details State Capture in South Africa. Available 
at: https://www.cfr.org./blog/zondo-commissin-witness-details-state-capture-south-africa.  
(Accessed on 15 February 2019).    
 
Carey, M. 2009. The social work dissertation using small-scale qualitative methodology. 
Berkshire: Open University Press. 
 
Chikulo, B.C. 2013. Developmental local governance and service delivery in South Africa: 
Progress, achievements and challenges. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 28(1), 35-64. 
 
Chetty, M. 2015. An integrated debt management model for municipalities in the Free State 
Province. Thesis (D. Tech). Bloemfontein: Central University of Technology. 
 
Cloete, F. and Mokgoro, J. 1995. Policies for public service transformation. Cape Town:  Van 
Schaik Publishers. 
 
Cloete, J.J.N. 1997. South African municipal government and administration. Goodwood: Van 
Schaik Publishers. 




Cloete, J.J.N. and Thornhill, C. 2005. South African Municipal Government & Administration. 
Pretoria: Dotsquare Publishing. 
 
Cooper, D.R. and Schindler, P.S. 2003. Business Research Methods. 8th Edition. New Delhi: Tata 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Compte, G.  2008.  Accountable democracy:  Citizens as the 4th power of government.  Available 
at:  http://www.researchgate.net/pubnlication. (Accessed on 04 March 2015). 
 
Community Law Centre. 2008.  Local Government Project. Municipal Accountability:  Assessing 
Municipal Accountability Tools.  Cape Town: University of the Western Cape. 
 
Corruption Watch. 2015. Corruption Watch Annual Report. Johannesburg: Corruption Watch (RF) 
NPC. 
 
Craythorne, D.L.  2006. Municipal administration the handbook. 6th edition. Cape Town: Juta and 
Company. 
 
Creswell, J.W., Ebershon, L., Eloff, I., Ferreira, R., Ivankova, N.V., Jansen, J.D., Nieuwenhuis, J., 
Pietersen, J., Clark, V.L.P.  2017.  In Maree, K. (ed.).  First steps in research. Pretoria: Van Schaik 
Publishers.  
 
Davis, G., Pecar, B., Santana, L. and Burke, A. 2014. Statistics for the social sciences using Excel: 
a first course for South African students. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
Davids, I. and Theron, F.  2014.  Development, the State and Civil Society in South Africa (Eds).  
Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
De Beer, F. and Swanepoel, H. 2012. Community development: breaking the cycle of poverty. 
Johannesburg: Juta and Company.  
© Central University of Technology, Free State
436 
 
    
Democratic Alliance. 2014. The Rot in ANC Municipalities: Five case studies of cronyism, 
corruption and ineptitude. Available at: www.da.org.za. (Accessed on 21 September 2014). 
De Visser, J. 2008. Good governance learning network: what lies in store for local government? 
Local Government Project Community Law Centre. UWC.  LGB, 11(2), 2-6. 
 
De Visser, J. 2010. Research and evaluation: The political-administrative interface in South 
African municipalities assessing the quality of local democracies. Commonwealth Journal of Local 
Governance. Special Issue, March 2010: Commonwealth Local Government Conference Freeport,  
Bahamas, May 2009. Available at:  http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg Associate 
Professor Community Law Centre. (Accessed on 15 April 2015). 
 
De Vos, A.S., Strydom, H., Fouché, C.B. and Delport, C.S.L. 2005. Research at grass roots: for 
the social sciences and human service professions. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
De Wet, C. 2014. Public administration in a democratic development state. In Thornhill, C., Van 
Dijk, G. and Ile, I. (eds.).  Public Administration & Management in South Africa: A Developmental 
Perspective. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.  
 
Diale, A., Maserumule, H. and Mello, D. 2007. Public sector administrative reforms and 
accountability. Journal of Public Administratio, 42(7), 636-649. 
 
Dixon, R. and Elston, T.  2017. The effect of shared service centres on administrative intensity in 
English local government a longitudinal evaluation. BSG Working Paper Series: Providing access 
to the latest policy-relevant research, (021), 1-29. 
 
Du Plessis, L.M. 2013. Implementing integrated strategic plans in Free State municipalities. 
Unpublished Doctoral Thesis.  Bloemfontein: University of the Free State. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
437 
 
Du Plessis, L.M. and Lues. L. 2011.  A conceptual framework for preparing effective Municipal 
councillors.  Ensuring the future of local government through skills identification.  Administratio 
Publica, 19(1), 104-120. 
 
Du Plessis, L. 2012. Dimensions of local governance Guidelines for consideration in the 
management of South African municipalities. Administratio Publica, 20(1), 12-13. 
 
Du Plooy-Cilliers, F., Davis, C. and Bezuidenhout, R. 2014.  Research Matters.  Claremont:  Juta. 
 
Durrheim, K. and Painter, D. 2006. Collecting quantitative data: sampling and measuring. In Terre 
Blanche, Durrheim and Painter, D.  (Eds). Research in practice. Cape Town: UCT Press.   
 
Engel, R.J. and Schutt, R.K. 2013. The practice of research in social work. Los Angeles: Sage 
Publishers. 
 
Erasmus, G.  2019. Good Governance is vital but is easier said than done once the state has been 
captured. Available at: https://www.org/blog/article/13928-good-governance-is-vital-but-easire-
said-than -done-once-the state-has -been-captured.html. (Accessed on 5 February 2019). 
 
Erasmus, W.  2015.  Public administration.  A negotiation of just administrative action.  
Administratio Publica, 23(1), 102-120. 
 
Esau, M.V. 2008.  Exploring the practice of legislative oversight by the South African parliament 
through an examination of the activities of the standing committees on public accounts.  Africanus, 
38(2), 95-105. 
 
Faherty, V.E. 2010. Wordcraft: applied qualitative data analysis (QDA): tools for public and 
voluntary social services. California. Sage Publications. 




Ferraz, C. and Finan, F. 2007. Electoral accountability and corruption in local governments: 
evidence from audit reports. Discussion Paper, 2843, June 2007.     
 
Fourie, D. 2015. Public procurement: a bastion against corruption. In Thornhill, C.,  
Van Dijk, G. and Ile, I. (eds).  Public administration & management in South Africa: a 
developmental perspective. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fourie, M. and Opperman, L. 2011. Municipal finance and accounting. 2nd Edition. Pretoria: Van 
Schaik Publishers. 
 
Fourie, M. and Opperman, L. 2015.  Municipal finance and accounting.  3rd Edition.  Pretoria: Van 
Shaik Publishers.    
 
Fourie, D. 2018. Ethics in municipal Supply Chain Management in South Africa, London South 
Bank University, 33(7), 726-739. Available at: https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/ 
67253/Fourie_Ethics_2018.pdf (Accessed on 26 September 2019). 
 
Fox, J. 2000. Civil society and political accountability: propositions for discussion: presented at: 
Institutions, accountability and democratic governance in Latin America. The Helen Kellogg 
institute for international studies; University of Notre Dame May 8-9, 2000. Santa Cruz: University 
of California. 
 
Fox, W. and Meyer, I.H. 1995. Public Administration Dictionary. Johannesburg: Juta and 
Company. 
 
Galvin. M. 1999. The impact of local government on rural development in South Africa. Available 
at: www.hrsc.ac.za. (Accessed on 18 December 2015). 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
439 
 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature. 2012. The people shall govern:  public participation beyond 
slogans. Deliberations of the International Conference on Public Participation. Johannesburg: 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature. 
 
Gauteng Provincial Local Government and Housing. 2012. Local government performance 
review: Reflecting on the 2006 – 2011: Term of local government in Gauteng. Johannesburg: 
Gauteng Legislature. 
 
Gerber, J.  2019.  Ramaphosa appoints Special Investigation Unit Tribunal.  News 24, 26 
September 2019. 
 
Gerhart, T. 1997. State, society and democracy: Decentralisation and state-building at the local 
level. The Association of Regional Councils Consultative Conference, Windhoek.  
Gericke, M.  2019. “Mangaung-metro gaan die kreeftegang, wys OG-verslag.  Die Volksblad, 10 
Julie 2019.” 
Gericke, M.  2020. “Metro nou laer as Rommel.  Heel laagste gradering volg dalk.  Die Volksblad, 
30 Januarie 2020.”   
Gibson, C.C. and Hoffman, B.D. 2006. Political accountability and public service provision in 
Africa:  evidence from Tanzania and Zambia. Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop in 
political theory and policy analysis, Indiana University. San Diago: University of California. 
 
Gildenhuys, J.S.H. 1993. Public Financial Management. Pretoria. Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Gildenhuys, J.S.H. 1997.  Introduction to the management of public finance:  A South African 
perspective.  Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Gildenhuys, J.S.H. 1997. Restructuring your local government. Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
440 
 
Gildenhuys, J.S.H.  2018.  Introduction to Local Government Finance.  A South African 
Perspective.  15 Impression.   Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers.  
 
Gildenhuys, J.S.H. and Knipe, A. 2000. The organisation of government: an introduction. Pretoria: 
Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Gliem, J.A. and Gliem, R.R. 2003. Calculating, interpreting, and reporting Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability coefficient for Likert-type scales. Midwest Research-to-Practice Conference in Adult, 
Continuing, and Community Education. 
Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN). 2010. Ethical leadership and political culture in 
local government. Cape Town: GGLN. 
 
Gordhan, P. 2014. Get the basics right first. City Press, 21 September 2014. 
 
Hair, J.F., Buch, R.P. and Ortinau, D.J. 2003. Marketing research within a changing information 
environnent. New York : McGraw-Hill Irwin.   
 
Hanabe, L., Taylor, D. and Maclean, S.  2017.  Normative Model for Enhanced Implementation 
of the Local Government Budgetary Reforms.  Journal of Public Administration, 52(2), 393-437.   
 
Henning, E., Van Rensburg, W. and Smit, B.  2004.  Finding Your Way in Qualitative Research.  
Pretoria:  Van Schaiks Publishers. 
 
Ho, G. 2010. In local government good governance is King III: The principles of the King III 
report municipalities give an opportunity to improve both governance and service delivery. Cape 
Town: KPMG. 
 
Hoffman, P.  2017.  Making accountability matter in South Africa State capture began with cadre 
deployment. IFAISA Accountability Now. Available at: http://accountabilitynow.org.za/state-
capture-began-cadt=re-deployment/. (Accessed on 15 February 2019).   




Hofstee, E. 2006. Constructing a good dissertation: a practical guide to finishing a master’s, MBA 
or PhD on schedule.  Sandton:  EPE. 
 
Holtzhausen, N.  2016.  Ethical public information services.  In Draai, E. (Ed). Van Rooyen E.J. 
and Raga, K.  2016.  A Practical Introduction to Public Management.  Cape Town:  Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Hussein, M.K.  1999.  Enhancing Accountability in Local Government:  An Assessment of the 
Enforcing Mechanisms. Unpublished mini dissertation.  Johannesburg: Randse Afrikaanse 
University. 
 
Ijeoma, E.O.C. and Sambumbu, A.M.  2013.  A framework for improving public accountability in 
South Africa.  Journal of Public Administration, 48(2), 282-298. 
 
IMIESA. 2012. Service Delivery: Leadership for local government is critical. October, 2012. 
Johannesburg: IMIESA. 
 
Ismail, N., Bayat, S. and Meyer, I. 1999. Local government management. Johannesburg: 
International Thomson Publishing. 
 
Joseph, C.  2002.  The political Role of the Councillor.  Johannesburg: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
 
Johnson, C. and Williams, E. 2017. Considerations for designing and implementing effective 
shared services. Public Policy Institute for Wales: Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO. 
 
Kafakoma, R.., Roka, M., and Chimutu, P. 2005. Local government accountability. Blantyre: 
Institute of Environment and Development. 
 
Kahn, S., Madue, S.M. and Kalema, R.  2016.  Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa.  2th 
Edition.  Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
442 
 
Kakumba, U.  2008.  External Control Systems in the Enhancement of Accountability in Local 
Government:  The Case of Uganda.  Unpublished Thesis.  Pretoria:  University of Pretoria. 
 
Kanyane, M.H.  2011. Financial Viability of Rural Municipalities in South Africa. Journal of 
Public Administration, 46(2), 935-946. 
 
Karim, S.A. 2016.  State capture report explained. Available at: 
https://www.groundup.org.za/article/simple-explanaiton-state-capture-report/.  (Accessed on 15 
February 2019). 
 
Kaunda, J.M. 2009. The progress of good governance in Botswana 2008: Final report of the 
UNECA project measuring and monitoring progress towards good governance in Africa.  The 
African Governance Report II (AGR II). Gaborone: Printing and Publishing Company Botswana. 
 
Khalo, T. 2011. Municipal financial management. In Van der Waldt, G. (Ed). 2011. Municipal 
Management: Serving the People. Cape Town: Juta and Company.  
 
Khalo, T., Nealer,E., Phitiagae, K., Van der Walt, C., van Niekerk, D. and Venter, A. 2011.  
Municipal Management Serving the People. In Van der Waldt, G. (ed.). 1st Edition.   Claremont:  
Juta and Company. 
 
Khalo, T. 2013. Accountability and Oversight in Municipal Financial Management: The Role of 
Municipal Public Accounts Committees. Journal of Public Administration, 48(4), 589 – 501. 
 
Khalo, T., Nealer, E., Phutiagae, K., van der Walt, C., Van Niekerk, D. and Venter, A.  2014.  
Municipal Management Serving the People.  In Van der Waldt, G (ed.), 2nd Edition. Claremont:  
Juta. 
 
Khalo, T. and Vyas-Doorgapersad, S. 2018.  Municipal financial management.   In Van der Waldt, 
G. (ed.), Van der Walt, C., Venter, A., Phutiagae, K., Nealer, E., Khalo, T. and Vyas-
Doorgapersad, S. 2018. Municipal Management Serving the People.  3rd Edition. Claremont:  Juta.  
© Central University of Technology, Free State
443 
 
 Koma, S.B. 2012. The evolution of developmental local government in South Africa: issues, 
trends and options. Journal of US-China Public Administration, 9(1), 53 – 67.  
 
Koma, S.B.  2017.  A Critical Analysis of Municipal Governance Challenges and Lessons Learnt:  
The cases of two South African municipalities.  Administratio Publica, 25(4), 23-39.   
 
Koon, M. 2015. Validity and Reliability. In Du Plooy-Cilliers, F, Davis, C. and Bezuidenhout, R. 
(Eds).  Research matters. Cape Town. Juta and Company. 
 
Kraai, S., Holtzhausen, N. and Malan, L. 2017. Oversight mechanisms in local government: a case 
of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality in South Africa. African Journal of Public Affairs, 9(6), 
pp. 59-72. 
 
Krishnan, H.B. 2008. Public accountability: from concept to practice in the South African local 
government context. Prepared for: the democracy development programme. Durban. University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, 5th Annual Local Government Conference, 11-12 August 2008, Southern Sun 
– Elangeni.   
 
Kroukamp, H.J. 2008.  Trust in leadership: a prerequisite for organisational effectiveness in the 
South African local government. Kampala. Paper presented at the annual IASIA conference held 
in Kampala, Uganda, 14 – 18 July 2008. 
 
Kroukamp, H.  2016.  Strategies to restore confidence in South African Local Government.  
African Journal of Public Affairs, 9(3), 105-116.   
 
Kumar, K., Moodley, S. and Reddy, P.S. 2003. Statutory reforms in local government financing. 
In Reddy, P.S, Sing, D and Moodley, S. (Eds).   Local government financing and development in 
Southern Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.  
 
Kuye, J.O., Thornhill, C. and Fourie, D.  2002.  Critical Perspectives on Public Administration 
issues for consideration.  Sandown: Heinemann.  
© Central University of Technology, Free State
444 
 
Kwele, L.  2016.  Strategic management in local government. In Draai, E. Van Rooyen E.J. and 
Raga, K. (eds.).  2016.  A Practical Introduction to Public Management.  Cape Town:  Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Landberg, C. and Graham, S.  (eds.).  2017.  Government and Politics in South Africa.  Coming of 
age.  Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers.   
 
Laubscher, L.H. 2011. Challenges on financial controls and accountability in South African 
municipalities. Journal for new generation sciences, 10(1), 63 – 79. 
 
Laubscher, L.H.  2007.  Finansiële beheer en verantwoording by plaaslike owerhede in Suid 
Afrika.   Unpublished Doctoral Thesis.  Bloemfontein: University of the Free State.  
 
Leedy, P.D.  1985. Practical research planning and design. 4th Edition. New York:  Macmilliam 
Publishing Company. 
 
Leedy, P. and Ormrod, J. 2005. Practical research. 8th Edition. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Legodi, L.F.  2017.  Governance Challenges in Combating Supply Chain Management Corruption 
in Ekurhuleni metropolitan Municipality.  Unpublished of master thesis.  Johannesburg:  
University of Witwatersrand. 
 
Lekorwe, M. 1998. The politics of urban governance and management in Gaborone. Pula: 
Botswana Journal of African Studies, 1.12 (1 & 2), 69 – 84. 
 
Lindberg, S. 2009. Accountability: the core concept and its subtypes. Working Paper. 1 April, 
2009, Published on behalf of the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) by the Overseas 
Development Institute. Brighton: University of Sussex. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
445 
 
MacSporran, A.J. 2015. Transparency and accountability in local government. Queensland: Crime 
and Corruption Commission. 
 
Madumo, O.S.  2015.  Developmental Local Government and Progress in South Africa.  
Administratio Publica, 23(2), 153-166. 
 
Mafunisa, M.J. 2002. Public partnership in South Africa: an overview of the BEE experiment. 
Thesis (PhD). Pretoria: University of Pretoria. 
 
Majam. T. 2011. Good governance principles for an integrated budget at local government level. 
Department of Public Governance. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. 
 
Makwetu, K. 2019. Wholesale good governance. City Press, 7 April 2019.  
 
Malan, L. 2014. The intergovernmental structure of the state: national, regional and local. In 
Thornhill, C, Van Dijk, G. and Ile, I. (eds).  Public Administration & Management in South Africa: 
A Developmental Perspective. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.  
 
Malapane, A.T.  2015.  Effective Oversight in the South African Legislative sector: A demand for 
accountability.  Journal of Public Administration, 50(4), 863-872.   
 
Mamogale, M.J. 2014. Financial Performance of Local Government in Limpopo Province, 2010-
2012. African Studies Quarterly, 15(1), 71-93. 
 
Mangcu, X. 2015. ANC’s disdain for grassroots is sowing the seeds of revolt. Sunday Times, 20 
December.  
 
Manning, T. 2006. Delivering the Dream: Designing and Implementing Strategy in the Public 
Sector. Cape Town: Zebra. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
446 
 
Mantzaris, E.A. 2017. Treands, realities and corruption in Supply Chain Management. African 
Journal of Public Affairs, 9(8), 121-134. 
 
Maree, K. and Pietersen, J. 2007. Sampling.  In Maree, K. (Ed). First steps in research. Pretoria. 
Van Schaik Publishers.  
 
Maree, K. and Van der Westhuizen, C. 2007. Planning a research proposal. In Maree, K. (ed.). 
First steps in research. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.  
 
Marrian, N.  2019.  Office of the public protector must not be captured.  Mail and Guardian, 14 
June 2019. 
  
Martin, M.E. and Solomon, H. 2017. Understanding the Phenomenon of “State Capture” in South 
Africa. Southern African Peace and Security Studies, 5(1), 21-34. 
 
Masango, R.S. and Mfene, P.N. 2012. Citizen empowerment for promoting access to public 
services. Administratio Publica, 20(1), 75-76. 
 
Mashamaite, K. and Madzivhandila, A. 2014. Planning Process for Effective Public Service 
Delivery in the Rural Limpopo Province. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(25), 227. 
 
Mathane, L.P.  2013.  The impact of the local government turnaround strategy on public 
participation and good governance with regard to the integrated development planning process:  
The case of Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality. Unpublished master’s dissertation. 
Bloemfontein: Central University of Technology, Free State.  
 
Matshabaphala, M.D.J.  2014.  Finding our way:  The need for accountable leadership and good 
governance in South Africa’s Public Services. Journal of Public Administration, 49(4),1008-1018. 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
447 
 
Maughan, K.  2018.  Prosecutions service.  Ramaphosa’s hurry up and wait approach to NPA boss 
is puzzling.  President turns to experts with just one month until the deadline to appoint a successor 
to Shaun Abrahams.   Business Day, 11 October, 7. 
Mavee, S.E.A. 2014. Civil society participation in a democracy towards the fostering of good 
governance. Administratio Publica, 22(3), 202-217. 
 
Mboga, H. 2009. Understanding the Local Government System in Kenya.  A Citizen’s Handbook. 
Nairobi: Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA).  
 
Mazibuko, G. and Fourie, D.J.  2013.  Municipal Finance.  Administratio Publica, 21(4), 130-152.    
 
Meyer, D.F. and Venter, A.  2013.  Challenges and Solutions for Local Economic Development 
(LED) municipal institutional arrangements.  The case of the Northern Free, State.  Administratio 
Publica, 21(4), 91-116.   
 
Mfene, P.N.  2013.  Public Accountability: A professional basis for the South African Public 
Service.    Administratio Publica, 21(1), 6-23.  
 
Mkhabela, M.  2018.  Government is overrun by corruption, yet where is the Public Service 
Commission.  03 May 2018.  Available at:  https://www.news24.com/Columnist/Mpumelelo 
Mkhabela/government-is-overun-by-corruption-yet-where-is-the-public-service-commission.  
(Accessed on 15 June 2019). 
 
Moeti, K. (ed.). 2014.  Public Finance Fundamentals.  Cape Town: Juta and Company.   
 
Mojapelo, P.M. 2013. The doctrine of separation of powers: A South African perspective. Paper 
presented at Middle Temple South African Conference, Forum, 37-43.    
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
448 
 
Motingoe, R.S.  2011.  The performance management system as implementation tool for integrated 
development plans: The case of Ngwathe local municipality.  Unpublished Master Dissertation. 
Potchefstroom:  University of the North-West University.  
 
Mouton, J.  2001.   How to succeed in your master’s and doctoral studies.   A South African guide 
and resource book. Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Mouton, J., Auriacombe C.J, and Lutabingwa J. 2006. Problematic aspects of the research, design 
and measurement process in public administration research: conceptual considerations. Journal of 
Public Administration, 41(3.1), 574-587. 
 
Moyo, T., Asha, A., Belete, A. Analysing decentralisation and local government's role in 
development in South Africa. The Journal of African & Asian Local Government Studies, 2(2), 
94-107.  
 
Mphaisha, C. 2014. Functioning between the branches of government: ensuring democracy. In 
Thornhill, C, Van Dijk, G. and Ile, I. (Eds).  Public Administration & Management in South Africa: 
A Developmental Perspective. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
Municipal Infrastructure Task Team. 2004. Policy framework for the introduction of the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant (MIG) concise version – final. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
Munzhedzi, P.H. 2016. South African public sector procurement and corruption: Inseparable 
twins? Journal of Transport and Supply Chain Managemnt, 10(1), 1-8. 
 
Namibia. 1992.  Local Authorities Act, Act 23 of 1992. Windhoek: Government Printers. 
 
Namibia. 2000.  Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing. Decentralization 
Performance. Windhoek: Government Printer. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
449 
 
Napier, C.J. 2007.  Accountability:  Am Assessment at the Local Government Sphere.  Journal of 
Public Administration, 42(4), pp. 376-390. 
 
National Development Agency (NDA). 2013. Funding Constraints and Challenges Faced by Civil 
Society in South Africa. A Research Report Commissioned by the National Development Agency 
and developed by Co-operative for Research and Education (CORE). Johannesburg. NDA. 
 
Ndaba, B. 2019. 25 billion wasted: municipalities in a mess, auditor-general to hold mayors, 
municipal managers to account.  The Star, 27 June 2019. 
 
Nealer, E. 2011. Municipal Human Resource Management.  In Van der Waldt, (Ed). Municipal 
Management: Serving the People. Cape Town: Juta and Company.  
 
Nel, P., Werner, A., Poisant, P., Sono, T., Du Plessis, A. and Ngalo, O. 2011. Human Resource 
Management. 8th ed. Johannesburg: Oxford University Press. 
 
Netswera, F.G. and Phago, K.G.  2013.  How popular protest influence public discourse and public 
accountability revisiting the theory of public spheres in South Africa. Politeia, 23(1), 24-39. 
 
Nkatini, NL. 2005. Glimpses of research: guidelines of the writing of research proposals, reports, 
essays, dissertations, and theses. Polokwane: Academic Bookshop. 
 
Nkuna, N. and Sebola, M. 2014. Public Finance Fundamentals. Cape Town: Juta and Company. 
 
Nombembe, T. Auditor-General South Africa. Auditor-General Report 23 July 2012: Free State 
Times, 23 July 2012.  
 
Ntliziywana, P. 2011. Leadership matters professionalising political leadership. LGB, 12(4), 4-6. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
450 
 
Nzuza, Z.W. and Lekhanya, L.M. 2014. Perceived Effectiveness of Municipal Management on 
the Performance of Inventory Stock Management in Local Government of South Africa. Journal 
of Economics and Behavioural Studies, 6(3), 251-261. 
 
Obioyo, R.  2007.  Democracy and the committee system of the South African Parliament with 
special reference to the standing Committee of Public Accounts.  Politeia, 26(1), 60-79 
 
Ochieng, K.O. 2017. Policy and practice. Who is responsible? Local government and 
accountability for service delivery in Kenya’s devolved health sector.  Commonwealth Journal of 
Local Governance, 20, 158 – 171.  
 
Olum, Y.  2014.  Public Accountability and Good Governance in Uganda’s Public Sector.  Journal 
of Public Administration. Special Edition, 49(2.1), 603-621. 
 
Okafor, C., Matiwane, S. and Onuigbo, R.A.  2015.  Examining Municipal councillors’ Oversight 
Roles in Alfred Nzo District Municipality of the Eastern Cape, South Africa.   Africa’s Public 
Delivery Performance Review, 52-71. 
 
Paradza, G., Mokwena, L. and Richards, R. 2010. Assessing the Role of Councillors in Service 
Delivery at Local Government Level. In South. Research Report 125 funded by the Open Society. 
Centre for Policy Studies. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies. 
 
Pauw, J.C., Van der Linde, G.J.A., Fourie, D. and Visser. C.B.  2015.  Managing Public Money.   
3rd Edition.  Cape Town: Pearson Holdings.    
 
Pricewaterhouse and Coopers (PwC). 2010. Local Government and King III: Public Sector 
Working Group Position Paper, 2 October 2010. Johannesburg. PwC and the Institute of Directors 
in Southern Africa (IoDSA). 
 
Pienaar, G. 2000. Office of the Public Protector. African Security Review. 9(2), 6-7. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
451 
 
Pillay, P. 2016. Ethics and accountability in South African municipalities: the struggle against 
corruption. African Journal of Public Affairs, 9(2), 115-126. 
 
Pillay, U., Tomlinson, R. and Du Toit, J. 2006.  Democracy and Delivery, Urban Policy in South 
Africa.  Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council.    
 
Potgieter, E. and Govender, R. 2016. 20 Years of the SA Constitution: people, institutions and 
rights. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). 
 
Public Service Commission. 2001. A review of South Africa’s national anti-corruption agencies. 
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
Quist, R.E., Certan, C. and Dendura, J. 2008. Republic of South Africa Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability Public Financial Management Performance Assessment Report Final 
Report Client: European Commission Delegation South Africa Specific Contract No: 
AFS/2008/159-145. Amsterdam: European Commission. 
 
Raga, K. and Taylor, D. 2005. Overview of the required skills and expertise of municipal 
councillors at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, In Terms of the New Developmental 
Mandate. Journal of Public Administration.  Conference Proceedings, October 2005.     
 
Raga, K., Taylor, J.D. and Albrecht, W.  2011.  Challenges for developmental local government 
and public participation in contemporary South Africa.   Administratio Publica, 19(1), 149- 168.  
 
Reddy, P.S. (ed.). 1996. Reading in Local Government Management and Development: A Southern 
African Perspective. Cape Town: Juta and Company. 
 
Reddy, P.S., Sing, D. and Moodley, S. 2003. Local Government Financing and Development in 
Southern Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
452 
 
Ringold, D., Holla, D.A., Koziol, M. and Srinivasa, S. 2012.  Citizens and Service Delivery 
Assessing the Use of Social Accountability Approaches in Human Development: The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  Available at:  www.worldbank.org. (Accessed on: 12 
December 2015). 
Ritchie, K. and Ansell, G. (eds.). 2006. Reporting the Courts: A Handbook for South African 
Journalists. Pinetown: Pinetown Printers. 
Robson, C. 2002.   Real world research.  Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Royse, D. 2011. Research methods in social work. Belmont: Brooks/Cole Cengage Learning. 
 
Salkind,  N.J.  2018.  Exploring Research, New Jersey:  Pearson Prentice Hill. 
 
Samson, T. 2011. Accountability in Public Services in South Africa: Selected Issues World Bank. 
Washington: Communications Development Incorporated. 
 
Sandford, M. 2015. Local government: new models of service delivery. A briefing paper. London: 
House of Commons Library. 
 
Sargiacomo, M. 2010.  Accounting and Accountability in Local Government: Contributions from 
Accounting History Research. The sixth Accounting History International Conference 
“Accounting and the State”. Wellington.  
 
Saunders, M.N.K., Thornhill, A. and Lewis, P. 2009. Research Methods for Business Students. 
Essex: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Schaeffer, M. 2005.  Local Government Accountability:  Challenges and Strategies.  World bank, 
Public Sector Expenditure and Management Thematic Group.  Available at:  
https://slidepalyer.com/slides/5937360.   (Accessed on 15 August 2019). 
 
Senay, C. and Besdiek, D.  1999.  Political Oversight of Municipal Projects.  In Van der Waldt, G. 
(ed.). An empirical Investigation.  Administratio Publica, 23(3), 48-69  




Sharma, K.C. 2010. Role of local government in Botswana for effective service delivery: 
Challenges, prospects and lessons. Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, 6, 1-8. 
 
Sebudubudu, D. 2010. Issues and Challenges in Democratic Governance in Africa: The Case of 
Botswana. A Paper Presented at the Conference on Governance Reform: What is the record? 
Perspectives from the South and North on governance, policy space and democratic processes. 
Montreal: University of Quebec. 
 
Sibanda, M.M.  2017.  Control, ethics and Accountability in The Financial Management 
Performance of Eastern Cape Municipalities.  Journal of Public Administration, 52(2), 313-339.  
 
Siddle, AM. 2011. Decentralisation in South African Local Government: A Critical Evaluation. 
Thesis (PhD). Cape Town: University of Cape Town. 
 
Siddle, A. and Koelble, T.A. The Failure of Decentralisation in South African Local Government. 
Claremont: UCT Press. 
 
Sikhakane, B.H. and Reddy, P.S. 2011.  Public Accountability at the Local Government Sphere in 
South Africa.  African Journal of Public Affairs, 4(1), 85-102.  
 
Sing, D. 2003. The theory and practice of performance management in local government. In Reddy, 
P.S, Sing, D and Moodley, S. (Eds) Local Government Financing and Development in Southern 
Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sing, D and Ntshangase, B. 2003. Ethics and corruption. In Reddy, P.S, Sing, D and Moodley, S. 
(eds). Local Government Financing and Development in Southern Africa. Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Sirovha, K.I. and Thornhill, C.  2017.  Partnership between traditional leaders and municipalities 
with special reference to Bojanala District Municipality.  Administratio Publica, 25(3), 134-156. 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
454 
 
Skiti, S.  2019.  NPA’s new directorate consolidating state capture cases.  Available at:  
https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-18-00-npas-new-directorate-consolidating-state-capture-cases. 
(Accessed on 15 February 2019). 
South Africa (Republic).  1994.  Public Protector Act, Act 23 of 1994.   Pretoria:  Government 
Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).    1995. Auditor- General Act.  Act 12 of 1995.  Pretoria:  Government 
Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 1995. The Labour Relations Act, Act 66 of 1995.  Pretoria:  Government 
Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria: 
Government Printers.  
 
South Africa (Republic).  1996.  The Local Government Transition Second Amendment Act, Act 
97 of 1996.  Pretoria:  Government Printers.  
 
South Africa (Republic).  1996.   Special Investigation Unit and Special Tribunals Act, Act 74 of 
1996.  Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  1997.  The White Paper on Transformation of Service Delivery (Batho 
Pele).  Pretoria: Government Printer   
 
South Africa (Republic). 1997.  Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, Act 57 of 1997. Pretoria: 
Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  1997.   Organised Local Government Act, Act 52 of 1997.   Pretoria:  
Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 1998. Demarcation Act, Act 27 of 1998. Pretoria: Government Printers. 




South Africa (Republic).  1998.  Employment Equity Act, Act 55 of 1998.  Pretoria: Government 
Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  1998. Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, Act 117 of 1998.  
Pretoria:  Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 1998. White Paper on Local Government. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 1999. Pubic Finance Management Act (PFMA). Act 1 of 1999. Pretoria: 
Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2000.  Department of Provincial and Local Government. IDP Guide Pack: 
A General Overview.   Pretoria: Government Printers.   
 
South Africa (Republic). 2000.  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000. 
Pretoria: Government Printers.   
 
South Africa (Republic). 2000.  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, Regulations on the 
Appointment and Condition of Service of Senior Managers.  Pretoria: Government Printers.      
 
South Africa (Republic). 2000.  Procurement Policy Framework Act, Act 5 of 2000. Pretoria: 
Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2000.  Local Government Municipal Electorate Act, Act 27 of 2000.  
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2000.  Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act, Act 12 of 2000.  
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
456 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2001.   Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, Act 5 of 2000.  
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2001.  Performance Management Guide for Municipalities.  Pretoria: 
Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2002.  Disaster Management Act.  Act 57 of 2002. Pretoria: Government 
Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2002.  Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, Act 41 
of 2002.  Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2003. Local Government: Municipal Financial Management Act (MFMA, 
2003). Act 56 of 2003.  Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2003. National Treasury. Modernising financial governance 
implementing the Municipal Finance Management Act 2003:   Updated Edition – August 2004 
Municipal Finance Management Act, Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2003. National Treasury. Municipality / Municipal Entity Code of 
Conduct for Supply Chain Management Practitioners and other Role Players in accordance with 
Regulation 46(4) and 46(5) of the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003: 
Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations General Principles. Pretoria: Government 
Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2003. National Treasury.  MFMA 2003 Circular 80, Municipal Finance 
Management Act, Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria:  Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2003.  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, Act of 2003.  
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
457 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2004. Public Audit Act. Act 25 of 2004. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2004.  Promoting Good Governance and Accountability: Local 
Government Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2004. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
South Africa Republic). 2004. National Treasury. SCM Guide for Accounting Officers/authorities.  
Pretoria:  Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2005.  Intergovernmental Relations Framework 2005, Act 13 of 2005.  
Pretoria:  Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2005.  National Treasury. Annual Report: Guidelines, January 2005. 
MFMA 2003 Circular 11, Municipal Finance Management Act.  Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria:  
Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2005. National Treasury. MFMA 2003. Version 1: Frequently Asked 
Questions.  Pretoria:  Government Printer.  
 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2005. National Treasury. MFMA. Municipal SCM Regulations. Pretoria: 
Government Printer. 
  
South Africa (Republic). 2005. National Treasury. SCM Guide for Accounting Officers of 
Municipalities and Municipal Entities. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2006.  National Treasury. MFMA, Circular 32 of 15 March 2006.   
Municipal Finance Management Act.  Act 56 of 2003.  March 2006.  Pretoria:  Government Printer.   
 
South Africa (Republic). 2007. Local Government: Municipal Regulations on Minimum 
Competency Levels June 15.  Pretoria: Government Printers. 




South Africa (Republic).  2007.  Local Government: Municipal Fiscal Powers and functions Act, 
Act 12 of 2007.  Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2008. Department of Provincial and Local Government. National 
Framework: Guidelines for provinces and municipalities in the implementation of the ward 
funding model. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2008. Division of Revenue Act (DORA), Act 2 of 2008. Pretoria: 
Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2008. Local Government: Laws Amendment Act, Act 19 of 2008.  
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2009.  Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG).   
State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report:   Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2009.  Parliament.  Oversight and accountability model: Asserting 
Parliaments oversight role in enhancing democracy. Cape Town: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2009. Department of Communication and Information Services. South 
Africa Yearbook 2009. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
South Africa. (Republic).  2010.  Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG).  
Delivery Agreement Outcome 9.  A responsible accountable effective and efficient local 
government.  Pretoria:  Government Printer.    
 
South Africa (Republic). 2011. National Treasury. Intergovernmental relations and the local 
government fiscal framework: Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review. Pretoria. 
Government Printer. 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
459 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2011.  National Treasury.  State of Local Government Finances and 
Financial Management Report.  Pretoria:  Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2011. National Treasury. Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2011. 
Pretoria: Government Printer.  
 
South Africa (Republic).  2012.  National Planning Commission.  The Presidency. The National 
Development Plan:  Vision for 2030.  Pretoria: Government Printers.  
 
South Africa (Republic).  2012.  National Planning Commission.  The Presidency. National 
Development Plan. 2030.   Executive Summary. Building a Capable and Developmental State. 
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2012.  National Treasury.  Municipal Public Accounts Committees 
(MPAC) Guide and Toolkit.  Available at:  https://www.Salga.org.za./event/document/municipal-
public-accounts-committees-guide-toolkit.  (Accessed on 31 March 2018). 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2012. Statistics South Africa: Census 2011.  Pretoria: Government 
Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2013. Auditor-General. Consolidated report on the audit outcomes of 
the Free State municipalities.    Available at: www.agsa.gov.za.  (Accessed on 15 June 2013). 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2013. Department of Co-operative Governance. Research Weekly e‐
Alert: oversight in the local government sphere. Pretoria:  Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2014. Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs. 
The Back to Basics Concept and Outcomes of the Back to Basics Local Government Summit. 
Pretoria: Government Printers.  
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
460 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2015.  The Presidency. Twenty Year Review South Africa 1994 – 2014. 
Background Paper: Local Government. Pretoria. Government Printers. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2015.  National Treasury. Municipal Regulations on Financial 
Misconduct Procedures and Criminal Proceedings, October 2015. MFMA 2003 Circular 76, 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria:  Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic).  2016.  National Treasury. Municipal Financial Systems and Processes 
requirements in support of the Municipal Standard Chart of Accounts (MSCOA), March 2016.  
South Africa (Republic).  2016.  National Treasury. Municipal Budget Circular for the 2017/18 
MTREF March 2016. MFMA 2003 Circular 85, December 2016. Municipal Finance Management 
Act, Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria:  Government Printer. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2017. National Treasury. Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2017. 
Pretoria: Government Printer.  
 
South Africa (Republic). 2018. Local Government: Amendments to Municipal Regulations on 
Minimum Competency Levels 2007 (Proclamation No. 1146). Government Gazette, 41996, 
October 26. 
 
South Africa (Republic). 2018. Public Audit Amendment Act, Act 5 of 2018. Pretoria: Government 
Printer. 
 
South African Legislative Sector. 2012. Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector. 
Cape Town:  South African Legislative Sector. 
 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA). 2005.  Guideline Document on the role 
and responsibilities of Councillors, Political Structures and Officials. Available at: 
www.salga.org.za/pages/Municipalities/Guidelines-for-Municipalities  (Accessed: 03 March 
2016). 
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
461 
 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA).  2005.  The Ward Committee Resource 
Book.  Pretoria: SALGA. 
 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA). 2011. Guideline Document on the Roles 
and Responsibilities of Councillors, Political Structures and Officials March 2011. Pretoria: 
SALGA. 
 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA). 2012.  Learning Framework for Local 
Government. Social Accountability: Compiled 19 April 2010 Consultations completed May 2012. 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA). 2012. SALGA Strategic Plan 2012-
2017. Pretoria: SALGA. 
 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA). 2011.  Handbook for Municipal 
councillors. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA). 2013. National Human Resources 
Management and Development Strategy (HMR&D) - Blueprint for Local Government. Pretoria: 
SALGA. 
 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA).  2015.  SALGA National Members 
Assembly, Discussion Documents.  Gallagher Convention Centre, Johannesburg, 24-26 March 
2015.  
 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA). 2018.  Accountability and Consequence 
Management in Local Government.  SALGA/CIGFARO, Free State May 2019.  Available at: 
www.salga.org.za/salga/accountability-consequence-management-local-government.  (Accessed 
on 10 June 2019). 
 
Subban, M. and Wissink, H.  2015.  Key Factors in Assessing the State of Local Government in 
South Africa.  Crisis Management or Facing the Realities of Transformation?  Administratio 
Publica, 23(2), 33-56. 




Swilling, M., Bhorat, H., Buthelezi, M., Chipkin, I., Duma, S., Mondi, L., Peter, C., Qobo, M., and 
Friedenstein, H.  2017. Betrayal of the promise: How the Nation is Being Stolen. Cape Town. The 
State Capacity Research Project (SCRP).   
 
Taaibosch, T.A. 2015.  Training and competency challenges of municipal councillors in the 
Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality in the Free State Province.  Unpublished master dissertation.  
Bloemfontein:  Central University of Technology.  
 
Terreblanche, M., Durrheim, K. and Painter, D. 2006. Research in Practice. Cape Town: UCT 
Press. 
 
Theron, F. and Machunu, N.  2016.  Development, Change and the Change Agent Facilitation at 
grassroots. 2nd edition.  Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers.   
 
Thornhill, C.  2009.  Local government’s contribution to a sustainable developmental state:  
Opportunities and challenges.  Administratio Publica, 17(3), 25-44. 
 
Thornhill, C. and Cloete, J.J.N.  2014.   South African Municipal Government and Administration.  
Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Thornhill, C., Van Dijk, H.G. and Ile, I. 2014.  Public Administration and Management in South 
Africa:  A Developmental Perspective.  Cape Town:  Oxford University Press.  
 
Thornhill, C.  2015.  Accountability. A Constitutional Imperative.  Administratio Publica, 
23(1),77-101. 
 
Thornhill, C.  2016.  Public Protector.  Fearless defender of ethical conduct - A seven-year 
campaign.   African Journal of Public Affairs, 9(3), 129-151.   
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
463 
 
Tötemeyer, T. 1997. Decentralisation and state-building at the local level. State, Society and 
Democracy, 108-149. 
 
Toxopeüs, M.  2019.  Municipalities (II):  Assessing mechanisms of municipal oversight.  18 July 
2019.  Available at:  https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/municipalities-ii-assessing-
mechanisms-of-municipalities.  (Accessed on 15 August 2019).  
 
Tsatsire, I. 2008. A critical analysis of challenges facing developmental local government:  A case 
study of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality.  Unpublished doctoral thesis.  Port 
Elizabeth: NMMU. 
Tshabalala, E.K. 2006. The role of community participation in the Intergrated Development Plan 
of Govan Mbeki Municipality. Dissertation (Masters). Pretoria: University of Pretoria.  
 
Tutu, M. 2006. The Role of Ward Committees in Enhancing Public Participation in Rustenburg 
Municipality: A Critical Evaluation. Cape Town: Idasa. 
 
UNDESA. 2003. Katsiaouni: Workshop on Poverty Alleviation and Decentralisation for 
ten West African countries. Organised jointly by UNDESA and the Government of 
Senegal, Dakar: July 2003. Dakar: UNDESA. 
 
Van der Nest, D.O., Thornhill, C. and De Jager, J.  2008.  Audit Committees and 
Accountability in the South African Public Sector.  Journal of Public Administration, 
43(4), 545-558.  
 
Van der Waldt, G. and Du Toit, D.F.P. 1997. Managing for Excellence in the Public Sector. 
Kenwyn: Juta and Company. 
 
Van der Waldt, C. 2011. The statutory and regulatory framework for local government. In Van 
der Waldt, G. (ed.). Municipal Management: Serving the People. Cape Town: Juta and Company.,
  
© Central University of Technology, Free State
464 
 
Van der Walt, C., Venter, A., Phutiagae, K., Nealer, E., Khalo, T. and Vyas-Doorgapersad, S. 
2018. Municipal Management Serving the People. In Van der Waldt, G. (ed.). 3rd Edition. 
Claremont:  Juta. 
 
Van der Walt, D. 2015. Public procurement: A bastion against corruption. In Thornhill, 
C., Van Dijk, G. and Ile, I. (eds.). Public Administration & Management in South 
Africa: A Developmental Perspective. Cape Town: Oxford University Press 
. 
Van der Waldt, G. 2015. Political oversight of municipal projects.  An empirical investigation. 
Administratio Publica, 23(3), 48-69. 
 
Van der Waldt, G.  2017.  Local Government. In Landberg, C. and Graham, S.  (eds.). 2017.  
Government and Politics in South Africa.  Coming of age.  Pretoria:  Van Schaik Publishers.   
 
Van der Walt, S. 2018.  “Alle oë op ondersoek na kaping van staat.  Volksblad, 20 Augustus 2018.”  
 
Van Donk, M., Swilling, M., Pieterse, E., and Parnell, S. (eds.). 2008. Consolidating 
developmental local government: lessons from the South Africa experiment. Cape Town: UCT. 
 
Van Niekerk, T. 2012. The local government turnaround strategy: challenges, constraints and 
benefits. Administratio Publica, 20(2), 61-62. 
 
Van Niekerk, T. and Dalton-Brits, E. 2016. Mechanisms to strengthen accountability and oversight 
within municipalities, with specific reference to the Municipal Public Accounts Committee and 
Audit Committee of Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality. African Journal of Public Affairs, 9(3), 
117-128. 
 
Van Niekerk, T.  2018.  The Praxis of Ethics, integrity and accountability in the South African 
Public Service:  Failure vs efficacy.  Presentation made at the annual IASIA/LAPAGA 
Conference, Lima, Peru, 26-28 July 2018.   
 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
465 
 
Van Rensburg, G. 2007. The Leadership Challenge in Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Van Rooyen E.J. and Raga, K.  2016.  A Practical Introduction to Public Management. In Draai, 
E. (ed.). Cape Town:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Venter, A. 2011. Administering national government.  In Venter and Landsberg, (eds). 
Government and Politics in South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.  
 
Venter, A. 2011.  Local government and its external environment. In Van der Waldt, (eds.). 
Municipal Management: Serving the People. Cape Town: Juta and Company.   
 
Visser, C.B. and Erasmus, P.W. 2002. The Management of Public Finance: A Practical Guide. 
Cape Town: Oxford University Press SA. 
 
Webb, W. and Auriacombe C.J. 2006. Research design in public administration: critical 
considerations. Journal of Public Administration, 41(3.1), 588-602 
 
Welman, C., Kruger, F. and Mitchell, B. 2005. Research methodology. 3rd Edition. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.   
 
Western Cape Government. 2012.  Improving financial oversight with a practical approach to 
MPACs/oversight institutions. Cape Town:  Western Cape Government.  
 
William, E.N. 2012. Improving political oversight in municipalities. Examining the law and 
practice surrounding oversight by the council over municipal executive and municipal 
administration. Available online: http://www.etd.uwc.ac.za/usrfiles. Date accessed: 06 August 
2013. 
 
Woolman, S.  2018.    A Politics of Accountability:  How South Africa’s Judicial recognition of 
the Binding Legal effect of the Public Protector’s Recommendations Has a Catalysing effect that 
Brought down a President.  Constitutional Court Review, 19, 155-192. 




World Bank. 2011. Accountability in public services in South Africa – selected issues. Washington. 
Communication Development Incorporated.  
 
Xuedong, Y. 2010. Constructing an accountable government in China. Cadernos Gestão Pública 
e Cidadania, 15(57), 197-214. 
 
Yilmaz, S., Beris, Y. and Serrano-Berthet, R.  2008. Local governance and accountability series 
paper no. 113 / July 2008: Local government discretion and accountability; a diagnostic 
framework for local governance. Washington: World Bank. 
 
Zainal, Z.  2007.  Case study as a research method.  Journal Kemanusiaan (9), 1-6. 
 
Zama, S.B. 2012. Citizen Report Card Surveys: A tool for effective social accountability. Policy 
Brief. Pretoria. Human Sciences Research Council. 
 
Zybrands, W. 2011. Local government. In Venter, A. and Landsberg, C. (eds.). Government and 











© Central University of Technology, Free State
467 
 
ANNEXURE A:  PERMISSION LETTER 
Boshoff Street 
Dealesville, 9348 
tsebakamotse@yahoo.com / 0824655151 
November 20, 2017 
The MM 
Re: Permission to Conduct Research Study 
Dear Sir/Madam 
This letter serves as a request to ask for permission to conduct a research study at your local 
municipality. I am currently enrolled for Doctor of Public Management degree in the Department 
of Public Management, Faculty of Management Sciences at the Central University of Technology 
in the Free State and I am in the process of finishing my doctoral thesis. The topic of this study is 
“The development of oversight and accountability framework for municipalities in the Free State 
Province”. 
I hope that your office will allow me to conduct a simple research survey with two of your Ward 
Committee members. 
The survey process should take not longer than thirty minutes to complete.  The survey results will 
be pooled for the thesis project only and individual results of this study will remain absolutely 
confidential and anonymous. Should this study be published, only pooled results will be 
documented. No costs will be incurred by either your municipality or the individual participants. 
Your approval for me to conduct this study will be greatly appreciated.  
Sincerely, 
Teboho Sebakamotse (student) 
Research supervisor: Prof. T, Van Niekerk: Department of Public Management, Faculty of 
Management Sciences at the Central University of Technology 
© Central University of Technology, Free State
468 
 
ANNEXURE B:  SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Municipal Management Semi-structured Questionnaire 
 




Respondent number        
 
Purpose 
I, Mr Jermia Khahliso Teboho Sebakamotse, a Doctor of Public Management student at the Central 
University of Technology (CUT), am conducting an academic this study in fulfilment of my 
doctoral degree.  
 
The purpose of this research semi-structured questionnaire is to determine the current practices of 
oversight and accountability within municipalities in the Free State Province. 
 
Your contribution to this semi-structured questionnaire will remain private and all information 
will be considered confidential and that no personal information will be published. Your identity 
will also remain anonymous and no information that can identify you will be on the questionnaire. 
 
Instructions 
• Your responses should be as accurate as possible to the situation in your municipality. 
• Please use X mark where applicable and please use a black ink pen. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
 
1. SECTION A:  BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
 
1.1 Population Group  


























1.6 Highest level of education completed (indicate only one of the following) 
 





1.6.2 Higher Education 












1.7 State Municipal council are you currently employed by. 
 
  
Coloured 4 White 1 African 2 Asian 3  
1 Male 2 Female  
1 Male 2 Female  
Sesotho 4 Setswana 1 Afrikaans
  




6 IsiZulu 7 
40 - 49 4 50 - 59 1 18 - 29
  
2 30 - 39 3 
 












1 Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality 










 2 Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality 
Fezile Dabi District Municipality 
 
Letsemeng Local Municipality 
Kopanong Local Municipality 
Mohokare Local Municipality 
Naledi Local Municipality 
Masilonyana Local Municipality 
Tokologo Local Municipality 
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2. 2. POLITICAL OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 1=Strongly Agree 2=Agree 3=Don’t 
Know 4=Disagree 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
2.1 Local government legislative acts and policies 
are understood by all political officials. 
 
2.2 Local government legislations, rules and 
policies are always implemented by all political 
officials. 
 
2.3 Municipal councillors interfere in the normal 
administrative functions of the municipality. 
 
2.4 Municipal elections are a good tool to ensure 
accountability and transparency for political 
office-bearers. 
 
2.5 Municipal council meetings are always well 
attended by Councillors. 
 
2.6 Academic qualifications are important for 
municipal councillors. 
 
2.7 Reports of corruption at local government 
sphere are grossly exaggerated. 
 
2.8 State capture reports at local government sphere 




2.9 Municipal councillors clearly do not understand 
the role of Portfolio Committees, Audit 
Committees and Municipal Performance Audit 
Committee. 
 
2.10 There is no consequence management for 
breaking the Code of Conduct for Municipal 
councillors. 
 
2.11 There are no reported cases of corruption at 
your municipality in the past year? 
 




3. SECTION C: MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
3.1 Municipal political and administrative officials 
have a proper understanding of the Municipal 
Finance Management Act, 2003. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3.2 The FS Provincial Treasury is assisting local 
municipality councils with compliance with the 
MFMA of 2003. 
 
 
3.3 Municipal Mayors understand their respective 
oversight roles in municipal financial 
management and administration. 
 
 
3.4 The executive mayor or committee oversees the 
performance of its officials by taking budgetary 
monthly reports seriously. 
 
 
3.5 The non-executive Councillors always hold the 
executive mayor or committee accountable by 




3.6 The municipal executive mayor or committee 




3.7 The municipal budget is always aligned to the 
IDP of the municipality. 
 
 
3.8 Municipal council does not do proper oversight 




3.9 MM as Accounting Officer is responsible for all 
funds managed by the municipality. 
 
 
3.10 Mayor or Councillor can authorise the spending 
of municipal funds. 
 
3.11 The report of the Auditor-General is accessible 
to all stakeholders in the municipality 
 
  
3.12 The municipality holds public meetings on the 
Auditor-General’s report on the municipality 
every financial year-end. 





1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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4. SECTION D:  MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Municipal Administrative Oversight and Accountability  
 
4.1 The MM is responsible and accountable to the executive mayor for the management and 


















4.5 Municipal Performance Management System for the MM and other Section 56 managers is 






Any additional comments:  ………………………………………………………... 
 
 
SECTION E:  Social Oversight and Accountability  
 






4.7 Local communities and their organisations fully participate in activities organised by Ward 
Committees and Ward councillor.  
 
 
1 Very true 2 True 
 
3 Not true 4 Not sure 
1 Very true 2 True 3 Not true 4 Not sure 




3 Not true 
 
4 Not sure 
 
1 Very true 2 True 3 Not true 4 Not sure 
 
1 Very true 2 True 3 Not true 4 Not sure 
 
1 Very true 2 True 3 Not true 4 Not sure 
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4.9 Municipal councillors regularly report back at least quarterly to their constituencies on the 





4.10 Your municipality is characterised by patronage politics, weak leadership and capacity, 


































3 Not true 
 
4 Not sure 
 
 




1 Very true 2 True 3 Not true 4 Not sure 
3 No true 4 Not sure 
1 The survey is relevant  
 
 
2 The questionnaire addresses current issues 
 3 The questionnaire is too long 
4 The survey is a waste of time 
5 The survey is outdated 
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ANNEXURE C:  SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE WITH WARD 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS  
 




Respondent number        
 
Purpose 
I, Mr Jermia Khahliso Teboho Sebakamotse, a Doctor of Public Management student at the Central 
University of Technology, am conducting an academic this studying fulfilment of my doctoral 
degree.  
 
The purpose of this semi-structured interview schedule is to determine the current practices of 
participation, administrative accountability (quality of service delivery and the performance of 
service delivery) within municipalities of the Free State Province. 
 
Your contribution to this semi-structured interview schedule will remain private and all 
information will be considered confidential and that no personal information will be published. 




• Your responses should be as accurate as possible to the situation in your municipality. 
• Please use X mark where applicable and please use a black ink pen. 
 








1. SECTION 1 -  BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
 
























1.6 Highest level of education completed (indicate only one of the following) 
 





1.6.2 Higher Education  













4 White 1 African 2 Asian 3  
1 Male 2 Female  
1 Male 2 Female  
Sesotho 4 Setswana 1 Afrikaans
  








40 - 49 4 50 - 59 1 18 - 29
  
2 30 - 39 3 
 


















1.6.4 Which one is your Local Municipal Council?  
Tokologo Local Municipal Council  
Tswelopele Local Municipal council  
 





1.7 How long have you been in this/these portfolio/s? 
Less than 1 year  
Between 2 - 3  
Between 4 - 5  
Between 6 - 7  
Between 8 - 9  
Over 10 years  
 
SECTION 2 - THEME 1 :  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
1.8 How is your local community informed about Municipal council meetings? More than one 
answer is permitted for this question. 
a) Municipal accounts  
b) Public notice boards  
c) Municipal newsletters  
d) Local newspapers  
e) Ward committee meetings  
f) Radio announcements  
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g) Members of the public are not 
informed 
 
h) Loud hailing  
i) Word of mouth  
j) Other, please specify  
k) Don’t know  
 
2 How often do you attend Municipal council meetings? 
a) Every meeting  
b) Occasionally  
c) Attended once  
d) Never attended  
 
3 In your municipal council what forums exist for community participation? More than 
one answer is permitted for this question. 
a) Ward committees  
b) CWP forums  
c) Steering committees  
d) No forums exist  
e) Don’t know  
 
4 If there are forums, how often did you attend any of these forums for community 
participation in the past year? 
a) Never   
b) Once   
c) Twice   
d) Thrice   
e) All  
 
5 In your opinion how effective are the following forums for community participation in your 
Local Municipal council? 
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Status  IDP forum  Ward committee 
a. Non-existent   
b. Very ineffective   
c. Ineffective   
d. Effective   
 
6 Do you, through your Ward Committee, give recommendations to the municipal council 
regarding your development priorities? 
a) Don’t know   
b) Never   
c) Rarely   
d) Regularly  
 
7 Do you, through IDP meetings, give recommendations to municipal council regarding your 
development priorities? 
a) Don’t know   
b) Never   
c) Rarely   
d) Regularly  
 
8 Are Ward Committees representative in terms of the following criteria? More than one 
answer is permitted for this question. 
a) Gender  
b) Disability  
c) Variety of stakeholders (i.e farmers, 
faith-based organisations, CBOs, 
political parties) 
 
d) ace  
e) Geographical location  
f) Age  
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9 Is there someone within the municipal council who is responsible for co-ordinating 
community participation? 
a) Yes  
b) No  
c) Do not know  
 
10. If yes, who is the person? 
Position of person Do not know 
  
 
11. How many consultative meetings were held to discuss the most recent municipal budget? 
a) 1  
b) 2  
c) 3  
d) 4  
e) None  
f) Do not know  
 
12. Has there been any conflict within your Municipal council in the past year? 
a) Yes  
b) No  
c) Do not know  
 
13. If yes, what was the conflict about? 
a) Water supply  
b) Electricity supply  
c) Bad roads  
d) Corruption  
e) Poor performance of councillor  
f) Poor performance of official  
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g) Unemployment  
h) Crime/drugs/gangsters  
i) Other (specify)  
 
SECTION 3 - ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY THEME 2:   QUALITY OF 
SERVICE DELIVERY  
 
14. Please indicate your present impression of the quality of service delivery of your 
municipal council on a scale of 1-5 (1 for least satisfactory and 5 for most satisfactory) 
Local Municipal council service 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Employees of the municipality have the knowledge 
to answer the questions of the local community. 
     
b) The Municipal council has employees who give 
members of the local community personal 
attention. 
     
c) When the Municipal council promises to do 
something by a certain time it does so. 
     
d) The Municipal council does repairs the first time 
and quickly when reported. 
     
e) The Municipal council has adequate resources 
(vehicles, personnel, etc) to perform its functions. 
     
f) Employees of the Municipal council are always 
willing to help members of the local community. 
     
g) Employees of the Municipal council are always 
punctual and willing to work extra hours to help 
members of the local community. 
     
h) The Municipal council environment is clean and 
refuse is collected regularly. 
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SECTION 4 - ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY THEME 3:   SERVICE 
DELIVERY PERFORMANCE 
 
15. How would you rank the current service delivery performance of your Local Municipal 
council (Use a scale of 1-5 where 5 denotes excellent and 1 denotes very poor). 
Local Municipal council 
service 
1 2 3 5 6 
Very poor Poor Fair Good Excellent 
a) Overall cleanliness of 
town/street (refuse 
removal) 
     
b) Quality of roads and 
streets 
     
c) Provision of houses      
d) Overall provision and 
control of water 
     
e) Quality of water      
f) Assistance to small-
scale communal 
farmers 
     
 
g) Provision of electricity 
     
h) Recreational facilities 
(parks, playing 
grounds, etc) 
     
i) Provision of sanitation      
j) Public facilities 
(toilets, taxi/bus ranks) 
     
k) Provision of primary 
health services 
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l) Wi-Fi and internet 
connectivity 
     
m) Assistance to informal 
traders and small 
businesses; e.g. trading 
space, etc 
     
n) Provision of fire 
services 
     
o) Provision of site-and-
service residential sites 
for middle income 
groups 
     
 
16. In your opinion, do you think your Municipal council is transparent in conducting its 
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